1941 year. May plans of the leadership of the Red Army

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, pd - infantry division Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, sd - rifle division, Ur - fortified area.

In the previous part the events that took place on June 16-18, 1941 were considered. It was shown that, unlike rifle divisions, mechanized corps ZAPOVO, KOVO and ODVO did not advance to the border before the start of the war. The exception was two divisions each from the 4th and 6th mechanized corps KOVO and ZAPOVO, which were probably ready to suppress provocations of the enemy in one of the directions. No other measures were taken to train the troops of the western districts (with the exception of the PribOVO) by June 22.

Disinformation measures about the presence of a large German group on the territory of Romania, Slovakia and Hungary turned out to be so grandiose that the British, like the Americans and our intelligence, provided false information on this issue.

A fictional version of one of the writers about the directive of the NKO and the General Staff of 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX to bring the troops of the western districts to combat readiness was considered. Due to a lack of knowledge, the writer came up with this version based on the unique events in the PribOVO and the words "directive" from the interrogation protocol of the head of communications of the ZAPOVO.

Could the spacecraft leadership have thought about the direction of such a directive if the speed of concentration of German troops at the border has significantly decreased?

If, out of the expected number of 180 German divisions for the start of the war, about 30% of the formations have not yet arrived at the border?

If there are no large mobile and aviation enemy groupings?

If there are no elite units near the border: SS divisions and airborne divisions?

If the SC leadership was completely confident in their exact knowledge of the enemy troops concentrated at the border? ..

Published documents of the General Staff of the Spacecraft

On one of the sites, schematic maps developed by the General Staff in mid-May 1941 appeared in good quality. Also on the site there are some documents related to 20.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. This date will be discussed later. Therefore, links to the considered schemes will be placed in the next part.

In mid-May 1941, the General Staff prepared a note with considerations on a plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces in case of war with Germany and its allies. Several diagrams were attached to the note. Almost all readers interested in the events of the Great Patriotic War are familiar with the text of the note.

On July 30, 2021, a meeting of the Russian Historical Society took place. In the foyer, the "Diagram of the balance of forces" and the "Diagram of the deployment of the strategic forces of the USSR" were exhibited. One of the schemes got into the media and was discussed in the article earlier.

The deployment scheme of the troops of the Northern, Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts

It turned out that this scheme has a different name "The scheme of the deployment of troops of the Northern, North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts" (Central Asia Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 28. Op. 17. D. 21. L. 8). The date of its creation is May 1941.

Since in "Case 21" on sheet 10 there is a diagram that has a date of 15.05.1941/15/XNUMX, the scheme in question was developed on May XNUMX or a little earlier.

With the help of this diagram, we will try to understand: how did the SC leadership imagine the plans of the German command in case of a war with the USSR?

After all, some writers claim that intelligence in December 1940 - in March 1941 provided all the necessary data on German plans.

A fragment of the diagram shows that the enemy has three groups: in East Prussia, in the northern part of Poland and in the southern part of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

The main blow of the northern grouping (the name is conditional, since at that time the SC leadership did not know about Army Group "North") was directed towards Smolensk with a deviation to Bobruisk. At the same time, a supporting (secondary) blow is delivered to Siauliai.

The central enemy grouping (the name is also conditional) makes two concentric (secondary) attacks on Volkovysk to encircle the spacecraft grouping in the Bialystok area.

The most powerful southern grouping strikes at Krivoy Rog, Vinnytsia, Kiev and Mozyr.

The note said:

There are no directions of strikes Munkach - Lvov and Sanok - Lvov on the diagram. The city of Rivne is located somewhat away from the direction of the main attack of the German group.

Let us consider the assumptions of the General Staff about the quantitative composition of enemy groupings.

The northern group consists of 42 39 divisions. 30 divisions (24 infantry, 4 tank and 2 motorized), and in the secondary direction - 9 divisions (6 infantry, tank, motorized and cavalry).

The central grouping consists of 29 divisions, concentrated in three directions:

- on the northern flank of the Bialystok salient: 6 infantry, 3 tank and 2 motorized divisions;

- in the central sector: cavalry and 4 infantry divisions;

- on the southern flank of the Bialystok salient: 10 infantry, 2 tank and 2 motorized divisions.

Behind the northern and central groupings are 5 infantry divisions of the reserve of the main command.

Thus, nothing dangerous is expected for the ZAPOVO.

Two mythical motorized divisions (not existing at this time) by reconnaissance on the right flank have already been discovered. Reconnaissance only needs to track the appearance of three tank divisions in the southern part of the Suvalka salient. According to intelligence, these are three tank and three motorized brigades, several artillery regiments and separate units. The reconnaissance will not be able to detect arriving tank and motorized divisions until the beginning of the war ...

On the left flank of the ZapOVO, reconnaissance is required to detect the appearance of two motorized and two tank divisions. The reconnaissance will also not be able to detect the appearance of the 2nd Panzer Group in the area ...

The number of divisions of the enemy's southern grouping by directions is not shown in the diagram. Only the total number is indicated.

Thus, the General Staff considers the so-called "southern option" of the concentration of German troops as the main option for the enemy's actions by mid-May 1941: 68 divisions in the north (against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO) and 107 in the south, of which up to 60 will be concentrated in Romania ...

Power balance diagram

Simultaneously with the scheme considered above, or a little later, the "Scheme of the balance of forces [annex to the note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft G.K. RF.F. 15.05.41.Op. 28.D. 17. Sheet 21).

In the General Staff in the southern direction, enemy strikes are expected through Zhmerinka on Kazatin, on Lvov (from the direction of Munkach), on Zhitomir and on Tarnopol.

The directions of all strikes (with the exception of the strike through Zhmerinka) differ from the routes considered by the General Staff in the previous scheme.

The diagram on the areas of responsibility of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO again reflects the strikes on Shauliai and Volkovysk. The direction of the main blow was changed to Minsk. At the same time, the General Staff does not expect an attack by the German group from the direction of Brest to Minsk.

In the area of ​​Minsk, a zone with the inscription "RGK" - the reserve of the main command.

On the "Scheme of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in case of war with Germany and its allies [annex to the note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft G.K. Zhukov to I.V. (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 15.05.41. Op. 28. D. 17. Sheet 22) this group of troops is also indicated.

The troops of the RGK are the 22nd Army from the Ural District, consisting of six rifle divisions and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District.

At the same time, the "Scheme of covering the state border in the West [an appendix to the note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense S.K. F. 15.05.41.Op. 28.D.17.L.22). In this scheme, the concentration of the troops of the 13nd Army and the 22st Mechanized Corps is provided northeast of Minsk. The diagram even shows the defense lines of the mechanized corps and some of the Ural divisions.

On June 12, the rifle divisions of the 22nd Army were sent not to Minsk, but to the areas indicated on the "State Border Covering Scheme". Consequently, the main attack of the German troops from the north to Minsk by mid-June in the General Staff is not considered as relevant.

On June 19, the 44th Rifle Corps began to move towards Minsk, the divisions of which were limited in mobile, combat-ready and practically had no ammunition. The 64th rifle division was the first to arrive at Minsk. The 163rd artillery regiment of this division had only 207 rounds of different calibers when it was advanced. By the beginning of the battles for the Minsk UR, this artillery regiment from the UR depots received cartridges and shells for 76-mm cannons. There were no shells for 122-mm guns, since these systems were not in service with the UR. Also, probably, parts of the hull were not provided with ammunition for mortars, grenades, etc.

Thus, it can be stated that at this time no one comes up with the idea of ​​the possibility of German troops reaching Minsk at the end of June 1941.

Let us return to the "Scheme of the balance of forces" and consider the quantitative assessment of the General Staff of the German groupings in directions. Somewhat surprising is the large number of German armies that are expected to be seen in the General Staff at the state border.

Three armies (44 divisions) are concentrated in East Prussia: the 13th (motorized and 6 infantry divisions), the 17th (cavalry, 2 tank and 22 infantry divisions) and the 25th (motorized, 2 tank and 6 infantry divisions). The diagram does not indicate one of the motorized divisions.

On the Warsaw direction, 29 divisions (including 2 airborne divisions) are concentrated as part of the 15th army (motorized and 6 infantry divisions), a separate army corps (3 infantry divisions), the 3rd army (7 infantry, 2 tank and 2 motorized divisions) and groupings near Brest (tank, cavalry and 4 infantry divisions).

The concentration of 107 German divisions is expected against the KOVO and ODVO troops: 81 infantry, 12 tank, 9 motorized, 2 cavalry and 3 airborne divisions.

At the border in southern Poland, seven German armies are indicated: 1st (motorized, 2 tank and 9 infantry divisions), 4th (2 motorized, 3 tank and 12 infantry divisions), 9th (2 motorized, 2 tank and 10 infantry divisions), 7th (motorized, tank, 2 cavalry and 8 infantry divisions), 16th (8th infantry division), 2nd (motorized, tank and 7 infantry divisions) and 11th (motorized, 2 tank and 10 infantry divisions). A total of 85 divisions.

In the Note with Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan, there is a reference to the RM dated 15.05.1941/9/13. In accordance with the specified RM, there are 14 German divisions in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary), and another XNUMX-XNUMX divisions in the border regions of Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudja).

In total, 107 German divisions are concentrated against the KOVO and ODVO troops. Subsequently, the German group in Romania, according to intelligence, will be increased.

It is noteworthy that the General Staff does not expect the appearance of large mobile groupings in any of the directions: tank armies or groups. The General Staff believes that the German command will distribute all its tank and motorized troops among the field armies. Probably, the General Staff was sure of this due to the absence (according to intelligence data) at the border of the headquarters of motorized corps and tank groups.

Since the advance of troops took place on the basis of the above schemes, then in mid-June these plans in the General Staff were considered relevant. Indeed, by June 12-15, RMs differed slightly from the materials received by May 31, and no one knew that these RMs were unreliable ...

17-18 June 1941

S. M. Firsov (Chief of Engineering Troops of the 11th Army, PribOVO):

Colonel AB told me that, starting from June 17-18, observation from border posts, from towers, at night spotted light, the movement of cars and the hum of engines, which he personally observed and listened to ...
On June 17 and 18, I, together with the commander, went to check the progress of work on field construction and heard similar stories and reports from the officers ...

Below are fragments of two maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces with the situation for the evening of June 16 and 19.

When comparing the situation on the maps, you can see:

- on the left flank, the 217th Infantry Division moved to the border, reducing the front of the 61st Infantry Division;

- to the right to the border, the 21st Infantry Division moved forward, reducing the front of the 269th Infantry Division;

- For the 269th Infantry Division, the headquarters of the 56th Motorized Corps was concentrated, which was not detected by our intelligence;

- at the junction of the 8th and 11th armies, the 30th Infantry Division began to move towards the border. At a distance of about 9 km from the border, the concentration zone of the 8th Panzer Division begins. But there could be no tank units in this zone;

- to the south, we moved to the border of the 12th and 32nd front lines;

- there were no changes in the deployment of troops on the Suvalka salient.

Thus, the advancement of vehicle supply convoys and infantry divisions, artillery and sapper units to the border could be detected. But this could not greatly disturb the command, since at that time the advance of motorized and tank units and divisions was not recorded to the border.

In the depths of enemy territory, tank and motorized divisions were concentrated, but their movement was not detected by reconnaissance.

19 June 1941 year

Note of the 1st department of the NKGB in RU:

According to the intelligence information we received, referring to the middle of June of this year, the German command intends to begin an offensive against the USSR by inflicting main blows against Murmansk and the Murmansk railway. roads, Vilna, Bialystok and Chisinau.
On the Warsaw front, the German army intended to remain passive, and in southern Ukraine, lead an offensive in the direction of Odessa, Kherson, Rostov ...
The source reports that the 2nd Air Fleet is currently relocated to Poznan. From June 18th, various headquarters began to move to the east ...

Again, the message contains echoes of German misinformation about the passivity of the German army on the Warsaw front. On June 18, the movement of German headquarters to the east began and, therefore, intelligence should timely detect their concentration in different directions.

Message NKGB BSSR:

The message is ambiguous, since there is no railway in the area of ​​the village of Koden. The railway runs through Terespol to Brest and from Chelm through Wlodawa to the territory of the USSR.

There were indeed units of the 3rd and 4th German tank divisions in the indicated area, but on June 19 there were no tank units near the border. Tank battalions began to move out later.

Magazine combat operations of the 3rd Panzer Division: «[From 20.06 to 21.06 - Approx. auth.] behind the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment came 1st and 2nd battalions of the same regiment ... "

It is unlikely that in the 4th Panzer Division, two days earlier, someone had allowed the withdrawal of tank units to the border. It is possible that tracked vehicles were mistaken for tanks.

Received two messages from Basil (from Budapest):

At the Soviet borders (including Hungary and Romania), Germany has concentrated about 5 million soldiers. 65 mechanized divisions are ready for military action. The German and Hungarian top military circles assume that the military strike will have two directions - towards Belarus and through Romania towards Bessarabia ...

... 130 German divisions are concentrated near the Soviet borders ...

The reports could be believed, but the information about the attack on Belarus and the absence of attacks from the southern part of Poland towards KOVO should have caused bewilderment.

Special message NKGB USSR:

From the German, Italian embassies, the Romanian and Hungarian missions, applications were received for urgent travel abroad for a number of employees and members of their families.
From the German Embassy - for 19 seats ...
From the Italian Embassy - for 10 seats ...
From the Romanian mission - 7 seats ...
From the Hungarian mission - to 4 places ...
Those departing, violating the established procedure for submitting applications to Intourist, called themselves by phone and asked to arrange any seats on the train, but only on June 19th of this year. G.
Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Kobulov.

Of course, this message should have alerted the leadership of the Soviet Union.

But on June 18, a similar message was sent from the NKGB of the USSR: "During the period from June 10 to June 17, 34 people left for Germany ..." But the war did not start on June 18-19 and there were no provocations on the border ...

Of protocol interrogation of the secretary of the German embassy in Moscow Eisengart (6.01.1946 g.): “From the words of the diplomatic couriers of the German embassy in Moscow and other employees of the embassy, ​​I knew that an increased concentration of troops was being carried out on the state borders by the German government. Conversations at the embassy took place openly about the impending war against the USSR ...

Ten days before the German attack on the USSR, Ambassador Schulenburg said the following: "If June 22, 1941 goes well, then there will be no war between Germany and the USSR." home to Germany, and this was confirmation of Schulenburg's statement about the upcoming war ... "

RU received two messages from KhVTs (G. Kegel - employee of the German embassy in Moscow):

Again, quite menacing messages that reached the country's leadership on the evening of June 19 or in the afternoon of the 20th. But everything that happens on the border does not cause serious concern to the leadership of the spacecraft, since the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff will appear at Stalin's only in the evening of June 22. It is possible that they ended up there together only at Stalin's summons ...

If the leadership of the KA is not worried, then the head of the country should also trust them ...

Unknown RU document

In the report of the RU dated 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX there is a note "Where is the summary?"... Probably, it was made by the hand of the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin after G.K. Zhukov left for the South-Western Front. It turns out that Vatutin did not see the previous document of the RU General Staff.

It seems that there was nothing special in the RU document of June 20 (with the situation as of June 19), and therefore G.K. Zhukov did not address it to N.F. the volume of documents passing through it at this time.

The RU summary of June 22 includes a text that allows us to establish the number of German divisions near our border as of June 19, as it was presented in RU.

In one of the previous parts there was assessed the number of German divisions located at our border on June 19.

64 divisions were located against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO (taking into account the front reserves in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area). In the border areas against KOVO and ODVO there are 63 German divisions.

Before the invasion grouping of 180 German divisions, defined in the General Staff in mid-May, there are still 53 divisions missing. It is very important for the General Staff to have an idea: where the missing divisions will be transported in order to find out about the directions of the main attacks.

For nineteen days in June, the German grouping in Poland and East Prussia increased by only 5-7 divisions! Nothing terrible happens in the border areas. Based on the incoming RM - so the General Staff might think ...

Orders of NPO and General Staff

Two orders of the People's Commissar of Defense have been prepared (No. 0042, 0043):

- About camouflaging airfields, military units and important objects of the district;

- About aircraft camouflage, runways and airfield facilities.

At the suggestion of an NGO, the issue under the second order is considered by the Government and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The orders raised important issues, but the established dates for July 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20 do not agree with the date of the start of the war. From this it follows that less than three days before the start of the war, the NGOs and the General Staff are not aware of its imminent start.

At the same time, the NKO and the General Staff issue orders for the withdrawal of front directorates to command posts.

The established dates for the advancement of front directorates again show that on June 19, the SC leadership does not expect war at dawn on June 22.

P.V. Afanasiev (Deputy Chief of Engineering Troops of PribOVO):

The fact that they had moved to the command post not to conduct exercises, but on the eve of a possible war with the Germans, was obvious to everyone, but whether the war would really start or everything would be limited only to private border clashes was not clear. Hope to delay the war continued to exist...

Events on the territory of PribOVO

On the territory of PribOVO, they continue to prepare for possible military operations.

Even in order No. 0052 of June 15, the district commander notes that there may be spies among the people working at the communications centers of the NKS (People's Commissariat of Communications). Therefore, from the first day of the divisions' withdrawal into the areas of their operations, all nodes should be occupied by military signalmen. A list of communication centers to be occupied by spacecraft specialists was determined.

S. L. Chekunov:

By order of PribOVO dated 19.06.41/22/57 (sent by cipher telegram at 3:00), it was ordered to take control of the NKS communication nodal stations by 20.06.41:2 3/XNUMX/XNUMX by sending one middle commander and XNUMX-XNUMX Red Army soldiers to them, as well as to establish a communication procedure at communication centers only in Russian (in case of the opening of hostilities) ...

It seems that pressure from Moscow prevented the implementation of the requirements of the said order.

In accordance with order No. 00229 dated 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the head of the air defense zone was ordered: "To the end of 19.6.41 bring the entire air defense of the district to full combat readiness"... Nothing like this happens in other districts.

N.N. Voronov:

June 19 ... I took over as head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense. By order of the commander of the PribOVO troops F.I.Kuznetsov, the blackout of cities and individual objects of military importance was introduced.
I immediately reported this to the chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov by phone in order to obtain permission to carry out such blackouts in other border districts. In response, I heard swearing and threats against Kuznetsov. After a while, the commander of PribOVO was instructed to cancel this order ...
A wide network of VNOS posts reported in detail about all flights of German reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of our border districts. These data were put on special maps and immediately reported to the General Staff ... We were told: “We already know. Do not worry…

An angry encryption from the General Staff comes to the actions in PribOVO:

You, without the sanction of the People's Commissar, gave an order on the air defense to put into effect provision No. 2, which means to carry out a blackout in the Baltic region, which could cause damage to the industry. Such actions can only be carried out with the permission of the government. Your order provokes various rumors and irritates the public. I demand to immediately cancel the illegally given order and give an encrypted explanation for the report to the People's Commissar. Zhukov

It seems that the discussion of the events with the blackout drags on until June 21st.

N. D. Yakovlev (new head of the Main Artillery Directorate):

The initiative of the PribOVO command, which developed further plans to bring the troops of the district to combat readiness, did not find understanding from the leadership of the spacecraft or from Stalin.

After the abolition of position No. 2, the district headquarters found another way out and on June 21 introduced a blackout at the locations of the troops, but the new directive did not manage to reach the units everywhere.

On June 19, the former commander of the PribOVO AD Loktionov was arrested. Other workers of the district, who worked with A.D. Loktionov, could have followed him. Therefore, the initiative at the headquarters of the district could decline.

A directive was sent from the district headquarters to the military councils of the 8th and 11th armies:

You should be more effective in managing the equipment of the defensive zone. A blow to the preparation of positions on the main strip of the UR, the work on which should be strengthened.
Finish the work in the foreground. But the positions of the foreground should be occupied by troops only in case of violation of the state border by the enemy.
To ensure quick occupation of positions, both in the foreground and in the main defensive zone, the corresponding units must be completely in combat readiness ...

The commanders at the border understood the situation better, but their initiative was slowed down so as not to provoke anger in Moscow.

On June 19, the commander of the 125th rifle division, Major General Bogaychuk, sends a cipher telegram to the PribOVO headquarters:

Historian S. L. Chekunov https://www.izakayasushilounge.com militera.lib.ru wrote: “... All the advanced divisions of the PribOVO received the order for the preparation of mining. The order was sent to the army at 17:25 on 19.06.1941/128/XNUMX, but, due to a mine blown up by a local peasant, a cow began to make various reservations about the installation. As a result, for example, in the XNUMXth [SD - Approx. auth.] the installation began only on the evening of the 21st ... "

The commander of the 125th rifle division, better understanding the situation on the border, began to evacuate the families of the division's command personnel.

In response, an angry encryption comes from the chief of the General Staff:

To order the division commander Bogaychuk to give in code a PERSONAL explanation to the People's Commissar of Defense on what basis he evacuated the families of the commanding staff of the division. The People's Commissar considers this an act of cowardice, contributing to the spread of panic among the population and provoking conclusions that are extremely undesirable for us ...

Such a reaction of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff can only indicate that they are absolutely sure that there will be no war in the near future.

Some events on June 19

The chief of staff of KOVO, General Purkaev, responded to a request from the commander of the 12th Army, General Ponedelin:

The fire can be opened:
a) if a special order is given to the Military Council of the district;
b) upon the announcement of mobilization;
c) when the cover plan is put into effect, unless there is a special prohibition;
d) The Military Council of the 12th Army knows that we do not fire anti-aircraft artillery on German aircraft in peacetime ...

The commander of the 19th Army, General Konev, sends a telegram to the People's Commissar for Defense: "I ask permission to leave for Rostov-on-Don for 3-5 days to resolve urgent issues in the district's affairs".

On June 20 at 19:57 a reply was sent from the NGO: “I allow you to travel to Rostov-on-Don for 3-5 days. Tymoshenko ".

I. T. Peresypkin (Commissar of Communications) wrote:

This reaction of Stalin testifies that less than a day before the war he does not expect the start of the war ...

June 19. Navy events

admiral A.G. Golovko (commander of the Northern fleet): "We have received a directive from the Main Naval Staff - to prepare submarines for going to sea ... He ordered to disperse the submarines in different bays and lips in order to go out to sea immediately as soon as the signal is given ..."

In the Northern Fleet, things were happening that were prohibited in the NPO. During the day on June 19, the anti-aircraft artillery of the Northern Fleet repeatedly fired at the intruder aircraft, using up 241 76 mm rounds. The pilot of the I-153 aircraft, senior lieutenant Volovikov, who returned to the airfield, reported that at 11:40 he made two attacks on the twin-engine aircraft, and on the second approach he was attacked by the Me-109 aircraft. Our command gave the order to disperse and camouflage the aircraft at the airfields.

German historian P. Karel Wrote:

In the Far North, where the strategically important port of Murmansk was located, a raid on Soviet airbases undertaken by German aircraft on June 22 at 4:00 was ineffective: Soviet aircraft were dispersed and camouflaged in advance ...

Yu. A. Panteleev (Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet):

The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to bring the fleet to increased operational readiness ...
Admiral [V. F. Tributs - Approx. auth.] detained me. He called Moscow and summoned the People's Commissar of the Navy NG Kuznetsov: “Comrade People's Commissar, I have the opinion that an attack by Germany is possible at any hour. We must begin to erect barriers, otherwise it will be too late! I consider it necessary to increase the operational readiness of the fleet ... "
Putting down the phone, the admiral sighed with relief: “With the increase in the operational readiness of the fleet, he agreed, but ordered to be careful, not to get involved in provocations. And with the setting of mines he ordered to wait. Let's act! ..

S. I. Kabanov (commander of the naval base on the Hanko Peninsula):

At 17:15, a signal was received by the fleet: [Operational readiness number 2 - Approx. auth.]. There were no explanations of the reasons for the introduction of readiness, reports, documents ... But units of the 8th rifle brigade did not receive orders from Leningrad to occupy their battalion defense areas.
In the evening, at about eleven o'clock, I came home to rest ... From the border, they reported by telephone that three cars had passed from Helsinki to the city with the plenipotentiary of the USSR in Finland, Comrade Orlov, his deputy Eliseev, and the naval attaché, captain of the 2nd rank Taradin ...
The plenipotentiary said briefly: “Perhaps on June 22-25, Germany will start a war with the Soviet Union, Finland is its ally ...
I ordered to deploy all the forces of the base, as it was supposed to according to OG No. 1, but not to declare a combat alert ...
On the morning of June 20 ... the commander of the [8th Rifle Brigade - Approx. auth.] reported that his regiments had completely occupied their defense sectors ... I ordered, at my own risk, the turboelectric ship on June 21 not to be released on the voyage ...

At 16:15, the People's Commissar of the Navy NG Kuznetsov ordered the transfer of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as well as the Danube and Pinsk flotilla to OG No. 2.

To be continued ...

Comments

[Covid]

To me, as an ordinary person, something else is much clearer. If the USSR at the time when Germany attacked Poland and there even seemed to be the government fled, it was not the Germans to help and not to take the Poles prisoner, and this is 200 thousand, it was necessary to supply these Poles with weapons and ammunition, and even move the entire Red Army there, it would not have happened on June 22, 1941. Then also France was not defeated. Nemchura would have been crushed at the root without great losses.
And now it is necessary to write a multivolume JUSTIFICATION of his foolishness and stupidity. Although there was neither one nor the other, it was just that the USSR was fishing in troubled waters, hoping that the Soyuznichki would get bogged down in a protracted war with Germany, and when they exhausted each other then the USSR would take them all lukewarm in one breath. But the German Blitzkrieg ruined everything. And after Poland, Germany was able to build up its strength faster than the USSR. And again, well, it came to mind on June 22nd.
The USSR lost in its plans to capture all of Europe, but Peace won. And the USSR no longer exists.

[Xlor]

Would crush a nemchura at the root without big losses

France would sit behind the Maginot Line, and England behind the strait. And we would, for them, as you said, "crushed nemchura"

[citizen]

And so there was no lights out directly from the assistants? And yes, France behind the Maginot line is much better than the French-occupied supplying resources to the Wehrmacht.

[Covid]

Quote: Xlor

France would sit behind the Maginot Line, and England behind the strait. And we would, for them, as you said, "crushed nemchura"

Don't you think this phrase is ridiculous? When the Germans slapped on June 22, France was no longer there, and England, too, was not much of a help to the USSR. But the industry of France was already working for Germany, and somehow the Germans more quickly used the time to prepare for June 22.
And at 39 meters they would actually fight on foreign territory, driving the angry Poles in front of them. And at that time Germany had hardly any weapons, just to break Poland.
That's it.

[Xlor]

When the Germans slapped on June 22, France was no longer there and England was also not much of a help to the USSR

You are our historian, gray-winged, when Germany attacked Poland, it was 1939 ...

[Covid]

Have you tracked my topic from the beginning? My opinion is that if the USSR had hit the Germans first in 1939, there would have been no meat that they received after June 22. Although France and England are "strangely at war", they do not help the Germans either. And knowing that they can change their minds, then on the border with them it is necessary to keep troops. The Germans therefore signed the Pact with the USSR so that the USSR would not hit them. If it were not for the Pact, the Germans would hardly have dared to go to war with Poland. And so the USSR got a large half of Poland in the economy, easy for itself. True, again, this did not benefit the USSR in the end. Hitler outplayed Stalin.

[antivirus]

the outskirts will be annexed to Russia.
after a series of failures on both sides and impoverishment-degradation (with the flight of European integrators to Canada)
but who knows about it now?

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Covid

To me, as an ordinary person, something else is much clearer. If the USSR at the time when Germany attacked Poland and there even seemed to be the government fled, it was not the Germans to help and not to take the Poles prisoner, and this is 200 thousand, it was necessary to supply these Poles with weapons and ammunition, and even move the entire Red Army there, it would not have happened on June 22, 1941. Then also France was not defeated. Nemchura would have been crushed at the root without great losses.
And now it is necessary to write a multivolume JUSTIFICATION of his foolishness and stupidity. Although there was neither one nor the other, it was just that the USSR was fishing in troubled waters, hoping that the Soyuznichki would get bogged down in a protracted war with Germany, and when they exhausted each other then the USSR would take them all lukewarm in one breath. But the German Blitzkrieg ruined everything. And after Poland, Germany was able to build up its strength faster than the USSR. And again, well, it came to mind on June 22nd.
The USSR lost in its plans to capture all of Europe, but Peace won. And the USSR no longer exists.

And the aspirations of the British, American and French "partners" would come true - the Russians and the Germans would collide head-ons. Because any assistance provided to the Poles inevitably led to a war between Germany and the USSR.
And then the "partners" only had to help the losing side so that the war dragged on and led to the extreme exhaustion of both sides. And so that the Russians and the Germans would kill as many as possible.

This point of history has been studied far and wide. But each new generation of history buffs is asking the same questions and gradually making discoveries that have long been open to them.

But even if we consider this option, then we must take into account the main thing - the Russophobic spirit of Polish society and especially the officer corps. Until the summer of 1939, the Polish political elite was concerned with the idea of ​​a joint German-Polish campaign to the east. In this case, it’s like bringing the wolf and putting it on a chain in the yard. A legitimate question arises: will he throw himself at the "owner" when he approaches the wolf?
But even if the Poles did not suffer from Russophobia,
It is pointless to supply a defeated ALIEN army. This one is like a foreign organism that has lost its head.
The government fled. The flight of the government itself had a corrupting effect. The army looked like a gangrene patient. Which generals and senior officers are ready to fight, which ones are not going to? Baaal question. Those who decided that everything was over should be urgently removed.

If the Germans had not advanced ... even then it would have taken months to recover. But for this we needed an apparatus of commissars who knew Polish realities and the LANGUAGE. My purely personal opinion: the Polish officer corps would not want any cooperation with the "Soviets". Russophobia would not allow. And the best confirmation of this is the story of Anders' army. I. Ehrenburg about the Anders army being formed: "They hated us and did not hide it."

[Covid]

What did the USSR gain by waiting for June 22? At 39 meters there would be no "sudden, without declaration of war" attack. Wait and got 27 million victims here is the result.

[chenia]

Quote: Covid

To me, as an ordinary person, something else is much clearer.

Simplicity is worse than theft.
The USSR tried long and hard to conclude an alliance against Nazi Germany, but failed. Britain and France also stubbornly refused to take on specific obligations in the event of a conflict (for example, with Czechoslovakia, when they generally ignored their obligations, and later with Poland, too, a similar story). And there was an understanding that the attempts of Western democracies for an alliance with the USSR is a clever diplomatic game that would push the Germans directly against us.
And then they would have acted at their own discretion.

[Covid]

The USSR had its own policy. The USSR and Czechoslovakia promised protection, but did not help. ... And what was the USSR then? There is a massacre in the form of the Great Terror in the country. The USSR gave up the debts of the Republic of Ingushetia. And in general, an alien ideology of the state. The USSR was an outcast state and its fate, death in 1991, is a confirmation of this.
There is a funny video about the USSR before the Second World War. Soviet newspapers will be read to you here.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Covid

USSR and Czechoslovakia promised protection, but did not help ...

Blatant lie. The Soviet Union, seeing that things were heading towards the rejection of the Sudetenland, made a statement that it was ready to come to Czechoslovakia's aid, even if France did not fulfill its obligations and did not stand up for Czechoslovakia. But there was one problem: Czechoslovakia and the USSR did not have a common border. The opportunity to reach the territory of Czechoslovak territory was, the only opportunity was to go through the territory of Poland. But Poland flatly refused to give a corridor for the passage of Soviet troops.
Those. Poles, namely Poles, threw the very pebble that led to the avalanche.
That's how it was.

[Covid]

Did France and England have a common border with Czechoslovakia?
Well, we know how the Soviet troops passed the Baltic states, and the Finns also know the Romanians. It's just that the smarter Poles did not give a pass.
In fact. Wherever the USSR went, everything immediately became Soviet. )))
And then about the "impudent lie" Preparation of the USSR for the defense of Czechoslovakia. Mobilization of troops
http://protown.ru/information/hide/4912.html
You still write what you really know, and not speculation.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Covid

Did France and England have a common border with Czechoslovakia?

Did not have. But France had a common border with Germany.
The Soviet Union did not have a common border with Germany at all. The only way for the Red Army to stand up for Czechoslovakia is to enter its territory and defend its territory. When the tripartite mutual assistance agreement was concluded, the French assured that Soviet troops could enter Czechoslovak territory through Poland, which was heavily dependent on France, or (less conveniently) through Romania, which could not breathe without French permission.
But when it came to practical matters in 1938, everything began to slip and slip.
The French demanded from the USSR guarantees of assistance to the Czechoslovakians, but without the introduction of spacecraft troops into Czechoslovakia, such guarantees could mean a declaration of war on Germany and the expectation of the Wehrmacht's approach on the Soviet-Czechoslovak border. = the blue dream of the Anglo-Saxons

[ecologist]

The USSR did not then have a common border with Germany. Learn geography, disgrace.

[chenia]

Quote: Covid

The USSR and Czechoslovakia promised protection, but did not help.

The USSR sent an armada to the shores of Czechoslovakia, but the storm in the Tatras scattered our ships and ships. And it didn’t work otherwise.

Quote: Covid

The USSR gave up the debts of the Republic of Ingushetia.

And it was not a fucking thing to arrange an intervention (and this is not free).

.

Quote: Covid

What did the USSR gain by waiting for June 22? At 39 meters there would be no "sudden, without a declaration of war" attack

Time. And the reasons for the catastrophe of the beginning of the war, not a surprise attack (this is a third-rate reason), and not the expected start of the war, given Germany's unpreparedness for war in 1941

[Covid]

Quote: chenia

And it was not a fucking thing to arrange an intervention (and this is not free).

ANTANTA helps his ally suppress the anti-government uprising of the Bolsheviks.
You and I obviously have different sides in the history of Russia. You are for the Bolsheviks, and I am for Russia.
And the fact that the Bolsheviks were all scum from China and even Latvia hired to cut the Russians, too, was it right?
I am always amazed what mutations 70 years of propaganda can make to a person. Russians begin to defend the fanatics who destroyed Russia.

[chenia]

Quote: Covid

ANTANTA helps his ally

And who is this ally? Kerensky? Who is the legitimate one?

Quote: Covid

I am for Russia.

faith, king! It's clear.

Quote: Covid

the Bolsheviks hired all sorts of scum from China and Latvia to cut out Russians

A couple of thousand were driven by 170 million. people (and then in each house there was a rifle, after five a machine gun, and after ten a cannon). And who did not resist?

Quote: Covid

what mutations can make

Are you not a mutation (but not a covid, but Olgovich)?

Quote: Covid

destroyed Russia.

Believe it or not, the population under the communists grew all the time, and the country was a superpower.
This is now degradation (now still moderate, under the liberals in general there was horror) and extinction. And so we go on the Soviet reserve, and it is he who makes Russia reckon with.
What's wrong?.
In Ukraine, in general, a complete victory over communism, and the country has confidently become a country of the fourth world.

[Covid]

Quote: chenia

And who is this ally? Kerensky? Who is the legitimate one?

Russia was an ally of France and England. You should know something other than Soviet history.

Quote: chenia

faith, king! It's clear.

Russia is not the Tsar, but the people, and it took your beloved Bolsheviks decades to make them Soviet, while killing millions of disagreeing people.

Quote: chenia

A couple of thousand were driven by 170 million. people (and then in each house there was a rifle, after five a machine gun, and after ten a cannon). And who did not resist?

The point is not in thousands, there were more, but in the fact that your teachers did not disdain everything that would make the USSR out of Russia.

Quote: chenia

Are you not a mutation (but not a covid, but Olgovich)?

I am not a mutation because I am Russian and for Russia, unlike you.

Quote: chenia

Believe it or not, the population under the communists grew all the time, and the country was a superpower.

It is stupid to assume that the population should not have grown then. But according to the forecasts of the chemist-demographer Mendeleev, by 1950 the population of Russia should have been 400 million.
Your Bolsheviks, with the help of all kinds of international dishonesty, tried to prevent these predictions from coming true.

[chenia]

Quote: Covid

You should know something other than Soviet history.

You should understand what you read.

Quote: Covid

decades to make them Soviet,

Yes, in just twenty years, and they were able to selflessly break (almost single-handedly) the Wehrmacht (which scattered the entire western liberda with ease.)
Feel the difference.

Quote: Covid

But according to the forecasts of the chemist-demographer Mendeleev, by 1950

You are a new person here and do not know that this topic has already been discussed a thousand times. In short, Mendeleev is a great chemist and a lousy demographer. And they themselves could understand (if you turn on the brain) that this way the population could grow. only by budding.

Your foreign spirits helped to arrange the GW, and this is a loss of up to 15 million and fostered Hitler for the war with the USSR (though if then RI would also have been incited) - and this is another 37 million losses.

[Old Orc]

You are offering to help those who during all 20-30 years staged provocations at the border. They attacked border outposts. They officially declared the destruction of the USSR and the restoration of Poland from sea to sea as their goal. She carried out measures to destroy the Ukrainian and Belarusian intelligentsia and polonize the lands. It should be noted that there was no difference in the measures carried out by Poland between them and Nazi Germany.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Old Orc

You are offering to help those who during all 20-30 years staged provocations at the border. They attacked border outposts. They officially declared the destruction of the USSR and the restoration of Poland from sea to sea as their goal. She carried out measures to destroy the Ukrainian and Belarusian intelligentsia and polonize the lands. It should be noted that there was no difference in the measures carried out by Poland between them and Nazi Germany.

Andrei, at the end of the 30s, Poland was no longer an enemy for our country.
Since a more terrible threat appeared - Nazi Germany, which was objectively hostile to Poland as well. Therefore, helping an enemy who is threatened by a much more dangerous YOUR enemy is quite reasonable and correct.
It was critically important for the Soviet Union to preserve the existence of the Polish state, to prevent its absorption by the Reich. If Poland had survived until 1942, the Germans might simply not have dared to attack even Poland. There would have been no sense, the Red Army would have completed rearmament by the summer of 1942, the URs on the borders would have been 80% lined up ... And before May, the Germans simply could not start a war - the roads would not have had time to dry out.

[Old Orc]

Unfortunately, I cannot agree. First, Poland was an ally of France and Great Britain, and these were the strongest armies in Europe in terms of indicators. And they were technically enough to smudge Germany.
The political ideology of the Allies, before the outbreak of the war, was not much different from that of Germany. In addition, the Polish leadership made regular proposals to the German leadership, in person, about a joint march to the east.
URs on the new frontier. The former Polish territory.
Yes, if Germany had attacked in 42, the war would have been different. But helping Poland would only lead to the fact that the war between the USSR and Germany began at 39 when we were even less ready than at 41. At the same time, on the Western Front, French and British soldiers would go across the front to the Germans for schnapps and sausages.

[james]

Then the Poles would instantly reconcile with the Germans and turn their bayonets to the east, given their ineradicable Russophobia and the dream for Poland from sea to sea (the phantom pains of the speech of the polity)

[Charlie]

Moreover, as the author writes, "no other measures were taken to train the troops of the western districts (with the exception of the PribOVO) by June 22". Were carried out. And quite extensively. Here, in ZapOVO, on June 20, 1941, units of the 37th Red Banner Rifle Division, leaving Vitebsk, advanced to the western border. On June 22, two rifle and one artillery regiments of this division arrived at the Lida railway station. The 247th Infantry Regiment, stationed in Lepel, was alerted on June 16, 1941, and reached the vicinity of Grodno on the evening of June 21. The headquarters of the 56th Infantry Division, which was located in Lida, was moved to Grodno a week before the war, and to the town of Svyatsk 2 days before the German invasion. Grodno, in my opinion, was about 50 km from the border then.
No. 545. DIRECTIVE OF THE NARKOMA OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND THE HEAD OF THE RKKA GENERAL STAFF TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS KOVO

№ 504206
12th of June 1941
Top secret
Of particular importance
Ex. No. 2

1. On the territory of KOVO in the period from 15.6 to 10.7.41, the 16th army will arrive, consisting of:

Army management with service units;
5 fur. corps (13, 17 tank and 109 motorized divisions);
57th Panzer Division;
32 line corps (46, 152 rifle divisions, 126 corps artillery regiment).

2. To include the arriving units and formations in the KOVO troops with subordination in all respects to the KOVO MILITARY COUNCIL.

3. Arriving connections to camp:

Management of the 16th Army with service units - STARO-KONSTANTINOV

A number of formations, as we can see, on the territory of KOVO should have completed their full concentration only in the first ten days of July. They began to advance even before the German attack. A mass of troops moved to the western districts, to the very border, and this process took place right up to the invasion itself.
This is so, at a glance. On the Internet, if you dig around, there is a lot of data on troop movements in the western districts, right up to the beginning of the war.

[AsmyppoL]

It's good that you can surf the internet ...
But it’s probably easier to go back a few parts and read about the events associated with the advancement of the 16th Army formations, about the location of the 46th Rifle Division from the 32nd Army Division at the point of permanent deployment. On the advancement of the 57th separate tank division, which was not part of the above army.
Instructions on the deployment of deep rifle divisions in KOVO and ZAPOVO were considered earlier ...
These divisions did not have the proper amount of transport and therefore were forced to leave part of the weapons and transported property in the points of permanent deployment. Therefore, these divisions were limited mobile and limited combat capability.
Two regiments of the 37th Rifle Division you mentioned were marching to the border and, probably, like other divisions, dragged tents, training equipment and other nonsense with them. They did not have a complete set of artillery and ammunition. The corps commander, which included the 37th Rifle Division, wrote that the division's ammunition was sent by the last echelon ...
When it is written that there were no other events, it means with the exception of those already listed above ...

[Charlie]

What "other events" are we talking about? There were a lot of events.

[AsmyppoL]

The phrase to which you began to answer sounds like this:
"In the previous part, the events that took place on June 16-18, 1941 were considered. It was shown ....
No other measures were taken to train the troops of the western districts (with the exception of the PribOVO) by June 22. "

In the previous part, some events (the most important in the opinion of the author) that take place from June 16 to June 18 are considered. It does not follow from all these events that the leadership of the spacecraft expected the inevitable start of the war at dawn on June 22.

In several parts that came out earlier, the events on the start of the 16th Army's advance at the end of May and some of the oddities associated with its advance are considered. The strangeness with the groupings of troops located in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia.
Strangeness with the advancement of the 19th Army. When the directive of the NKO and the General Staff says about the nomination of five divisions, and only three moved forward within the specified period. And the mechanized corps was never touched until the start of the war.
The promotion of deep divisions in ZAPOVO and KOVO and the oddities with their promotion were also considered.
The beginning of the advancement of troops from the Ural Military District and the Privy Military District was considered. And there are also incomprehensible moments.
And all the incomprehensible moments are simply missed in the published books ... The author tried to present his version of events about these oddities ... And all this falls into the logical chain of actions of the country's leadership and the army. Not that Stalin forbade the military and pointed out the direction of the enemy's main attack, but that the military did not understand how the Germans would fight.

And they did not understand this because of unreliable intelligence materials. A map of the General Staff with the situation for June 20 has now been discovered. It depicts a number of large German headquarters, the location of tank and motorized divisions, tank regiments and tank battalions. And many said that the General Staff operates only with divisions, and headquarters and tank regiments are not needed at this level ... It turns out that the luminaries were lying without understanding what was happening in the General Staff. And in their books they set out only their personal opinions, and not true events ...

So, it is better to familiarize yourself with the previously stated material in order to understand what was happening in the spacecraft.
Or consider the author a liar who does not understand or distort elementary events, which are even mentioned on the Internet.
It doesn't matter to me, because I want to present a picture of what is happening for those who want to understand the details ...

[Charlie]

No, well, you can describe all the movements of troops in the western districts on the eve of the war. The topic is extensive, enough for several articles. You can talk about intelligence reports, you can even tell why Stalin did not believe these reports, and did not even believe Schulenburg's direct warnings about the German attack. All this is possible. But the main thing that interests all researchers of that period are PLANS. Troops plans in case of hostilities. Moved the 16th Army to KOVO, in the implementation of which plan was the directive for redeployment? And what should she do in a new place, if tomorrow is a war, if tomorrow is a campaign? Or, for example, what should a unit of the 11th mixed air division do when an alert is announced? And the 10th? These are air divisions from the troops of the Western Military District. These plans are a special secret. It is unlikely that the public will ever find out about them.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Charlie

No, well, you can describe all the movements of troops in the western districts on the eve of the war. The topic is extensive, enough for several articles. You can talk about intelligence reports, you can even tell why Stalin did not believe these reports, and did not even believe Schulenburg's direct warnings about the German attack.

Well said Schulenburg. And Churchill warned. Where is the evidence? If they handed over the documents. And so ... all these are words.
The General Staff, NGOs and the country's leadership relied on objective data. First of all, on RM. RM brought a highly distorted picture. But there were no others.
The author devoted about 30 articles to this. Read on.

Quote: Charlie

All this is possible. But the main thing that interests all researchers of that period are PLANS. Troops plans in case of hostilities. Moved the 16th Army to KOVO, in the implementation of which plan was the directive for redeployment? ... Or, for example, what should a unit of the 11th mixed air division do when an alert is announced? And the 10th? These are air divisions from the troops of the Western Military District. These plans are a special secret... It is unlikely that the public will ever find out about them.

But you have penetrated these secrets and now you will tell us everything. Why?

[Charlie]

What to make fun of. I wrote that these plans are a secret with seven seals

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Charlie

What to make fun of. I wrote that these plans are a secret with seven seals

I just want to understand the meaning of your phrase. I understood it this way: all these cards, RM, information about the REAL state of affairs, which became known later ... all this is garbage. Here are the PLANS ... plans to get it ... and since they (you) are not put on the table (or maybe they are not), there is nothing to talk about.
After all, you do not need plans, but proof of the aggressive intentions of the USSR. But if the facts say that there were no such intentions, so much the worse for the facts. Right?

[Charlie]

In my opinion, there is an abundance of evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR. On the Internet, this is discussed on many resources and even with available documents, those that "surfaced" after the collapse of the USSR. I don't know if it makes sense to "grind" all this in the framework of comments to individual articles of the local "writers". Sometimes I insert my comments. This author writes what has already been discussed on other sites. Cuts the loot on this, well, that's his business. And so, in general, yes, as you know, there were no defensive plans. This notorious "defense plan" has already been analyzed in detail, recognized as unrealistic, there are too many overlaps and inconsistencies. There were no defense plans, well, that would show the plans of the offensive, especially since they were going to fight on foreign territory. But they will not be shown, for it is a secret.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The author tried to present his version of events about these oddities ...

The author of AsmyppoL simply lied to gullible people that the 16th Army was allegedly moving to the Transcaucasus to participate in a campaign against Iran. This lie of his was documented, because in May 1941, the General Staff planned the transfer of the 16th Army to KOVO, as evidenced by officials:
Marshal M.V. Zakharov:

Thus, in the second strategic echelon, which was the reserve of the High Command,

16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies entered;

and they included 58 rifle, 13 tank and 6 motorized rifle divisions.
The advance of the 19th and 16th armies to the Kiev direction shows that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated south of Polesie, according to the certificate "On the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the west", compiled by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin eight days before the start of the war, that is, June 13, 1941.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

In several parts that came out earlier, the events on the start of the 16th Army's advance at the end of May and some of the oddities associated with its advance are considered. The strangeness with the groupings of troops located in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia.

Three earlier articles about the deployment of the 16th Army in Transcaucasia turned out to be false and were fabricated on the basis of Chekunov's ridiculous version that this army was supposedly heading to the border with Iran. A map of May 15 has been published in the president's library, which clearly indicates the place of arrival of the 16th Army in KOVO between Starokonstantinov and Tarnopol:

https://www.prlib.ru/item/1323480
Those. there is another historical falsification spread by "Evgeny-Aleksey".

[AsmyppoL]

First of all, you should know the history: before June 10, 1941, the 16th Army WAS NOT GOING to KOVO and, therefore, to the area that you marked. DIDN'T GO.
When her trains departed from Transbaikalia, they did not go to KOVO.
Historians Isaev and Chekunov wrote about this.
Can you refute this documentarily?
Not words, but d-o-to-u-m-e-n-t-a-m-and?

Now try to refute the words of the historian Isaev and Chekunov, as well as generals MF Lukin and AA Lobachev and Marshal AI Eremenko.
In addition to analytical calculations that you cannot refute, the article on the redeployment of the 16th Army uses the statements of two historians and three military leaders that 16th Army was heading for Transcaucasia.
Try to refute these statements!
So which of us is trying to deceive and take "impudently" members of the forum ???

[AsmyppoL]

Thus, you cannot refute the words of two generals and one marshal about the direction of the 16th army in Transcaucasia!
Also, you cannot refute the words of two historians about the direction of this army in the Transcaucasus!
What else to talk about with a person who is not responsible for his words? ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Thus, you cannot refute the words of two generals and one marshal about the direction of the 16th army in Transcaucasia!
Also, you cannot refute the words of two historians about the direction of this army in the Transcaucasus!
What else to talk about with a person who is not responsible for his words? ...

You cannot answer for your lie, so you hide behind other people's names, which were not informed by the General Staff about the plans to move the 16th Army, that is why you did not know where they were going. All this was due to the secrecy requirements for the movement of the 16th Army and other armies from the inner districts.
These directives, developed on the basis of the decision on May 15 to transfer units from the North Caucasian Military District (North Caucasus Military District) and 16 armies from Transbaikalia to KOVO, are shown in Yakovlev's collection. Parts of the North Caucasian Military District were supposed to arrive in KOVO from the 3rd to the 17th of June. The 16th Army from Transbaikalia was supposed to arrive at KOVO from June 15 to July 10, 1941.
Enlighten:

No. 545. DIRECTIVE OF THE NARKOMA OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND THE HEAD OF THE RKKA GENERAL STAFF TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS KOVO
No. 504206 June 12, 1941 Top secret Special importance Ex. No. 2
1. The 15.6th army will arrive on the territory of KOVO in the period from 10.7.41 to 16, consisting of:
Army command with service units; 5 fur. corps (13, 17 tank and 109 motorized divisions); 57th Panzer Division; 32 line corps (46, 152 rifle divisions, 126 corps artillery regiment)….
10. Reports on the unloading of echelons for each station should be submitted to me, through the Chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft, daily by 22 o'clock.
11. Confirm the receipt of the directive.
APPENDIX: a list of conventional names of military formations arriving on the territory of the district on 9 pages.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov

And where is the border of Iran marked here, if the point of arrival of the 16th Army was determined on May 15, and its arrival began on the specified date and at the designated point?
You are just a liar, not knowing how to wriggle out after exposing your lies about the 16th Army.

[kalibr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

But it is probably easier to go back a few parts and read about events,

When there are many parts and many facts, no one wants to go back. The format of online journalism is such that an article on the site lives for exactly two days.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: kalibr

Quote: AsmyppoL

But it is probably easier to go back a few parts and read about events,

When there are many parts and many facts, no one wants to go back. The format of online journalism is such that an article on the site lives for exactly two days.

Yes ... that's a problem. You need to make an effort on yourself.

[Luminman]

Quote: antivirus

the outskirts will be annexed to Russia

Only without the population!

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Luminman

Only without the population!

I wonder where the population is? As far as I understand, you have a couple of radical ideas? Feel free to voice it.

[Catfish]

Afraid of getting banned for genocide and inciting ethnic hatred. They are always like that, patriots, bark from the gateway, and into the bushes.

[Luminman]

patriots, bark from the gateway, and into the bushes

Others are barking here. And for fear of getting banned, I will not voice who it is

[Catfish]

Others are barking here

Yes, there are enough people like you here, so sound in chorus.

[Luminman]

Yes, there are enough people like you here, so sound in chorus

People like you, unfortunately, too

[Catfish]

Exclusively to Your unfortunately.

[Pavel57]

Quote: Xlor

Would crush a nemchura at the root without big losses

France would sit behind the Maginot Line, and England behind the strait. And we would, for them, as you said, "crushed nemchura"

And America played for Germany.

[kalibr]

Quote: Pavel57

And America played for Germany

Meaning?

[Xlor]

Quote: kalibr

Meaning?

1. Large and wealthy German community in the United States
2. Eliminate your geo-competitor - England

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Xlor

Quote: kalibr

Meaning?

1. Large and wealthy German community in the United States
2. Eliminate your geo-competitor - England

The United States helped Germany to bury the British colonial empire. The US economy was suffocating without foreign markets - only Latin American markets were available to them. And the rest ... The USSR market was autonomous, everything else was captured by Great Britain, France, Portugal, Holland, even Belgium. Hitler had to weaken the WB so that it unclenched its claws and the colonial countries became independent.

[Covid]

No one helps anyone, as long as there is a peaceful period. No one knows the future and being a smart hindsight is the height of not competence. The business is working and looking for applications. The 1936 German Olympics, whose help was it? It turns out that no one knows what will happen in Czechoslovakia, Poland and June 22, 1941.
But when the war begins, then let's get help. After 1st Sept. 1939 who trades with Germany? THE USSR. We even managed to sign the contract just before the start. England, France, USA trade?
Germany defeated France and is waging a war against England. It’s here that it’s obvious who HELPS whom,

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Covid

The 1936 German Olympics, whose help was it?

It was the help of the collective West. After all, Hitler carried out a coup d'etat, the activities of all parties, except for the Nazi, were prohibited. Trade unions were banned. Political opponents were killed and thrown into concentration camps. But Hitler and his regime were needed by the West. The Olympics served to "return" Germany to a "decent society".
But the most disgusting thing is that just a year before that, in 1935. in Germany, the racial Nuremberg laws were passed. And nothing, the hypocritical West did not even "notice."
The Olympics and the World Cup in football are still used to encourage their own and spread rot on others.

Quote: Covid

After 1st Sept. 1939 who trades with Germany? ... Do England, France, the USA trade?

Trade. They trade, so the noise is worth it. The United States is open, they were not interested in Poland at all. And the AIF trade through the colonies - they were not colonies, but quite independent, as it were.
In the foreign trade balance of Germany, trade with the USSR did not reach 5%. And the rest are loyal allies: Hungary, Romania, Italy and "democracy". Sweden supplied the scarcest chrome ore, very high quality steel and SKF bearings - the best in the world. The firm still exists.

[Charlie]

“Thus, the Soviet Union became the main supplier of grain for Germany. But on the bridges across the Bug, not only rye, oats and wheat followed in the western direction. For sixteen months of friendship, Stalin, strictly in accordance with the agreements, supplied Germany with about 1 tons of oil products , 000 kilograms of platinum and large quantities of manganese ore, chromium and cotton "
This is from Karel Paul's book "Hitler Goes East". He does not indicate how much chromium was there, he simply writes "a large amount". In general, not only Sweden supplied Germany with chromium ore, the Soviet Union also "helped" her in this.

[Covid]

Stop talking nonsense in 1936, some kind of collective West.! At least when you make a reorientation from today to those years, switch your brains.
Olympics 1936. 46 countries. Turkey, Japan, the Philippines including, is this also the Collective West?
Don't write nonsense, you won't look stupid !!
And the point is not that the USSR is pulling the balance of trade, but that it trades openly with the Nazis, unlike England and the United States.
German sailors who sank Allied ships and pilots who bombed London ate bread from Soviet grain. There is even exactly the amount of it that the USSR delivered.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Covid

Stop talking nonsense in 1936, some kind of collective West.! At least when you make a reorientation from today to those years, switch your brains.
Olympics 1936. 46 countries. Turkey, Japan, the Philippines including, is this also the Collective West?
Don't write nonsense, you won't look stupid !!
And the point is not that the USSR is pulling the balance of trade, but that it trades openly with the Nazis, unlike England and the United States.
German sailors who sank Allied ships and pilots who bombed London ate bread from Soviet grain. There is even exactly the amount of it that the USSR delivered.

The cllective West at that time was the Anglo-Saxons, French, Germans and Italians. The Germans were discredited in the eyes of the world community and therefore they had to be urgently rehabilitated. Filipinos and other Malays are just extras. They were called to the games for the number of participants, or they might not be called.

[Vladimir Yevseyev]

The 1st World War was supposed to be the last world war, since technological progress and the emergence of weapons of mass destruction made such wars meaningless. However, after the seizure of power in the Russian Empire by the disgusting communes, it became obvious that sooner or later, but inevitable, that between the communes and the capitalist world there would be a new and fierce war with a completely predictable outcome ...

[ivan2022]

Quote: Vladimir Evseev

However, after the seizure of power in the Russian Empire by the disgusting communes, it became obvious that sooner or later, but inevitable, that between the communes and the capitalist world there would be a new and fierce war with a completely predictable outcome ...

It's understandable ... Like; "Don't mess with these guys or it'll hurt a lot." But the Russians still got in touch and therefore the "respected capitalists" hurt them very much. And the "commies" are to blame, but not the Nazis. Which are your own type for you?

But now they can simply "slaughter the Russians, but it doesn't hurt at all." For it is not difficult to guess that if under the "commies" the population of the USSR by the 70s was more than in the United States, and now it has been steadily decreasing in the Russian Federation for 30 years, what will we eventually come to. This, sir good, is the very "quite predictable outcome." And there is no need to "predict" the events of 30 years ago ...

[Kostadinov]

If the USSR at the time when Germany attacked Poland and there even seemed to be the government fled, it was not the Germans to help and not to take the Poles prisoner, and this is 200 thousand, it was necessary to supply these Poles with weapons and ammunition, and even move the entire Red Army there, it would not have happened on June 22, 1941. Then also France was not defeated. Nemchura would have been crushed at the root without great losses.

If the USSR did this in 1939, then the war with Germany began immediately. To the West, France and Britain watched with interest the battle to the East as they watched the agony of their ally Poland. It could last 5, 10 or more years, just like the West looked at the aggression of Japan in China. The USSR was bleeding and the victims could be beaten several times more. In the end, they could come to an agreement with Hitler at the expense of the USSR.

[ccsr]

Author:
Alexey Ivanov

In the report of the RU dated 22.06.1941/1/XNUMX there is a note "where is the report?" Probably, it was made by the hand of the XNUMXst Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin after G.K. Zhukov left for the South-Western Front. It turns out that Vatutin did not see the previous document of the RU General Staff.
It seems that there was nothing special in the RU document dated June 20 (with the situation for June 19), and therefore G.K. Zhukov did not address it to N.F. Vatutin, or this document was not deposited in Vatutin's memory due to the large volume of documents passing through him at that time.

This text once again showed how illiterate the author is in military matters, and moreover, he exposed the lies that he had long imposed on the gullible public.
First, the intelligence report of June 20, after Zhukov got acquainted with it, immediately gets to the head of the operational department Malandin, who writes it off to the head of the department responsible for monitoring the operational situation and keeping records and plotting the situation on the current day. That is why Vatutin could not see her, but if he wanted to, he can always get acquainted with it, because and she unsubscribes to him. That is why he wrote "where", in order to understand whether the report was returned or it is still in operational management under processing.
Secondly, the author constantly lied that there were no intelligence materials, except for intelligence report No. 5, in the RU, which is why, allegedly, the SC leadership did not know the operational situation. Bringing this scan, with his illiterate comments, he carved himself, because from the text it follows that the DAILY reconnaissance report of the RU was constantly presented to the head of the General Staff, and after him immediately entered the operational management. And there were at least twenty (20!) Such reports before the start of the war in June, not counting ten-day intelligence reports and other analytical materials prepared by RU for the country's leadership and the command of the Red Army.
This is how this would-be researcher deceives the gullible public with his illiterate comments, indicating that he does not understand at all how not only the RU, but also the General Staff functions.

[ivan2022]

Quote: ccsr

This is how this would-be researcher deceives the gullible public with his illiterate comments, indicating that he does not understand at all how not only the RU, but also the General Staff functions.

Frankly, I also did not understand, how do you assess the most important thing - the actions of the chief of the General Staff Zhukov? Did he know about the impending main attack of the Germans on Minsk? Or didn't you?
Or did he think that the Germans had no superiority in means and forces at all? And how that functioned there 80 years ago, I don't give a fuck. Here is what the author writes about the failures of the army intelligence of the Red Army, I understood that. And this is curious!

Because this completely contradicts the highly original reasoning that “Stalin knew everything and did not believe in anything” and that “the Germans started the war because they saw what half-fools are in the command of the Red Army, and the advantages in weapons did not have".
I can believe that one intelligence service at a certain stage outplayed another, but I can’t believe the general idiocy of the leadership of the country that won the greatest war in the history of the World! I'm just trying to be objective .....

[ccsr]

Quote: ivan2022

Frankly, I also did not understand, how do you assess the most important thing - the actions of the chief of the General Staff Zhukov?

His history has already been appreciated, tk. most consider him the Marshal of Victory. As for his activities as chief of the General Staff in 1941, it must be admitted that this was not the best candidate for this post, given that he did not have serious experience in command and control of troops even at the district level. So you must first decide what stage of his career you want to evaluate.

Quote: ivan2022

Did he know about the impending main attack of the Germans on Minsk? Or didn't you?

In the spring of 1941, the intelligence department submitted a detailed report on three options for the action of the German troops, and he, as a commander, only needed to determine which option would actually be used at the beginning of the war. I think that commanders of this level can do it, if there are daily intelligence reports until June 21.

Quote: ivan2022

Here is what the author writes about the failures of the army intelligence of the Red Army, I understood that. And this is curious!

The author of the articles is lying in a shameless way, and it's a pity that you bought into his chatter.

Quote: ivan2022

I'm just trying to be objective .....

You can do this if you study not only the articles of this anonymous author, but also well-known works about the pre-war events, where more authoritative authors present completely different facts.
Especially for you I will note that neither Golikov nor the chiefs of intelligence of districts and armies after the start of the war were repressed or tried for incorrect assessments, and Golikov was generally entrusted with a matter of state importance at the level of a plenipotentiary ambassador, which already speaks of everything. Well, do not forget that more than 20 officers of the Russian General Staff in the spring of 1942 were awarded the BATTLE orders based on the results of their work in 1941. I hope this tells you something ...

[ivan2022]

Quote: ccsr

it must be admitted that this was not the best candidate for this post, given the fact that he did not have serious experience in command and control of troops even at the district level

This is what I wanted to know... As for the title "Marshal of Victory" - the pirouettes of History are not over yet. After the Victory, Zhukov turned out to be an ally of Khrushchev in a strange way, and after dubious joint actions in 1953 he was thrown into the trash heap. It's good that at least he was not accused of spying for Britain, like Beria. But he got his hands dirty in this matter ..... Much in the past is still hidden in complete darkness.

[ccsr]

Quote: ivan2022

After the Victory, Zhukov turned out to be an ally of Khrushchev in a strange way,

Well, you obviously got it from unreliable sources, because there is no evidence of their close connection, apart from the well-known events with Zhukov's disgrace.

Quote: ivan2022

, and after questionable joint actions in 1953 he was thrown into the trash heap.

In fact, in 1953 Zhukov provided Khrushchev with tremendous support, including during the arrest of Beria. But it was removed in 1957, so that Khrushchev used it for his own purposes for a long time until he felt threatened by Zhukov's authority.

Quote: ivan2022

Much in the past is still hidden in complete darkness.

As one person said: "Why do you need the truth, you still don't know what to do with it."

Quote: ivan2022

Why can't one intelligence outplay the other, what's in this version of the primitive?

The fact that counterintelligence is playing against intelligence, and not intelligence, is known to any military professional. So neither you nor the author of the articles understand the question of the priority goals of intelligence, which is why you are raising such a question without delving into its essence.

Quote: ivan2022

According to the author, the intelligence of the Red Army simply did not see the main forces of the enemy. Where they were.

Have you seen a copy of the map with intelligence data for June 20 in the articles of this author? What's wrong on it and in the "legend"?

[Konnick]

Because this completely contradicts the highly original reasoning that “Stalin knew everything and did not believe in anything” and that “the Germans started the war because they saw what half-fools are in the command of the Red Army, and the advantages in weapons did not have".
I can believe that one intelligence service at a certain stage outplayed another, but I can’t believe the general idiocy of the leadership of the country that won the greatest war in the history of the World! I'm just trying to be objective ....

Trying to find the extreme in the unsuccessful course of hostilities in the summer of 41 is an extremely difficult task and blaming everything on the surprise of an attack due to reconnaissance is very primitive. Even if they knew the exact time of the attack, this did not particularly affect the nature of the hostilities. The basic principle of the blitzkrieg was the maximum precise interaction of different types of troops and precise supply. The defeat of the Western and Reserve Fronts is indicative of this. A well-organized defense, a sufficient number of troops, prepared, developed operational plans ... and there was practically no resistance, although there was no surprise, but they also blamed on reconnaissance, you see, they did not know the direction of the main attacks.
It's just convenient to blame everything on the surprise of the attack, and the fact that the army was not ready for war, and there were modern tanks, but without the normal provision of tank units with vehicles, they could not fight because of their capabilities. The complete supremacy of the Luftwaffe in the air paralyzed any plans of our command. The Germans knew how to concentrate their aviation in the right places and at the right time. There are many reasons for the failure of the initial period of the war, but surprise is an excuse. The army must always be combat-ready at the start of hostilities. One of the reasons is the formation of formations and units directly on the western border, almost in contact with the enemy. The first echelon was supposed to contain fully combat-ready troops, and the practical absence of such troops on the border was the main mistake.

[ivan2022]

Quote: Konnick

Even if they knew the exact time of the attack, this did not particularly affect the nature of the hostilities.

I agree .... The most important thing is not knowing the exact time of the attack, but the direction of the main attack, its strength and means. Here it is necessary to determine from the beginning; surprise is if they see the enemy's forces, but overslept the moment when they were launched. The time of the attack can always be postponed for any period - at least one day before the appointed date. This information may become out of date at any time.

Quote: Konnick

blaming everything on surprise attacks because of intelligence is very primitive

Not on surprise in general, but on the surprise of the attack through Brest on Minsk. And why primitive? I first asked the question in this sense. Why can't one intelligence outplay the other, what's in this version of the primitive?

Quote: Konnick

There are many reasons for the failure of the initial period of the war, but surprise is an excuse.

Does the author of the article write off everything as a surprise? No, he says that intelligence was wrong, suggesting the main attack through the Baltic states. According to the author, the intelligence of the Red Army simply did not see the main forces of the enemy. Where they were.

Quote: Konnick

The first echelon was supposed to contain fully combat-ready troops, and this is the main mistake.

And how to know where exactly this "first echelon" should be located? Only from intelligence. In my opinion you contradict yourself.

[Konnick]

And how to know where exactly this "first echelon" should be located? Only from intelligence. In my opinion you contradict yourself.

Covering troops of the state border. What's incomprehensible?

[Seal]

Quote: Covid

If the USSR at the time when Germany attacked Poland and there even seemed to be the government fled, it was not the Germans to help and not to take the Poles prisoner, but this is 200 thousand, it was necessary to supply these Poles with weapons and ammunition, and even move the entire Red Army there, it would not have happened on June 22, 1941

You have a very good opinion of the Poles. And about the West.
1. It is not at all a fact that the Poles would have taken our weapon.
2. And if they did, it’s not at all a fact that the Poles would not have used our weapon against us, and not against the Germans.
3. In England, the government is headed by Chamberlain, who is not at all inclined to fight with Hitler. In such a situation, Chamberlain immediately sends the Viscount Halifax to Germany to Hitler (whose deputy (Hess) is an ardent admirer of England) with proposals to end the war between the Western powers (which, although it was declared, did not actually start), to cut off part of the Polish lands to Germany, and on the basis of these agreements, all together to strike at the USSR.

[Dragon_first_1]

Good afternoon.
Personally, it seems to me that one should start a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the warring sides' preparation for war with the fact that it is necessary to fix (for example, on one map) the mutual position of the troops of both these sides by a certain date.
That is (for example):
1. On June 1, the position of the troops (with the same degree of detail), command posts, rear structures of the sides was like this ...
2. Of these, the intelligence of the parties (both sides, not just ours!) Uncovered this. And I didn't open this ...
3. On June 15, the situation was like this (with the same degree of detail as in the first position).
4. The intelligence agencies of the parties uncovered this and that.
5. On June 22, the troops, command posts and rear services of the sides were there and there. And they did this and that ...
6. The intelligence agencies of the parties opened this and did not reveal this.
Only with this (systemic) approach will we get a picture of the parity deployment of troops.
Other methods of analysis may have a right to exist, but they all, to one degree or another, rely on speculation and various interpretations of an infinite number of textual documents. Which gives rise to endless controversy in the comments.
Thank you.

[Anatoly Mikhailenko 2]

Sergey-1950, you don’t know history and geography well: “There was an opportunity to reach the territory of Czechoslovak territory, the only opportunity was to pass through the territory of Poland.” The Romanian one could be no worse than the Polish corridor. But the USSR really wanted through Poland to stay there forever. The Poles sensed how it could end, did not succumb. Stalin's plan to ignite the 2nd World War from the territory of Czechoslovakia failed. I had to wait almost a year for the German attack on Poland. The fire of war flared up. This was what was needed to create the future Zemshar Republic of Soviets.