1 call service year: leave, how to eat, or increase the term? (Poll)
One of the reformational positions, constantly subjected to quite sharp criticism, is the reduction of the term of military service to 12-months. This decision was made at the beginning of 2008, after a rather long confrontation between those who advocated for such a decline, and between those who were clearly not happy with this idea. The fact is that the idea itself, which later became one of the foundations of the new approach to military service as part of the reform of the Russian army, had, as often happens, good goals. The authors of the idea, to which, incidentally, the first persons of the state also belonged, stated that it was such a period of service that would allow attracting a suitable number of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty. The idea of reducing the duration of military service by conscription was based on the need to reduce the number of draft dodgers, let's say, with good intentions. They say that if someone does not wish to serve in the ranks of the Russian 2 army of the year, considering such a term too long, the state is ready to make sufficiently substantial concessions and reduce the length of service exactly twice. Intentions, of course, are good, but only everyone knows where the road usually paved with such intentions leads. This is eloquently shown by statistical indicators published by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (Chief Military Prosecutor's Office): if in the 2007 year (before the introduction of innovations associated with a decrease in service life) the army of draft dodgers numbered about 130-140 thousand people, then this (2012 year) who "runs" from the draft board, has reached 235 thousands. In other words, the increase in the number of draft dodgers was about 100 thousand people over the last 5 years! The figure is truly impressive, and indicating that the change in the length of time a young man in the army has the status of a military recruiter does not correlate with the attractiveness of service for the so-called draft dodgers.
It turns out that the main task of reducing the service life for recruits was not fulfilled (at least at the current stage of the program to reform the army).
Let's not forget that the reduction in the length of service for those soldiers who had or have the status of conscripts meant a gradual transition to an increase in the percentage of contract soldiers in the army. For a full-fledged recruitment of the army with contract servicemen, the figure was about 430 thousands of servicemen. To date, the number of servicemen serving under contract in the Russian army does not exceed 200 thousand people (less than 47%). It turns out that the second reason for reducing the service life for recruits does not work to the full.
What is the matter? Where did the failure in the army modernization mechanism occur? Without addressing the corruption components that have recently scored the backbone in the work of the Ministry of Defense, one can note one of the main reasons for the difficulties in recruiting army units. And the reason for this is demographics. Today, young people who were born no later than 1994 are recruited to the army. In the 1994 year, according to Rosstat, 1,408 million were born in the Russian Federation. However, this indicator can not be called a demographic bottom. The fact is that such a level fell down to the 1999 year, and it was in 1999 that the record low birth rate was recorded in Russia - 1,214 million people. It turns out that for at least another five years, the Russian army will feel obvious negative manifestations of the demographic crisis of the 90s. And if the army will feel these manifestations on itself with its whole, sorry, skin, then it is hardly possible to cope with the need for constant rotation of the draft staff every year. It would have been possible if the idea worked with a multiple increase in the number of servicemen serving under the contract. But only here with the complete set of military units by contract servicemen today there are even more problems than with the complete set of their conscripts.
It turns out those who initiated a bill to reduce the service life in the army, did not calculate the likelihood of a significant impact of demographic changes in Russia on the configuration of the Armed Forces. If so, then it is more like our banal "maybe" when you wish for what you want. Like, yes, we knew very well that with the birth rate in 90's there was trouble, but we just wanted the best ...
As a result, such carelessness today brings the first negative fruits. In many divisions, the level of acquisition does not reach the 60% of the norm. Moreover, this state of affairs is not only in parts of the Ministry of Defense, but also in parts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Troops of the FSB of the Russian Federation, and in other agencies that recruit on the basis of draftees (contract soldiers, by the way, too). An interesting trend is observed: the closer the military unit is to the federal center, the more problems its commanders face with completing separate units with contract soldiers. The reason for this is in the level of funding, because in many regions of Russia the monetary allowance of contract sergeant in 20-25 thousand rubles can be called quite acceptable, but in the same Moscow not every young man will want to sign a contract on the specified conditions. Solving the problem with the help of military personnel, who can be called internal Russian migrants (for example, came from Yelets or Saratov to sign a contract in Moscow) is also not easy. Compensation for renting Moscow housing alone can result in a pretty penny for the budget of the military unit ...
But the one-year military service life at the time was also justified by the fact that now, they say, our soldiers will be spared the need to carry out chores. Like, if someone has doubts that in a year you can master military equipment and all military wisdom, then these people must certainly drive such doubts with both hands, because now outsourcers will do all the "dirty" work for the soldier. That is, civil servants who wash for the soldier and the barracks, and clean the potatoes, and even armored personnel carriers with a tank will be repaired. Like, now for a year of service, conscripts will learn more than those who once served for 2-3 years, because the year will go exclusively to tactical, fire and other military training without “spraying” to clean the territory, washing equipment in the fleet and packing of vegetable stores. It would seem that this is also a good that should be made of modern conscripts-conscripts of trained and effective fighters. But, as always, it was smooth on paper ...
Outsourcing takes place only in exemplary parts, where journalists are often invited. However, in the majority of Russian military units, soldiers called up for annual service continue to devote to that same “dirty” work, from which they are supposedly released on paper, much more time than military training.
He served in one of the military units of the Russian Defense Ministry in the Tver region. For all the time of service in the military unit, civilian personnel observed only in the canteen (cooks and cook assistants). At the same time, the cleaning of territories, the park and economic work are carried out exclusively by conscripted soldiers. In the daily routine of the day (with the exception of the weekend) there were records of exercises with military equipment and weapons, the study of their material part, but in fact these classes were conducted extremely rarely. Yes, most soldiers are not particularly and sought to study the methods of warfare and other military wisdom.
He began his service at the training center of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Moscow in the military unit 3792 (commander - colonel Viktor Derkach). The staff was engaged in patrolling the Moscow metro, the streets of the capital. Civilian personnel in the military unit worked in the kitchen, where they periodically sent assistants from among the conscripts. Cleaning, maintenance of equipment, repair of premises was carried out by conscripts. I cannot say that we did daily tactical training and exercises with weapons, the peculiarities of working with suspicious individuals in the subway or on the streets of the city. Fed well. About the new form for explosives just heard ...
These are two small examples of the fact that the Russian army structures (and this is not only the units of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation) are in the best case in a state of transition, when not all military units receive adequate funding for the use of outsourcing companies, which should have freed up their time on professional military training. After all, one can say as much as necessary that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is separate, and the Ministry of Defense is separate, and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs does not seem to fall completely under army reform. But in this case, this is a profound error, because Russian security is not only security from an external enemy. The war in the North Caucasus also demonstrated that the units of any power structures should be ready at any moment to solve the task set for them. And here it would be strange to begin to divide recruits into those who need more combat training while serving, and less who need it ...
It turns out that the designated benefit of the annual service clearly does not become a benefit in terms of the combat capability of the army itself, the effectiveness of all its structures and divisions. Moreover, the conscription service at the level of 12 months leads the commanders of military units to the constant need to puzzle over who he will be, forgive, plug the resulting gap after the dismissal of another group of draftees to the “demobilization”. After all, it often happens that it is necessary to “optimize” the options for work, and, to put it simply, expand the range of responsibilities of each of the military personnel in the conditions of a total under-set of personnel. Yes, and from their own pockets to pay to outsourcing companies for the fact that they took out the trash or cleared the ground from the snow, too, not everyone wants.
In general, a year of service for the recruit himself is certainly not bad, but so far the Russian reality itself, unfortunately (or, fortunately, for whom as), opposes it. After all, even in this case, most often the scripts written at the top on snow-white paper are not able to cover all the nuances of military service. Paper, it can endure, but in reality, everything is not so rosy, as described in the plans for the modernization of the country's defense.
That is why today there are more and more ideas that it is time to increase the service life at least until 1,5 years (if 1,5 will decide something in the conditions of 90's negative demographic echo). But even if we assume that our leaders will decide on the addition to the existing time frame of the service for at least six months, this can cause a huge resonance in society. After all, reducing is one thing, but increasing it is quite another. The decision will be extremely unpopular among the overwhelming majority of the population, which, by and large, are hardly concerned with personnel shortages by contract servicemen and non-compliance with the outsourcing regime of the troops. That is why the state is unlikely to want to start talking today about returning to the “old” service life, which is already confirmed by reports from the Kremlin. No one wants to make such a high-profile decision, even if all the reasons for the need to make such a decision are to be put on the shelves and get the draftees to memorize them before going to bed.
In general, many people understand that it is necessary for the army itself to increase the service life of the draft, but I want to drive such an idea into the legislative framework, and my mother does not want to…
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