Alone against a coalition of European powers: the reasons for the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War
In Russian historiography regarding the Eastern (Crimean) War, a lot has been written directly about the defense of Sevastopol and the fighting in the Crimea, however story Russian military planning, until recently, did not stand out as an independent issue. Meanwhile, the problem of strategic planning requires an integrated approach that will reveal the close interconnection of Russia's domestic, foreign, and military policy.
In 2019, a book by the historian Alexei Krivopalov was published, in which he revealed this topic in sufficient detail, and also examined the role of Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich in the Eastern Crisis and the Russian foreign policy strategy in the final seven years of the reign of Nicholas I. The factual material of Krivopalov’s work “Field Marshal I. F Paskevich and Russian strategy in 1848–1856. contributed to the writing of this material and will be cited frequently in what follows.
If the revolutionary crisis of 1848-1849, thanks to the efforts of the participants in the "European concert", did not cause a pan-European war, then the conflict in the Middle East in 1851-1852. rapidly got out of control and turned into a confrontation between an isolated Russia and a powerful Western European coalition along almost the entire perimeter of the western and southern borders of the empire [1].
In this material, we will try to answer the questions - what events led to the Eastern Crisis of 1853-1856? Was the Russian strategy in the final seven years of the reign of Nicholas I a failure, discrediting all the results of military construction in the 1830s-1840s? To what extent is Field Marshal Paskevich responsible for the outcome of the Crimean War?
The Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire in the 1830s–1850s
Emperor Nicholas I
In the second quarter of the 1830th century, two problems arose in the foreign policy of the Russian Empire and other European powers - the revolutionary danger and the Eastern question. At this time, Europe experienced two revolutionary crises in 1831-1848 and in 1850-XNUMX.
The main content of Russian foreign policy in Europe in the 1830s–1840s. was the preservation of the European status quo, which had developed on the continent by 1815 as a result of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. This policy assumed the strengthening of allied relations with the conservative monarchies of Austria and Prussia, as well as the constant readiness to suppress the revanchist aspirations of France, including with the help of military force [2].
In the 1830s Russia's relations with Austria were not as warm as relations with Prussia. King Friedrich Wilhelm III was the father-in-law of Nicholas I. Frederick William IV, who ascended the throne in 1840, was the brother-in-law of the Russian emperor. Prussia directly bordered France along the Rhine and counted on Russian military assistance in the event of a threat from its restless western neighbor.
Cooperation between the two armies was exceptionally close. For example, the future Minister of War of Prussia, General I. von Rauch, "combined the inspection of Russian fortresses with similar activities in Prussia." In 1835, joint military maneuvers took place near the city of Kalisz in the presence of Nicholas I and Frederick William III. The most secret information, including military plans, was confidentially communicated to Nicholas I by decision of the king [1].
Some historians do not just say that the Germans had a fairly strong influence on the royal court: this was partly true, given that Nicholas I considered the Prussian king Frederick the Great the ideal of a monarch.
The ideological views of Emperor Nicholas I on the state system were based on Prussian patriarchal monarchism, combined with exemplary military discipline and religious and moral principles, expressed in the idea of duty and devotion to traditionalism [3].
The protective policy of Nicholas I was aimed at building a strong police state capable of overcoming destabilizing factors in the form of the spread of liberal trends, which came down to supporting revolutionary theories and terrorist methods of fighting the autocratic government. The emperor achieved this during his 30-year reign, enlisting the support of all sectors of society.
The society had to rally in trust in the state represented by the government under the influence not of fear, but of patriotic feelings, the support of which was laid down in the national conservative program of Nicholas I, expressed in the triad of the Minister of Public Education Count S. S. Uvarov: Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality [3].
From this point of view, Nicholas I considered the revolutionary events in the Danubian principalities and Hungary as a direct threat to the Russian autocracy and for this reason willingly responded to the request of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph for help in suppressing the Hungarian revolution.
The successful Hungarian campaign of Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich secured Russia's status as the "gendarme of Europe" - this is how many historians describe the role played by the Russian Empire in European politics in the period 1815-1854, this is how the European press called Nicholas I after he suppressed the uprising in Hungary.
Traditionally, in the national historiography of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I, the so-called gloomy seven years of 1848–1855 were the most criticized, which in domestic politics was accompanied by a chaotic tightening of censorship and the onset of an era of government reaction, and in foreign policy was associated with two successive international crises.
European Crisis 1848–1850 threatened to develop into a full-scale war on the continent and therefore was accompanied by a full mobilization deployment of the Russian land army on the western border. However, the collective efforts of the great powers, in which Russia played an almost decisive role, stopped the spontaneous expansion of local military conflicts in Hungary, Denmark and Northern Italy to the scale of a pan-European war. The fighting of the Russian army was limited to the fleeting Hungarian campaign in the summer of 1849. [one].
Despite the successful resolution of the crisis, which took place largely due to the decisive actions of the government of Nicholas I, subsequent events in the Middle East and the lost Crimean War actually devalued, in the eyes of researchers, the positive results of Russia's foreign policy in 1848–1850. [one]
Russian imperial army and military reforms in the 1840s
Between 1801 and 1825, the empire's armed forces more than doubled from 457 to 000 men. Russia, despite the victorious end of the Napoleonic Wars, due to the need to ensure Russia's position as the supreme arbiter in Europe and the disunity of potential theaters of hostilities, was forced to maintain an army that greatly outnumbered the armed forces of its neighbors.
The understanding of the fact that military power is in fact the only guarantor of the great power status of the empire forced Alexander I to maintain the so-called two-power standard after 1815. The need for a two-power standard, that is, some numerical superiority of the Russian ground forces over the armies of Austria and Prussia taken together, after 1815, Emperor Alexander I mentioned in a conversation with P. D. Kiselev [1]. But maintaining it was associated with enormous financial strain. The cost of maintaining the land army in the period 1827-1841. never fell below 33% of the nationwide.
The quantitative growth of the army entailed a heavy burden on the demographic resources of the empire, since Russia did not have superiority in population compared to its European neighbors.
In the 1830s–1840s Emperor Nicholas I gradually changed the nature of the recruitment system of the Russian army. With the formal preservation of the former name, recruitment duty actually acquired many features characteristic of the Western European concept, which assumed the existence of a general queue, as well as a selection procedure of lots and a wide system of benefits, deferrals and substitutions [1].
The wars of the early XNUMXth century showed the danger of bleeding regiments in the course of hostilities. The lack of trained reserves in the Russian army made it difficult to restore the combat capability of the formations that had suffered losses, while recruiting kits could only provide completely untrained replacements, which took at least nine months to get into service.
For this reason, in 1834, the term of service in the army was reduced from 25 to 20 years, in the guard - from 22 to 20 years. On August 30, 1834, the "Regulations on indefinite leave" were adopted. Soldiers who served without penalties for 20 years, after this period, were dismissed for 5 years (in the guard - for 2 years) on indefinite leave.
Field Marshal Paskevich's large active army consisted of I, II, III and IV infantry corps. The army headquarters was located in Warsaw. Field Marshal F.V. Osten-Sacken’s combat department of the First Army, which was previously in Kyiv, was disbanded in 1835 [1].
The Large Active Army became the largest association of field troops in the empire. She played a key role in the military policy of Nicholas I. In the army, the permanent commander of which in 1831-1855. was Prince Paskevich, assigned a complex of the most important interrelated tasks.
Firstly, on the basis of the Active Army, in the event of a serious war in Europe, the combat deployment of the Russian military ground forces was supposed.
Secondly, the Active Army was directly responsible for internal security in the Kingdom of Poland and carried out garrison service on its territory.
Thirdly, the active army, having received reinforcements in the form of infantry and reserve cavalry corps of the second line, was to become the main striking force in the theater of war [1].
A flexible combination of centralization and decentralization became a distinctive feature of the approach to military command under Nicholas I. The command of troops on the ground was in the hands of organizationally independent army headquarters, which ensured efficiency, significant financial savings and accelerated decision-making.
The gradual accumulation of a cadre of trained reservists gave the government a flexible tool for bringing troops into martial law without such extraordinary measures as recruiting. Mortality among the troops was significantly reduced, although it continued to be relatively high. Approximately 37 people per year died from diseases. out of 1 people list composition.
The number of deaths in the Russian army in peacetime was twice the number of deaths in European armies. However, even among the civilian population of Russia, mortality from diseases was on average a quarter higher than in Europe [1]. Desertion was also not a mass phenomenon.
The structures of the highest military administration - the War Ministry and the General Staff - in the 1830s. have also been reorganized. F. Kagan, in his monographic study, examined in detail the prerequisites for this reform and the process of its implementation under the leadership of Count A. I. Chernyshev [5].
In the course of the transformation of the central apparatus of the military department, the functions of command and control of troops from the General Staff, abolished in peacetime, were transferred to the War Ministry. Administrative and economic functions were concentrated in the collegiate Military Council chaired by the Minister of War [1].
For 25 years, a complete rearmament of the ground forces was carried out. At the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I, the army was still armed with various variants of the smooth-bore flintlock musket of the 1808 model, which, in turn, was a version of the famous French Charleville musket of 1777.
Diversity and Diversity weapons negatively affected the fire performance of the Russian infantry during the Napoleonic wars. On the Borodino field there were regiments that used guns of up to 20 different types and calibers. The problem of standardization and unification of small arms in the first years of the reign of Nicholas continued to be unresolved [1].
The final standardization of flintlock guns was carried out only in 1839, but soon a massive conversion of flintlock guns into percussion capsule guns was launched, which became known as the “1844 model”. Since the alteration of flintlock guns did not satisfy the army's need for modern rapid-fire smoothbore weapons, the production of a new primer gun was launched already in 1845.
The Russian rifle of the 1845 model with a caliber of 7,1 lines was created on the basis of the French one and was one of the most successful against the background of contemporary European primer guns. It fully corresponded to the tactical ideas generally accepted in Europe at that time about the use of line infantry in maneuver warfare, which proclaimed the priority of the rate of fire of a gun over its range [1].
If we talk about the total number of troops that Russia, after the completion of the combat deployment of the Army in the field, could put in the field at the first stage of a possible war in the west, then the figure by the standards of that time turned out to be impressive - about 400 people [000].
The fact that Russia kept more than 800 people under arms in peacetime was not a secret for Europe, although it caused certain doubts in it. For example, the Austrians, from their own experience, did not quite reasonably assume a significant shortage in the Russian ranks. In February 000, the ambassador in Vienna, D.P. Tatishchev, reported to St. Petersburg about estimates of the number of Russian ground forces that existed among the Austrian generals. Then the Austrians counted 1828 people in the Russian army. according to the lists, but only 838 people. – in service [981].
The Eastern Crisis of 1853–1854 and its causes
During the gradually aggravated Eastern crisis of 1851-1853. on the part of Russia, a number of dangerous foreign policy miscalculations were made, the direct consequence of which was the almost complete isolation of the empire in the war that began in the fall of 1853. Nicholas I and Prince Varshavsky (Paskevich) personally bear a significant share of the responsibility for these mistakes, although the historical unprecedentedness of the events that unfolded then can partly justify them [2].
The main reason for the Crimean War was the clash of interests in the Balkans and the Middle East of such powers as Austria, France, England and Russia. The pretext for the Crimean War was the dispute over the Holy Places in Palestine, which began as early as 1850 between the Orthodox and Catholic clergy, who were under the patronage of France. In 1851, Turkey, incited by France, gives the keys to the shrines to the Catholics.
To resolve the issue, Emperor Nicholas I sent an extraordinary envoy, Prince Alexander Menshikov, to Constantinople in 1853, who demanded that the Porte confirm the protectorate of Russia over the entire Orthodox population of the Turkish Empire, established by previous treaties, and also resolve the issue concerning the Holy places.
It is worth noting that the Russian emperors acted as defenders of the Orthodox faith, from which it follows that the All-Russian autocrats were the spiritual patrons of the Slavic peoples who were not part of the state. In the course of the struggle for independence, the "brothers in faith" - the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, often turned to Russia for help, which in turn provided them with all kinds of support.
It is worth remembering that on the eve of the First World War, the Russian Empire acted as the defender of Serbia, which was a Slavic state, which once again emphasizes the phenomenon that Russia provided all possible assistance to the Slavic peoples.
The Turks agreed to consider the question of the Holy Places without infringing on the rights of the Orthodox, but officially refused to recognize Russia as the patroness of the Orthodox on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, similar to the Turkish-French agreement of 1740 [6].
Menshikov received oral instructions from Nicholas I and written instructions from Chancellor K. V. Nesselrode and followed them. These instructions reserved for the Russian emissary the right, if necessary, to influence the Turkish government by threatening to recognize the independence of the Danubian principalities. The proposals made by Menshikov Porte went far beyond the dispute over the status of the Holy Places. It was about adding to the treatise of 1774 a special clause concerning formal guarantees of the rights and privileges of the Sultan's Orthodox subjects in exchange for concluding a military alliance against France [1].
The demand for a broad interpretation of the articles of the Kyuchuk-Kaynarji Treaty of 1774, related to the right of Russian patronage of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, caused serious opposition from the British and French. Paskevich in his notes considered the demands stated by Menshikov to be excessive [7]. In the immediate environment of the monarch, there was a serious difference of views on this issue.
Against the backdrop of diplomatic negotiations, the situation began to gradually worsen. Colonel H. G. Rose, the British charge d'affaires in Constantinople, and his French colleague, Count V. Benedetti, demanded that their governments send fleets to the Aegean Sea with the aim of diplomatic pressure on Russia [1].
Military preparations were gaining momentum in Russia as well. At the end of 1852, Nicholas I ordered the troops of the 10th Infantry Corps stationed in the Crimea and Novorossia to be put on martial law. From February 1853, XNUMX, measures were taken to deploy the IV Infantry Corps, which moved south to join the V Corps.
On June 21, 1853, Russian troops under the command of Adjutant General M. D. Gorchakov crossed the Prut and occupied the Danubian principalities.
“After crossing the Prut,” the French observer admitted, “the war became a matter of decision” [1].
At this stage, Field Marshal Paskevich (and he was not alone in this) still relied on assistance from Austria and Greece in the event of a war. However, these hopes were not destined to come true.
Crimean War 1853–1856 and military miscalculations of Field Marshal Paskevich
Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich
The Crimean (Eastern) War can be divided into two stages - the first stage lasted from October 1853 to April 1854, this period was characterized by the confrontation between the Russian Empire and Turkey. The fighting unfolded on the Danube and Caucasian fronts. In the process of confrontation, Russia was able to achieve considerable success, which, it seemed, contributed to the successful completion of the war. The culmination of this stage was the Battle of Sinop, during which the Russian fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov destroyed the Turkish squadron.
This battle served as the official reason for the entry into the war of England and France. Nicholas I and Field Marshal I. Paskevich did not believe that this alliance would be sustainable, and believed that the Russian Empire would be supported by Austria and Prussia, which in fact almost went to war against Russia, which was an unpleasant surprise for the Russian political and military leadership .
After the entry of France and England into the war, the second stage of the Crimean War begins, which lasted from April 1854 to February 1856 and is characterized by attacks on remote territories of the Russian Empire and the landing of the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force in the Crimea.
On February 15, 1854, the allies issued an ultimatum, demanding that Russia clear the Danubian principalities. Nicholas I did not answer, and a declaration of war followed on March 27–28. Prussia, following Austria, also refused to sign a neutrality treaty with Russia. At the same time, both powers also refused the Anglo-French proposal to join their alliance, but nevertheless, together with the maritime powers, they agreed to sign a protocol confirming the integrity of the possessions of the Turkish Sultan and recognition of the rights of Christians.
In fact, this meant the accession of both German powers to the ultimatum of the allies, as well as the general desire to neutralize the influence of Russia within the Ottoman Empire [1].
As historian Vladimir Degoev noted,
“The establishment of a blockade of the Russian Black Sea ports was presented to Petersburg as a defensive action. Nicholas I, who did not understand such logic, had every reason to come to the conclusion that an open challenge was thrown to him, to which he simply could not help answering.
Even in this situation, the Russian emperor makes a last attempt to keep the peace with England and France, which was more like a gesture of desperation. Overcoming a feeling of indignation, Nicholas I notified London and Paris of his readiness to refrain from interpreting their action as an actual entry into the war on the side of Turkey.
He suggested that the British and French officially declare that their actions are aimed at neutralizing the Black Sea and therefore equally serve as a warning to both Russia and Turkey.
It was an unprecedented humiliation for the ruler of the Russian Empire in general and for a man like Nicholas I in particular. One can only guess what such a step cost him.
The negative response of England and France was tantamount to a slap on the hand extended for reconciliation. The tsar was denied the smallest thing - the opportunity to save face.
Even in this situation, the Russian emperor makes a last attempt to keep the peace with England and France, which was more like a gesture of desperation. Overcoming a feeling of indignation, Nicholas I notified London and Paris of his readiness to refrain from interpreting their action as an actual entry into the war on the side of Turkey.
He suggested that the British and French officially declare that their actions are aimed at neutralizing the Black Sea and therefore equally serve as a warning to both Russia and Turkey.
It was an unprecedented humiliation for the ruler of the Russian Empire in general and for a man like Nicholas I in particular. One can only guess what such a step cost him.
The negative response of England and France was tantamount to a slap on the hand extended for reconciliation. The tsar was denied the smallest thing - the opportunity to save face.
The problem of protecting the Black Sea coast in 1854–1855. turned out to be inseparable from the problem of Austrian mobilization in the west. In the conditions of confrontation with almost all the great powers, Russia could not provide a reliable defense of its long borders. Field Marshal Paskevich understood this very well when, on February 8, 1854, he wrote in a report to Nicholas I:
“... if there was a separate war only on the shores of the Black Sea, then nothing would prevent us from gathering as many troops as possible. But this is not our position now. We need to find all the means by reducing the number of troops where necessary, to direct them to where they are really needed” [2].
And these troops were needed primarily in the west. There were already signs of Austrian military preparations. Two and a half infantry divisions with reserves and a cavalry brigade remained in the Crimea and Odessa to protect the coast from landing.
In February 1854, this was considered quite sufficient. In addition, the intelligence data received by Paskevich spoke in favor of the low probability of a landing on the Crimean Peninsula. Therefore, the field marshal considered it possible not to increase, but, on the contrary, to reduce the forces here by one division [2].
Characteristically, the draft note drawn up by Paskevich in February contained the outlines of the most general action plans for the near future. And among the twenty-one scenarios under consideration, the option of landing an enemy in the Crimea was completely absent. This was a serious miscalculation of Paskevich.
Considering Russia's position in the Crimea quite reliable, Paskevich was not alone. In September 1853, the commander of the 20th Corps, Adjutant General A.N. Liders, estimated the possible number of troops on the Crimean Peninsula at 30-XNUMX thousand people. At the same time, Leaders considered the Evpatoria raid one of the least likely points of such a landing. Only Prince A. S. Menshikov, who commanded the Russian forces in the Crimea, experienced growing anxiety. He considered the Allied landings to be a difficult but doable undertaking.
In September 1854, 62 Anglo-French-Turkish troops landed in the Crimea. To repel an expedition of such magnitude, Menshikov's forces were clearly not enough. Nevertheless, on September 8, 1854, the commander took the battle on the river. Alma, in which he was defeated. Since the autumn of 1854, the struggle in the Crimea began to rapidly absorb those reserves that Paskevich considered necessary to keep in the western strategic direction [2].
Paskevich clearly misunderstood the complexity of the situation in the Crimea. And he simply did not have time to delve into the study of the situation in this theater of war. He partly admitted this in a letter to G. V. (A. A.) Jomini. The recommendations of the field marshal regarding the construction of advanced defensive structures in order to flank the enemy's siege work were implemented in February 1855. But the enemy, equipped with numerous siege artillery and constantly receiving reinforcements, methodically brought his trenches to the bastions [2].
The relatively weak profile of earth fortifications and the small area of the defended perimeter did not allow the reserves to be echeloned in depth. As a result, during the bombardment, the garrison of Sevastopol suffered losses that significantly exceeded the damage of the enemy. Arriving reserves basically only covered the losses.
Prince Varshavsky clearly exaggerated the defensive capabilities of Sevastopol and made a number of serious mistakes. However, the Russian strategy, by clearly dividing the potential theaters of military operations into main and secondary ones, reduced the damage in the initially hopeless war to a minimum [2].
Results of the Crimean War (as a conclusion)
During the Crimean (Eastern) War, Russia opposed a powerful coalition of Western powers, having no allies. Neither Emperor Nicholas I nor Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich were prepared for such a turn of events.
Prince Varshavsky understood the impossibility of winning such a confrontation, so his plan was to drag out the war and to strive to reduce the final result to the least losses for the Russian Empire. During the years of the Eastern War, the actions of the Russian army actually pursued the goal of achieving such peace conditions under which Russia, despite not being defeated, would retain its place among the great European powers [1].
The Crimean (Eastern) War ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, which in Russia, not without reason, was considered shameful. The international prestige of the empire was seriously damaged. However, the Russian Empire practically did not suffer territorial damage - Russia lost its territorial acquisitions in the Danube and the Caucasus, and also, following the points on the neutralization of the Black Sea (like Turkey), was deprived of the right to keep a navy in the Black Sea.
The Crimean War revealed a number of problems within the country, which led to military failure. After the Eastern War, the series of military victories of the Russian Empire was interrupted, which forced the future emperor, Alexander II, to begin a whole range of reforms.
Many historians consider one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War to be the technical backwardness of the army. This problem really took place - despite the reforms, it was not possible to achieve a complete rearmament of the Russian Imperial Army, but this was not the main reason for the defeat.
The reason for the defeat was the hopeless position of Russia, which found itself alone against a powerful coalition of European powers. In such a strategic situation, it was almost impossible to achieve victory.
Использованная литература:
[1] Krivopalov A.A. Field Marshal I.F. Paskevich and Russian strategy in 1848–1856. - M .: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science. 2019.
[2] Krivopalov A. A. Sevastopol in the strategic plans of Field Marshal I. F. Paskevich in 1853–1855. // Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 8. History. 2013. No. 3. S. 58–69.
[3] Dubov A. Protective ideology of the Russian state under Nicholas I // Power. - 2012. - No. 11.
[4] Daly J. C. K. Russian seapower and "The Eastern question" (1827-1841). Annapolis, 1991. P. 191.
[5] Kagan F. I. The military reforms of Nicholas I. The origins of the modern Russian army. NY, 1999. P. 164–171.
[6] Besov A. G. On the causes and results of the Crimean War of 1853–1856 // Eastern Archive. 2006. No. 14–15.
[7] Shcherbatov A.P. Field Marshal Prince Paskevich, his life and work: in 7 volumes. St. Petersburg, 1904. T. 7. S. 59–61.
[8] Degoev VV The Caucasus and the Great Powers. M., 2009. S. 187.
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