What surprise awaits the operators of the Iron Dome air defense missile system if it is used in the Donbas? Russian defense industry is famous not only for MLRS
For almost one and a half weeks in the observing circles of Ukrainian and domestic news and military analytical portals, discussions about the consequences of the probable delivery of two batteries of the Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile / anti-missile complex to the Air Force, which never took up permanent combat duty as part of the network-centric air defense-missile defense system of the US Ground Forces in connection with the slipping of the hardware and software integration of the combat control points of the Israeli air defense systems in the information field of the unified PBUs of the EOC / IBCS family ("Engagement Operations Centers") of the American Patriot PAC-3MSE anti-aircraft missile systems.
The capabilities of the Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile systems in the architecture of the anti-missile umbrella of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The Russophobic-minded audience, the so-called military "experts", as well as representatives of the defense department of "Nezalezhnaya" continue not only to dream, but also foaming at the mouth to talk about the ability of the "Iron Dome" complexes to erect a truly "impenetrable" anti-missile system over the Donbass theater of operations / anti-aircraft barrier, which is a full-fledged no-fly zone, supposedly eliminating even the minimal likelihood of effective artillery and aviation support of the defending units of the army corps of the NM LDNR in the event that Kiev implements an escalation scenario in the region.
Our audience and expert circles agree that the deployment in Donbass of two divisions of the Iron Dome air defense missile system (even taking into account the batteries of the C-300V1 medium-range air defense system and the C-300PS regiment that have already entered combat duty) cannot lead to a radical shift in the balance of forces in favor of the defensive capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in comparison with the strike potential of the MFA and the Aerospace Forces of Russia.
In reality, after a detailed acquaintance with the tactical and technical parameters and the functioning of the guidance and control systems of the Tamir missile interceptors, the EL / M-2084 S-band AFAR target designation / guidance radars, it can be concluded that in the case of deployment two batteries of the "Iron Dome" in the Donbass, the operational-tactical alignment for the 1st and 2nd army corps of the LDNR and Russian MFA units in the Southern Military District will become noticeably more complicated.
In particular, the EL / M-2084 multichannel radar systems will provide the ability to simultaneously target an almost unlimited number (about 200 objects per minute) of airborne objects "captured" for precise auto-tracking. Consequently, the Tamir anti-missile arrays equipped with active radar seeker are able to easily “stop” a couple of salvoes of the Uragan, Grad and Smerch / Tornado-S MLRSs, which have non-maneuvering 220-mm 9M27F missiles / K, 122 mm RS of the 9M22U family and 300 mm RS of the 9M55K / 9M542 line.
The aforementioned rockets are equipped with standard aerodynamic stabilizers and gas-dynamic units, which do not provide anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of more than 3-5 G, which allows the Tamir missiles to freely intercept these types of air attack weapons.
The presence of additional photocontrast optoelectronic sensors in the radio-electronic architecture of the ARGSN anti-missile system Tamir also increases the likelihood of intercepting missiles, detecting the appearance of silhouettes of the widest spectrum of aerospace attack weapons.
In the same turn, it should be noted that anti-aircraft guided missiles "Tamir" still do not have either gas-dynamic belts of transverse control engines (they are present in the control systems of the MIM-104PAC-3MSE and "Aster-30" missiles), or gas-jet / spoiler systems. thrust vector deviations (integrated into the control systems of the RIM-162B ESSM Block II and 9M317MA Buk-M3 missiles), due to which they are unable to intercept aerospace attack weapons performing high-intensity anti-aircraft maneuvers.
In particular, two or three 9M723-1 Iskander-M operational-tactical ballistic missiles are quite enough to suppress a pair of Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile batteries.
Unlike the 300-mm adjustable / guided missiles of the 9M55K "Smerch" and 9M542 "Tornado-S" families, the 9M723-1 OTBR boasts advanced tail aerodynamic rudders of a large area, as well as 4 twin tail gas-dynamic nozzle blocks powered from individual gas generators with quick-acting butterfly valves.
These units, in combination with aerodynamic rudders and specialized modes of operation of the inertial navigation system, provide the 9M723-1 OTBR with the ability to implement anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of 25-30 G, which is quite enough to level the maneuverability of the Tamir interceptors.
Consequently, the supply of two batteries of the Iron Dome anti-aircraft missile system to the air defense forces of the "Square" will only be able to ensure the suppression of retaliatory missile and artillery strikes carried out by rocket artillery divisions (ReADn) MLRS "Uragan", "Grad" and "Smerch", limited the number of which is in service with the 1st and 2nd army corps of the People's Militia of the LDNR.
The involvement of even a single battery of 9K720 Iskander-M tactical missile systems of the Russian Missile Forces and artillery in the suppression of the Iron Dome air defense system will, with the maximum degree of probability, ensure the achievement of the desired result.
Information