Repression is a sore topic for our people even after 90 years, and the topic, alas, is largely politicized. At first they denied repressions, then they rehabilitated the convicts en masse, then hushed up, and then again ...
There were repressions, and there were innocent convicts, even the most ardent supporter of Stalin cannot but admit that the arrests of people like Rokossovsky or Gorbatov are stupidity on the verge of betrayal.
But not everyone was judged and just like that, especially in the cases of 1941, when in a supercritical situation it was clearly manifested what kind of person is inside, and whether there is a core in him. And, alas, not all pre-war generals had a core.
Major General Potaturchev
A career, in principle, typical for that time - an ordinary artilleryman in the First World War, four classes of education (at that time it was pretty good, at the level of our secondary school), the Red Army in the Civil, a party school, an anti-aircraft artillery school. One of the young cadres who were supposed to replace the tsarist generals and commanders of the Civil War.
Career advancement is also fast - already in 1930 he was a student of the Faculty of Mechanization and Motorization of the Military Technical Academy. F.E.Dzerzhinsky. From May 1932 to May 1935 - student of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army named after V.I. I. V. Stalin. Further - the battalion commander and brigade commander of the 21st heavy tank brigades, elites of the Ground Forces of the Red Army. Combat experience, however, not very: The liberation campaign in Western Belarus is not a war.
And in the summer of 1940, he was appointed commander of the Fourth Panzer Division - one of the strongest and oldest armored divisions of the Red Army. Most of them were formed in 1941 and entered the battle without even completing their formation, and Potaturchev's division was of the first wave, from those whom they managed to form, equip and where they could even take a course of combat training. Actually, the Sixth Mechanized Corps of Khatskilevich itself, which included the division, was staffed normally, by the standards of the Red Army in 1941 - just excellent. At Potaturchev's disposal were only the newest tanks: 88 - T-34 and 63 - KV, manning was almost one hundred percent (10 people), transport - 900%.
And then there was the war and the Bialystok cauldron, where the Sixth Mechanized Corps and the Fourth Tank Corps disappeared.
The fate of the commanders was different: Boldin, who headed the KMG, with a small group left the encirclement, Khatskilevich led the breakthrough and died, and Potaturchev ...
During the years of perestroika, his widow told the following history:
Potaturchev was betrayed by the storekeeper of the quartermaster service, who recognized him in Bobruisk. After interrogations, Potaturchev was taken to execution. The bullet went through below the heart. The peasants picked him up and cured him. Until January 1942, he was partisan, then he crossed the front line. Then he was arrested, and on September 30, 1945, he died in the prison hospital.
The hero was rehabilitated immediately after Stalin's death, his wife received a pension.
It's beautiful, it's a pity that it's not true, and everything: from a to z.
First, Potaturchev, leaving the unit entrusted to him, changed into civilian clothes and really walked towards the front, where he was captured by a German patrol in Minsk, becoming the first captured Soviet general.
Second:
In the appendix there is a sheet with General P.'s own hand-written diagrams concerning the battles of his division. It was interesting to see with what pedantic precision he painted them. Disadvantages such as too wide spread, lack of clear leadership and communication, he fully acknowledged. If he gave orders, after recognizing the threatening German encirclement, he would collect his units (while he clenched his fists) and would break through to the southeast or east. The decision was correct, but he did not seem to be aware of the difficulties in managing and supplying the units that would arise as a result of its implementation.
After leaving his troops, he wanted to try to get through Slonim, Baranovichi and Bobruisk to Smolensk, and from there to Moscow. He recognized the possibility that when he arrived in Smolensk, Moscow would have already fallen, and intended in this case to move to his family. When asked about the family, he began to cry and asked to be taken out of the room.
After leaving his troops, he wanted to try to get through Slonim, Baranovichi and Bobruisk to Smolensk, and from there to Moscow. He recognized the possibility that when he arrived in Smolensk, Moscow would have already fallen, and intended in this case to move to his family. When asked about the family, he began to cry and asked to be taken out of the room.
From a purely human point of view, you can understand, after the defeat broke down and fled, being captured by the Germans, split and said what he knew and what, from his point of view, the Germans might like:
He is not a convinced communist, but every commander had to [be] a member of the party, that is, a communist according to the documents. Internally, he is pessimistic about communism. In the Soviet economy, he is dissatisfied with many things; he does not agree with the collective farm system.
And the conclusion of the Germans:
P. looks like a man of the people who owes his ascent not to talent, but to personal ambition, diligence and energy. It is noteworthy that he willingly gives data on his division, its structure and combat use, even on the tactical foundations of the actions of the Russian tank forces. It seems to him that it does not occur to him at all that by doing so, from our point of view, he is violating the most sacred duty of an officer.
You can argue with this or not, but you can read:
58-1 "a". Treason to the Motherland, i.e. actions committed by citizens of the USSR to the detriment of the military might of the USSR, its state independence or inviolability, such as: espionage, issuing military or state secrets, going over to the side of the enemy, fleeing or flying abroad, are punishable by the capital punishment - shooting with confiscation of everything property, and under extenuating circumstances - imprisonment for a term of ten years with confiscation of all property. 58-1 "b". The same crimes committed by military personnel are punishable by the highest measure of criminal punishment - shooting with confiscation of all property.
Criminal Code.
Again, in those conditions it was easy to break down, the Western Front survived a catastrophe, and this is a fact. Potaturchev is not guilty of the catastrophe, he is rather a victim. But...
Law is law, and Potaturchev's colleagues perished, broke out of the encirclement with groups of their fighters, but did their duty.
At the same time and in the same places, another general, Karbyshev, was captured, who preferred death to shame. And he is not alone, the number of soldiers and officers of the Red Army who fought to the end is enormous. Otherwise, we would not have won the war.
But Potartuchev broke down, an ordinary soldier can be sent to a penal company for this, what to do with the general?
He was arrested, in 1947 he died in prison, before he was tried and executed.
I don't see a monster in him, a traitor - too, just an ordinary person who has chosen the wrong profession. But this does not relieve him of responsibility, especially since he really violated the law.
Major General Chernykh
“Chernykh was found guilty and convicted of the fact that, being the commander of the 9th Air Division, during the outbreak of hostilities by the Nazi forces against the USSR, he showed criminal inaction in the performance of his duties, as a result of which aviation the enemy destroyed about 70% of the material part of the division, and on the night of June 27, 1941, being at the Seshchensky airfield and mistaking the 3 Soviet planes that had arrived at this airfield for fascist ones, he showed cowardice, announced a pointless alarm, after which, leaving the leadership of the division's units, he fled from the front to the city of Bryansk, where he spread provocative fabrications that the enemy had landed troops at the Seshchensky airfield ... "
As a division commander in the Bialystok ledge, he was brought to a village near Bryansk - a little later. In the meantime, about the landing - in addition to panic, Citizen Chernykh ordered the destruction of materiel in Sesche ...
He ordered and rushed to Bryansk shouting "Germans", which disorganized the front-line city.
What happened, in principle, is clear - a young officer born in 1912, appointed to command the division:
As of June 22, 1941, the division had 429 aircraft, including 74 out of order. Of the 256 combat-ready crews, 55 were ready to carry out combat missions at night in simple ones, and only 45 in the daytime in adverse weather conditions. 110 crews arrived from schools or were retrained for new vehicles.
I screwed up my job, because I had neither the experience nor the talents of the genius level. On the first day of the war, he was confused and did not disperse the regiments entrusted to him, then he evacuated with those who survived to the rear for rearmament, where he finally fell through.
At the same time, Sergei Chernykh is a combat pilot with experience in fighting in Spain and a skilled fighter, like his boss, also from Rychagov's team, General Kopets. Just the rapid career of Rychagov, who pulled behind him the same young and early, sincerely believing that they know what is best, led to what it led to: a third of the MIGs of the Red Army was lost, the division commander fell into a panic and was shot.
Under Khrushchev, he was rehabilitated - after all, Stalin was personally guilty of everything ...
Without denying the guilt of Comrade Stalin, who staked on the youth, but Major General Chernykh was not appointed by force, did anyone?
Did the security officer with a revolver stand behind when he received the front-line division?
Privates were shot for panic in wartime: we, the Germans, the Americans and the British. And the demand from the general, in my humble opinion, is much higher.
At the same time, he was not a traitor to Black, nor was he a coward. If he was in command of a regiment at the age of 29, and the Germans would see Kuz'kina's mother in the sky, as they saw in the performance of, say, Lev Shestakov, the regiment commander in Odessa, who did not jump above his head after Spain. Or other Spaniards who fought bravely and skillfully ... At their level.
Colonel Alekseev
July 9 p. The division commander Alekseev, having a written order from the Front Military Council - to hold the occupied positions, on the basis of an alleged oral order from the commander of the 7th rifle corps Dobroserdov, the 492nd rifle regiment, which had all the capabilities to hold the line defenses until the arrival of reinforcements, ordered to withdraw. This order was not passed on to the rest of the regiments. Division commander Alekseev, along with commissar Korzhev and other commanders, leaving the units, fled from the battlefield. In the area where the division headquarters was located, on July 11, all the office work of the division headquarters and about 2 million money were found abandoned.
Moskvich, 44 years old, career commander of the Red Army. Having brought far from the best division (formations of 1941) to position, he was confused and:
parts of the division took up defensive positions later than the specified time, in addition, during the march, food for the fighters was not organized. People, especially the 617th Rifle Regiment, arrived in the defense area exhausted.
After occupying the defense area, the division command did not reconnoitre the enemy forces, did not take measures to blow up the bridge over the Sluch River in the central defense sector, which made it possible for the enemy to transfer tanks and motorized infantry. Due to the fact that the command did not establish contact between the division headquarters and the regiments, on 6 July the 617th and 584th rifle regiments operated without any direction from the division command.
After occupying the defense area, the division command did not reconnoitre the enemy forces, did not take measures to blow up the bridge over the Sluch River in the central defense sector, which made it possible for the enemy to transfer tanks and motorized infantry. Due to the fact that the command did not establish contact between the division headquarters and the regiments, on 6 July the 617th and 584th rifle regiments operated without any direction from the division command.
In panic, he did not fulfill the elementary things for the divisional commander, which led to the defeat, conviction and execution on December 27, 1941, with further rehabilitation during the time of Khrushchev.
It happened, of course, in different ways, repression is also a dubious method of restoring order. Here is the Northwest Front:
Glovatsky again turned to I.S.Kosobutsky with a request to allow the retreat. Kosobutsky gave the order to retreat to Pskov, but did not inform Glovatsky that, in addition to his division and the garrison of the Pskov fortified area, two regiments of the 111th division should simultaneously withdraw from the left bank. (Subsequently, when arrested and during interrogation, Kosobutsky refused to acknowledge the fact of the order given. Since Glovatsky did not have time to receive a written order, he could not confirm the fact of the order. The absence of a written order and Kosobutsky's refusal to acknowledge the fact of the order formed the basis of Glovatsky's guilty verdict).
Then the corps commander set up his divisional commander, he got off with a sentence of 10 years, served a year, and was reinstated in rank. Divisional commander Glovatsky was shot and rehabilitated posthumously, which is little consolation.
But you must understand that time - this is the period when people died in the Brest Fortress, but did not surrender, when the pilots rammed, when civilians were enrolled in the militia, and the absolute majority of commanders fought to the last.
As an example of the mood of the time:
"Among the Red Army, when you talk to them about retreat, there is massive discontent, and literally you have to pull them out of the trenches, people want to fight, and the orders to retreat."
And in such conditions it was necessary to punish alarmists.
Well, after the war ...
The commander of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov, after captivity continued to serve, for example, and he was not alone. He simply did not testify, did not surrender military secrets, did not cooperate with the Germans.
22 generals were restored to the rank, 6 more escaped from captivity, 28 died, only eight out of 81 went over to the side of the Germans.
With regard to rehabilitation - there is a law, there is a private opinion, each has its own.
My point is that the time has not yet come to issue final verdicts, but the rehabilitation of everyone without exception is also not a method. Our era and understanding of justice are too different from that era.