Problems of combat training of the Red Army
Since 1939, a sharp increase in the number of the Red Army begins, and this growth was accompanied by a drop in training and discipline, however, as in any other army in the world in such conditions.
For example, in July 1940, in the city of Ulyanovsk, a 154 rifle division of 3 was created, headed by brigade commander Fokanov. In April 000, she transferred to the staff number 1941/4 - 120 people, in May she received 5 more reservists and in early June began to move to the West. As a result, the division received 900 recruits for 6 regular soldiers and commanders. At the same time, in general, the division showed itself well, but ...
However, the problems of the infantry were not the main ones.
And instead of a heart, a fiery motor
There were always enough flight enthusiasts in Russia, young people were eager to go to schools, but the rapid growth of the Air Force led to a deterioration in pilot training, and the formation of a large number of regiments and divisions - to a drop in discipline.
As an example - order No. 0168 dated 29.06.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX:
The crew of the SB plane of the 31st high-speed bomber regiment consisting of senior lieutenant S.P. Lebedev, junior lieutenant I.K. Kuznetsov and junior platoon commander G.D. During a training flight in a closed cockpit near his airfield, he lost his bearings, flew over the state border and landed in Memel.
The scandal in the conditions of that time was epic - not only was it a violation, but also to the airfield of a potential "partner", with whom everything was difficult, and in the conditions of a world war. The reasons are prosaic.
The investigation established:
1. Senior Lieutenant Lebedev did not properly prepare for the upcoming training flight and was not checked before this squadron commander, Captain Zorin.
2. The plane before departure was taken by a trained pilot, and not by senior lieutenant Lebedev, as it should be according to instructions.
3. The intercom on the plane was faulty.
4. The departure was made by Lebedev with an old, tattered map, on which the line of the state border of Lithuania with the Memel region was not drawn; junior lieutenant Kuznetsov left his map on the ground.
5. Having lost his bearings, Lebedev displayed a panic unworthy of the commander of the Red Army and began to wander randomly in arbitrary courses; the worst was his decision to land, knowing that this was a foreign airfield.
2. The plane before departure was taken by a trained pilot, and not by senior lieutenant Lebedev, as it should be according to instructions.
3. The intercom on the plane was faulty.
4. The departure was made by Lebedev with an old, tattered map, on which the line of the state border of Lithuania with the Memel region was not drawn; junior lieutenant Kuznetsov left his map on the ground.
5. Having lost his bearings, Lebedev displayed a panic unworthy of the commander of the Red Army and began to wander randomly in arbitrary courses; the worst was his decision to land, knowing that this was a foreign airfield.
The commander and navigator of the regiment did not fulfill their official duties, and the young pilot, frightened, sat down on the nearest site. The punishment is serious - the SB crew went to court, the squadron commander and the navigator lost one asterisk.
This is understandable: how the Germans could perceive the SB over their airfield, God knows, they could shoot down, and then what?
The Germans, by the way, also show sloppiness: a Soviet bomber went out unhindered and sat down at their airbase.
In general, there was little fun in the Air Force:
It is established that the main causes of accidents are:
1. Extremely low discipline, laxity and disorganization in the Air Force units of the Red Army.
A large number of drunks with fights, unauthorized absences and other immoral offenses incompatible with the rank of a commander, a Red Army soldier, characterize a low state of discipline and give rise to accidents.
2. The formulation of combat training in many shelves is unsatisfactory.
The planning of combat training is carried out "out of time and space", which is a consequence of the lack of knowledge of squadrons' preparedness and leads to the formulation of impossible and unrealistic tasks.
3. Navigator training in most parts, and especially in the fighter, is at a low level.
4. As a mass phenomenon - poor knowledge of the material part of the flight and technical personnel. The pilots and some of the commanders have little knowledge of the data of their aircraft and engine ...
In one regiment Zapovo, an aircraft reception and delivery book was found, in which the pilot signed the adopted car ten days in advance.
5. A large number of breakdowns, accidents and disasters occur during takeoffs and landings of aircraft.
1. Extremely low discipline, laxity and disorganization in the Air Force units of the Red Army.
A large number of drunks with fights, unauthorized absences and other immoral offenses incompatible with the rank of a commander, a Red Army soldier, characterize a low state of discipline and give rise to accidents.
2. The formulation of combat training in many shelves is unsatisfactory.
The planning of combat training is carried out "out of time and space", which is a consequence of the lack of knowledge of squadrons' preparedness and leads to the formulation of impossible and unrealistic tasks.
3. Navigator training in most parts, and especially in the fighter, is at a low level.
4. As a mass phenomenon - poor knowledge of the material part of the flight and technical personnel. The pilots and some of the commanders have little knowledge of the data of their aircraft and engine ...
In one regiment Zapovo, an aircraft reception and delivery book was found, in which the pilot signed the adopted car ten days in advance.
5. A large number of breakdowns, accidents and disasters occur during takeoffs and landings of aircraft.
And the August 1940 order speaks about this in detail and point by point. Moreover, he proposes remedial measures in detail and point by point.
But the measures did not work, and the arrest of Rychagov did nothing - with the growth of the Air Force and the need to master and study as soon as possible, there could be no other, who there would not have put their signatures under the orders. There was no time to study, no one to teach, the pilots were making careers simply impetuous, ready-made personnel - a terrible shortage.
Armor is strong
Directive No. 15119-c of September 27, 1940:
... The newly formed headquarters of the 6th mechanized corps, the 4th tank divisions, 9th and 10th aviation divisions. Formation commanders and higher-ranking chiefs still pay little attention and do little to prepare and put together their headquarters. The number of exercises conducted over the summer with headquarters is small ...
Tactically, too, not very:
The preparation of tank units and subunits in tactical and firepower relations is mediocre. For the better, the actions of flamethrower tanks stand out ... The tanks involved in the exercises acted well (165 TB), but during the attack they broke away from the infantry, being carried away by solving long-range tasks.
The Far East is no better:
The main flaws in the preparation of tank units:
1) inability to interact with small infantry units in the foreground;
2) insufficiently firm control of the platoon commanders of their subunits;
3) tank crews are not trained to observe the battlefield.
1) inability to interact with small infantry units in the foreground;
2) insufficiently firm control of the platoon commanders of their subunits;
3) tank crews are not trained to observe the battlefield.
Although, in general, there are much fewer claims to tankers than to pilots. According to the same directive, the ZOVO pilots managed to dive into their positions during the exercises, and they were able to carry out successful bombing after preliminary training on this particular object.
The tankers had other problems after all: if you regularly reorganize the subunits, first removing the mechanized corps, then replacing the brigades with divisions and re-forming the mechanized corps in a new way, we will get a management crisis.
He came out at the end of 1940, and in the year 1941 it only got worse - the mechanized corps of the second wave of the 1941 formation were pulled up ...
god of War
Improving the training of command personnel and staffs of ground and anti-aircraft artillery is not given due attention.
Most of the units do not have a system, plans and programs for the training of command personnel and staffs. At best, planning is done on monthly schedules. The subject of the classes is random and therefore does not provide a consistent build-up of the commander's knowledge and skills. Self-study is usually not organized. Some units have not conducted command training at all over the past three months.
The training of leaders and the quality of training continue to remain low, especially in terms of firearms and artillery training. The commanders of platoons, batteries and divisions do not know well the theory of shooting, shooting rules, and do not have stable training skills. The senior and higher command staff of the artillery takes very little part in the direct training of the commanders of battalions, batteries and platoons. Combined arms commanders do not control the training of artillery command personnel.
Most of the units do not have a system, plans and programs for the training of command personnel and staffs. At best, planning is done on monthly schedules. The subject of the classes is random and therefore does not provide a consistent build-up of the commander's knowledge and skills. Self-study is usually not organized. Some units have not conducted command training at all over the past three months.
The training of leaders and the quality of training continue to remain low, especially in terms of firearms and artillery training. The commanders of platoons, batteries and divisions do not know well the theory of shooting, shooting rules, and do not have stable training skills. The senior and higher command staff of the artillery takes very little part in the direct training of the commanders of battalions, batteries and platoons. Combined arms commanders do not control the training of artillery command personnel.
If we take specifically on the western districts, then the picture is sad:
Checking the shooting and artillery training of command personnel using simulation equipment showed the following results:
PribOVO - the command personnel of four artillery regiments were checked by ground artillery, all of them received a bad rating; one regiment and five divisions were tested in anti-aircraft artillery, all received a bad rating.
ZAPOVO - the command personnel of five artillery regiments were checked for ground artillery, of which four received a bad rating and only one was mediocre.
ODVO - the command staff of three artillery regiments was checked for ground artillery, of which one received a bad and two a mediocre assessment; one regiment and five divisions were tested in anti-aircraft artillery, of which only two divisions received a mediocre rating, the rest poor.
PribOVO - the command personnel of four artillery regiments were checked by ground artillery, all of them received a bad rating; one regiment and five divisions were tested in anti-aircraft artillery, all received a bad rating.
ZAPOVO - the command personnel of five artillery regiments were checked for ground artillery, of which four received a bad rating and only one was mediocre.
ODVO - the command staff of three artillery regiments was checked for ground artillery, of which one received a bad and two a mediocre assessment; one regiment and five divisions were tested in anti-aircraft artillery, of which only two divisions received a mediocre rating, the rest poor.
The actual reasons are given by the same order dated February 14, 1941:
Inspection of divisional headquarters on the outskirts of the field showed the poor training of staff commanders in their specialty and the inability of divisional commanders to organize the work of their headquarters. Divisional headquarters, in their present state, are more of a chancellery than a real governing body. Commanders of all grades have very little interest in the training of their headquarters, meanwhile in divisional headquarters, as a rule, there are young command personnel who do not have even a year's work experience in their positions.
The reason is highlighted in black - a large number of young and recruited personnel who, even if they wanted to, did not know how to organize full-fledged work. There were only four months left before the war ... At the same time, in addition to personnel problems, there are purely material problems:
Material support for the combat training of artillery units is uneven. Units in the districts: the Baltic, Odessa, North Caucasian, Transcaucasian and Western districts are poorly provided, in which there are few teaching aids, training devices and shells. The condition and maintenance of the materiel of weapons, instruments and equipment is satisfactory. The repair of tractors, vehicles and instruments is poorly carried out.
All together it sounds like a reason for a long work or a sentence in the event of a war in the near future.
This is not to mention communications - in the same order, the requirement to study fire control by radio using command tables by May 1, which in 1940 the commanders simply did not know how to do.
Tactic
Battle formations in an offensive battle have not been worked out at all. There is great crowding and disorder in the movement of the infantry, often the latter comes in a crowd; heavy machine guns move in the front lines of the infantry, constantly change positions and actually do not support it with their fire; anti-tank guns and individual escort guns, rolled by hand, lag behind the infantry; control with the beginning of the offensive is lost, the interaction of the battle formations of the infantry with the means supporting them is disrupted.
It would be possible not to continue further, only this is enough for defeat (by the way, hello to those who believe in Stalin's plans to attack Germany, here at least it would be better not to move in a crowd to teach), but for the rest, that NP:
Commanders do not know how to choose their place for a command post: they are usually located within the lines of battle formation, depriving themselves of the opportunity to observe the entire battle formation and being in danger of being killed at the first enemy fire.
And what about intelligence:
As a rule, the advancing battle formations do not have combat intelligence agencies (reconnaissance patrols) and guarding units ahead of them. Flank surveillance and flank guards are absent, making the formation very sensitive to the flanks.
What's the connection:
The applied control methods are primitive. Signaling is not practiced, and there are few signaling devices in the army and they are very monotonous. The liaison service is not established, and they do not know how to use it.
And as for such a thing as mobilization readiness, a separate order number 83 is dedicated to it:
An irresponsible attitude and self-removal from the leadership of mobilization work on the part of commanders and chiefs of staff of some military units, formations and gross violation of my orders No. 127 134 and No. 0130 1940
There are many orders: from combat training to discipline. There was just order with her, and any hazing was persecuted extremely harshly, and an example of this is Order No. 88:
According to the report of a member of the Military Council of the Trans-Baikal Military District, in the 10th construction battalion there was an unacceptable fact of distortion of the Disciplinary Regulations, expressed in assault on the part of certain command personnel.
Two cases of assault, the commissioner went to court, the company commander who hit the soldier lost his star. Moreover, judging by the level of decision-making - the People's Commissar of Defense, a case atypical for the Red Army of that time and not an ordinary one, since the scandal reached such a level. Disciplinary problems, unlike others, were just solvable.
Generally
In general, the country's leadership and comrade Tymoshenko kept their finger on the pulse, carried out checks and revealed shortcomings. Everything possible was done to fix them, but it is basically impossible to fix the problem of lack of specialists quickly. Especially in the lower-middle tier, where the number of full-time positions far outstripped existing opportunities. It is not for nothing that the most problems in the Air Force are in the fastest growing branch of the armed forces, where normal development before the war went on even for less than a decade.
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the war, thanks to intensive training, some of the problems had been mitigated, some had been resolved, staff training had been adjusted, and the governing documents had been replaced with more relevant ones.
In general, the work of the Timoshenko-Zhukov tandem is underestimated by historians, it was in 1940-1941 that their efforts revealed the existing problems and began work to eliminate the shortcomings. Another such year and the Red Army would have become completely different. But the war fell on a difficult period of structural changes and the development of combat experience, and the work had to be completed amid the roar of cannon fire.
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