80 years of the Battle of Prokhorovka

Abandoned near Prokhorovka disabled German Tanks Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" from the 10th "panter brigade" (tank regiment von Lauchert)

Western myths

According to Western, in particular German, researchers, there was no victory for the Soviet troops in the Prokhorov battle. Moreover, the Red Army allegedly suffered a crushing defeat. So, it is even reported that only on the evening of July 12, 1943, the Russians lost about 235 vehicles, and the Wehrmacht only 5 (!). That is, the German tankers simply shot the enemy like targets in a shooting range. But the Russians did not answer, or they beat past all the time.

Among the fundamental works, the 10-volume official publication "The German Reich and the Second World War" should be mentioned. Professional historians of the Military History Institute of the Armed Forces of Germany took part in its writing. The events on the Soviet-German front from the summer of 1943 to the end of 1944 are devoted to the 8th volume of this work, edited by the famous German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser. Thus, Frizer argues that the hallmark of the Red Army's warfare was massive avalanche attacks without taking into account losses. The Russians attacked as "mad" and in a state of intoxication.

Aerial photographs are given with crowds of wrecked Soviet equipment made by Luftwaffe aircraft. British historian Ben Wheatley found these photographs from the Russian front in the US archives. Although these shots are quite easy to explain. A significant part of the tanks that are damaged in battle can be restored by repairmen in the near rear or at repair plants. The Germans took their equipment to the rear. After August 1, so many faulty equipment accumulated at the German repair enterprises in Belgorod, Kharkov and Bogodukhov that even for minor repairs, tanks and self-propelled guns had to be sent to Kyiv. In the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army took over, and many wrecked German tanks were later captured at enemy stations and repair bases.

The main goal of such myths in the West is to rewrite the world stories in general and the history of World War II in particular. They agreed there already to the point that Hitler, it turns out, delivered a preemptive strike against the Bolshevik hordes, who were preparing to invade Europe. That supposedly there were no great victories of the Red Army, that the Germans were “filled up with corpses”, that there was no liberation of Europe, but there was a “Soviet (Russian) occupation”. That Europe was allegedly liberated by the British and Americans. That we were ruled by the "bloody tyrant" Stalin, who killed tens - hundreds of millions of people, etc. That the Russians supposedly had no victories: no Battle on the Ice, no Stalingrad, no Prokhorovka.

When young people believe in this, the West will be able to turn Russians into "ethnographic material" from which anything can be molded. Like the current Russian-Ukrainians (Little Russians), who were made "Russian Janissaries" and left to kill their own brothers.

Soviet T-34 tanks are on the march 30 km from Belgorod, heading for the Prokhorovka station

Prokhorovka

The Battle of Prokhorovka was part of the Battle of Kursk, which began on July 5 and lasted until August 23, 1943. The battle took place on the southern face of the Kursk ledge, in the strip of the Voronezh front under the command of General Vatutin. Here, on July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht launched an offensive in two directions - on Oboyan and Korocha. The German command, building on the first success, stepped up efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan line. By the end of July 2, the 9nd SS Panzer Corps broke through to the third defense line of the 6th Guards Army and wedged into it about 9 km southwest of Prokhorovka. But the German tanks could not break out into the operational space.

On July 10, 1943, the Fuhrer ordered the command of Army Group South to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the failure of the breakthrough in the Oboyan direction, Commander Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and attack Kursk in a roundabout way, through Prokhorovka, where success was noted. At the same time, an auxiliary strike force was attacking Prokhorovka from the south. Prokhorovka was attacked by the elite divisions "Reich", "Dead Head" and "Adolf Hitler" from the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and part of the 3rd Panzer Corps.

Having discovered the movement of the enemy, the command of the Voronezh Front sent units of the 69th Army to this direction, then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. At the same time, the Soviet Headquarters strengthens Vatutin at the expense of strategic reserves. On July 9, the commander of the Steppe Front, Konev, was ordered to advance the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction. The 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were also transferred to Vatutin. The troops of the Voronezh Front were to stop the offensive, launch a powerful counterattack on the enemy in the Oboyan direction.

On July 11, it was not possible to launch a preemptive counterattack. On this day, the Nazis reached the line where Russian mobile formations were to deploy. At the same time, the introduction of four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army into battle made it possible to stop the Germans 2 km from Prokhorovka. That is, the first battles near Prokhorovka began on July 11, 1943.

On July 12, a large-scale oncoming battle began, and Soviet troops and the enemy attacked in the Prokhorovka direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Prokhorovka railway. At the same time, all plans were destroyed: the Red Army was unable to deliver the foreseen powerful aviation and artillery strike. A fierce battle unfolded. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka.

To the north-west of Prokhorovka, units of the Soviet 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies attacked Yakovlevo. From the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army with two attached tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army attacked in the same direction. In the Belgorod direction, the 7th Guards Army went on the offensive.

On the morning of July 12, after a short artillery attack, the 18th and 29th tank corps of Rotmistrov's army, with the 2nd tank and 2nd guards tank corps attached to it, launched an attack on Yakovlevo.

Earlier on the river Psel in the defense zone of the 5th Guards Army, the German tank division "Dead Head" launched an offensive. At the same time, the tank divisions "Reich" and "Adolf Hitler", directly opposing Rotmistrov's army, remained on the occupied lines and prepared for defense. As a result, a head-on collision of two tank strike groups took place on a rather short interval of the front. An extremely fierce battle lasted all day.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Battalion of the 2nd Panzer Regiment, Sturmbannführer Joachim Peiper, who took up position behind the anti-tank ditch at a height of 252,2, described the battle as follows:

“We hardly slept when the Russians, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us and between us. We fought against each other."

As a result, none of the parties was able to complete the tasks.

The Nazis did not break through to Kursk, and the Soviet troops did not reach Yakovlev. However, the advance of the enemy's main strike force against Kursk was halted.

The German 3rd Panzer Corps advancing on Prokhorovka from the south was able to push back the troops of the 69th Army that day, advancing 10-15 km. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The German command did not immediately abandon the idea of ​​a breakthrough to Kursk, bypassing Oboyan from the east. And the troops of the Voronezh Front tried to fulfill their task. Therefore, the battle of Prokhorov lasted until July 16.

The successes of both sides were partial, the battles were fought on the same lines that the troops occupied. Both armies exchanged attacks and counterattacks, fought day and night.

On July 16, the troops of the Voronezh Front were ordered to go on the defensive. On July 17, the German command began the withdrawal of troops to their original positions. The troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive and on July 23 went to the positions that they occupied before the start of the enemy offensive.

On August 3, the offensive of the Red Army began on Belgorod and Kharkov.

Reasons for high losses

The Soviet command made a mistake when they launched an offensive in the forehead, and not in the flank of the enemy strike force. The front command had the ability to strike at the base of the German tank wedge, which made it possible to defeat the enemy or even surround him. The Wehrmacht lost the Battle of Kursk, but fought very skillfully, the relative superiority of the German command and control skills and tactics affected.

In addition, in a number of sectors the Germans managed to prepare for the defense, which proved to be effective and was broken through a little later. It is also worth noting that the Soviet tanks were somewhat inferior to the German ones in the efficiency of firing at long distances and (especially) in the quality of optics. On a flat landscape, this gave the Germans certain advantages.

In general, entire volumes have been written about comparing the materiel of the tanks participating in the Battle of Kursk, and it is impossible to approach this issue unambiguously and in general. A variety of equipment participated on both sides, and it is simply impossible to give the palm. Yes, our T-34 was inferior to the Tiger, which was normal, the medium tank is inferior to the heavy one in everything except speed. But the same T-III with its 75-mm "Okurok" (short-barreled gun) had no chance against the Soviet tank either at medium or at long range.

In general, the parties used all the equipment that was at their disposal "to the fullest." Hence the big losses.

In the Battle of Prokhorovka, our troops, according to the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, lost 60% of their vehicles (500 out of 800), the Germans - 75% (300 out of 400). Naturally, the Germans underestimated their losses, reporting 80-100 lost tanks.

Modern Russian historian Valery Zamulin, an expert on the Battle of Kursk, reports that on July 12, Rotmistrov's army lost more than half of its equipment - 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns burned down or were shot down (some could be restored). In the period from 12 to 16 July 1943, the losses of the 5th Panzer Army amounted to: 2 people killed, 440 wounded, 3 missing, 510 T-1 medium tanks and 157 T-225 light tanks, 34 ACS.

However, it is worth noting the well-established logistics of the Soviet army, which formed a stock of combat vehicles at railway junctions and equipped them with crews of failed tanks and self-propelled guns.

There are no exact data on German losses, and there are no documents on the losses of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12 either. It is clear that the tales of the loss of five tanks are nonsense.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front, and Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov (center). Voronezh front. July 1943

Tactical draw and strategic victory of the Russian troops

In a fierce battle that began on July 11 and lasted until July 16, our troops repelled a strong blow from the German strike force. The elite German armored divisions were unable to take Prokhorovka, defeat our formations and break through as planned. Seeing that further attacks had no prospects, the Nazis wisely retreated. On the night of July 17, the German divisions began to withdraw back.

Soviet intelligence discovered that the enemy was retreating, and the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, precisely because there was something to attack and by whom. That is, the final victory was ours. The Germans left the battlefield and retreated.

Soon our troops launched a large-scale offensive and liberated Belgorod.

On the other hand, the counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front, including the army of Rotmistrov, did not lead to the fulfillment of the task. Two enemy tank corps could not be destroyed. The enemy was not defeated in the Battle of Prokhorov, although he suffered significant losses.

For us, the Battle of Prokhorov is one of the battles of the great Battle of Kursk, during which a radical turning point in the war ended. The Red Army finally seized the strategic initiative in the Great War.

Therefore, Prokhorovka is one of the symbols of our Great Victory, for which our people paid a high price.

Soviet soldiers inspect the German tank Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther", destroyed during the fighting near Prokhorovka

Comments

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

an indisputable fact, it was we who were in Berlin, and not the Germans in Moscow, although another 30 years and this will be disputed

[ZhEK-Vodogrey]

Our troops enter Berlin on average once every 1 years:
- On October 9 (according to the new style), 1760, the Russians under the command of General Zakhar Grigorievich Chernyshev captured the capital of the Prussian kingdom, Berlin.
- The second time the Russian army occupied Berlin during its foreign campaign in 1813.
- For the third time in 1945.

[PROXOR]

Why weren't the Germans there? Were. 1944

[kor1vet1974]

Tactical draw and strategic victory of the Russian troops

Therefore, Prokhorovka is one of the symbols of our Great Victory, for which our people paid a high price.

So Victory or a draw, the author, you somehow decide something, with terminology, as well as with the words Russian and Soviet. The USSR is still the Union of Soviet, not Russian, Socialist Republics.

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

Quote: kor1vet1974

So win or draw

I think no one will answer, similarly, you can ask the question who won the battle of Borodino?

[kor1vet1974]

After Borodino, there were a number of battles, after which Napoleon's flight from Russia began. And the Battle of Kursk, but the real turning point in the Great Patriotic War, Germany, no longer carried out large-scale offensive operations, even similar to Kursk. I emphasize, offensive, in order to defeat the Soviet troops . And what role did the Battle of Borodino play? Even if we assume that the Russian army won?

[novel66]

At least they knocked out the French cavalry

[kor1vet1974]

They knocked out, but it affected later, a few months later. And immediately after the battle? Napoleon did not retreat, did not go to Smolensk, for example. There was no turning point.

[novel66]

The turning point was that Napoleon was sitting in Moscow, without supplies and reserves, and Kutuzov in the Tarutino camp, replenished and supplied. Maloyaroslavets was a purely military turning point

[Aviator_]

The turning point was that Napoleon was sitting in Moscow, without supplies and reserves, and Kutuzov in the Tarutino camp, replenished and supplied. Maloyaroslavets was a purely military turning point

Borodino was an operational draw, and the Tarutinsky maneuver and Maloyaroslavets were a strategic victory. And there was nothing for our troops in Europe to do, but after the death of Kutuzov, the then European, Emperor Sasha No. 1, the forerunner of the labeled Gorby, wanted European glory.

[PROXOR]

Well, at least the fact that Napoleon then suffers a defeat near Maloyaroslavets. He no longer had the strength to break through the defenses to the south.

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

Quote: kor1vet1974

After Borodino, there were a number of battles, after which Napoleon's flight from Russia began. And the Battle of Kursk, but a real turning point in the Great Patriotic War

so after Kursk there was the Dnieper, the battle for the Kuban

[kor1vet1974]

so after Kursk there was the Dnieper, the battle for the Kuban

And breaking the blockade of Leningrad and much more. Only the Red Army advanced. After Borodino, did the Russian army go on the offensive? Napoleon retreated to Smolensk?

[lubesky]

Quote: kor1vet1974

Army. After Borodino, did the Russian army go on the offensive? Napoleon retreated to Smolensk?

Napoleon dreamed of a general battle, chasing the retreating three armies, and finally the Russians gave him this general battle! However, the main goal of Napoleon in all the decisive battles was - to DESTROY the enemy's army, to deprive him of his army, to shatter all hopes of resistance. After the battle of Borodino, the Russian army not only was NOT defeated and defeated, but also remained combat-ready and replenished, which by the way cannot be said about the French, especially in terms of cavalry, the main striking force of Napoleon's army. Therefore, Napoleon did not achieve the goal of a general battle.

Returning to the topic - it didn’t work out to DESTROY the formations of the Voronezh Front and push the grenadiers into the operational space of the Germans near Prokhorovka!

[Grossvater]

One of the meanings of the word "victory": . Success in the struggle for smth., achievement, successful implementation of smth. as a result of the struggle.
The goal of Napoleon's grandfather in the battle near Moscow was the complete defeat of the Russian army.
Kutuzov's goal was to weaken the French army as much as possible and prevent the defeat of the Russian army.
Well, which of the warring parties has achieved its goal? Who has won?

[kor1vet1974]

Kutuzov achieved his minimum goal. He didn’t allow it, weakened it. But a radical change did not happen. The fracture occurred later, after leaving Moscow, after the Tarutino maneuver.

[BMP-2]

I don't think anyone will answer

Why not? In fact, everything is simple: the victory of the side whose goals are achieved. The aim of the Germans was to break through the defenses. Our goal is to hold positions and prevent a breakthrough.

[V. Salama]

Quote: Vasilenko Vladimir

I don't think anyone will answer...

Have you ever watched boxing - boxers disperse in the corners after several rounds (it's already 1943 in the yard). Amateurs watching the fight can argue as they like, for them the obvious is not obvious. Only one fighter got so much that he was no longer capable of further actions, he had no strength and was unable to recover, while the other had a second wind (and T-34-85 tanks were on the way). In general, the article has all the answers, at least the main ones. And now I’ll tell you one fact about the losses in the war and in the Battle of Kursk in particular, it’s your right to believe me or not: I have one history teacher and a front-line soldier, he is no longer among us, he said that the Germans had stopped keeping records since July 1943 their combat losses, and they never kept records of the combat losses of their "allies".

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: V. Salama

Since July 1943, the Germans have ceased to keep records of their combat losses.

How did the teacher know this? And how did the Germans plan operations in this case?

[V. Salama]

Quote: Sahar Medovich

How did the teacher know this?

I think that then (in Soviet times) many people knew this, when history had not yet been rewritten and documents had not been burned or hidden. Moreover, a front-line soldier, at that time university teachers improved their skills at the Military Academies in Moscow, where almost all specialists in the History of military art were doctors and candidates of science and, they had access to the archives unpolluted, but to me at that time (2003 . somewhere) somehow did not get around to asking what documents you can refer to. The time was such, the main thing is that I myself know, I thought so. Indirectly, the author's article confirms my information:

There are no exact data on German losses, and there are no documents on the losses of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12 either. It is clear that the tales of the loss of five tanks are nonsense.

Quote: Sahar Medovich

And how did the Germans plan operations in this case?

And just like now in Ukraine, they staffed units to full strength from the reserve, created groupings based on current tasks. Here, when it is impatient, we must consider the remaining combat-ready, and not the dead.

[Negro]

Quote: Sahar Medovich

How did the teacher know this?

From a political officer.

Quote: V. Salama

in Soviet times) ... when history had not yet been rewritten and documents had not been burned or hidden.

)))

[V. Salama]

Quote: Negro

From a political officer.

They themselves came up with - themselves offended. You can't hide the mentality. Yes, you hate political officers, like all Bandera people. I wrote from where, because I myself attended such courses four times: twice in the VAKHZ (1980 and 1991), in the VAD (RVSN) in 1989 and in the AGZ (2003).
This is of course a weak argument, but you don’t have anything at all, except for a throw on the fan.

... when history had not yet been rewritten and documents had not been burned or hidden.

By "burned" and "hidden" I will give two examples:
- remember the story of Academician Yu. Pivovarov, the head of INION, or rather the fire in the library of this INION, which was related to the NATO Information Bureau, when a corrupt traitor allowed the office with the CIA to the whole floor, digitized 7 thousand Western documents from 14 million documents stored there, and then there was a very strange fire, as a result of which a significant part of the books and historical documents were destroyed;
- regarding the "hiding" of archival documents (in Gorbachev's safe) in order to falsify them (this was already under Yeltsin) - these are the events in Khatyn, which is already known as "The Lie that Has Become History" in a number of studies with irrefutable evidence.
I don’t even want to talk about the facts of “rewriting” History - it is still being rewritten, but you won’t understand it. How can people understand what it is to cunningly correct history in narrow class interests, who sincerely could believe that their ancestors dug out the Black Sea and did a hell of a lot of funny things - Egyptian pyramids were built there, etc.
Whose Crimea, dear?

[Negro]

Quote: V. Salama

Yes, you hate political officers

There is one.

Quote: V. Salama

because he himself was on such courses four times: twice in the VAKhZ (1980 and 1991), in the VAD (RVSN) in 1989 and in the AGZ (2003).

Well, that means you guessed it.

Quote: V. Salama

case of the Katyn massacre

I love the case of Katyn and the position of the current Russian officialdom on this issue. Perhaps someday there will be an opportunity to develop this idea.

Quote: V. Salama

Khatyn, I'll ask you, Bandera.

Why haven't you asked until now? It seems like now they even take pensioners. Can you tell me the address of the nearest recruiting office?

Quote: V. Salama

Whose Crimea, dear?

Now (July 16, 2023) Crimea is under the military control of the Russian Federation.

[V. Salama]

Quote: Negro

Well, that means you guessed it.

I don’t understand what you mean, I have nothing to do with political workers. Everything else seems to be explained clearly. Or is it like with the concept of "superiority" - it makes no sense to explain.

Quote: Negro

There is one.

This is what I figured out.

Quote: Negro

Why haven't you asked until now? It seems like now they even take pensioners.

I also wrote a report to Afghanistan - they didn’t take it. Now, take my word for it, they definitely won’t take it, except hypothetically - to run away to the front. Remember the words from the famous song: "You fight a soldier wisely, you fight a soldier sensibly, where you are now standing - there is the Kulikovo field." I wanted to escape to Afghanistan, I thought it would be easier there - here he is an enemy with a weapon and you have a weapon. You can not understand.

Quote: Negro

Perhaps someday there will be an opportunity to develop this idea.

That's when I will help turn this idea into a steering wheel, in the form of zero, everything is for the benefit of the Fatherland.

Quote: Negro

Now (July 16, 2023) Crimea is under the military control of the Russian Federation.

Well, you just confirmed once again that I guessed right. And you play with words. The territory of any country is under the military control of that country. That is, Russian Crimea. But in TsIPSO you may not be punished, they will even give you a bonus, for how you got out here, because everyone there has such primitive tricks. Filling concepts with content that is beneficial to you is an old trick, it doesn’t work anymore.

[Negro]

Quote: V. Salama

The territory of any country is under the military control of that country

Of course not. There were exceptions to this rule before, but in October last year, the Russian Federation completely abandoned the modern concept of state borders in favor of the medieval practice of "claims for *". So there are no more borders in Eastern Europe, and only the actual military control of this or that territory is discussed. In the case of Crimea, it is completely for Russia, in the case, for example, of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions of the Russian Federation, it is basically not.

Naturally, on any given day, both can change.

[V. Salama]

Quote: Negro

Of course not.

The truth of any statement is relative. An exception is possible, for example, in case of war.

Quote: Negro

There were exceptions to this rule before, but in October last year, the Russian Federation completely abandoned the modern concept of state borders in favor of the medieval practice of "claims for *".

In October? Maybe at least some confirmation to sit down in the form of a document or the words of a country's politician that Russia refused.
Perhaps you were simply misled. Russia has never claimed foreign territories and so far operates in accordance with the norms of international law. However, unfortunately, these norms, or rather the principles of international law, have contradictions, which makes it possible to accuse Russia of aggression when it acts in the interests of protection.

Quote: Negro

So there are no more borders in Eastern Europe, and only the actual military control of this or that territory is discussed.

In Europe, they can discuss all sorts of nonsense, among their politicians there are many examples of inadequacy, perhaps for EU members there are some special rules for crossing borders within the union by citizens of these countries, but no one has canceled the borders there yet. Concepts discussed by someone should not be taken as reality.

Quote: Negro

In the case of Crimea, it is completely for Russia, in the case, for example, of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions of the Russian Federation, it is basically not.
Naturally, on any given day, both can change.

I could not cite this statement of yours here in view of what was said above, but it is interesting in its manipulativeness or synthesis based on incorrect analysis. Crimea went to Russia as a result of a referendum of the people, Russia only took part in protecting this people from aggression. And the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions are taken under control during the NWO, according to the declared goals of the operation and, again, generalizing, for the purpose of protection.

[Negro]

Quote: V. Salama

for example, in case of war

Not only. There are many problematic locations, not all of them are connected in the Russian Federation. Borders of Israel, Kosovo, etc.

Quote: V. Salama

In October? Maybe at least some confirmation to sit down in the form of a document

Конечно.
Federal constitutional law dated October 04.10.2022, 7 No. XNUMX-FKZ
"On the admission to the Russian Federation of the Zaporozhye region and the formation of a new subject - the Zaporozhye region" as part of the Russian Federation

Quote: V. Salama

Concepts discussed by someone should not be taken as reality.

You did not understand. If Russia ends where our boys stand, then the questions of political geography move to a different plane. It seemed that Europe has moved away from this, but no, nevermind.

Quote: V. Salama

Crimea went to Russia as a result of a referendum of the people,

)))
Thanks to the former journalist Venediktov, now it is not difficult to vote anywhere. The main thing is to decide who conducts it.

Quote: V. Salama

Kherson and Zaporozhye regions are taken under control during the NWO, according to the declared goals of the operation and, again, in general, for the purpose of protection.

)))
Yeah. This is what I call "rejection of the concept of the state border." Although it would be more correct to say - the rejection of the concept of sovereignty, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

[V. Salama]

Quote: Negro

Federal constitutional law dated October 04.10.2022, 7 No. XNUMX-FKZ.

This Law is not a confirmation, as a document, of the fact that "Russia has abandoned the modern concept of state borders in favor of the medieval practice of" claims to * "". And what kind of concept is this - "the modern concept of state borders"? You are cunning at inventions, I see.
Article 1 of the Law very clearly defines the grounds and terms for the admission of the Zaporozhye region to the Russian Federation, and all this is in line with the principles of international law.
So don't overthink it.

Quote: Negro

You did not understand. If Russia ends where our boys stand, then the questions of political geography move to a different plane.

I already wrote to you about the exceptions that are possible in the event of military actions to control the state's own territory. So there is no other plane in matters of political geography. Especially since:
Article 3 of this law very clearly defines both the boundaries of the Zaporozhye region and the state border of the Russian Federation.
So, once again, there is no reason to assert that Russia has abandoned state borders or, whatever it is, a modern concept.

Quote: Negro

Thanks to the former journalist Venediktov, now it is not difficult to vote anywhere. The main thing is to decide who conducts it.

Maybe it's enough to exploit this slanderous statement that "the main thing is who counts the votes." The truth of this statement is indisputable, as well as the statements that "politics is not a dirty business, it is dirty because it is done with dirty hands." And you can at least “thank yourself” to Venediktov, but believe him - do not respect yourself. With the same success, I can return your advice to you - go yourself, to the Crimea, and personally see the opposite, you are definitely not in danger there, since the referendum was held there not at gunpoint, which is confirmed by foreign journalists, and now tourists, and even military analysts.

Quote: Negro

Yeah. This is what I call "rejection of the concept of the state border"

The key words here would be “Yeah. That is what I call…” You can call it whatever you like, you are already accustomed to filling concepts with your own false content and living with false ideas about reality. Such things must be argued with their own conclusions, and not just refer to the names, numbers and dates of documents.

Quote: Negro

Although it would be more correct to say - the rejection of the concept of sovereignty, the principles of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Well, you get the idea, yes. In addition, you are again trying to jump off the topic: sovereignty with the state border may not be connected in any way "in modern" conditions. So decide on these concepts and with "modernity", in particular.

[V. Salama]

PS Today, in our TV program "Time Will Show" a Polish political observer or analyst (his current status was not specified) Jakob Koreiba took part on a video channel. He spoke on behalf of the European elites, since he assessed the current relationship between the EU and Russian economies as required from the standpoint of the interests of the West, in addition, he spoke from the standpoint of the interests of the Polish elites.
In particular, he did not deny Poland's claims to "its historical" lands that now belong to Ukraine. In addition, he argued that Ukraine is now acting 101% in the interests of both the collective West and Poland, providing them with the opportunity for a peaceful life, and there can be no question of any moral principles if Ukraine does this voluntarily. Koreyba also admitted that Poland does not need a state border with Russia, Ukraine should remain as a buffer zone.
Further, his thought was even more interesting - he argued that at the moment Ukraine is growing in territory at the expense of Russia on the sole basis that it wants to return to the state of borders in 1991, that is, it is ready to implement the West's wishes "to the last Ukrainian." And this is not just right, it is already a reality - if he wants and purposefully acts in this direction, then it “grows”. Further - more, in anticipation of "the renaissance of Europe at the expense of Russia's resources", he argued that we would see a time when the media would cover conflicts on the Ukrainian-Chinese border, on the sole basis that "Russia has already managed to be divided twice, why not will it work for the third time?

Based on this chatter, I drew, in particular, two conclusions:
1. “... abandoned the modern concept of state borders in favor of the medieval practice of "claims on *" not Russia, but the West.
2. and as is customary in the West, he shifts all his vices to Russia, and you only act as a conductor of Western ideas in shifting unhealthy ideas from a sick head to a healthy one.

[Grancer81]

Alas, pensioners aged 60 and over, and some younger, even those with combat experience, are not accepted ....

[V. Salama]

I apologize, of course, here I had a saying because of the habit of keeping everything in my head at once and desires that run ahead of the possibility of their realization. In Gorbachev's safe, the case of the Katyn massacre, taken from the archives, was lying, waiting for the master to falsify it, but I'll ask you Bandera people for Khatyn.

[cast iron]

Those who have normal logic understand that Borodin is actually a minor defeat that did not lead to any serious or catastrophic consequences in the war. And this despite the fact that the battle itself was the largest.

[novel66]

Yes, not even a draw, they drove the tank army into narrowness on the prepared anti-tank defense.
Another thing is that the Germans simply did not have any reserves, and had to retreat. Strategically, the entire Battle of Kursk is a victory

[Grossvater]

Oh my God! Since when did a 75 mm gun appear on the T III? It seems like it was on the fourth. And there were no "cigarette butts" in the 43rd, but there was a very powerful L48 gun with an initial speed of under 800 capes. And the frontal armor of the four is 80 mm.
The tigers did not break through at all, neither on the forehead nor on the side. Thank God, at least the Panthers, for the most part, burned out on their own.
It was in 43 that the Germans had complete technical superiority in tanks. Plus flat terrain. Later, when the T 34-85 entered the series, and the battles moved to Europe with its typical distances of 500-700 meters, it became much easier.
The Germans in the 43rd were a terrible enemy and the victory at Kursk was very, very difficult!

[novel66]

Moreover, the IPTABRs were armed, in general there were forty-five or 76 mm divisions

[Victor Leningradets]

This is wrong. In addition to the mentioned anti-aircraft guns, the anti-aircraft guns were also armed with 85-mm and 76-mm anti-aircraft guns, which pierced the tiger into the side from 800-1000 m, and into the forehead from 500 m. There were also 57-mm guns, both ZiS-3 and QF 6 pounder. And they really put a "cigarette butt" on the Pz-III.
Only howling about how terrible the Germans were in the summer of 1943 is a lie. They ran out of reserves. If in the 2nd SS TC the percentage of Aryan military personnel was 80%, then in the Kempf group it barely reached 50%. What a future!

[lukash66]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

There were also 57 mm guns, both ZiS-3 and QF 6 pounder!

All the same, ZiS2, you probably pressed the wrong button)))

[kor1vet1974]

It was in the 43rd year that the Germans had complete technical superiority in tanks

And that the Tigers and Panthers made up at least 50% of the enemy's mechanized corps?

[Grossvater]

Excuse me, do you know how to read? The German fours of the 43 model were not inferior to the T34 in armor and were significantly superior in armament. And there were also Stugs with L48.

[saigon]

Yes, PzIII.N did have 7.5cmKwK37. barrel caliber 24 or 1765, 3 mm gun weight 490 kg. also on many fours there was a 43-caliber gun.

[Grossvater]

And how many of these did they do? Let's still talk about mass weapons.
L43 was inferior to L48 quite a bit. If I'm not confused, 760 and 790 capes.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Grossvater

The tigers did not break through at all, neither on the forehead nor on the side.

Trim sturgeon. ©
Only the 76-mm division had non-penetration in the forehead and side of the "Tiger" - all types of shells from a distance of 200 m or more.
But the 45-mm has already taken the side of the sub-caliber: "short" - from 200 m, "long" M42 - from 350 m.
57-mm probably took the forehead from 300 m - they didn’t test it at shooting from such a distance, but on the whole, the English 6-pounder, similar in armor penetration to our cannon, was able to do this.
Well, the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun was the absolute champion: the forehead - from a kilometer, the side - from one and a half.
Plus a hull 122 mm gun.
For work on a heavy tank, this is a completely normal situation: it is precisely designed based on protection against divisional calibers. Therefore, in the direction of the main attack (where TTs operate), anti-aircraft defense should always be reinforced by anti-aircraft and hull guns.

Quote: Grossvater

Thank God, at least the Panthers, for the most part, burned out on their own.

So the "Panther" was impenetrable only forehead. And on the sides, their armor was thinner than that of the T-34.
Moreover, by the middle of 1943, they finally began to demand that we build anti-tank guns based on the calculation of flank and oblique fire.
And what about burnt out on their own... The 67th division and the artillerymen of the 27th iptabr and heavy artillery of the 6th army will clearly not agree with you.

[Negro]

Quote: Alexey RA

"long" M42 - from 350 m.

Strictly normal. And Soviet sub-calibers are a separate conversation.

Quote: Alexey RA

The 57-mm probably took its forehead from 300 m - it was not tested at shooting from such a distance, but in general, the English 6-pounder, similar in armor penetration to our cannon, was able to do this

There are some questions about the ZiS-2 and shells for it. And especially at the time of Kursk.

Quote: Alexey RA

Well, the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun was the absolute champion: the forehead - from a kilometer, the side - from one and a half.
Plus hull 122 mm gun

Yes. The Tiger is more likely to reach the A-19 than to 52K.

Quote: Alexey RA

The 67th division and the artillerymen of the 27th Iptabr and the heavy artillery of the 6th Army will clearly not agree with you.

Long story. Who says gunners, and who says drowned in the ravine.

[Grossvater]

I think that they shot and burned themselves. The bottom line is that near Kursk, the Panthers did not make much of an impression.

[Negro]

Quote: Grossvater

The bottom line is that the Panthers did not make much of an impression near Kursk.

)))
Near Kursk, the great idea of ​​​​the Germans made its debut to make a regiment of 200 of the latest vehicles and give it under the command of a major, say thank you that the tanker, and not the infantryman (in the spacecraft it would be a corps and would be attached to it, respectively, a lieutenant general). At the same time, in fact, the regiment went into battle from the wheels, without even coordinating with itself, not like with the infantry of a foreign division. Plus the lousy state of the machines themselves.

In general, the "wrong German" was demonstrated quite unexpectedly. I mean, at the end of the war, not the same as at the beginning.

[Wildcat]

a regiment of 200 newest vehicles and give it under the command of a major

it was just that the major (or was it still a colonel?) was uncommunicative. And they answered him the same.
From Zamulin:
"then at the headquarters of the 48th TC they felt something was wrong. Heierlein's division stretched unacceptably wide along the front, not all of its command units had contact. In particular, [547] the whereabouts of the Panther Regiment and how it operates was unclear. ."
...
"The headquarters of the 10th brigade and its commander, Colonel Decker, were supposed to establish communication and interaction with parts of the "Great Germany". But by the time the operation "Citadel" began, he had not fully arrived directly in the division's area of ​​\u5b\u539boperation and did not start work. The reader is already familiar with the confusion that was going on in the brigade on July XNUMX, and Knobelsdorff was also aware of this. “Due to friction between individual commanders,” General Inspector of Tank Forces G. Guderian wrote to General Seidlitz, Chief of Staff of the OKH, “this headquarters did not function at the initial stage” {XNUMX}.
Control problems continued the next day. Going on the offensive on the morning of July 6, the brigade lost contact with the division command. For several hours in a row, neither General Heierlein nor the corps headquarters really knew where and how it was operating, and whether such a powerful armored formation was operating at all. Only after a communications officer was sent to the division, and then to the brigade, did the corps, again with difficulty, begin to receive at least some information. But even after that, it was not possible to build an effective system of interaction between the troops of the division and such a significant tank grouping. To a large extent, this was hindered by the personal hostility of Strachwitz and Decker."
...
""Mr General!
According to your order, I report on the first results of the operation, on the difficulties that arose and my impressions after returning to the brigade headquarters, from where I was called in accordance with the order. I note that the state of affairs in my absence was very deplorable , about which I will report further.
... The next day, as a result of an attack by 300 tanks of the brigade, I managed to reach the second defensive line. After each successfully completed such attack with minimal losses, I, according to the order, reported to General von Knobelsdorff.
The tank brigade operated in conjunction with the division "Grossdeutschland". In the tank regiment "Grossdeutschland" there were eight companies of T-4 tanks and a company of "tigers".
The regiment was commanded by Count von Strachwitz, who was on the Lion tank. Interacting with him during the attack was quite difficult, as he preferred to act on his own and did not respond to call signs on the radio. In the end, when I was ordered to report to General von Knobelsdorff's headquarters, von Strachwitz took completely illogical actions that resulted in an irreversible exposure of the flank. Thus, as a result of mediocre tactical maneuvers, we lost 12 "panthers", which were blown up by mines and were destroyed by hitting the sides that were vulnerable to them"(c) Dekker

But the question IMHO is not to Dekker and Strachwitz, but to IMHO Goth and Manstein, who at first "untypically" deployed their forces without mobile reserves, then, when everything went according to ..... (a little not according to plan), I had to portray a "regrouping "on the terrain that is not the most convenient for this, and only very later, when the issue of flanks and reserves arose, then they put them in the trenches right up to the sappers / veterinarians.

Things didn’t come to encirclement and pogroma then, but as they say: “Manstein, Goth! Where, female dog, reserves? And why didn't they insist on alternative strikes elsewhere?"

PS. Why, instead of the hundredth retelling about the "large-scale oncoming battle" (it's time to be embarrassed a little about this term), at least Zamulin (the author mentions him) should not be rewritten in his own words? After all, in general, the plan to "stretch the flanks of the Germans" was a success.

[Negro]

Quote: Wildcat

just a major (or is it a colonel?) was unsociable

No, you are confusing the Soviet reader.

The panthers were consolidated into two battalions (51 and 52) of 96 vehicles each (already a good start) and then into a regiment (48th), where 8 staff vehicles were added to a beautiful number of 200 (after all, the number of tanks in units should be beautiful). The regimental commander was Major Meinrad von Lauchert at that time.

Upon arrival in the area, this beautiful regiment was attached to Great Germany, which already had its own regiment, led by the nugget you described. Since the wise command, not without reason, considered that the panther major would simply send a quadruple colonel over them, literally two weeks before the action, a special brigade floor was created led by Colonel Dekker to organize joint actions, so to speak. How he organized these actions can be seen from your quote.

Summing up, the work of the fifth column is felt. But the Germans were well aware that there should not be divisions for 400 tanks. However, they gave an unimaginable amount of iron to the Soviet tank army, mechanized division.

Quote: Wildcat

After all, in general, the plan to "stretch the flanks of the Germans" was a success.

Yes. I read somewhere (or wrote it myself))) that there were three "turning points" in the East (not counting afterknowledge and alhistory like Guderian's turn / non-turn). Moscow (prayers and icons, battle magic), Stalingrad (50/50, someone was more fortunate), and Kursk, when there was no such reference, but were simply stronger than the strongest set of Germans they could muster.
But the Germans also degraded, it's hard to argue with that. Starting from the top floor, when Field Marshal Manstein was subordinate to Colonel General Model. And their mother was crossed out by the commander of the operation, Novoseltsev was crossed out by the chief corporal himself (although it is already difficult to forget about the German memoir tradition here).

[Wildcat]

Hmm, I hope that Comrade Lauchert also contributed to the defeat of the "old, truish" National Socialists. But the description of his actions somehow did not come across with a negative connotation.

And their mother was crossed out by the commander of the operation, Novoseltsev was crossed out by the chief corporal himself

In principle, it is logical not to write in "Lost Victories" about "by 1943 he himself began to become a little stupid and try not to conflict with the authorities, the authorities know better."

Kursk, when there was no such management, but were simply stronger than the strongest set of Germans that they could muster

It somehow worked out for us: "the intelligence reported accurately", and the troops had time to prepare; not "the Germans are not the same", but the level of spacecraft has increased. For the Germans, IMHO, an unobvious problem has appeared - the same Zamulin is already writing about psychological problems, saying "we have a plan, we" think "and will not change it," even if the "corporal" admits that "he has my stomach hurts when I think about Kursk" (something like this, close to the text). From the point of view of afterknowledge, even the non-obvious idea of ​​not "cutting off the ledge" (since there is a "fixation" on it), but starting from its top in order to force the spacecraft to fight with an "inverted" front" looks more promising.
IMHO, old Nimitz was right, changing the Task Force command for each operation: something like "we changed the" coachmen "every time for the freshness of thoughts, although we could not change the" horses "and the" horses "had a hard time." Headquarters fatigue is costly.

[Negro]

Quote: Wildcat

try not to conflict with the authorities, the authorities know better."

Well, by the way, Kluge, the commander of the Center GA, who was supposed to command the Citadel, said that this was some kind of muddy whore and he did not want to participate in this. Thus, the commander of 9A Model became the main one.

Quote: Wildcat

not "the Germans are not the same", but the level of spacecraft has increased

It seems that they have already discussed that the Germans behaved strangely. Back in February, the third battle for Kharkov, the same Germans performed noticeably better.

Quote: Wildcat

something like "we changed" coachmen "every time for the freshness of thoughts, although we could not change" horses "and" horses "had a hard time." Headquarters fatigue is costly.

Nimitz's is even thicker. While Halsey performed the operation, Spruence prepared the next one and vice versa.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Negro

Near Kursk, the great idea of ​​​​the Germans made its debut to make a regiment of 200 of the latest vehicles and give it under the command of a major, say thank you that the tanker, and not the infantryman (in the spacecraft it would be a corps and would be attached to it, respectively, a lieutenant general).

At the same time, do not give the "panther" regiment anything other than tanks (a sort of gross panzer regiment for infantry support). And then give it to the division "Grossdeutschland". But not directly, but through one place - forming a superstructure in the form of the headquarters of the 10th tank brigade, which united the 39th "panther" regiment and its own tank regiment "VG" under its command.

The “panther” regiment was transferred to reinforce the “Grossdeutschland” panzergrenadier division from the 48th tank corps. This division, of course, had its own tank regiment, and it was commanded by Colonel von Strachwitz - one of the promising commanders, as they say, who received another award for the spring battles near Kharkov - Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross. Given his combat experience and a higher rank than Laukert, von Strachwitz could well expect that the Panthers would be transferred to him at least under operational control. However, the command decided otherwise, and in order not to “overload” Strachwitz with additional leadership of two hundred newest tanks, both regiments were combined into the 10th tank brigade, appointing another colonel, Dekker, as its commander.

© Tomzov / Ulanov
And yes, for the debut to be 146% a failure, the brigade headquarters should have been formed just before the start of the operation and not staffed with personnel and equipment.

The decision to form a brigade was made literally in the last days before the Citadel. The officers appointed to the headquarters of the 10th Tank Brigade did not even have time to arrive at the front before the offensive, there was also no necessary equipment, which was vital for the normal functioning of the headquarters. Several vehicles were "borrowed" from the "panther" battalions and one of the Great Germany was shared by one mittlerer Kommandopanzerwagen (a mobile command post based on the Sd. Kfz.251 armored personnel carrier).

Yes, it was difficult for the pedantic Germans. But they did it.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Negro

Strictly normal. And Soviet sub-calibers are a separate conversation.

But not in theory according to Jacob de Mar - but with a real projectile against real armor.

Quote: Negro

Long story. Who says gunners, and who says drowned in the ravine.

A ravine with a stream, supplemented by an anti-tank ditch (into which the sappers launched the same stream) was on the first day of the offensive - June 5 - still on the outskirts of the battlefield

Very soon some 25 Panthers from the 51st Tank Battalion and Brigade Headquarters were immobilized by a combination of mud, mines and technical malfunctions. The Panthers could not maneuver on slippery slopes - when trying to get out of the load, the teeth of sloths at the drive wheels began to crumble. Soviet artillery began shelling the huge mass of stationary tanks in their kill zone. Although the armor of the Panthers was supposed to reliably protect against shelling, Langhammer tank No. 401 was destroyed by a successful ricochet into the lower armor plate. Many other tanks were damaged and at least six tankers were killed.

© Robert Forczyk - op. by Tomzov/Ulanov. "The Debut of the Panthers"

And then the "Panthers" reached the defensive positions. Where they were met by the 67th Rifle Division, the 27th Iptabr, supporting artillery of the 6th A, as well as tanks and self-propelled guns of the 245th detachment (M3s "Lee" and M3l "Stuart") and 1440th sap (SU-76 and SU-122).
The next day, June 6, the moat and ravine were no longer there - so the "cats were strangled" already by the forces of the infantry, artillery and inzhtroysk (the Germans traditionally brought new equipment directly into the minefield).

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Negro

Strictly normal. And Soviet sub-calibers are a separate conversation.

But not in theory according to Jacob de Mar - but with a real projectile against real armor.

Quote: Negro

Long story. Who says gunners, and who says drowned in the ravine.

A ravine with a stream, supplemented by an anti-tank ditch (into which the sappers launched the same stream) was on the first day of the offensive - July 5 - still on the outskirts of the battlefield

Very soon some 25 Panthers from the 51st Tank Battalion and Brigade Headquarters were immobilized by a combination of mud, mines and technical malfunctions. The Panthers could not maneuver on slippery slopes - when trying to get out of the load, the teeth of sloths at the drive wheels began to crumble. Soviet artillery began shelling the huge mass of stationary tanks in their kill zone. Although the armor of the Panthers was supposed to reliably protect against shelling, Langhammer tank No. 401 was destroyed by a successful ricochet into the lower armor plate. Many other tanks were damaged and at least six tankers were killed.

© Robert Forczyk - op. by Tomzov/Ulanov. "The Debut of the Panthers"

And then the "Panthers" reached the defensive positions. Where they were met by the 67th Rifle Division, the 27th Iptabr, supporting artillery of the 6th A, as well as tanks and self-propelled guns of the 245th detachment (M3s "Lee" and M3l "Stuart") and 1440th sap (SU-76 and SU-122).
The next day, July 6, the moat and ravine were no longer there - so the "cats were strangled" by infantry, artillery and inzhtroysk forces (the Germans traditionally brought new equipment directly into the minefield).

[Grossvater]

Are you seriously? Shooting magpies from 200 meters? Well, you could climb on a tank with a bucket of gasoline and set it on fire. The probability of surviving is about the same.
Regarding 52K and A19. It’s great to drag a 5-7 ton fool the size of a country house for direct fire. Just do not cite Flaki in Africa as an example. They fired at the Naglitz tanks from distances of 1,5-2 km. And the saturation of the battlefield was somewhat different.
ZiS 2 gun is certainly excellent! The question is how many of them were near Kursk.
By the way, there is no need to offend Grabin’s creation, the impudent 6 pounds was inferior to it in muzzle energy by one and a half times and, by the way, the ZiS 2 took the Tiger in the forehead from eight hundred meters with the usual armor-piercing. But later, great later.
Returning to the body art , then it should be recognized that the most effective anti-tank guns of the Second World War were the 14 and 16-inch English and Amer battleships. And what! In Normandy, they fired at tanks and successfully!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Grossvater

Are you seriously? Shooting magpies from 200 meters?

Well, the Germans did this in 1941 - and not without success.
And generally speaking, battalion a gun that pierces a heavy tank (albeit on board and from close range) is very good.

Quote: Grossvater

Regarding 52K and A19. It’s great to drag a 5-7 ton fool the size of a country house for direct fire. Just do not cite Flaki in Africa as an example.

Why do we need Africa we are well fed here © .
Remember again 1941, when the German Kampfgruppen on the offensive they carried "flaks" and 10-cm corps guns with them - and used them against our tanks. This was done, for example, by Heinrich Eberbach or the ever-memorable Wilibald Freiherr von Langermann und Erlenkamp, ​​who, to his misfortune, met the same combined tank group of Katukov.

Quote: Grossvater

By the way, there is no need to offend Grabin’s creation, the impudent 6 pounds was inferior to it in muzzle energy by one and a half times and, by the way, the ZiS 2 took the Tiger in the forehead from eight hundred meters with the usual armor-piercing.

And no one is offended. Those who are in the subject know perfectly well what our guns owe such low armor penetration with good ballistics. And why, in the same shelling of the "Tiger", our 76-mm did not even penetrate it into the side from 200 m, and the similar (by "roots") American M3 pierced the side of the chamber M61 at a distance of 400 meters and a solid M72 - as early as from 650 meters .
The answer was given in the test report - which noted that American shells pierced armor with little or no deformation. Alas, no initial speed, accuracy and accuracy will help if the projectile, due to the imperfection of the design or material, cannot penetrate the armor itself (for the same 76-mm BR-350A, when it hit at an angle other than normal, the hardened head very often broke off , after which the body, instead of breaking through, split on the armor).
The problem was solved only after the war - because of this, by the way, tabular data on armor penetration from post-war tables can never be transferred to wartime.

[Viktor Starikov]

Razik of the third modification N was armed with a 75-mm cigarette butt. But they released a few.

[Grossvater]

Yes, I know, I know. I do not remember only in the 42nd or 43rd year.
Truly, "monsieur knows a lot about perversions"! More precisely, Herr . No matter how much I tried to understand the meaning of this action, I could not!

[Negro]

Quote: Grossvater

No matter how much I tried to understand the meaning of this action, I could not!

As a "cruising tank", the troika is already clearly outdated, and for infantry support, a car with a cigarette butt is better than with a "hole punch" thanks to a full-fledged land mine and a hinged trajectory. In fact, the trio was given an early Stug 3 gun or an American M8 Scott.

[Jager]

What was the technique, all used. We also had T-70s, the Germans had Pz.II. A short 75 mm was placed on the Pz.III Ausf. N.
The value of the "Tigers" is more than overestimated. Instead of using a tank fist, the Germans used their separate tank battalions as "fire brigades". Pz.VI was simply not enough for everyone.

[Grossvater]

German heavy tank battalion, these are 40-60 vehicles. In the Red Army, not every tank brigade had so much. Don't be fooled by the names.
There is one more nuance. Remind me, please (Kolomiets is at home and I am at work), when was the T34 transferred to a five-speed gun? Could all thirty-fours near Kursk ride in gears except for second?

[Alexey Lantukh]

Well, that's more or less true. The Prokhorov battle was indeed unsuccessful for us - this was the defeat of the 5th Panzer Army. They even wanted to put Rotmistrov on trial for such losses. It was also bad that the battlefield remained under the control of the Germans. During the night, German sappers blew up all our damaged tanks, which then could no longer be restored. However, the main tanks of the Germans were still not the Tigers of which there were few, but reinforced T-IYs with an elongated, more powerful gun and thicker armor. Along with the failure of our counterattack on the southern front of the Kursk salient, on the northern Orlovsky front, ours still set the heat on the Germans.

[alovrov]

Some kind of mixture of propaganda, facts and even Soviet myths. Everything has been obvious with Prokhorovka for a long time - Rotmistrov senselessly killed the 5th and 5th Guards, which was prepared by the Germans in a short time, the VET. There was no oncoming tank battle. The next day after the counterattack, Manstein continued to move, but it was already obvious that the failure of the Model in the north and the difficulties in the south would not give the intended result, plus problems in Sicily. The citadel was rolled up, with an obvious strategic defeat for the united Europe.

[novel66]

Zatulin just had it - the generals, unlike Alois, set themselves the task of defeating mobile formations. Actually, we did it

[Stas157]

Quote: alovrov

Rotmistrov senselessly killed 5th and 5th Guards prepared by the Germans in a short time PTO.

The Germans broke through all three lines of defense and had to enter the operational space, which would be a clear tragedy for us. Rotmistrov's army sealed the third line of defense with a counter tank attack and bled the Germans. As a result, the battle near Prokhorova decided the outcome of the entire summer company in our favor.

[alovrov]

She did not seal anything, Manstein began to move forward on the Prokhorovka section already on July 13th.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Stas157

The Germans broke through all three lines of defense and had to enter the operational space, which would be a clear tragedy for us. Rotmistrov's army sealed the third line of defense with a counter tank attack and bled the Germans.

And it was impossible to do this without hitting the enemy's unexplored defenses? And without reconnaissance, in an unknown area, without artillery preparation and with the introduction of tank corps brigade and battalion?
I suggest - look at the actions of the neighboring tank army of Comrade Katukov.

[Stas157]

Quote: Alexey RA

without reconnaissance, on unknown terrain, without artillery preparation

The day before the battle, on the evening of July 11, Rotmistrov, together with Vasilevsky, observed German tanks through binoculars in the Prokhorovka area. And in the morning, after artillery preparation (8:00), the Soviet tanks went on the offensive (8:15).

That is, the main brain of Soviet military thought Vasilevsky was aware of the frontal impact, and perhaps he suggested it himself. Does this circumstance bother you? Already Vasilevsky is difficult to blame for the inadequacy of actions and illiteracy.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Stas157

The day before the battle, on the evening of July 11, Rotmistrov, together with Vasilevsky, observed German tanks through binoculars in the Prokhorovka area.

What Rotmistrov wrote about in his memoirs. Vasilevsky does not have this episode.
To believe Comrade Rotmistrov, who managed in a well-known letter to shift the losses of his corps onto the shoulders conservatives and swindlers - our tank designers and production workers...

[chenia]

Quote: Stas157

operational space, which would be a clear tragedy for us

The Germans got stuck on the rear line of the second army line. And these milestones were 9 (nine !!!!), i.e. 7 more ahead, and the Steppe Front was hiding in the bushes. And what tragedy could have happened?
Manstein, just with his offensive (crackhead), knocked out the entire color of the Wehrmacht. I thought how it would work in the Crimea. did not roll. You see the consequences. Model did not begin to destroy his troops with an offensive, and as a result, he held back the offensive of our three fronts. And Manstein? Having a cooler grouping, he didn’t keep what he had achieved (well, with such flanks, hell would have worked), but he didn’t keep the original ones either. He did not hold the intermediate ones (there was generally a run to the Dnieper, and his howl would give 15 divisions, otherwise the krants gave three), And this is 500 km in two months of our offensive. He did not hold on to such a super-line as the Dnieper. In November, ours took Zhytomyr (100 km beyond the Dnieper), though we had to leave it later. BUT THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK!!!
In 4 months we advanced up to 600 km, and in the sector most saturated with enemy troops (Model had fewer troops, but he saved them and arranged a Belarusian balcony).
And Manstein? In the Battle of Kursk, the elite, the core of the Wehrmacht, was knocked out (then the German went NOT THAT).
This Battle, along with the Moscow one, is the most important, and our victory was crushing for the Wehrmacht.

[Stas157]

Quote: chenia

The Germans got stuck on the rear line of the second army line. And there were 9 (nine!!!!)

And there are three of them on the cards. At what for any.

The third line is the army's rear defense line. Bring, if it's not difficult, a map where 9 lines of defense are indicated.

Quote: chenia

In the Battle of Kursk, the elite, the core of the Wehrmacht, was knocked out (then the German went NOT THAT).

This is true. And in aviation, the USSR began to dominate only after the Battle of Kursk.

[chenia]

Quote: Stas157

And there are three of them on the cards. At what for any.

This is not a map, but only a diagram. The depth of our defense was 250-300 km.
Vissarionych, having listened to the plan of our military (to exhaust the defense and then .. which, by the way, completely turned out) for every fireman (remembering the Crimean events, he ordered to prepare the defense, almost to Moscow. I won’t provide maps (operational), this is a strategic level. and as it turned out reinsured (where is 36 km and where is 300 km?) And the diagrams show what is relevant.
Near Prokhorovka. it's sad, but the Kursk salient is a fracture of the ridge of the Wehrmacht. A common phrase, but it accurately reflects this event. We forced the most elite troops to flee (offensive phase), and they could not even hold the Dnieper. This shows the level of defeat of the German group, which was created for a strategic offensive, it was erased. And this is their elite. We, too, not only got it, but the fact remains.

[vovochkarzhevsky]

The losses of the Germans in armored vehicles are no less significant. It's just that the Germans were still masters of hiding losses in reports.
Otherwise, they would have continued the offensive. And no references to the fact that they suspended the strategic battle just because somewhere in Sicily the allies were moving do not roll.
First of all, the Germans were summed up by their own belief in technical superiority. They tried so hard to outdo the Soviet tanks that they missed the fact that the Soviet aircraft received anti-tank weapons.

[Grossvater]

The technical superiority of the Germans was and at the same time was not. And the modernized four and the Tiger and Panther SIGNIFICANTLY surpassed everything that was at that time in the Red Army, but the dampness and complexity of the design of the Tiger and Panther, frank overdimension, plus the incredible complexity of maintenance reduced this advantage to almost zero within a few days. By the way, including this, the stop of the German offensive is explained.
In general, like grizza, God does not give horns to a vigorous cow.
By the way, the Germans in forty-four had a well-developed tank gas turbine engine, practically the one that is now on Abrams. In any case, the constructor is the same or from the same team.
They put on the Panther and very successfully. Can you imagine a Panther with an engine in tyshshu and-go-go !? But! Goering intervened and all forces were transferred to the 262nd. So, thanks to Herman from Soviet tankers !

[ivan2022]

Stubborn terminology with "Russian troops" is not in favor of the author. In general, a feature of many modern authors is an abundance of details and an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of events.

On this topic, Guderian reasonably spoke: "the Russians set up mass production of one or two models, while we began to rush about and spray funds in search of super-weapons." Gold words!

He said this about the period after the defeat near Moscow .... When he realized that the war had entered a completely new phase.

Unfortunately, apart from the "Russians" - our authors did not take anything from him .... Although he was a smart man, Guderian - something ...

[bubalik]

In the period from July 12 to 16, 1943, the losses of the 5th Panzer Army amounted to: 2 people killed, 440 wounded, 3 missing, 510 T-1 medium tanks and 157 T-225 light tanks, 34 ACS.

Report on the fighting 5 Guards. TA
The authors of the document: 5 Guards. TA, Mrs. tank major general Baskak troops, Guards. Colonel Belozerov
Date of creation of the document: 30.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX

[Andybuts]

Tactical draw and strategic victory of the Russian troops

what Russians? Soviet troops fought in 1941-45, not Russian, the Red Army, not Russian or not Russian.

[AB]

When young people believe in this, the West will be able to turn Russians into "ethnographic material" from which anything can be molded.

Reading or listening to this, one always remembers a phrase from James Swallow's fantasy book - Garro (Waha40k): "... Their goal is not just to destroy our strongholds and our spaceships. They seek to destroy those things that make us what we are They are looking for any achievement and any evidence of success, and they knock them off their pedestal, erasing the past, plunging us into unconsciousness.". This phrase, at the time, explained a lot to me.

[Alexey RA]

When young people believe in this, the West will be able to turn Russians into "ethnographic material" from which anything can be molded. Like the current Russian-Ukrainians (Little Russians), who were made "Russian Janissaries" and left to kill their own brothers.

... the author writes to us, who in the Great Patriotic War has some Russian army fought on Russian front.

[Negro]

The Russian army was really there. But there is a nuance.

[Kojote21]

Quote: Negro

The Russian army was really there. But there is a nuance.

She fought on the side of the Fritz (ROA - Russian Liberation Army under the command of General Andrei Vlasov). Is that what you meant?

[Negro]

Quote from Kojote21

Is that what you meant?

))

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Negro

The Russian army was really there. But there is a nuance.

Yeah ... I already wrote about him in the comments to the previous article "The 1943 campaign on the Russian front: a bet on a" draw result "" by the same author:

Quote: Alexey RA

The author is not even embarrassed by the fact that the formation, which had the words "Russian" and "army" in its name, fought for the Nazis in that war.

[lukash66]

What a newfangled trend, what the hell is the "Russian Front"? Nemchura herself called it the Eastern Front. And by the way, then our country was called the USSR, not Russia. Then the Soviet-German front. And it was not the "Russians" who fought on it, but all the peoples of the USSR.

[Negro]

Quote from: lukash66

What a newfangled trend, what the hell is the "Russian Front"?

This is Samsonov, he sees so.

[Kojote21]

I don't understand at all why mentioning British and/or American historians here?

It's completely useless. On the one hand, who? Soviet troops. On the other hand, Fritz. Consequently, only Soviet, or, in extreme cases, German historians can be mentioned. And nothing else!

Quote: Negro

This is Samsonov, he sees so.

I don't see it! For me, there is either the Soviet-German Front or the Eastern Front. And nothing else!

[Alexey RA]

Quote from Kojote21

I don't understand at all why mentioning British and/or American historians here? request

It's completely useless. On the one hand, who? Soviet troops. On the other hand, Fritz. Consequently, only Soviet, or, in extreme cases, German historians can be mentioned. And nothing else

And then, so that when they once again sing to you about five destroyed tanks on July 12, you would know where this one's legs grow from. And also because Western historians just studied the Battle of Kursk from the German side - on the basis of official German documents.

And, by the way, Soviet historical There are no studies on Prokhorovka. There is an ideologically correct description of the greatest oncoming tank battle, which ended in our victory, wandering from work to work. Because state historians do not argue with persons at the level of the Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces or the head of GlavPUR, but take it under the hood and carry out orders.
First historical work on Prokhorovka already dates back to Russian time - and this is Zamulin.

[Alexey RA]

On July 10, 1943, the Fuhrer ordered the command of Army Group South to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the failure of the breakthrough in the Oboyan direction, Commander Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and attack Kursk in a roundabout way, through Prokhorovka, where success was noted.

EMNIMS, a strike against the Soviet mechanized reserves, which were supposed to try to stop the German offensive, was laid down by the Germans at the planning stage of the future operation.

[Viktor Starikov]

Panthers did not directly participate in the battle of Prokhorov! Vatutin may have been glad to hit Hauser's corps on the flank. So they did not have time with the deployment ...

[Evgeny Sedlyar]

The article seems to be made up of clippings from Soviet textbooks. Close them already at last, there is no truth in them

[certero]

Well, why continue to tell fairy tales in the article? Yes, near Prokhorovka, the Soviet troops suffered very heavy losses, the Soviet command absolutely immediately found out about this.
And then at some point this event began to be mythologised.
Now there are a lot of documents, both ours and Western ones, so a more or less detailed picture of what was there at Prokhorovka is already known.
Objective information is needed because without it, such special operations are obtained as now, when 70% of modern technology is on paper ....
Patriotism can only be brought up with the truth, otherwise it turns out garbage that is pouring in When objective facts appear. Really, after the collapse of the Union, the vaccinations did not receive as quickly as possible to destroy history when a lot of lies were formed in it?

[Frank Muller]

The tank (but not military) biography of one of my grandfathers ended after the Battle of Kursk (after which he was recalled from the front to the Headquarters), but he still managed to visit the Prokhorovka Field, which kept traces of the "tank battle". And in the words of an eyewitness, he subsequently spoke about these events, which for forty years were presented by domestic historical propaganda as an unquestioning and undeniable victory of Soviet weapons. After leafing through V. Kondratenko’s book “Kursk Bulge”, which I had not read, he shook his head: “Probably, the time has not yet come to tell the whole truth about the war, which we, who fought, will have to experience in memory as it was, with all the offensive failures and joyful victories. And not everyone will correctly understand the reasons for our defeats and failures, which were also bricks in our building of victory. Already then, in the middle of the 60s, he told about Prokhorovka what only the archives and the memory of eyewitnesses kept in those days: “There was no unconditional victory of the Red Army in that battle. The operation was carried out without comprehensive planning and proper intelligence. It was necessary to prevent a German breakthrough, and this was done, however, at a high price, attacking the Nazis, who had taken advantageous combat positions. There was no avalanche-to-avalanche battle (with head-on and rearing tanks colliding). It was after the war that such a legend began to circulate, which Rotmistrov and Khrushchev launched. The main losses were caused not by the vaunted "Tigers" and "Panthers" (many of the latter, as it turned out later, broke on the road), but by modified T - 4 with reinforced armor and elongated guns. The battlefield was initially left to the Germans, who did not fail to take advantage of this: their engineering and sapper teams blew up our wrecked tanks, which they managed to get to, and evacuate their damaged vehicles. My unit was sent directly from the "cast iron" to reinforce Rotmistrov's army, from which Stalin (as we were rumored) was going to strictly demand the full for the heavy losses and failure of the operation. Then they said that Pavel Alekseevich was already preparing to appear before the tribunal with the darkest ending. After the war, I learned that “Khrushch” and Vasilevsky still convinced the Supreme: “For a beaten man they give two unbeaten, but not everyone takes!” However, after the first two war years, Vissarionych himself began to treat command personnel more carefully, realizing that someone needed to fight, and fight at least somehow successfully. He even left the mediocre Kulik in the back roles, trying to use as much as possible and "not without benefit." True, the last of him on the Steppe Front, where he ended up, was not so much.

[Grossvater]

Kulik was an experienced and successful administrator, not a commander. I already wrote about four. By the way, they were often confused with the Tigers, especially in the anti-cumulative body kit. You can tell what the hell is in the smoke, the tower is square, the cannon is stepped, it doesn’t penetrate the forehead.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Grossvater

I already wrote about four. By the way, they were often confused with the Tigers, especially in the anti-cumulative body kit. You can tell what the hell is in the smoke, the tower is square, the cannon is stepped, it doesn’t penetrate the forehead.

He-he-he... uv. M. Svirin wrote that at the end of the war, in one of the battles, our tankers identified CTs as "Panthers" - for exactly the same reasons: the similarity of the silhouette, poor conditions and short observation time.

[Grossvater]

Well, according to the design of the hull, Korolevich is a direct development of the Panther. To be honest, in the photographs I distinguish them only by the mask of the gun. This is if with the Henschel tower. With the Porsche tower, the difference is more noticeable. By the way, healthy fool! I saw it in Bovington.

[Lynx2000]

I will clarify the comment to the second photo in the article:

Against the background of the movement of a tank column with troops on the sides, and the movement of foot soldiers on foot with weapons at the ready, combat aircraft are visible, most likely IL-2 and possibly on a combat course before the attack ... we see not a marching column, but rather military operations .
If I'm not mistaken, this photo was taken on August 5, 1943, when, with the support of massive art. artillery and aviation fire, tanks of the 4th Guards Tank Corps broke through the enemy defenses near the settlement. Cossack Lisitsa and Ivanovskaya Lisitsa are advancing on the city of Grayvoron. From photographic materials on 4 Gv.TK.

[Altmann]

The Battle of Prokhorovka was certainly an important part of the war and one of the largest tank battles, but perhaps thanks to the work of historians with access to former Soviet archives, it will lose the title of "the largest tank battle." Battle in history. It is a fact that new knowledge is emerging that shows that the largest such battle took place two years earlier at the training ground near Brody, which is now in Ukraine.

The Soviet Union's victory at Moscow was a major German defeat that closed the door for Hitler to end the war on his own terms. The later Battle of Stalingrad ended Germany's chances of winning the war.

It can be said that the fighting at the beginning of the war on the border showed that German tanks were not indestructible, which gave the Soviet commanders the first valuable experience in mechanized warfare.

[Alexey Lantukh]

T-34-76 tanks up to 43 years old were quite workhorses that surpassed the German ones. But already Prokhorovka showed that they had already lagged behind the Germans, which forced them to urgently install a long-barreled 85 mm gun.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexey Lantukh

T-34-76 tanks up to 43 years old were quite workhorses that surpassed the German ones.

In theory and tabular data.
But in practice, nuances immediately came out. Like a diesel engine guzzling oil, with a power of 10-15% less than the theoretical one. Or the "four-stage", for which the specialists from Kubinka in 1942 did not find good words in the report: it does not allow the full use of engine power, the gear ratios are chosen incorrectly. The five-step, EMNIP, appeared in large numbers in the troops only by 1944. The transmission as a whole provided the driver with 30 kg of effort on the control levers, reducing the speed to zero when shifting gears and the danger of engine shutdown during this procedure.
Armor protection of the T-34 already in 1941 was recognized as insufficient for a medium tank. And the results of shooting captured AP shells in 1942 confirmed this.
The 76-mm gun in 1943 had an insufficient direct shot range (which did not allow to effectively suppress the heavier German anti-tank guns, the opening lines of which increased to 500-800 m), and there were problems with armor penetration (the shooting of the "Tiger" showed this well) .
Plus, the lack of a dedicated commander, aggravated by poor surveillance devices.

[Negro]

Quote: Alexey RA

Plus, the lack of a dedicated commander, aggravated by poor surveillance devices

This is not a plus, this is the first. The T-34 corresponded to the four, in which the commander was knocked out and only the gunner and loader remained. That's why I always write that the T-34-76, in all paper characteristics, corresponded to twice the lighter Valentine with a 75mm gun. And in real life, with its reliability, layout, optics, buckshot for impact instead of BB, etc. usually underperformed.

[mmaxx]

All the figures and drinking of the Battle of Kursk are capable of confusing anyone's head. And on this basis, to argue who won, who lost or was a draw.
One has only to ask oneself one question: if the Germans won or drew, then why, after Prokhorovka, did they wind up their fishing rods and pull back so that they stopped only beyond the Dnieper? After all, it was just a run to the Dnieper - who will have time first.
They probably won and tried to take the winnings home.

[tank64rus]

Five "Tiger" tanks, which the German "historians" trump with, were taken from the British, who apparently read one of the reports of the GABTU of the Red Army, which spoke of FIVE German "Tigers", in a state more or less suitable for research, and sent from battlefields by decision of the commission, for further research to Kubinka. This is how the information war goes.

[Tank destroyerSU-100]

I am tormented by vague doubts. In fact, the 39th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Brigade, armed with Panthers, was attached to the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland". This division was part of the 48th Panzer Corps, which rushed to Oboyan. And near Prokhorovka there were no parts of it from the word at all. Somehow it turns out that the "Panthers" could not seem to participate in the battles near Prokhorlovka.

[Simon_Dellsen]

Just yesterday I watched a documentary on YouTube about this very battle, which talked about Ribbentrop’s son.

What I notice from the Western side is that when they talk about the "Russian Front", there is always a but...

“The Russians were helped...” by the Yankees, without this help they would not have survived.

The "Russians" won by numbers.

General Winter.

The Allied air war over the Reich, which revived (untruely) the German arms industry.

A Soviet victory is always “tied” to some condition that does not belong to it. The Soviets didn't win, the Germans lost - that's the premise.

Well, they won under Lend-Lease, although this aid to the Yankees was aimed at allowing the Soviets to weather the storm and so that "they" and not the West would take over the war effort, and we, to top it all off, " They charged them!"

In Spanish, finding something that speaks well about the USSR is a miracle.

Greetings!


In Spanish :

"Justo ayer vi un documental en Youtube sobre esta misma batalla, que hablaba sobre el hijo de Ribbentrop.

Lo que noto, desde el lado occidental, es que cuando se habla del "Frente Ruso", siempre hay un pero...

Los "Rusos fueron ayudados..." por los yanquis, sin esta ayuda no hubiesen resistido.

Los "Rusos" ganaron por número.

El General Invierno.

La guerra aérea aliada sobre el Reich, que relantizó (cosa que no es cierto) la industria de guerra alemana.

La victoria soviética siempre está "atada" a alguna condición que no es propia. Los soviéticos no ganaron, perdieron los alemanes, esa es la premisa.

Bien, ganaron por el "Préstamo y arriendo", aunque esta ayuda yanqui tenía la premisa de permitirle a los soviets, aguantar la tormenta y que "ellos" y no occidente absorvieran el esfuerzo de guerra, y encima les "cobramos"!

En castellano, encontrar algo que hable bien de la URSS es un milagro.

Cheers!"

[Alexander Kuksin]

My dad is a participant in the Battle of Kursk! When I came to visit him in Oryol on vacation, he took me to the Oryol Museum of the Battle of Kursk. There's also a panorama. And he began to tell. So all the groups, together with the guides, gathered around and listened. Dad was then a captain, two Red Stars, for the Patriotic War and for the Victory over Germany. These are combat ones. He only wore them on Victory Day.
If the roads take you to Orel, be sure to visit the Oryol Military History Museum of the Battle of Kursk.