World War I. Note from the General of Infantry Baluyev
The current campaign must be divided into two sharply different periods. The period of field battles and the period of positional warfare.The first period is from the start of the campaign to the end of 1914. when offensive and oncoming field battles are being fought by both sides, and if the troops meet with fortifications, they are made quickly in trenches without blocking obstacles that the attacking troops cannot stop. If during this period we met with heavily fortified positions, it was only on the Cana River, and in the East Puscia - in the lake area; but the first Austrians were not protected, and the second were bypassed by us.
But this period has shown that the old way of waging war, mainly by living force, must withdraw to the field of legends. The academies have become so huge, quickly replenished by a contingent given by the population, and therefore little-trained, theaters are so vast that it is out of the question to break up and destroy the enemy’s army than usual in the old times of war. On the contrary, it turned out that the destruction of entire corps and the enemy, the capture of hundreds of thousands of the enemy does not lead to victory.
And the very nature of the modern war, as it were, prompted the warring parties what to do, and both opponents, as if by agreement, stopped and burrowed into the ground, and the second campaign period began - the positional one, where the main role was played not by living force but by technical means fight
None of the belligerents turned out to be unprepared for this kind of struggle. The means of this struggle develop gradually, with the passage of time, depending on the methods of defense and attack that are used by the enemy. In addition to manpower, wire and fire in all forms, such as guns, machine guns, artillery, mortars, bombers, hand grenades, etc., are of enormous importance.
We have, at the beginning, the fascination with fortified positions to the point that we stretch our troops along the front, to the body of 50 versts and almost do not recognize the deep construction, and at the same time do not take any measures to increase and improve the technical means of struggle.
The enemy in this case turned out to be more far-sighted than us. Realizing that the whole force of the struggle lies in technical means, and most importantly in artillery, mostly heavy, he is standing in front of us and, not only giving us the opportunity to move forward, begins to accumulate these means, and in the process to develop them we are far ahead. At that time, he already has established a positive basis for defense and attack. We are still at a crossroads; however, not only we, but even our allies are lagging behind in this respect, although in comparison with us they have an advantage in the mass of their artillery, shells and other technical means.
Having accumulated all the means, our enemy could easily break through our fortified lines and knock us off our positions, and in the middle of last year we were beset by a catastrophe: we are knocked down from all positions and we must give way to the enemy one line after another, while he himself is deafened and no longer being able to beat our manpower with its own technical means, it does not stop, again it does not bury itself - and in this form both sides have stood against each other since September of last year.
All this is so new for all of us, all this is not so similar to what we learned in peacetime, that we are confused and face a dilemma of what to do next and which way to take further action.
If we follow the battles over the past 20 months of war, we will see that in all battles only one thread runs, that all theoretical combat techniques, all field combat techniques used by both us and our allies and our opponents, have no success only due to those technical tools that are used in modern wrestling.
From November, month 1914 on the Western Front, the French, used different ways to go on the offensive, but all unsuccessfully, and worked out solid methods to it. The Italians still can not go beyond their borders. The Gallipol operation ended unsuccessfully, and only where a field war is being conducted, without improved technical means, have known results been achieved (Caucasian Front, Serbia, Montenegro), or where the adversary is weaker in technical means (Russian 1915 Front). On the other hand, the Germans, despite their superiority in technical means, have only partial successes, and sometimes where they meet with the same rich technical means as they (Verdens operation) they suffer a complete failure.
Unfortunately, despite the lessons we had during the campaign, there are still no firm fundamental and conscious methods of fighting the Germans. We still wander between the desire to attack and the need to defend ourselves, and every novelty strikes us and we are now striving to use it and put it into practice and, of course, fail over failure, wasting our not so rich means for making these experiments. The fact that we have no firm and definite methods of waging the struggle is shown by the fact that the troops are bombarded with instructions and guidelines for the defense and attack of fortified positions, methods of the struggle for fortified positions, transfers from the methods given by our allies, instructions on how to train the troops, and t .P. Most of the instructions and manuals - the whole fortification and tactics courses compiled by theorists contradict each other, block up the troops, knock them down and in the end don’t give any correct method in the struggle in which they pour their blood, but they don’t see .
The operations that have just been carried out serve as vivid proof of the justice of all this. In the December and March operations, we launched an offensive without sufficient technical means and wanted to apply the methods of field war: to break through, smash and destroy the enemy, having lost sight of the fact that the enemy now consists not of one manpower, but also of earth, iron and cast iron. and of course they failed. Having a small partial success on the front of one of the corps, we decided to go on the offensive somewhere again and lose what we acquired, again forgetting that without technical means, it’s impossible to defend any position with one living force, no matter how it was strengthened. And in this last case, the Germans give us a lesson on how to act, in order to have a small success, namely, they show us that in order to take away from the enemy, although small patches of earth, one must first fall asleep by hundreds of thousands of heavy shells, demolish everything not set up on him, to destroy his living force, and then to occupy this area unhindered.
I will not touch all the instructions and instructions given to the troops, but let me just point out that in many of them, especially in case of failure, the troops are reproached for not being able to act, that they did not repeatedly given instructions on the actions of the troops in battle, that the Chiefs did not act like that, etc., losing sight of the fact that our troops are poorly trained and cohesive, are controlled by young Regimental Commanders and Warrant Officers often sitting months in the trenches, even showing off heroes feats really do not know how to act, that the instructions sent repeatedly have never given the troops certain methods of conducting battle for fortified positions, that these instructions are scattered in fragmentary telegrams, directives, orders and observations that they are often contradictory and if they are put together, you will a voluminous volume that cannot be overcome in a combat situation, and that there is no way for them to teach young officers, and besides, the troops often move from one army to another, from one front to another oh, where there are already other views and indications of the same subject; that in the majority we undertake operations with a limited number of projectiles and in the absence of the necessary quantity of other technical means of combat, and that the troops cannot be taught according to published manuals once and nowhere else.
Then, in the majority, the basic view of the struggle for fortified positions was incorrectly adopted.
In most indications, the red thread contains the idea that the positional period of the war is only a temporary wait for the most favorable circumstances for going over to the offensive and constitutes a preparatory period for the offensive. The view is theoretically completely correct: every defense must try to go on the offensive. But in a real war, when the troops dug at the front in the 1500 versts - it is not applicable, but even harmful, because it gives the troops the right to look at their positions as temporary, and therefore do not require careful decoration and, if we take this look as a basis, the Germans will break through us everywhere, because they have a different opinion about it. They first of all consider that positional warfare is defense and while they
will not strengthen their positions to perfection, then the transition to the offensive is out of the question. The same defense gives them the opportunity to accumulate technical means to go on the offensive. When they accumulate them in unlimited quantities, they anticipate going over to an offensive on any sector, and they are preparing for this for a long period, without attracting to this those troops that take a position and who know only one defense and are busy only with reinforcement defended position. The preparation of all the necessary means to go on the offensive depends on the higher commanding staff; on the same troops it depends least of all, so the troops cannot defend their positions in a real war as a preparatory period for launching the offensive.
The correctness of this can already be taken out of the one thing that we must defend on our entire, extensive front, and we will go on the offensive only in any one sector. If, on the whole of our front, we pursue only one offensive, we will be weak everywhere in defense. As the experience has shown, we will never succeed in deceiving the German with respect to our real intentions, no matter what measures we take. Then, if we take this view as a basis, then the troops on all fronts and sectors should be given all the means to go on the offensive, and this is impossible for the Germans and our allies, and not only for us.
Therefore, the troops first need to give solid, based on the experience of war and executable instructions for them to defend their positions, and then the second instructions for the transition to the offensive.
Since units are often transferred from one army to another, such instructions should be common to all fronts and armies, and not to individual armies and fronts.
The simpler, shorter and more definite these instructions - the better, the more extensive and more conditional - the worse. Especially it is necessary to avoid giving the troops these instructions in extensive textbooks on engineering. Such extensive instructions can be given only to the engineering troops, as leaders in strengthening positions.
The instructions for the case of going on the offensive should also be brief, definite and clearly indicate what the troops should do at each moment of an attack, and the instructions for the troops should be sharply separated from the instructions for the higher command personnel.
Taking it as a basis, let me express in particular my opinion on the issue I have touched.
Often, instructions to the troops say that the longer the positional period, the preparation for the offensive must be brought to a greater degree of perfection. I will allow myself to notice that this concerns the troops least of all, wholly it relates to the commanding staff, and this training should consist in the formation of large reserves from the troops trained in the production of the offensive, in accumulating in an unlimited number of all the technical means to go on the offensive, i.e. rifles, ammunition, guns, shells and other weapons; in the construction of the rear, namely in the arrangement of warehouses for supplying troops with everything necessary and supply routes so that the troops do not need anything, not only during the production of the operation itself, but also that they have no idea what they will be, or what will shoot if you manage to move miles on 20. Indeed, throughout the entire campaign, all our offensive operations ended unsuccessfully as a result of the failure of the rear. The failure of the Germans last year to break through our armies should be explained in the same way.
And then in the same instructions it is often said that this training must also consist in the combat training of the personnel of the troops and their staffing.
This preparation is possible only when parts are in reserve. Those troops that are long in position in the trenches are unsuitable for offensive operations and there is no possibility to train them in offensive techniques. Since defense requires fewer troops, then a smaller part should be held solely for defense positions, and in reserve troops should be active in which all attention should be paid to training the offensive and taking reinforced positions.
In this, mainly, we must see the main principles of preparation for the transition to the offensive. And in order to have time to make this training, it is necessary that the troops staunchly and firmly defend their positions and not allow the enemy to go on the offensive.
To do this, troops, first of all, as mentioned above, should be given instructions on strengthening and defending their positions.
The basis of these instructions should be:
1) occupying positions suitable for defense, but not accidental.
2) strengthening the first line of trenches, and the device barriers.
3) device trenches for private front line reserves.
4) second line defense device for divisional reserves.
5) equipment of artillery positions and observation posts.
6) the device of the army position is not closer than such a distance that the troops shot down from the position could take it, coming out of the enemy's strikes, and this position, like the advanced ones, should consist of three specified lines.
The execution of these points 2, 3 and 5 must be entrusted to the troops under the responsibility of the combatant commanders, in the 4-m can be executed searches, but with the help of army organizations and in 6 -m only by means of the army.
7) Continuous observation of the enemy and the production of intelligence. Moreover, the impossible cannot be expected from the troops. Troops can observe and scout only the first line of defense of the enemy. Nevertheless, that behind the rear of this line is hidden from the troops and this intelligence should lie entirely in the intelligence departments of all headquarters, which, for this, must have at their disposal agents and aviation detachments.
8) The defense of the position must be based on both manpower and artillery fire, so the troops must be given a sufficient amount of heavy artillery.
9) The positions of the positions should be linear with the flanking parts of both the trenches themselves and the approaches to them. There should be no sharply forward parts and sections. It is not necessary to reckon with the fact that, the current troops are poorly trained, they are little stubborn and terribly susceptible to detours and coverage.
The most serious attention should be paid to the device of the piercing barrier, moreover, it should be made massive and firmly hardened into the ground, and not consist of thin poles stuck into the ground, and must be in several rows.
Trenches should be made to the full height of the person, narrow and better to do them without visors, and with durable loopholes. Visors serve only to shelter from the rain; instead, there must be solid shelters for the garrison.
For observers, machine guns and bombers and commanders should be made strong dugouts. In the trenches, there should be as many traverses as possible to protect against flanking fire. From the trenches to the supports, communications must be made.
10) In the trench line for private reserves (p. 3), strong points should be set up to fire both the first line and the approaches to it.
11) The next line of defense should also be arranged.
12) For telephone communication, it was necessary to switch to an underground cable a long time ago, which at each position should be connected to the main lines in known directions, but in such a way that it was possible to connect them with troop wires.
13) The terrain must be carefully studied, made photographically; snapshots of the enemy’s position and on the basis of this our artillery must be positioned so that we can keep both the enemy’s positions and approaches to our positions under fire, including defensive artillery, although part of which is difficult without which defense is unthinkable.
14) Special and separate groups should not be formed from artillery, and artillery should be subordinated to the head of the sector who is responsible for the defense of his sector in all respects and
15) Although with our insufficient means we cannot have special batteries for the device of barrage fire, as it is practiced, the French and Germans, but should at the first opportunity separate a part of the batteries and for this purpose.
There must be a close link between the infantry and the atillery, for which, in addition to infantry observers, advanced trenches must have artillery observers at a certain site, united by an artillery officer, who, in trenches, must have an advanced artillery observation post, connected by phone lines, with an artillery observation point, connected by phone lines, and a band will have a piece of artillery in the trenches. this site.
ALL artillery commanders of a known section should be in full communication with senior infantry commanders of this area.
Performing an offensive operation should embrace the preparatory period and the period of the operation itself.
The preparatory period should consist of preparation for the offensive of the rear both of the entire front, and of the army and military training.
On the preparation for the offensive front and front already mentioned. It should consist in arranging in all respects the rear of those sectors from which it is planned to launch an offensive, and most importantly in concentrating behind these sectors of troops trained to launch an offensive, powerful artillery, projectiles in unlimited quantities, and other technical means for an offensive, in an arrangement supply ways, warehouses, etc.
Troop training should consist of the engineering preparation of the battlefield, artillery preparation and the deployment of troops intended to go on the offensive.
But before talking about troop training, let me express my opinion about the actions of the Germans based on the observations of the participants in the last battles with them.
The Mapta battles sharply found out the intensification of the artillery fire of the Germans, which now reaches a much higher intensity than last year. The accuracy of their fire is very high. On April 1, the Germans smashed our troops with artillery as they approached the trenches at 150 steps, and we should refer them to the perfection of the material part of their artillery. At the same time, the struggle with their artillery is terribly difficult to disguise. Their observant points are placed openly, but they are so firmly established that 5 - 8 of March was not damaged at all. But when 8 in March their position was broken and our troops advanced to their second line, then the fire of their artillery immediately became disorderly, extremely liquid and obviously without good observation. Releasing a mass of shells, they threw them in the squares, often missing very respectable living forces. This went on hours until 9 in the morning, when, obviously, from the new positions, they opened the exact hurricane fire on our troops.
The failures of all our attacks in the March operation should be attributed to precisely such artillery fire which positively prevented our infantry from moving forward.
On April 15, the speed of their artillery fire, the accuracy of their shooting and the power of destruction were amazing. None of the participants in the war did not see anything like it. Within a few hours, such a mass of shells was fired and with such accuracy that everything was demolished, broken, and people were stunned, bombarded and almost all destroyed, and the mass of shells that they fired and the duration of hurricane fire, which was conducted continuously, struck everyone. and over a large area in the continuation of 7 - 8 hours.
With such a force of fire, an offensive with large infantry distances is almost impossible, and therefore, an attack in the afternoon is possible only in a short circuit. If it is necessary to attack at large distances, then a short distance approach must be made at night, otherwise our infantry will not fit even their wire fence.
Fixing after the attack, putting the units in order, changing them, bringing in reserves, building artillery observation posts, carrying the wounded, replenishing the cartridges - during the day under such terrible fire are positively impossible.
On the other hand, in the event of a breakthrough in the first line of the Germans, it is necessary to immediately develop success, so as not to allow their artillery to organize and re-meet the troops, for which it is necessary to have strong reserves near us that could be immediately thrown forward as soon as our advanced troops rush into the first line of the enemy's trenches.
For reserves, narrow gaps proved to be the best preventive against their fire, the depth of the fathom.
In the same way, their machine-gun fire turned out to be very valid at a distance of at least one mile and inflicting large losses to our troops who attacked the position.
Machine guns are perfectly camouflaged and it is very difficult to open them even from close distance, especially the flanking trenches and approaches to them.
I. For the engineering preparation of the battlefield, the troops should be given sufficient time (at least one month).
This training will consist of:
1) In the performance of all engineering work for the class. by troops in a selected area of the initial position, i.e., approaching the enemy’s wire obstacles with flying sap to a distance from which it would be possible to pass this distance, run wire obstacles and break into the trenches without stopping; distance it will be 200 - 300 steps to the enemy position. The same preparation should be done at the demonstrative sites at the same time.
Without such a starting point, in the mind of the Germans ’just stated about the strength of the fire, the troops would not fit even the enemy’s wire barriers during the day. In those areas where this approach to local conditions is impossible, the approach to the enemy position can be made only at night and then with great difficulty, and therefore it is better to abandon the attack on such areas.
In this initial position, machine-gun batteries should be arranged to flank the attacked trenches and counter the machine-gun fire of the Germans. It is also useful here to use anti-assault guns and strong bomb or mortars against the enemy’s flanking machine guns.
2) In the device for reserves cracks and shelters. These gaps and shelters should be located in such a distance from the advanced troops and in the order in which the reserves will be located to produce an attack. These gaps must be connected by a message with a forward line. Difficulty in their construction will be encountered only when the initial position is taken out for the wire fence, but even then behind the trenches of the initial position, covered places should be prepared in the form of the same slots or trenches, at least for a part of the reserves.
3) In a device of durable and reliable dugouts for all commanders in the area of their reserves, in the device between them a telephone connection, in the device for them observation points.
4) In the equipment of artillery positions and artillery observation posts.
In all of these works, the engineering department should come to the troops to help with the delivery of the necessary material and entrenching tools, as well as their working organizations.
Ii. Artillery preparation should consist in studying the terrain in artillery relation, choosing artillery observational taps and positions, concealing the installation of batteries and adjusting them in the same way, which is called from under the floor; in the selection and, if possible, in the equipment of the advanced artillery positions in the area of our advanced trenches, so that although some of the batteries could be moved immediately after our troops had taken the advanced enemy position; in the designation for them artillery observation points and in reconnaissance of the ways to the selected positions. It is even better if this duty is imposed on fresh batteries, which must be in reserve, as the change of position for the current artillery during the battle is extremely difficult and slow.
Iii. Targeting with a quest intended for an attack of that part of the position from which it is supposed to attack must be completed at least a week before going on the attack in order to be able to get acquainted with its position, the position of the enemy and the approaches to it.
In addition to the troops intended to produce the attack itself, each attacking corps must have reserve corps that could have used the success of our troops that broke through the enemy’s first trenches immediately to prevent the Germans from organizing their artillery defenses again at the same time, these reserve corps should be put in their places.
The advance location of all troops assigned to go over to the offensive in their places is necessary in order to be able to familiarize all commanders with the plan of operations and with the tasks that may fall on each unit, and so that the chiefs can familiarize themselves with the terrain. which they will have to act and in advance to make the necessary reconnaissance.
The production of the operation itself must consist of artillery preparation and infantry advance.
Artillery must pursue the goal of destroying all means of defense, firing stormy fire with an unlimited number of shells in the same way as the Germans do.
The troops should be given all the means to observe the results of this shooting, that is, the greatest possible number of kite balloons and pilots.
Training with methodical fire must be viewed as forced, owing to lack, we have opydy and projectiles.
But to get involved in such measured fire is impossible. With such a fire, you can make passes to wire barriers and destroy part of the enemy’s dugouts and trenches, but manpower, machine guns, bombs, etc., will remain intact and the approach of the troops to the enemy’s position will only be rarely possible. As a result of the lack of projectiles, we see fired fire as a waste of ammunition. The look is wrong. For each projectile fired at the location of the enemy, you can not look like a waste of shells. If the projectile does not cause material damage to the enemy, then produce a moral effect both on his troops and on the enemy.
In preparing the artillery should be divided into groups and subordinated to the senior artillery commander. Infantry, chiefs must be in full communication with the artillery commanders and must present to them, the requirements that the artillery must fulfill for them during the period of artillery training.
Regarding the subordination of artillery during offensive operations, the views of the front commanders sharply differ from each other. Some require that all artillery during the preparation of an attack by fire be distinguished from the subordination of infantry commanders making the attack, while others stand in front of the whole artillery divided between combat units and subordinate to the chiefs of these sectors. It is difficult to disagree with the arguments of those and others. In my opinion, when attacking the enemy’s fortified position, as well as the fortress, all artillery must be united in one hand, since it has to shoot not depending on where it stands with its wheels, but depending on the goal that it can shelling. In this case, it would seem correct to accept (as a rule) that all the artillery of a known section is directly subordinated to that senior commander, in the area of which she is preparing an attack.
Thus, if a corps will act on a plot of this, the Corps Commander; if the division, then the Chief of the division. But in no case can you crush artillery in regimental areas. It should be taken as a rule that during the production of the attack itself, the artillery must be in full communication with the infantry commanders, and therefore the observation artillery points of the artillery group serving the well-known section of the position should be, along with the observation point of the infantry chief of this section, and while the artillery must fulfill all the requirements of the latter.
If there is an unlimited number of shells, then the moment of attack may come soon, therefore, in case of hurricane artillery fire, the troops must take up their original position from the very beginning of this fire. If a methodical fire is made, the moment of attack will come only after execution, the artillery of the tasks assigned to it and the beginning of the attack may be delayed. Therefore, the troops, in order not to tire them, should take the initial position not with the beginning of artillery fire, but at least two hours before the start of the attack, the hour of which will be appointed by the senior commander.
The attack of the first line of the enemy position must be placed on the hulls of the first line.
The hull must be given on the front 4-5 versts. Appointment for a large section of the body would weaken the impact force, and assignment of a smaller front would lead to building the corpus too deep, which makes it impossible to use all the means to the full and increase the influence of neighboring buildings, as a result of which the necessary independence of the corpus decreases, which can be harmful on the success of the attack.
In the initial position, the troops should be in the order in which they will attack, each part being exactly opposite to the part of the position assigned to it for attack.
When attacking, the occupation of the first line of the enemy’s position must be entrusted to the regiments of the first line, and the attack and occupation of the subsequent fortified lines of the enemy, already the shelves of the second line. The regiment must be given for attack approximately a stretch of 1 a mile.
The task of the regiments of the first line should be - only to break into the trenches of the first line, to occupy it and strengthen it. With the occupation of the first line of trenches, their task ends.
Afterwards, they must immediately pass through the already occupied trenches of the regimental and corps reserves, which must repel all enemy counterattacks and cover the forward regiments, attack and rush into the second and subsequent lines of the enemy trenches and secure the entire captured fortified band of the enemy.
Even the Germans with all their technical means are not able to take more than one strip of fortifications. An example is their attack on April 15 on the sections of the 5 Army Corps. Despite the fact that they concentrated powerful artillery, with which everything was positive, they demolished and almost destroyed the forward regiments of the corps and threw four divisions into the attack, then they could not pass Kolodinsky position.
The troops, who were in the attack, are of little use for further offensive, both after dropping out of the mass of officers, and because of the disorder into which they come after the attack, and therefore by mastering the first fortified enemy line - the task of the forward corps should be considered complete.
The further development of success - the attack of the second and subsequent lanes - should be entrusted to the corps of the second line, which pass for this through the already occupied first lane, attack and seize the second lane. If this is not immediately possible and the troops stop, in front of the second lane, then the latter will have to be taken as well as the first.
As for the time of attack, then a definite indication, of course, cannot be given. Time it depends on the mass of reasons. It is not possible to say with more or less positive certainty that in case of hurricane fire of the targeted artillery, an attack can be made at any hour of the day, as soon as our artillery does its job; with methodical preparation of an attack by artillery fire, an element of surprise or darkness must be introduced for the attack.
Attacking the position of the enemy at night should be made by troops well aware of this position, i.e., those who stood in front of this position for a long time and well studied both its approach and the approaches to it. In this latter case, the best time to attack should be considered the night before the evening and the second half of the day before the evening.
Thus, the troops should be given two brief and concise instructions with precise and specific techniques, one for strengthening and defending positions only, and the other for going over to the offensive. At the same time, in these Instructions, there should be no receptions for those cases that are wholly dependent on the situation and do not suit which templates, such as, for example, for repulsing counter-attacks, location of reserves during gas attacks, etc. In all these cases, the troops cannot be trained and they will depend, mainly on the resourcefulness and sharpness of the commanders and their ability to quickly grasp the situation and figure out what to do, as well as on the stamina of the troops, and these qualities cannot be replaced with any instructions and techniques.
The instruction about the defense should not say about any offensive.
The instructions should be sharply delimited all that relates to headquarters and commanders, from that of the combat troops; Staffs should not shift their duties to the troops.
In offensive operations, troops should not be given strategic tasks, and only the closest tactical, developing them, to perform the assigned strategic task, with reserves.
It is necessary to look at an offensive operation as a struggle for every inch of land, and therefore such an operation should be started only upon the procurement of all funds in the largest number and once started such an operation, then it is necessary to bring it to the end without stopping. Even if we do not have much success even then, keeping the Germans constantly under threat of attack and striking them blow after blow, we can calculate in the end to defuse them and take over them.
In the infantry it is necessary to have as many officers as possible, according to 4-5 per company. This need is especially felt in the management of units that burst into the enemy’s trenches, and meanwhile, in the attack, officers and soldiers, who are deprived of control, first of all drop out, do not know what to do. Failure of consolidation of parts in occupied enemy trenches in the former operations mostly depended on this. In these cases, it was always as if the part was overloaded with the disorganized lower ranks and the lack of a sufficient number of officers.
In fixing the captured, the initiative should be fully demonstrated, as the situation is complex and changeable. You need to quickly understand it and, holding a part in your hands, quickly use the new combat conditions to your advantage in various places and, moreover, in alien, unknown trenches where you need to quickly grab the whole situation and combine the actions of the part, which is inaccessible and impossible for the lower ranks. Yes, and for the young officer will be available only when he has in his hands a small part of the soldiers.
Then the attacking units, but the failed ones, must necessarily be replaced with fresh reserves, and even those that had success, should be replaced as soon as possible, because after the outburst and terrible tension and nerve heights, reaction and fatigue soon comes, and such troops are already unsuitable for immediate new serious business. So the troops need to give time to recover, to put themselves in order and rest, after which they will show even more their fighting ability and stamina.
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