On March 14, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Alexander Grushko announced that the grain deal to create a safe corridor for the export of Ukrainian grain from the ports of Odessa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny was extended for 60 days. Of course, this fact irritated part of the patriotic public, because both political scientists and officials have repeatedly argued that this deal is unprofitable for Russia.
At the same time, not a single official explained why, in fact, Russia prolonged this deal? Dmitry Peskov called this event a “goodwill gesture” on the part of Russia, since part of the agreement regarding lifting the ban on the export of Russian fertilizers and food has not yet been implemented, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin made an even more interesting statement than added fuel to the fire .
“As far as the export of Ukrainian food is concerned, it works well, brings considerable profit for Kyiv. And the second part of the package, which concerns Russian fertilizers, does not bring concrete results. In this regard, the Russian side has no objection to the extension of the Grain Deal for 60 days,”
Vershinin said.
Some bloggers called such a statement (not without reason) a symbol of the helplessness of Russian diplomacy. Moreover, based on this quote, it turns out that the deal is being extended, since it is beneficial to Ukraine? Of course this is not so.
In fact, the real reasons that the grain deal was extended are much more trivial and are directly related to the difficult international political situation in which Russia finds itself. The reasons for the extension of the grain agreement and the international political situation will be considered in this material.
The international position of Russia after the start of the NWO
The international prestige of a state is, first of all, its reputation, the authority of the authorities. A favorable image of the state in the international arena is a prerequisite for the successful protection of the interests of the country and its citizens, effective negotiation, and the conclusion of profitable business agreements [1].
The authority of the state in the international arena is far from being an ephemeral category; they are mainly considered with the state that is able to defend its own interests. If the state repeatedly fails and demonstrates weakness, its authority falls.
The American political scientist Hans Morgenthau noted that "international politics, like any other, is a struggle for power ... The goals of foreign policy must be determined in terms of national interest and supported by appropriate force." Morgenthau believed that the desire to convince the whole world that the state has sufficient power, prestige, authority, is the main task of a wise, balanced policy of prestige [2].
After the start of the special military operation, Russia found itself in a rather difficult international political situation, which is gradually deteriorating. Having not completed the military operation in Ukraine in a short time, Russia entered into a proxy war (including economic) with the entire collective West, which supports Kiev, both military and financial resources, while not having a single serious ally, with the exception of Belarus, with its very limited influence on the international arena.
Iran turned out to be the only state that secretly provided military-technical assistance to Russia, but it is not possible to call it a full-fledged ally, moreover, Tehran publicly denies rendering assistance to the Russian Federation. China takes an expectantly neutral position, trying to increase its prestige with the proposals of the “peace plan”, which, according to the author, does not carry any deep meaning, as some political scientists and experts try to present it, and for the most part is an empty shell.
At the same time, it seems that China is not ready to break off relations with the United States (this was also shown by the situation with Taiwan, where China's reputation was dealt a serious blow) and therefore is unlikely to provide serious support to Russia in the conflict in Ukraine. No "anti-American coalition", which, according to some experts, is allegedly being created now, actually does not exist. At least for now.
Russia's geopolitical situation in Europe has also deteriorated. So, after the start of the military operation, Russia de facto lost the European energy market, thereby losing leverage over Europe, which played into the hands of the United States, which strengthened its position in the region. In addition, NATO has strengthened, which will expand with new states (Finland and, probably, Sweden), which creates additional problems for Russia along the entire perimeter of the borders. Moreover, taking advantage of the difficult situation in which Moscow found itself, the Americans (both directly and through European allies) began to put pressure on states that were previously friendly to the Russian Federation to change their attitude towards the Russian Federation. And, for example, in the case of Serbia, it has paid off.
It should be noted that Russia became directly dependent on some states, in particular Turkey, which, after the start of the NMD, seriously increased its influence on the Russian political leadership. It was this factor that played a key role in extending the grain deal.
Turkey's position in the grain deal as a key factor in its prolongation
On March 1, Turkey suddenly stopped parallel imports of sanctioned goods to Russia (and these are laptops, smartphones, tablets, game consoles, etc.), without explanation. The Turkish customs system simply began to block the transit clearance of goods of non-Turkish origin.
It is worth making an important remark here - after the West imposed sanctions against Russia, and electronics manufacturers (which are not produced in Russia) refused to cooperate directly with the Russian Federation, foreign companies appeared to help retailers purchase equipment. Parallel imports were established, the deliveries of brands that left Russia began to be made through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey became an important transit hub. The loss of the Turkish hub may threaten Russia with certain problems.
Some media (for example, Kommersant), citing market participants, reported that these problems could be related to the recent visit to Turkey by Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, who put pressure on both Turkey and the UAE. However, the fact was somehow overlooked that all these events began to take place against the background of the approaching date of the end of the grain deal and the decision on its future fate.
And as soon as Russia announced a “goodwill gesture” in the form of an extension of the grain deal for 60 days, “problems with registration” suddenly disappeared somewhere - VPost reportedthat starting from Tuesday, customs has been steadily releasing cargo by all modes of transport.
Thus, it becomes obvious that the grain deal was extended so that the schemes of parallel imports (and, probably, “gray exports” as well) continued to work, and therefore, there is no question of any “goodwill gesture”. But officials of the Russian Federation cannot say this publicly.
In this regard, the opinion of some experts, for example, political scientist Andrey Nikiforov of radio Sputnik, who said that Russia extended the grain deal not because of blackmail, but allegedly "in order not to weaken the position of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the elections", is presented to the author unconvincing. There was both serious pressure from Turkey and the desire of the Russian Federation not to spoil relations with Recep Erdogan for economic and political reasons.
So, one of the key reasons for extending the grain deal was Turkey's position. However, although this is the key, it is not the only reason.
Let's try to answer the question - what would Russia get out of this deal?
What will happen if Russia withdraws from the grain deal?
There is an opinion that Russia should stop participating in the grain deal and arrest ships going from Odessa to Odessa. For in ships going to Odessa, Kyiv can secretly transport weapon. However, this scenario looks almost unrealistic for several reasons.
Firstly, after the well-known events on Snake Island, which was de facto lost by Russia (“goodwill gesture”), the incident with the Moskva missile cruiser, which sank not without the help of Western-made missiles, and also in connection with the general transition to strategic defense, the Black Sea Fleet lost the ability to block the ports of Odessa.
Secondly, in connection with the above fact, Russia has lost the opportunity to arrest these vessels. Since one of the guarantors of the grain deal is Turkey, whose fleet, frankly, is much stronger fleet The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, the Turks, in the event of Moscow withdrawing from the agreement, can simply supply their escort for dry cargo ships, and the grain deal will continue to function without Russia's participation. Russia will definitely not declare war on Turkey because of this. This fact will be a serious blow to the already not very impressive prestige of Russia in the international arena.
Thirdly, a logical question arises: on the basis of what will Russia arrest these ships? Is there any evidence that they carry weapons? If not, then such actions can be declared piracy, with corresponding consequences - for example, in the form of entry into the Black Sea of the combined fleets of Europe and the United States.
These are the consequences that Russia may face if it withdraws from the grain deal.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Russian Federation found itself in a difficult international political situation, in connection with which the political leadership is deprived of room for maneuver in making decisions.
Использованная литература:
[1]. Quote by Bozadzhiev VL Political psychology: a textbook for students of higher educational institutions. ‒ M.: Publishing House of the Academy of Natural Sciences, 2015.
[2]. Antanovich, N. A. Hans Morgenthau: a realistic theory of international politics / N. A. Antanovich, E. A. Dostanko // Belorus. magazine intl. law and international relations. - 2000. - No. 1. - P. 76–81.