How the Russian Aerospace Forces will respond to the concept of the "container" launch of the JASSM-ER. Established S-300 and S-400 in question
Announced and several days earlier demonstrated by the US Air Force and the military-industrial company Lockheed Martin, the concept of a massive container launch of unobtrusive long-range tactical missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER, worked out by the crews of specialized military transport aircraft EC-130J Super J and C-17A Globmaster III, it is not by chance that it received the closest attention of domestic observing and expert circles, aware of the tactical and technical features of the anti-aircraft missile systems in service with the Russian Aerospace Forces.
After all, a likely attempt to implement it, for example, in the European conditional theater of military operations, is designed to at least deprive the Kaliningrad, Leningrad and Crimean anti-aircraft zones of access restriction and A2 / AD maneuvers, erected by the S-300PS / PM2 and S-400 anti-aircraft missile regiments. , as well as mixed military anti-aircraft missile regiments based on the Buk-M1-2 / 3 and S-300V / 4 air defense divisions of the 2nd and 31st air defense divisions of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The critical issue of the S-300PM1 / 2 and S-400 combatants remains a serious concern
And, unfortunately, weighty reasons for concern in this case are visible with almost the naked eye.
In particular, both during the development of a hypothetical massive missile and air strike ("digital" MRAU), and during a real strike by the US Air Force on our A2 / AD air defense zones using virtual models or real stealth ALCM AGM-158B JASSM-ER, dropped in modular transport and launch farms from the cargo compartments of the Hercules and Globmasters, experts from the Pentagon and the US Air Force command to this day can rely on the key tactical and technical flaw inherent in anti-aircraft missile systems of the S-300PS / PM2 and S families -400 Triumph.
In this case, we are talking about the preservation of the aforementioned anti-aircraft missile systems of the classic and noticeably outdated semi-active radar guidance principle of the 5V55R, 48N6E2 and 48N6DM SAM interceptors, which are equipped with X-band semi-active radar homing heads based on slot antenna arrays.
As you know, during the interception of the enemy's aerospace attack, these homing heads need permanent illumination of targets with divisional illumination and guidance radars (RPN) 30 / 92N6E until the target is hit (warheads are initiated with semi-active radio fuses).
This guidance method completely eliminates the possibility of hitting high-precision weapons weapons the enemy, firstly, hiding outside the radio horizon, which is about 38-45 km for the 40 / 6N30E illumination radars placed on the 92V6MD universal tower, and secondly, operating in the terrain bend mode and avoiding the radiation patterns of these radars behind hills, hills, plateaus and in the passes.
Naturally, this list of enemy WTO means includes the JASSM-ER, low-signature tactical ALCMs with an effective reflecting surface of about 0,05–0,07 square meters. m, and equipped with high-precision inertial navigation units, correlation optical-electronic TV / IR sensors, as well as GPS-correction radio navigation modules, which allow flying in ultra-low-altitude mode at altitudes from 50 to 20 m (depending on the complexity of the terrain).
It is logical to assume that, in the case of a hypothetical MRAU, for example, for the 2nd and 31st air defense divisions covering the Kaliningrad region and Crimea, dozens of routes for "detachments" of hundreds of AGM-158Bs will be formed and adjusted by operators of strategic radio-technical aircraft. and electronic reconnaissance RC-135V / W Block 8 Rivet Joint in accordance with the "blind" zones of radars 30 / 92Н6Е in one or another section of the Baltic and Black Sea theaters.
These zones will be determined by comparing information on the modifications of 30 / 92H6E radars identified by the RTR 55000 AEELS complexes of the Rivet Joint aircraft with the geographic coordinates of their location and the characteristic features of the terrain for these areas, which prevent the formation of a radiation pattern for illumination of 48H6E2 / DM.
The implementation of the active radar guidance principle in all combatant air defense systems is an indisputable panacea of an operational and strategic scale in countering promising low-altitude tactical missiles with an ultra-small radar signature
A comprehensive solution to this problem could be facilitated by the constructive and software and hardware integration into the ammunition sets of the S-300PM2 and S-400 combatant long-range anti-aircraft missiles 9M96DM, placed in specialized triple transport and launch modules located on self-propelled PU 5P85CE / 2 instead of one of the TPK missiles 48N6E / 2.
A similar configuration of the earlier S-300PM1 was demonstrated by the Russian Aerospace Forces during the joint exercises of the Air Defense Forces of Russia and the Air Defense Forces of Serbia "Slavic Shield - 2019", carried out three years earlier at the Ashuluk training ground.
Having centimeter-sized active radar seeker of the Slanets X-band family with transmitting and receiving terminals for data exchange (including receiving target designation) with third-party ground / airborne radar / electronic reconnaissance means, 9M96DM missiles are capable of striking the entire spectrum of low-altitude air attack weapons at a distance from 1 up to 80-100 km.
In the arsenals of the majority of the three-hundredth and four-hundredth missiles of the Russian Aerospace Forces, such interceptor missiles are still not observed.
Apparently, it was once again decided to save money on such a stage of updating these air defense systems, which is so critical for maintaining the combat stability of military districts.
Therefore, we can only hope for the intensification of large-scale production and delivery of military air defense systems Buk-M3, S-300V4, as well as S-350 Vityaz and S-500 Prometey (55R6M "Triumfator-M").
The Buk-M3 and S-300V4 complexes can oppose the AGM-158B medium-range anti-aircraft missiles 9М317МА and long-range interceptors 9М82МВ, which are capable of hitting subtle low-altitude objects at distances of 45 and 250-300 km, respectively. They owe this quality to the same active radar seeker “Slate” based on waveguide-slot antenna arrays, designed by the Moscow Research Institute “Agat”.
As for the "Knights" and "Triumphants-M", the former are equipped with the same 9M96DM, while the S-500 "equipment" also has an ultra-long-range missile-interceptor 77N6-N, capable of intercepting low-altitude missile launchers for target designation at a distance of 350 –400 km.
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