Military Review

A look into the future of modern warfare. Kamikaze drones

A look into the future of modern warfare. Kamikaze drones


In this modest series of articles (although, to be more precise, in the dreams and fantasies of the author), I propose to fantasize a bit about exactly how technologies in the field of information systems and robotics will develop in the near future, and think about the possibilities of their military application.

This series of articles is nothing more than the personal opinion of the author, which by no means claims to be the ultimate truth, but seems important and logical enough to be published in a timely manner.

As a theoretical example of a supposed theater of operations, I propose to consider the conflict of a conditional ally state (it will be, for example, "Mother Rus'") against a hypothetical unfriendly military bloc (for example, let it be a conditional alliance of "North Atlantic Defense Lovers", abbr. C .A.L.O.).

I propose to consider separately both a proxy war with limited forces and a full-scale military conflict of the superpowers.

In the case of a proxy war, by default, it is assumed to conduct hostilities on a front line up to 1 kilometers long, with actions to a similar depth of the territory of a mock enemy, in the role of which any conditional puppet proxy state supported by the hypothetical military bloc S.A.L. .O., with the limited use of advanced weapons of the above bloc and the need to deliver these weapons to the territory of the puppet state.

In the event of a global conflict, a theoretical justification will be given for the possibilities to deprive the conditional S.A.L.O. bloc, in fact, of the desire to unleash this conflict.

In the series of articles there will be no revelations on military topics and information that the author could not easily find in open sources, in general - I will talk more about concepts and theory than about facts and information. Only from time to time we will consider very real weapons and even the capabilities of existing enterprises, of course, using information from official and public sites. So part one...

Drones-kamikaze. Primary requirements

Drones are a new word in the vocabulary of a military man. Someone underestimates them, and someone, on the contrary, is blinded to the loss of reason by the simplicity and efficiency of these machines, but one way or another, this word will have to be returned more than once.

First of all, I would like to point out that kamikaze drones seem to the author to be an extremely promising type of weapon, which is just beginning to reveal its huge potential.

Despite the fact that, for example, the Shaheed-136 drones have already demonstrated high efficiency in practice, further in the article it will be shown in detail that their theoretical potential has not been realized even to a small extent, and ideas are proposed on what needs to be done to implement this functionality to the fullest.

Moreover, there is every reason to assert that even now it is necessary to think about measures to neutralize a new, not yet fully formed, but extremely significant threat.

To begin with, I propose to fantasize a little about what an ideal kamikaze drone could become, consider the necessary qualities, determine technical requirements and think over the most effective tactics of use. In order to better imagine the subject of conversation, we will be forced to use existing drone models as examples and start with the most relevant, namely the modern weapons of the Russian army, as a prototype of the hypothetical "Army of Mother Rus'" from our alternative reality.

So, one of the most important tasks that kamikaze drones (hereinafter - DK) solve on the battlefield is to search for and destroy enemy armored vehicles, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and infantry clusters in open areas and in shelters. In the depths of the theater of military operations, DCs solve the tasks of paralyzing logistics and destroying critical infrastructure facilities if the use of a cruise missile is clearly excessive or impossible (for example, a transformer substation or a wooden footbridge across a stream can become the target of a DC).

Particular attention should be paid to the most valuable possibility of the DK, which has not yet been implemented in practice, to pinpoint the destruction of moving objects deep in the rear of the enemy.

Based on the foregoing, and also not forgetting the conditions and features of the hypothetical conflict between Mother Rus' and the military bloc S.A.L.O. (in an alternative reality), it is already possible to define an outline of the main technical requirements both directly to the DC and to the infrastructure for ensuring their work.

So, DC should:

– have a flight range of at least 1 kilometers;
- be equipped with high-quality search thermal imagers;
– have the ability to receive / transmit data throughout the flight;
- have a sufficiently powerful high-explosive fragmentation warhead;
- equipped with a three-coordinate gyroscopic stabilization system.

DK must have a flight range of at least 1 kilometers.

This is the easiest requirement to understand - since we are considering combat operations at a distance of up to 1 kilometers from the front line, hitting targets in such a deep rear of the enemy may require following a route around areas protected by air defense and active maneuvering, which means that a reserve of flight range and loitering time.

DCs must be equipped with high-quality search thermal imagers.

With this, too, everything is simple - since the ability to search for a target at any time of the day is required, and in any weather, thermal imaging optics is absolutely necessary.

The resolution of the optical system should ideally allow you to accurately identify the type of target from a distance of at least 5 kilometers, but the greater the range of confident target identification, the better in this case.

It is allowed to work “in aerial photography mode”, with a frequency of one frame per few seconds - this will not become a critical drawback, but in fact I would still like to get at least some kind of video sequence - in some cases it is much more convenient to use video, but in this example the quality images are disproportionately more important than the number of frames per second (this will be explained later).

DC must be able to receive / transmit data throughout the flight.

This requirement is unconditional, although it is difficult to fulfill, due to the significant distance between the DC and the operator.

Despite all the complexity, the task is quite solvable, and the importance of its solution is extremely high.

Without the possibility of transmitting a television image, at least in the format of aerial photography and receiving operator commands throughout the entire flight to the target, the potential of the DC will not be revealed even to a small extent (I will explain this in more detail a little later).

It is reasonable to consider satellite communication channels and related equipment as part of the DC data reception/transmission complex.

DK must have a sufficiently powerful high-explosive fragmentation warhead.

The warhead of the drone should be high-explosive fragmentation, with an interactive choice of the type of charge detonation after the drone is launched.

The required power of the warhead is estimated at 50 kg of explosive plus ready-made fragments. Such a warhead should be no less destructive than the FAB-100 high-explosive aerial bomb, which will make it possible to defeat all of the above standard targets with the very first hit and somewhat reduce the requirements for drone guidance accuracy, and in addition, such a carrying capacity will make it possible, if necessary, to equip the DC with a “special” warhead with a capacity of several thousand tons of TNT.

DC must be equipped with a three-coordinate gyroscopic stabilization system.

This is extremely necessary to prevent unwanted yaw in difficult weather conditions, especially at the moment of attacking the target. This should be discussed in more detail…

The fact is that absolutely all armored vehicles of the military bloc S.A.L.O. can be equipped with generators of noise barrage interference in the radio range (in the professional slang of specialists in the field of electronic warfare, they are also called "radio brooms").

The operation of such a system leads to a guaranteed loss of the possibility of "passing" to the receiver of any radio signal within the range of the system, which is usually measured in tens of meters, but can be more.

All of the above suggests that when attacking high-tech armored vehicles of the military bloc S.A.L.O. the loss of the ability to manually control the drone is very likely and, therefore, at the last moment of the attack, the operator will not be able to correct its trajectory.

In addition, interruptions in radio communications are possible even at a greater distance from the object of attack, which can drastically reduce the number of frames transmitted by the drone per unit of time and also complicate the correction of its trajectory, but this should not interfere with the attack, and therefore there are special requirements for stabilizing the drone in space absolutely necessary.

This means that the drone must automatically “remember” the position in space that was indicated to it by the operator when pointing at the target and securely hold this position in any conditions, not allowing itself to deviate from the course by a single degree.

For a better understanding of the problem, I will show a practical example of the use of Russian-made Lancet drones (RIA News").

At first glance, everything may seem perfect, however, if you look closely, you will notice that the work of the stabilization system, although clearly present, is hardly sufficient. The drone scours the course and, although the stabilization system returns it to its previous position, the operator has to periodically correct the trajectory, i.e. if communication is lost a hundred meters from the target, the target could not be destroyed by a direct hit. However, the Lancet is a very light DK, and a slight yaw is likely inevitable in its weight class.

That is why I focus on the fact that the ideal DC should:

- be heavy enough and at the moment of attack have a high specific power and minimum windage in order to confidently withstand adverse weather conditions with minimal deviation from the set course;

- carry a powerful enough warhead to destroy the object of attack even in the event of a slight miss;

- have a high-quality and reliable stabilization system in space (at the time of the attack, the drone must follow the indicated course, as if on rails).

Below I have given another video from RVvoenkory, and this time, most likely, we see the work of "Product-305". I ask you to evaluate the quality of the stabilization system of this rocket - it keeps the indicated course almost perfectly. It is precisely this accuracy that should be achieved when creating an ideal DC (although the comparison with a rocket is not entirely correct).

In general, if Russia was trying to build an ideal DC, I would have the audacity to recommend completely transferring the television control and data transmission systems from the above rocket to the DC, naturally adapting all systems to the latter and supplementing the data transmission system with a satellite communication channel.

Drones-kamikaze. Tactics of application and ways to protect against them

Drones-kamikaze. Application tactics

I would not like to talk here about the most primitive tactics of destroying stationary objects with the guidance of a DC using a global satellite navigation system - all this has already been demonstrated in practice and is well understood.

It is worth mentioning, however, that such a guidance scheme is the most reliable, since even an interactive change in the coordinates of the target after the departure of the DC (change of the target already in flight) requires minimal operator participation, and the transmitted data packets are measured in bytes only, which greatly simplifies the transfer of data to conditions of electronic countermeasures.

Speaking about the more interesting tactics of using the DK, it is necessary, first of all, to mention the absolutely incredible possibility of destroying moving targets even deep behind enemy lines, and first of all, these are trains and especially locomotives, and here's why:

- the train is an extremely visible target;
- the train is not able to move off the tracks and is generally limited in maneuver;
- the railway range is always the most significant component of any military logistics.

All of the above makes railway tracks especially vulnerable to DCs with the characteristics stated in the previous chapter. All that is required is to send a detachment of 3-5 DK along the enemy’s railway and observe their search cameras, which can even work in the “aerial photography” mode, that is, in the most favorable mode for data transmission.

When a train is detected, it is enough to determine its approximate coordinates, direction and speed. Knowing your own DC coordinates, all this is done elementarily.

Then the DK detachment (all but one of them) is given the coordinates of the attack objects in such a way as to form a continuous chain of destruction with a step of 100–200 meters on the railway track along the train, while at least one of the drones with with a high probability of getting into the train, and the rest will destroy the railway tracks in front of the locomotive and with a high probability will provoke a derailment of the train.

After that, the remaining DK clarifies the coordinates of the immobilized locomotive and finishes it off with one precise blow.

Please note that the above tactic does not require the transmission of a video stream at all, but works exclusively with the transmission of photographs and global navigation systems, which makes it extremely resistant to electronic warfare.

If the enemy does not have a powerful electronic warfare system, then destroying the locomotive with a direct hit from a single DC, induced by a video camera, is a couple of trifles and, probably, even too simple.

Thus, it is possible to completely deprive the enemy of the opportunity to use the railway communication and destroy all of his locomotives in a relatively short time.

All of the above is equally true for the destruction of sea / river transport.

The ability to bring the DC to a stationary target (for example, an airfield) solely according to the data of navigation systems, using only aerial photography to clarify the coordinates of targets (for example, aircraft) and to destroy all targets with precise strikes is an invaluable opportunity for a DC.

Today, DKs fly strictly "in a straight line", as if on rails, which makes them vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and pursuit aviation, but in fact, the DK is an incredibly maneuverable target, and it would be more correct to lay their routes not in a straight line, but in “broken lines” (this can be easily foreseen programmatically in the DK control system).

Performing active maneuvering along the course and altitude, the DK becomes extremely a difficult target for any interception attempt.

Drones-kamikaze. ways to protect against them. A few words about Starlink

With this part of the article, dear readers, everything was very difficult. When the first version of it was ready, rereading it, I suddenly realized that I did not have the necessary knowledge to cope with this topic, and at first I decided to do without it, but again and again I came to the conclusion that this most important part of this article could not not be mentioned at least superficially.

I ask you to excuse the author in advance for possible inaccuracies - the topic of conversation is technically difficult and, perhaps, somewhere I did not have enough knowledge, but in no case should I touch it.

We will talk about the simplest and most effective way to counter the DC, namely depriving the enemy of the ability to use satellite data transmission systems, without which the realization of the huge potential of the DC to destroy critical infrastructure in the deep rear will be significantly difficult.

As an example of a satellite data transmission system, I propose to consider Starlink as the most technologically advanced and complete example of such a system.

Let me remind you that Starlink is a constellation, which in the final version may have about 40 low-orbit satellites, which will make it possible to form a continuous data transmission field over most of the surface of our planet.

Particular attention should be paid to the military potential of the system, as well as to the military satellites of the Starshield system, which are equipped with multiple more powerful data transmission systems and are integrated into the Starlink constellation, thanks to the equipment unified with it.

In addition to the above, mention should be made of:

- extremely high combat stability of such systems;
- some non-obvious, but their most important qualities;
- how to deal with them.

Speaking of high combat stability, it should be noted, firstly, the practical impossibility of destroying a satellite system like Starlink (at least selectively).

The fact is that any attempt to destroy tens of thousands of satellites at approximately equal heights will inevitably lead to the appearance of millions of fragments that will fill outer space and make it almost impossible to distinguish active satellites among them, and this is not to mention the fact that satellites can be equipped with false targets. , which will be used at a certain moment: just imagine how 40 satellites simultaneously shoot 000 decoys from themselves each and change their orbits (they have engines for this).

The above means the possibility of "sudden" appearance of 400 decoys and the simultaneous de-orbiting of 000 satellites, and an attempt to destroy them will only multiply the number of decoys by the number of debris.

In addition, the latest generation of Starlink satellites are equipped with a laser data transmission system. This means that the Starlink laser data network:

- absolutely reliably protected from the effects of electronic warfare;
– does not emit radio waves during data transmission;
– provides communication absolutely protected from any interception.

At the moment, there is no exact information about the possibility of "laser" data transmission, say, from outer space to an object in the Earth's atmosphere and vice versa, but if such a possibility is realized, then connecting enemy UAVs, aircraft and helicopters to the Starlink network will hammer the last nail in the lid the coffin of any anti-satellite electronic warfare system.

Moreover, if we are already talking about electronic warfare, then one cannot fail to note the theoretical possibility of using the Starlink network as a global electronic warfare system.

Of particular note are the satellites of the Starshield system - they are much heavier than standard Starlink satellites and are designed to install an additional load, which can include anything - including electronic warfare systems, the operation of which will absolutely not affect the operation of the indicated satellite constellation with a laser data transmission system, but as for less advanced satellites, the inclusion of several thousand electronic warfare stations at once in low orbits can allow the enemy to completely disrupt data transmission over radio channels.

Thus, with the help of Starlink, two key problems can be solved at once in the context of combating DC (kamikaze drones) and ensuring their operation. On the one hand, it becomes possible to suppress the work of an enemy satellite constellation with the help of an orbital electronic warfare system, and on the other hand, to provide their DCs with reliable communications anywhere in the world. If the DC can be equipped with a laser data transmission system compatible with the satellite system, then technical perfection and reliability become almost absolute.

Returning to the alternative reality to the confrontation of "Mother Rus'" against the military bloc S.A.L.O., we can say the following.

As the only possible strategy for combating such satellite systems, the author considers the real possibility of creating an orbital constellation consisting of several dozen satellites equipped with thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of at least 10 megatons of TNT or more.

Simultaneous detonation of, say, fifty sufficiently powerful thermonuclear warheads at altitudes of 300-400 kilometers or more is guaranteed to lead to the formation of the strongest artificial radiation belts, including in low orbits of interest to us in this context, on which the above satellite constellations are located.

Even protected from EMP and other damaging factors of a nuclear explosion, space systems will not be able to withstand the impact of high-energy charged particles (penetrating radiation) inside artificial radiation belts for a long time, which can last (depending on the activity of the Sun) up to several years or more, completely blocking any possibility technical use of near space in a given period of time.

Thus, it is possible to destroy all 40 satellites with one blow, if necessary. In general, most likely, 000% of all satellites in near-Earth orbit will not be able to “survive” such a “geostorm” and will be lost within a few weeks or even days from the moment the thermonuclear warheads are detonated, which sharply limits the above possibility in use.

virtual conflict

Nuclear explosions in orbit are possible only in a global conflict of superpowers, but it is unlikely that such measures would be approved in a local conflict of Mother Rus' against puppet state entities supported by the S.A.L.O. Wrong format and high risks of nuclear escalation.

Thus, the only really applicable alternative in the context of a local conflict remains the development of a similar satellite system by Russ-Mother, the deployment of a possibly smaller but sufficient number of communication satellites, and the development of secure laser data transmission systems for them.

The conditional "Mother Rus'" has the advantage that there is no need to cover the entire globe with communications satellites - it is enough to provide its territory and the territories of neighboring states with high-quality military satellite communications channels, because a defensive strategy does not require more, which means - for to achieve the same density of the satellite constellation, a many times smaller number of satellites will suffice. In addition, one should not forget about the possibility of urgently hanging a heavy communications satellite into a geostationary orbit over the area of ​​interest.

If we talk about distributed systems, then it is no secret that some corporations not so long ago successfully tested a prototype of the so-called. a radio photon radar, which is characterized by the highest noise immunity, power, compact size and, in theory, can be used not only to obtain ultra-highly detailed radar images, but also for the most secure radio communications and even as an electronic warfare system.

Mother Rus', like its prototype from reality, has already created such a potential, and it would be perfectly reasonable to use it to create a global low-orbit system of ultra-high-detail radar reconnaissance, a satellite network for noise-immune data transmission and even electronic warfare, plus all this on based on the latest technology ROFAR - the latest word in science in the field of radar.

The specified option for building a universal multifunctional satellite network based on ROFAR, if it were implemented in reality, according to the author, would qualitatively neutralize all the advantages of the Elon Musk system, create, perhaps, even a better satellite data transmission system and not empty the treasury to the last pennies.

The presence of an orbital electronic warfare system based on radio photonics technology would allow Mother Rus', for example, to suppress GPS signals throughout the entire territory of the specified system, which would not only be the most effective way to protect its territory from a spacecraft, but would also cast doubt on the characteristics of a controlled by GPS precision weapons in general.

Moreover, even if it is not possible to completely suppress the communication channels, the resolution of the radar based on radio photonics (ROFAR) declared by the developer makes it possible to detect a drone in the Shaheed-136 form factor even from low Earth orbit, while completely eliminating the possibility of an air defense breakthrough on extremely and even at prohibitively low altitudes (and this is one of the most unpleasant advantages of the DC).

The ability to track hundreds and even thousands of DKs, including those breaking through at prohibitively low altitudes, to transmit comprehensive information about each of the attacking drones in real time and to any position is priceless.


So - in the first part of the cycle, we only slightly touched on the truly impressive capabilities of unmanned robotics, in particular kamikaze drones, and very clearly specified the military future of satellite data transmission systems, especially in interaction with the above unmanned vehicles.

I believe that people who make strategic decisions get the most complete picture of what is happening in the world of military robotics. I hope that if once the army significantly underestimated the potential of robotics in the field of light reconnaissance quadrocopters, then the second time nothing like this should happen again.

This means that we will also consider at least the capabilities of light and heavy reconnaissance and strike drones, robotic armies, the essence of the so-called. "gigafactory" and methods of programming society as a format for attacking the state.

To be continued ...

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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 9 December 2022 05: 35
    A look into the future of modern warfare.
    I really don’t want any modern wars in the future. And so the beautiful is far away, it has not become beautiful.
    1. Civil
      Civil 9 December 2022 08: 04
      This is already the present, and some of what the Author describes is already the past in modern armies.
      1. Alien From
        Alien From 9 December 2022 14: 22
        Artillery - God of War. Alas, the past.
        1. Sergey Romanchenko
          Sergey Romanchenko 10 December 2022 02: 55
          I don't agree with you.
          Artillery is one of the most effective and cheap ways, in terms of the cost of physical energy, to deliver goods over distances.

          Well look.
          It consists of a cylinder and a piston.
          If the object is of sufficient size, it can rise up to 10 km where the air resistance is much lower. And give this object a wing, then it can glide 1/10, that is, from 10 km it can fly 100 km.
          And not what ramjet-155s are needed in FIG if there are a lot of them and guided heavy shells.
          You understand the logic.
          If you plunge into the imagination.
          B-37 naval gun in 1950 43 cm 50 calibers I shoot at 40 km, although the deviation was 1/600.
          The weight of the projectile is one ton. The thickness of the shirt was a few centimeters of steel, if you make rudders and controls, then God have mercy on them.
          After all, if we simplify it, this is the delivery of gooses, kinetic or high-explosive, to the enemy and as accurately as possible.
          After all, the good old artillery has the highest efficiency.

          All that remains is the development of shells and their guidance and planning is possible.
  2. User_neydobniu
    User_neydobniu 9 December 2022 06: 24
    DK must have a flight range of at least 1 kilometers.
    DCs must be equipped with high-quality search thermal imagers.
    DC must be able to receive / transmit data throughout the flight.

    And there will be such drones as worth the floor of an airplane ....
    Kamikaze drones do not need to have an exorbitant range, it is enough to adapt a carrier for them that will take them to the operation square (the time spent in the air is a really important parameter so that the drone can search for a target for at least 6 hours)
    A high-quality thermal imager is expensive, so the minimum necessary means of detecting an enemy must be installed (the same inexpensive thermal imaging matrices that are on Chinese smartphones, + optical sensors)
    Receiving / transmitting data is generally superfluous, there is enough ROM in which the main signatures of the targets being hit are clogged, and then let the drone itself, checking this data, look for a target for itself
    1. alexoff
      alexoff 10 December 2022 01: 50
      Well, if we assume that Mother Rus' launched a "sphere" and a terminal with a couple of megabits of a channel costs a couple of hundred thousand rubles, and a good 1024 resolution thermal imager costs about half a million rubles, we will double the amount for brains and an encryption system. And in principle, a smart geranium will cost as much as two or three stupid ones. And cheaper than a whirlwind, which is completely stupid
    2. shikin
      shikin 10 December 2022 16: 45
      I'll add my pennies.
      The author, it seems to me, mixed the first and second, added compote and an appetizer. What for? Why for all occasions one model of recreation center? It seems to me that there should be a wide range of such drones, from Lancet-1 to Geranium-2 (roughly speaking). There are many tasks for the DC - from the front line to the strategic rear. And chasing a drone with a bunch of bells and whistles and a 50 kg warhead for a separate howitzer or truck, especially in the far rear, will somehow be too expensive. And expensive - it means that there will be much fewer such drones than simpler ones like the Lancet. And DK, especially for the frontline, now needs a lot.
      I don’t know, maybe it’s worth creating a separate branch of the military (in close connection with the rest) for the best use of drones, thinking through and practicing different tactics for their use, in accordance with different tasks and forming these lines of drones, as well as training a lot of personnel for service and management.
  3. rotmistr60
    rotmistr60 9 December 2022 06: 27
    The author's view of modern warfare can be supported, especially since in terms of kamikaze drones this has already been tested and successfully applied in practice. But why does the author, following the example of the Ukrainian side, call "Gerani"
    for example drones "Shaheed-136"
    1. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 09: 45
      I don't even know what to say... but thanks for the support.
      1. Eule
        Eule 9 December 2022 10: 32
        For starters, there are the wonderful Russian terms "projectile" and "cruise missile". So "kamikaze drone" is superfluous.
        Price is the main issue. All described systems are expensive. A small chance to reduce their cost - to reduce the requirements for reliability. Since almost all these functions are in ordinary smartphones that break when they fall on the floor, then it is solvable.
        Up to the "alteration" of the "telephone kits" ordered in China for that, consisting of boards with parts, but the camera, magnetometer, accelrometers, and battery separately. So you can bypass any supply restrictions, order "telephone kits" without cases, but with the necessary cameras and sensors.
        The destruction of the railway does not require the difficulties you described. Simply fly the inertial system to the tracks, locate them, and fly at a height of 3m along the left track. There will be a hit on the locomotive "on the forehead", with damage to the entire control system and the defeat of the crew of machinists, without factory repairs it will not go further.
        The same with bridges - exit according to the program to the river, and flight along the smallest isobath, just an outboard thermometer is needed. Above the water, the air is a little colder, the flight is strictly along the fairway. It is also possible to accidentally "clog" a tugboat, but it also costs more than a projectile aircraft, so it will not be in vain.
        1. Alexior_Brante
          9 December 2022 10: 43
          I agree, but you won’t fly much on electrified tracks ... but you can use a neural network-based guidance system that will find the locomotive and point the drone at it.
          The fact is that neural networks are still unreliable and a cunning enemy can deceive them, and as for the high cost, you correctly noted that it’s actually not so expensive to equip a UAV with the necessary things, and if you don’t try and develop production, you can lagging far behind.
          There will be a cycle of three articles, they are already being moderated - in the third part, this risk will be discussed in more detail.
          Thank you for your feedback.
    2. Hypertension
      Hypertension 9 December 2022 13: 02
      Quote: rotmistr60
      But why does the author, following the example of the Ukrainian side, call "Gerani"
      for example drones "Shaheed-136"

      Maybe because it's fair? From Russia, only the name is stuck there. Simonyan and Solovyov say: "Stop lying." That's why "Shaheed-136". To tell the truth.
  4. Nikolay Malyugin
    Nikolay Malyugin 9 December 2022 06: 36
    Any long-range drone requires escort on the ground. So they came to safety in their own country. I am more than sure that the drones that flew inland were escorted in our country.
    1. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 09: 44
      Let me disagree - starlink successfully works with jet aircraft on the fly, i.e., the S.A.L.O block. it’s not a problem at all to connect a drone to a satellite system and they can control it even from the white house.
    2. filibuster
      filibuster 9 December 2022 11: 16
      Why do they need an escort? GPS/GLONASS in the simplest case.
  5. KCA
    KCA 9 December 2022 06: 45
    I doubt that 260 kg of the Starlink satellite can fit both radio equipment and laser equipment, from which laser equipment will be powered, and clean, cloudless days in the Central part of Russia can be counted on the fingers a year
    1. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 09: 49
      If I'm not mistaken, then the new generation of satellites is much heavier than 260 kg, and the Starshield (military version) is still about a ton.
      1. Alien From
        Alien From 9 December 2022 14: 31
        Author, in your opinion, is it possible to use the cheapest smartphone as the main processor / computing center in drones? (I am far from this topic)
        1. Alexior_Brante
          9 December 2022 16: 16
          Smartphone - no. But if you order it as a "car kit" - a separate processor, memory, data storage device - why not?
          Everything depends on reliability - a smartphone is subject to EMP, electronic warfare, and so on, but it makes no difference to the smartphone's processor, its memory, data storage, which program to execute - it's just computing power and controllers.
          The computing power of even the most budget smartphone is more than enough for any task that is not related to the operation of neural networks (AI), which require special accelerators (or video cards, but the smartphone will not pull it).
          1. Alien From
            Alien From 9 December 2022 16: 20
            Got it, thanks for the reply hi looking forward to the next articles!
      2. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 10 December 2022 18: 06
        Starlink's laser communication is only between satellites, and due to their low power (for electronic warfare), they will not be able to effectively set radio interference, because 2-4 devices fly over a specific place at the same time.
        1. Alexior_Brante
          10 December 2022 22: 08
          And what is "between satellites"? For example, the MiG-31 in the stratosphere - is it already a "satellite" or not yet?
          Then - can't they, for example, disrupt the operation of GPS or suppress the operation of such satellite systems? ...radiating at the same frequencies as the object of attack, with the maximum signal frequency? So you can suppress a lot of things.
          1. Vladimir_2U
            Vladimir_2U 11 December 2022 12: 51
            Quote from: Alexior_Brante
            And what is "between satellites"? For example, the MiG-31 in the stratosphere - is it already a "satellite" or not yet?

            A satellite is a satellite, only low and not orbital, and does not communicate with other similar "satellites" with lasers.

            Quote from: Alexior_Brante
            Then - can't they, for example, disrupt the operation of GPS or suppress the operation of such satellite systems? ...radiating at the same frequencies as the object of attack, with the maximum signal frequency? So you can suppress a lot of things.
            You should at least study the question a little bit before writing nonsense about laser interference, about GPS interference from Starlinks ... And it's not even about the radio signal frequencies ...
            1. Alexior_Brante
              11 December 2022 14: 31
              You, obviously, did not understand me - I never spoke about "interference with lasers" - on the contrary, I pointed out the impossibility of anything like that.
              As for the possibility of interfering with the GPS signal - I would love to hear from a more knowledgeable person, such a scenario seems to me possible (imagine if 40 thousand satellites begin to radiate in the GPS frequency range - wouldn't this cause huge errors in determining coordinates on Earth? ).
              1. Vladimir_2U
                Vladimir_2U 11 December 2022 16: 44
                Quote from: Alexior_Brante
                You, obviously, did not understand me - I never spoke about "interference with lasers" - on the contrary, I pointed out the impossibility of anything like that.
                Yes, some, some, there was a misunderstanding, I also confused the setting of interference with the impossibility of setting. So, for Starlink, even medium cloudiness reduces the data transfer rate, in the radio range!, let alone the laser ... But about interference - suppressing data transmission to the ground from Starlink is really problematic, BUT this is based on a very accurate data transmission from Earth for subscriber positioning! And here an accurate transmission means a sensitive receiving antenna ON THE SATELLITE! And this antenna is completely choked by directional interference ... And imagine how easy it will be to press a certain receiving lens on a satellite with a laser.

                Quote from: Alexior_Brante
                imagine if 40 satellites started to radiate in the frequency range of the GPS - wouldn't this cause huge errors in determining the coordinates on Earth?

                Well, damn it, the difference in the range, the difference in the height of the orbit, the difference in the speed of the satellite is not even once, but once - does it make sense to crush the signal of the American system to the Americans? Two - does it make sense for this (there is Glonass, Baidou) to use a communication system?
  6. Carib
    Carib 9 December 2022 07: 58
    Thank you. There are moments with which, as an engineer, he does not agree, but this is more likely not to the possibilities, but to the intricacies of the implementation. But a deep analysis of complementary characteristics and capabilities surprised. There is something to think about and take into account.
    1. agond
      agond 9 December 2022 08: 56
      Quote from: User_neydobniu
      And there will be such drones as worth the floor of an airplane ....

      Back in 2003, a record was set for the flight range of a radio-controlled model of 3010 km over the Atlantic made by an amateur (the weight of the model was somewhere around 7 kg, including 4 kg of fuel), today it’s not a question for the S.A.L.O. cheap UAVs with satellite communications, it can be argued that by the spring of 2023 there will be many different types of them.
      As the author rightly noted, the only effective way to fight can only be EMP in space, for example, anywhere over the Arctic or even over Siberia, such as we do what we want over our territory.
      By the way, if the drone has AI elements, then it does not need to be controlled and it needs communication, it will find what it needs.
      1. nickname7
        nickname7 9 December 2022 15: 09
        EMP in space, for example, anywhere over the Arctic or even over Siberia, like we do whatever we want over our territory.

        Then you will need to give a written guarantee to the MoD that you will not be indignant that your laptop, TV and hearing aid will burn.
    2. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 09: 47
      Thank you for reading and giving your assessment, but a deep analysis will be in the second part, which is currently being moderated - in general, there are already many answers to the questions that were raised here in the discussion in the comments.
  7. evgen1221
    evgen1221 9 December 2022 09: 09
    Nuclear weapons still need to be brought into space safely, it will be unpleasant to blow up a loaf over your territory yourself. The withdrawal of one of the powers into space Yao automatically gives the right to do so to others, well, and in my opinion it’s cheaper to launch something with a shrapnel cassette then and litter all orbits plus hunter satellites to eliminate those that remain later.
    1. agond
      agond 9 December 2022 09: 29
      It will take a lot of small "shots" of tungsten, a heavy one will slow down more slowly in low orbits, balls with a diameter of 1 mm are not easy to detect, ideally the orbits should be oncoming, that is, the rocket must be launched against the rotation of the Earth, but it is even difficult to roughly estimate how many balls will be needed, not enough missiles.
      1. evgen1221
        evgen1221 9 December 2022 09: 38
        The orbits are known, the speed is known, launch n-satellites with boosters, put them in the right order, accelerate the satellite faster than the target’s speed and shoot shrapnel nails on a catch-up course, until there is enough energy to knock something down, and then well, let’s say the nails slow down, so there’s no target which means she herself flies into a cloud of fragments and hello to the kitten. In this way, there are not so many charges for the wall of fragments on the path of the satellites that need to be done, minus-shooting down will be all indiscriminately.
  8. vovochkarzhevsky
    vovochkarzhevsky 9 December 2022 09: 32
    What kind of maniacal desire to increase the cost of ammunition? Long-range kamikaze drones have been around for a long time, these are missiles.
    But damn it, let's separate the flies from the cutlets. Reconnaissance and guidance separately and striking a target, separately. And therefore, expensive reconnaissance, search and guidance equipment should still be installed on reconnaissance UAVs. Which, if they are shot down, then at least a few missiles will have time to direct.
    I understand the author’s desire to hang thousands of the kamikaze drones he mentioned over the enemy, but such a war will ruin, first of all, its own economy.
    In my opinion, it is even necessary to reconsider the tactics of using loitering ammunition. It is also not the best idea to combine search and strike functions in one ammunition.
    I would organize everything according to the principle of cellular communication.
    For example, for a certain area, let's say a dozen search and guidance UAVs are launched, which will be brought together into a kind of network. Well, each such reconnaissance drone will already be assigned kamikaze drones, with a minimum of equipment, only for guidance, due to which the warhead is increased. About six pieces per scout. But strikers should have the function of reassignment to other scouts, in case of loss of them, or the need to concentrate the strike.
    1. Maxim G
      Maxim G 9 December 2022 10: 19
      Here the question is, who in their right mind will let a dozen celestial sluggards into this particular area.
      Air defense should be completely full of holes.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. vovochkarzhevsky
        vovochkarzhevsky 9 December 2022 18: 22
        It's all about cost. Shooting down ATGM-level ammunition is more expensive for yourself.
        1. Maxim G
          Maxim G 9 December 2022 18: 44
          What to shoot down.
          If these are machine guns and anti-aircraft artillery with radar, then it will be inexpensive to shoot down drones.

          There are KAZs against ATGMs - losing a tank or infantry fighting vehicle / armored personnel carrier is more expensive.
          1. vovochkarzhevsky
            vovochkarzhevsky 9 December 2022 19: 58
            It's not all that simple. Moreover, no one excludes the use of false targets.
            1. Maxim G
              Maxim G 11 December 2022 09: 18
              Those. stealth from the radar (a relatively high flight altitude for radar detection) and the swiftness of the attack (the flight speed is also low) are immediately swept aside, and the stake is on deceiving the enemy?
              1. vovochkarzhevsky
                vovochkarzhevsky 11 December 2022 10: 22
                Yeah, the principle that trees are better to hide in the forest.
                1. Maxim G
                  Maxim G 11 December 2022 12: 31
                  Airbus and MBDA are going this way - Remote Carriers UAVs will be suspended on fighters, and larger ones will be produced from the A400 - reconnaissance, electronic warfare, apparently can be used as traps, or undermined as anti-missiles, disposable or reusable (judging by the Western press).
                  But everything is very streamlined.
    2. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 10: 50
      Quite rightly - one full-fledged reconnaissance and strike UAV is quite capable of leading a kamikaze group without a target search system (you can strengthen the warhead with it in favor of abandoning the camera, for example).
      You don’t even have to link them together - just transfer the coordinates of the targets identified by the reconnaissance to data packets to the kamikaze and everything will work.
      1. vovochkarzhevsky
        vovochkarzhevsky 11 December 2022 10: 27
        Here the point is not what to tie together, but to direct any of the kamikaze UAVs through any reconnaissance UAV.
        Okay, I'll try one of these days to present my idea in more detail, with diagrams.
        1. Alexior_Brante
          11 December 2022 12: 04
          Very interesting, but my IMHO - this is possible only if there is an analogue of Starlink, otherwise it will take some insane number of UAVs to create a "cellular network" from them (if I understand you correctly).
        2. Timur_kz
          Timur_kz 12 December 2022 01: 11
          And how will he lead? If you need to accurately hit, and even on a moving object, then it is only to highlight with a laser. In this case, you already get a bayraktar, which itself can take ammunition, but it will also not shine on the radar like a geranium. Actually because of this, such losses in eagles and bayraktars.
    3. Timur_kz
      Timur_kz 12 December 2022 01: 16
      The reconnaissance turns out to be large, without laser guidance it will not direct anyone. If you feel sorry for the equipment on the kamikaze, then you can drop the warhead and try to go back. Such a dive drone will work. The range is true to be drastically reduced, but does a large radius per 1000 km make sense? 150-300 km is enough to get the enemy.
  9. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 9 December 2022 10: 46
    So, DC should:

    – have a flight range of at least 1 kilometers;
    - be equipped with high-quality search thermal imagers;
    – have the ability to receive / transmit data throughout the flight;
    - have a sufficiently powerful high-explosive fragmentation warhead;
    - equipped with a three-coordinate gyroscopic stabilization system.

    Such an UAV is called a cruise missile with OE seeker guidance in the final section.
    Taking into account the cost of the OES, a communication system (including relay components) and an intelligence system that provides data output for real-time target designation at a distance of 1500 km (without such a control unit, it is impossible to hit moving targets) - such UAVs will be golden.
  10. Alexander Vorontsov
    Alexander Vorontsov 9 December 2022 11: 54
    In the first video, the dude seemed to be torn by a cumulative jet ...

  11. kor1vet1974
    kor1vet1974 9 December 2022 12: 14
    Kamikaze drones
    Everything returns to normal .. In the 30s in the USSR, the Grokhovsky Design Bureau, a ram plane was developed .. Not a drone, and narrower tasks .. But still
  12. Zaurbek
    Zaurbek 9 December 2022 12: 32
    Something mixed up.....
    Firstly, one should not confuse the DC (like the Lancet) with the ersatz DC (like the Shahid) .... here both are conceptually worthy devices. I think that first you need to create all the standard sizes of the main recreation centers, modularly for both GOS. There is no need to invent standard sizes, the Jews have them all. Lancet 1-3 with an e / motor and larger than an aircraft with an internal combustion engine.
    And then (analogues of the Shahids) are needed for strikes in depth and the fight against air defense
    (Analogues of the Lancets) - patrolling a given area with a strike on the targets found.

    It is worth comparing the similar in size and ICE Geranium2 and Jewish Harop ..... they do not replace each other and can have the same airframe and only different GOS
  13. Illanatol
    Illanatol 9 December 2022 13: 21
    Quote: Zaurbek
    And then (analogues of the Shahids) are needed for strikes in depth and the fight against air defense
    (Analogues of the Lancets) - patrolling a given area with a strike on the targets found.

    And also specialized air carriers for them, capable of carrying masses of such drones. Airplanes, helicopters, airships, maybe even screen planes.
  14. Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 9 December 2022 13: 35
    And how much will this kamikaze drone cost?
    1. Alexior_Brante
      9 December 2022 14: 11
      It depends on what are the requirements for the reliability of protection against EMP - if you don’t bother too much, then:
      processor / memory / camera / GLONASS - this is the price of a budget xiaomi i.e. 20 tr.
      medium-sized light amplifier / thermal imager (night vision) - this is 50/150 tr.
      satellite communication - 100 tr.
      engine - 100 tr.
      everything else (with a large margin) - 200 tr.

      Total: 20 + 50/150 + 100 + 100 + 200 = 470/570 tr.

      This is, of course, offhand...
  15. valek97
    valek97 9 December 2022 14: 19
    Author. Only many for some reason do not look at the civilian. Let's say a robot-womb (battery, generator (atomic), assembler (resources and sometime later autonomous lines)) and small drones. In civilian life, there is forestry, for example. These drones would clean up and monitor the forest, cut off the surplus and remains of trees or turn them into energy and resources. In wartime, conversion to collection and release for the needs of the war. Let the old mines be taken away for such drones, let them swarm and slowly refine the adits, giving resources. Many will say - ha fantastic. So there is no need to chase miniaturization. Nothing prevents you from making it empty not with a large number of batteries, but with an internal combustion engine or another system in order to try out the idea in life. The Americans, back in 2000, sort of tested a robot that is powered by collected materials, corpses, etc. Now it would be possible to build a base for this, and in time we would stop being so dependent on external factors and eventually reach full automation. Over time, to give the opportunity for self-assembly and replication in the field, let's say according to the 28 nm process technology, they recreate themselves and let them breed under control.
  16. Raccoon Raccoon
    Raccoon Raccoon 9 December 2022 16: 31
    Reminds me of a Soviet joke. "The smart bomb test failed because the scientists couldn't push it out of the plane." Interestingly presented.
    1. agond
      agond 9 December 2022 16: 59
      If the drone has an image recognition system, then you can do without satellite navigation and even without communication with the operator at all
  17. Garik Gorkin
    Garik Gorkin 9 December 2022 20: 37
    As I understand it, starlink laser transmission is used ONLY to communicate starlink satellites with EACH OTHER, but not for communication with ground terminals, because. it is unreliable due to weather changes.
    1. Alexior_Brante
      10 December 2022 08: 32
      As far as I know, this is true, but ... here, for example, the MiG-31 - it flies in the stratosphere and, most likely, could communicate with satellites via laser communication too.
    2. Vladimir_2U
      Vladimir_2U 10 December 2022 18: 09
      Quote: Garik Gorkin
      because it is unreliable due to weather changes.

      Moreover, the cloudiness of the I-no itself, the main task of the SL, makes it unstable
  18. bulat
    bulat 9 December 2022 20: 39
    With drones, just like with aviation, it is necessary to introduce a classification and division into front-line and strategic drones. Decide what we want. large impact action and strategic with long range.
    1. valek97
      valek97 10 December 2022 12: 49
      For some reason, when they talk about drones, they forget support / logistics and civilian drones. Civilians can be made more than military ...
      1. Blackgrifon
        Blackgrifon 10 December 2022 23: 49
        KAMAZ is just launching an experiment on the transportation of goods by unmanned trucks on one of the toll roads. Although for the army, the option with a control vehicle (the leader of the caravan) and a string of unmanned trucks connected to it is more preferable.
        1. valek97
          valek97 11 December 2022 02: 25
          Yes, at least remote control, like with drones in the movies. What for to lose people, if you can organize such convoys, shifts of 3 pieces for 8 hours.
  19. Blackgrifon
    Blackgrifon 10 December 2022 23: 47
    An interesting article, but there is one BUT - 1500 km is a heavy drone and their use is not tactical in nature. But "on the ground" drones such as a switchblade knife can have a greater impact - but their range should be at least 10 km. In fact, this is the same spike.
  20. The comment was deleted.
  21. Barberry25
    Barberry25 12 December 2022 13: 22
    how chaotic everything is .. before you come up with something, you need to determine the goals and objectives ...
  22. DemikSPb
    DemikSPb 13 December 2022 23: 19
    I propose a variant of the kamikaze drone complex. The most expensive components are the communication and video surveillance system. Accordingly, to work in depth, you can use a reusable and expensive drone observer, which can be used as a repeater. And the kamikaze drones themselves are without an expensive video camera, without a powerful radio station, with a small resource. Kamikaze takes off on the call of the observer.
  23. Keer
    Keer 15 December 2022 04: 20
    In drones, the top line is a swarm. For example, a bunch of inexpensive drones with low-power emitters - receivers, with the ability to control their coordinates, and correctly implemented delays, can work like a high-power phased array and give a picture orders of magnitude better than any AWACS radar. It is possible to differentiate tasks in one swarm consisting of drones carrying mini radars, thermal imagers and other detection equipment and strikers carrying warheads.