Tanks of the special operation "Z": criticism of the British analytical report
The main striking force of the army
Tank troops have always been and remain the main striking force of the ground forces. No matter how trite it sounds, it is the ground units that ensure victory over the enemy. As long as the infantry does not occupy the territory, there can be no talk of any tactical or operational success. And the first assistants to the infantry are not even artillery, but tankers. "Special Operation Z", which unfolds in front of us literally online, perfectly illustrates this thesis. Even taking into account all the tragic materials that come from Ukraine, it is safe to say that Russian tanks take out a large part of the hostilities. And they do it at a high level.
Now, according to the resonant report of the Royal Joint Institute for Defense Studies “Technical Reflections on Russian Armored Fighting Vehicles”, in which the British tried to speak rather derogatoryly about Russian armored vehicles. They say that the stabilization system of the tank gun is weak, and the side armor leaves much to be desired. To begin with, it is worth deciding what has been happening in Ukraine since February 24 of this year. By all indications, hostilities are unfolding there, the analogues of which have not been seen since 1945. Yes exactly.
Never before have two industrial powers confronted each other over such a vast territory and with the use of all available conventional weapons. Operational-tactical missiles are used, and volleys of Hurricanes and Tornadoes are becoming commonplace. Western analysts, who are now savoring every destroyed Russian tank, forget that NATO armies have never even tried to participate in something like this throughout their existence. Neither Vietnam, nor Korea, nor Iraq, and even more so Afghanistan can not be compared with "Special Operation Z". Someone will remember the Falklands War in 1982. But it was strictly a local conflict, not spreading to the territory of Great Britain and Argentina.
By the way, the “war of 08.08.08” was the last example when countries with regular, trained and fairly well-equipped armies clashed in battle. For several years before the conflict, NATO members had pumped up Georgia with weapons and competencies, intending to soon accept it into their military bloc. NATO countries in the latest stories fought against an enemy that was several steps lower in technological development. In Afghanistan, in general, the war was actually with the country of the XVIII-XIX centuries.
Any analytics should make at least minimal comparisons. And with what to compare the successes or failures of Russian tanks in Ukraine in 2022? Absolutely nothing, especially since Ukrainian nationalists can use the widest range of means against armored vehicles.
The authors of the report from the Royal Joint Institute for Defense Studies should have asked themselves the question: how would the vaunted Challenger 2 behave in the Ukrainian theater of war? It would be nice to simulate a situation where a 62-ton colossus, moving along a highway at a speed of no more than 30–40 km / h, receives a Stugna missile on board. Especially if it very successfully enters the ammunition load of a British vehicle. For reference: the Ukrainian ATGM hits up to 800 mm of armor behind dynamic protection.
Russian means bad?
The British, of course, are not the only ones who, from the beginning of the special operation, began to discredit Russian tanks. In April, the American Popular Mechanics unexpectedly made the T-72 and T-80 into the top five worst armored vehicles of our time. Previously, this pair of tanks was included in the "top 5" edition. The best, in American opinion, of course, was the M1 Abrams. Propagandists from a once respected magazine, in all seriousness, cite a voracious gas turbine engine in the list of cons of the T-80. There is not a word in the "analytics" about the problems with fuel logistics that the much less economical M1 Abrams engine creates. Now in the West it is customary to talk about the inferiority of Russian weapons solely on the basis of the fact that they are Russian.
The performance of Russian armored vehicles and the US military are assessed in their own way. In particular, Lieutenant General Carsten Heckl, Deputy Commander of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration, once again became convinced of the correctness of the refusal of the Marines from tanks. Americans are greatly impressed by photographs of destroyed Russian and Ukrainian equipment.
Recall that, in accordance with the new concept, the US Marines will no longer have M1 Abrams - light armored vehicles will come to replace them. A rather controversial statement, given the contribution that Russian tanks made, in particular, to the capture of Mariupol. That is, the US military, albeit indirectly, confirms that sensitive losses of armored vehicles in such conflicts are inevitable. And the point here is not at all in the mythical lag of Russian tanks from Western standards, but in the intensity of hostilities. When the enemy is equipped with ATGMs and grenade launchers of all stripes, the difficulties of using tanks increase manifold. Even if it's the "best in the world" M1 Abrams.
Let's return to the notorious "Technical Reflections". The level of the British "analytics" of the Royal Institute very characteristically conveys a comparison of the weapon stabilization systems of Russian tanks with Western models. An example is given with a beer mug, which, without spilling, rolled on the barrel of a Leopard-2 at one of the military reviews in Germany. And the Russian one, they say, is not capable of this, simply because British researchers did not observe shooting from the move in the Ukrainian chronicle. Well, or because they didn’t deliver beer mugs at the tank biathlon.
The disadvantage is the presence of only three people in the crew. According to British experts, this seriously complicates the repair of failed equipment. The automatic loader got negative, which somehow negatively affects the accuracy of the tank gun. Of the platitudes - a vulnerable ammunition rack that detonates when hit on the side, and weak armor of Russian tanks in all projections, except for the frontal one. It remains to wait for the authors of the report to answer the question of which foreign tank, except, perhaps, the Israeli Merkava, is capable of providing equal protection from at least three angles.
You can remind respected "analysts" about the Turkish Leopard-2A4TRs, which the terrorists burned in Syria. And the towers of the German "cats" flew no worse than the Ukrainian or Russian ones. But here, of course, it’s a completely different matter - NATO military analysts in no way blame the design flaws of the Leopard-2 series, but exclusively negligent Turkish military command. They say that the terrain was chosen unsuccessful, and infantry support was not provided, and artillery was not previously plowed all around. At the same time, the terrorists opposing the Turks in Syria used outdated Soviet-made ATGMs. Compare this to the anti-tank arsenal of Ukrainian fighters. However, an adequate part of the NATO military admits that the latest Leopard-2A7 + and Leopard-2A7V are not able to withstand a blow to the side even by an outdated Kornet.
Tanks do not write off yet
Now about the systems of active protection of armored vehicles, which Western experts often talk about. In particular, about the Trophy, which has become literally a panacea for NATO members from guided anti-tank missiles. Here we move away from the analysis of the report "Technical Reflections on Russian Armored Fighting Vehicles" and consider the materials of the British edition of Global Defense Technology, which is published by the Royal Joint Institute for Defense Studies mentioned above.
The headline of the magazine is "Don't write off tanks just yet", designed to reassure the Western public, impressed by the photo and video evidence of destroyed armored vehicles in Ukraine. The material mentions an advertising campaign by Rafal, which positions its Trophy as a universal remedy against recoilless rifles, anti-tank missiles, high-explosive anti-tank shells and RPGs. The Germans plan to equip their Leopards with active protection, and the British new Challenger 3.
However, examples of urban fighting in Ukraine cast doubt on the effectiveness. For example, Ben Barry, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on ground combat operations, reasonably notes:
Considering how tattered domestic tanks come out of urban battles in Ukraine, it can be assumed that such protection will be effective until the first serious clash.
A tank is always a set of compromises, and it is necessary to understand what is better - to spend resources on the expensive Arena-M or Afghanit, or to radically strengthen the side projections and the roof of the tank? Albeit due to a decrease in mobility, coupled with an increase in mass.
And finally, the main question posed by British authors is whether it is possible to speak of the decline of tanks based on the experience of the Ukrainian conflict? As it turned out, no. Simply because there is nothing to change the tank for. All light vehicles, even as perfect as the modular Boxer 8x8 infantry fighting vehicle, are completely underarmored. If even simple grenade launchers in the city can seriously complicate the life of tankers, then they are like death to all other armored vehicles.
At the same time, domestically developed tanks have repeatedly demonstrated amazing resistance to the most modern weapons - the vehicles remained in service after several hits, for example, by NLAW missiles. Most importantly, the presence of a 125-mm cannon in Russian armored vehicles does not allow the British to talk about abandoning tanks: not a single light vehicle can withstand a confrontation with such a weapon. Only the tank has a chance. Be that as it may, on the experience of "Special Operation Z" we will soon see a new round of military engineering, but more on that another time.
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