How the Germans took Kiev

A German sentry on the bell tower of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra against the background of a burning bridge over the Dnieper. September 19, 1941

80 years ago, the Germans surrounded the Soviet armies near Kiev. Troops of the German 1st tank Army Group South on September 16, 1941 joined up in the Lokhvitsa area with the 2nd Panzer Group, advancing from north to south.

The 5th, 37th, 26th armies and partially the troops of the 38th and 21st armies of the Southwestern Front were surrounded. On September 18, 1941, the Nazis occupied Poltava. On the night of September 19, our troops left Kiev. Our armies could not break through from the "cauldron" to the east and were defeated by September 24-26. The front command, led by the front commander Kirponos, was killed. The Kiev catastrophe led to the loss of about 500 thousand soldiers and officers. According to German data, over 600 thousand people were taken prisoner alone.

Battle in the Kiev direction

Given the difficult situation at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on June 30, 1941 ordered the commander of the South-Western Front to withdraw troops to the line of fortified areas on the former state border of 1939 and, relying on them, to organize a solid defense. The 5th Army withdrew to the Korosten UR, and the 6th Army - to the area of ​​Berdichev and to the south, with the task of taking up defenses in the Novograd-Volynsk UR.

The Germans broke through the Soviet defenses at the junction of our two armies and captured Zhitomir on July 9. The battle for Kiev began on July 11, 1941. On this day, the German 3rd Motorized Corps broke through from Zhitomir to the front edge of the Kiev fortified area. German two tank divisions, moving along the Kiev highway, reached the Irpen River, 20 km west of the ancient Russian capital. This strike was accompanied by massive airstrikes against our troops, communications and deep rear facilities. There was a threat of the fall of Kiev and the capture by the enemy of the crossings across the Dnieper.

The 5th Army of General Potapov with the forces of the shock group (31st Rifle Corps, 9th, 19th and 22nd Mechanized Corps) dealt a counterattack on the formations of the 6th Field Army of Reichenau and the 1st Panzer Group of Kleist in the Novograd area. Volynsky. Soviet troops attacked the flank of a German strike group aimed at Kiev. This forced the German command to reinforce the northern flank with 9 divisions from the 1st Panzer Group and the left flank of the 6th Army. The blow of the 5th Soviet Army temporarily distracted the enemy from Kiev.

After repelling Soviet counterattacks, Mackensen's German 3rd Motorized Corps trampled under Kiev for two weeks, waiting for the approach of the 6th Army's infantry divisions. Having met strong resistance of Russian troops in the Kiev direction, the Germans turned south to reach the rear of the 6th, 12th and 18th armies, which were retreating from the Berdichev - Starokonstantinov - Proskurov line. The German 48th motorized corps developed an offensive to the southeast, and the 14th motorized corps advanced between the 3rd and 48th. The Soviet 26th army Kostenko inflicted a counterattack on the 14th motorized corps at Fastov.

In mid-July, the 17th German army of Stülpnagel developed an offensive in the Vinnitsa direction. The Soviet 12th Army of Ponedelin left Vinnitsa. A wide gap formed between the Soviet 26th and 6th armies in the area of ​​Belaya Tserkov. Our 6th and 12th armies are retreating to the Uman region.

The situation worsened due to the breakthrough of the defense of the Southern Front by the 11th German army. The Germans developed their offensive with the forces of the 1st Panzer Group and the 17th Army. In early August 1941, the Uman cauldron was formed, in which the troops of the 6th and 12th armies, the 2nd mechanized corps were found. The Soviet troops could not break through and resisted until August 8-10. Up to 65 thousand soldiers and officers got into the encirclement, about 11 thousand came out of it. According to German data, more than 100 thousand people were taken prisoner alone. In captivity were also two commanders Muzychenko and Ponedelin, almost all the corps commanders were killed or taken prisoner.

German soldiers and officers stand near the pillbox of the Kiev fortified area

SS soldiers at the MG-34 machine gun during street fighting in Kiev

German Command Plans

On July 8, 1941, the German Headquarters ordered to break the enemy's resistance in the central (Moscow) direction and open the way to Moscow. Then the 3rd Panzer Group of Hoth was planned to be sent to the north, and the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian to the south and southeast, east of the Dnieper, to support the offensive of Army Group South.

The strong resistance of the Red Army, unexpected for the enemy, especially on the strategic flanks of the Russian Front, forced the German High Command to reconsider operational and strategic decisions. On July 21, Hitler arrived at the headquarters of Army Group North. The meeting confirmed the decision to turn the 3rd Panzer Group to the northeast to accelerate the capture of Leningrad and the 2nd Panzer Group to the southeast.

In the directive of the OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht) No. 33 of July 19, it was noted that in the southern sector of the front it was necessary to occupy Ukraine, Crimea and the territory to the Don. In the central sector - to capture Moscow, the 3rd Panzer Group was temporarily transferred to Army Group North. But already on July 30, OKW issued directive No. 34, according to which Army Group Center received an order to stop the offensive in the Moscow direction and go on the defensive.

The fact is that Brauchitsch and Halder, the commander-in-chief and chief of the General Staff of the ground forces, saw a looming crisis in a simultaneous offensive in three strategic directions. Therefore, they considered it expedient to concentrate their forces on the capture of Moscow, which would lead to the fall of the Russian defense. Here you can destroy the main forces of the Russians, since they will fight for the capital to the last and will throw all the remaining reserves into battle. As a result, the Germans will destroy the main forces and reserves of the enemy, their center of command and communications, the most important industrial area. Russia will be split into northern and southern parts, which will greatly complicate further resistance.

Hitler, with the support of Keitel and Jodl - the chief of staff of the OKW, the chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW, believed that instead of attacking Moscow, it was first necessary to defeat the enemy on the flanks. It was necessary to remove a possible threat from the flanks of Army Group Center. Hitler also believed that it was extremely important for victory in the war to seize the strategic resources of Ukraine and the Caucasus.

In the southern direction, the Russian troops actively resisted, inflicted strong counterattacks, preventing the Germans from reaching Kiev and not allowing them to break through to the south along the Dnieper in order to encircle the main forces of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts.

The available forces of Army Group South were not enough to fulfill the task assigned to it.

Soviet tank KV-1 stuck and abandoned near the town of Romny

German mountain shooters examine the Soviet T-34 tank, knocked out in the park of Poltava. September 1941

To Kiev

The battle for Kiev took on an even more fierce character.

The Nazis needed to take the city in order to solve the most important part of the overall strategic war plan. The Germans could not develop an offensive while the Dnieper line was covered by a strong group of Russian troops. In the Kiev area, the Germans were held back by the organized resistance of several Soviet armies. The townspeople took an active part in the defense of Kiev. Since the beginning of the war, more than 200 thousand Kievites (including 16 thousand communists and 40 thousand Komsomol members) voluntarily joined the ranks of the Red Army. A popular militia was also formed. More than 160 thousand townspeople built defensive lines every day. Three defense lines were erected, a 3-kilometer anti-tank ditch was opened, about 25 bunkers were built, etc.

Hitler ordered to take Kiev on August 8, 1941 and hold a military parade on Khreshchatyk. However, this order was not carried out.

Until August 11, the Nazis, with the support of large artillery forces and aviation continuously, day and night, the defensive formations of the Kiev fortified area and the 27th rifle corps were attacked. The Germans did not succeed.

The command of the SWF threw the last reserves to defend the city. A threat arose for Odessa, on August 5, the heroic defense of the city began. The city was defended by a separate Primorsky army, the forces and means of the Odessa naval base and the Black Sea fleet.

In August, the Germans captured the entire Right-Bank Ukraine, but the districts of Kiev and Odessa held on, preventing the enemy from breaking through further. The German Headquarters was deeply concerned about the backlog of Army Group South, which disrupted its interaction with Army Group Center.

On August 10, Chief of Staff of Army Group South Sodenstern reported to Halder:

“Our troops are badly exhausted and suffer heavy losses. The tense situation on the northern flank can only be alleviated by regrouping units and transferring new forces. "

Lacking strategic reserves, the German Headquarters decides to temporarily transfer part of the forces of Army Group Center - Weichs's 2nd Army and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group - to reinforce Army Group South. This was supposed to ensure the capture of the Dnieper line, a breakthrough into the Crimea and the Caucasus.

On August 21, Hitler signed a directive according to which part of the forces of Army Group Center turned south in order to defeat the main forces of the Soviet SWF. The main task was not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal regions on the Donets, depriving the Russians of oil from the Caucasus.

On 23 August, the headquarters of Army Group Center received a corresponding order from the Fuehrer. The command of Army Group Center met this decision of Hitler with disapproval. Guderian personally tried to persuade the Fuhrer to continue the offensive against Moscow, but achieved nothing.

German machine gunner, armed with a 7,92-mm MG-34 light machine gun, at the ruins of a burned down house on the outskirts of Kiev

Calculation of the German 37-mm cannon PaK 35/36 on vacation on Khreshchatyk in Kiev near the building of the regional committee

The environment of the Kiev group

The German 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group were turned south to encircle and defeat the troops of the South-Western Front's right wing. This immediately complicated the situation in the zone of the Central Front.

The 21st Army retreated to Chernigov, where the Nazis were rushing. The Soviet Headquarters allowed to withdraw part of the troops (5th Army and 27th Corps) from the right wing of the South-Western Front to the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The Kiev group remained in place with the order to defend Kiev to the last.

In early September 1941, the enemy's northern grouping reached the lower reaches of the river. Desna, and the southern grouping (1st Panzer Group and 17th Army) captured and expanded the bridgehead in the Kremenchug area on the left bank of the Dnieper. It was clear that two German groups were trying to encircle the main forces of the SWF.

The Soviet Headquarters instructed the newly created Bryansk Front to counter-attack Guderian's group and prevent it from breaking through to the south. The 2nd Cavalry Corps, directed by the Southern Front to Romny, was going to move to the Putivl area. However, the troops of the Bryansk Front, due to lack of time for a counterattack and errors of the command, could not stop the enemy's breakthrough.

The Nazis pushed back and bypassed the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front on the left. On September 7, German tanks reached Konotop, on the 9th Chernigov fell.

The 21st army of Kuznetsov, which was bypassed from the east by the troops of the 2nd tank group, and from the west by the 2nd German army, which reached Chernigov, was under the threat of encirclement and began to hastily retreat south to the Desna. Continuing to cover the troops of the South-Western Front, Guderian's group defeated the 40th Army of Podlas and entered the Romen area. The 40th Army retreated to the southeast.

By this time, the reserves of the SWF were exhausted.

The commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction Budyonny, the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Vasilevsky, the commander of the South-Western Front Kirponos, the chief of staff of the South-Western Front Tupikov repeatedly suggested leaving Kiev and withdrawing troops from the Dnieper border to the river. Psel. However, this proposal did not receive timely approval. Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov opposed this decision. The headquarters proposed to first stop the enemy's northern group and create a line of defense on the river. Psellus and only then leave Kiev.

Stalin hoped that the SWF would have enough strength to resist. Meanwhile, the armies of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts will strike at the flank and rear of the German northern grouping, stop it.

On September 12, Marshal Budyonny was removed from his post as commander-in-chief of the South-West direction. He was replaced by Tymoshenko. On September 13, tanks of the 3rd Panzer Division from the 2nd Panzer Group reached Lokhvitsa. About 60 km remained between the two German wedges, it was no longer possible to withdraw the troops of the South-Western Front. It was necessary to organize a breakthrough of the Kiev group and a strong counter strike.

On September 14, the 3rd and 16th Panzer Divisions of Model and Hube captured Lokhvitsa and Lubny. But because of the strong resistance of the Russians, they could not complete the encirclement. The German 9th Panzer Division from the 1st Panzer Group entered the Lokhvice area.

On September 16, the Germans closed the encirclement.

Burning destroyed building in Kiev captured by the Germans

A group of German soldiers at a motorcycle during a battle on the outskirts of Kiev

Catastrophe

The cauldron got the troops of the 5th, 26th and 37th and partially the troops of the 38th and 21st armies of the Southwestern Front.

On September 16, Tymoshenko ordered to leave Kiev and withdraw troops to the line of the r. Psel.

In the evening of the 17th front commander, Kirponos ordered the armies to break through to the east. The 38th and 40th armies with strikes on Romny and Lubny were supposed to help break through the armies of the South-Western Front. Due to a communication failure, the 37th Army did not receive an order to withdraw and continued to defend Kiev. Only on September 19 did her troops leave Kiev.

It was not possible to organize a retreat.

The troops withdrew without control, disorganized, most often in small groups, pressed from all sides by the enemy and suffered heavy losses.

So, on September 20, the combined column of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached the village of Dryukovshchina, in the area southwest of Lokhvitsa, where it was attacked by the troops of the German 3rd Panzer Division. The column was defeated, Mikhail Kirponos, members of the Front Military Council, Mikhail Burmistenko, Yevgeny Rykov, Chief of Staff Vasily Tupikov, members of the 5th Army Armed Forces Nikishev and Kalchenko, and Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Pisarevsky were killed. The commander of the 5th Army Mikhail Potapov was seriously wounded and taken prisoner.

It is interesting that the group (NKVD company) of the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the South-Western Front Baghramyan, which was supposed to cover the breakthrough of the main column, successfully passed the German barriers and went out to its own.

On September 21-23, the 37th Army was defeated in the Kiev region. His army commander Vlasov (was wounded) with a small group made his way to his own. The Pyriatinsky group of the troops of the 5th and 21st armies held out until September 25.

The remnants of the 5th Army came out of the encirclement in different places, going from Chernigov to Orzhitsa and further to the river. Psel. In the Orzhitsa area, the remnants of the 26th Army fought the longest - until September 26th. The commander of the 26th Army, General Kostenko, with the army headquarters managed to organize a breakthrough of the encirclement ring and the exit of the headquarters and part of the troops to their own.

Soviet troops suffered heavy losses.

According to data published in 1993 by the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, our losses amounted to over 700 thousand people, of which 627 thousand are irrecoverable. According to German data, over 600 thousand people were taken prisoner alone.

The Germans opened their way to the east, as a result, the entire Left-Bank Ukraine was lost, the Germans reached the Donbass. The armies of the Southern Front found themselves in a difficult situation. In the Azov region, the 18th army perished, they had to leave Odessa. The Nazis captured Taganrog, Kharkov and broke through to the Crimea. The defense of Sevastopol began.

However, the battle for Kiev also had a positive result. The Germans suspended the offensive on Moscow, which made it possible to strengthen its defenses.

The fierce resistance of the SWF troops for a long time fettered Army Group South.

Column of captured Red Army soldiers near Kiev

A column of captured Red Army soldiers in the vicinity of Kremenchug, Ukraine. September 1941

Comments

[Vladimir_2U]

To smooth out the painful impression, also Kiev (as they write under the photo), only the Germans, who surrendered to the mercy of the Soviet army, and this mercy was much, much stronger than the German!

[Serg koma]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

also Kiev (as they write under the photo)

On the night of November 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Kiev, engaging in street battles with the German garrison.

On August 16, 1944, a parade of German prisoners of war took place in Kiev

On that day, nearly thirty-seven thousand German prisoners marched through the streets of Kiev, including 549 officers, lined up in rows of ten in a row. The route of their movement was personally approved by Nikita Khrushchev - its total length was twenty-one kilometers. The prisoners of war marched across Kiev for five hours - from ten in the morning until three in the afternoon.

[Lech from Android.]

It is interesting how a further German offensive against Moscow would have developed if Stalin had agreed to leave Kiev and in time to withdraw troops to the line of the r. Psel.
And so the loss of 700 thousand fighters in one month of fighting is a disaster for any state ... for the Germans, the way to Moscow was open, and if at that moment they had thrown all their forces and reserves in this direction, they would have taken Moscow.
Hitler's throwing and desperate resistance from the Red Army gave time for our state to organize defense and mobilize the country ... all this cost our people dearly.

[Konnick]

It is interesting how a further German offensive against Moscow would have developed if Stalin had agreed to leave Kiev and in time to withdraw troops to the line of the r. Psel.

Then the Germans would have redirected the blow of Guderian's tank group to Moscow and acted according to the original plan to capture Moscow. They would no longer be threatened with a flank attack from the south.
Having pulled a huge mass of troops from their place, it would have been necessary not only to leave Kiev, but also all the warehouses. A retreat to such a distance would turn into a death march under the blows of aircraft and tanks, just as there was such a disorganized exit from the encirclement, which turned the army into a crowd.
It would be better not to rush around, but to organize a strong all-round defense of Kiev, with those resources of ammunition and food, they could hold out exactly until the end of October, causing much greater damage to the Wehrmacht.

[Lech from Android.]

Strong all-round defense of Kiev?
Are you seriously?
In the absence of normal communications, aviation, tanks, artillery, discipline and competent commanders.
How can you explain the mass capture of hundreds of thousands of Red Army men and commanders of the Red Army?
This cannot be explained by the superiority of the Wehrmacht alone.
It is so mediocre to drive people into a trap, it is necessary to try very hard.

[Konnick]

In the absence of normal communications, aviation, tanks, artillery, discipline and competent commanders.
How can you explain the mass capture of hundreds of thousands of Red Army men and commanders of the Red Army?

It was during the retreat that communications were disrupted, tanks, partly aviation, and fuel depots were abandoned. Yes, and Kirponos gave up control of the front due to the loss of communication when leaving the encirclement.

[chenia]

Quote: Konnick

Yes, and Kirponos gave up control of the front

Withdrawal (by the way, our troops are only retreating, but not retreating) is the most difficult event, which was very difficult for ours. Since they did not have time to leave, the best (second) solution would be not to leave at all.
And the nemchura would freeze. Yes Kiev would be destroyed. The Germans could not advance from the front through the Kiev UR, deploy the army from the west with the opposite front, and let the Germans hammer the defense. whose density does NOT fall in depth. And where would the Germans find the strength to keep such a grouping surrounded (and the Germans could no longer advance in all directions)? Only at the expense of other directions (the environment is a confirmation of this).
But then the offensive on Moscow would have been thwarted. They could take Kiev just in time for the end of autumn. A battle in the city with 600 thousand groups (wow, how would they get bogged down), when the rest of the Wehrmacht troops are shackled (and in this direction it is very problematic to hold the ring against the remnants of the South-Western Front, the Baltic Fleet and the Russian Federation).
We would have gained time and the Typhoon would have started two (or even three) months later (if at all, it would have begun), and by the end of autumn we already outnumbered the Germans in manpower and resources, and would have had troops with no less than 3 months training.

Although the best option is to withdraw the troops in time. This would also disrupt the offensive on Moscow (until they figured out (defeated or pushed aside) the group on the flank).

This is one of our biggest mistakes.

[Sergey Valov]

“And where the Germans would find the strength to keep such a grouping surrounded” is easy. Lack of supply of ammunition, and especially food, in a week will turn any army into an uncontrollable crowd.

[Konnick]

Lack of supply of ammunition, and especially food, in a week will turn any army into an uncontrollable crowd.

So there were stocks in warehouses for months, but when they left, they abandoned everything and were left with nothing. And what they tried to withdraw by rail was destroyed by the Luftwaffe along with the echelons.

[Sergey Valov]

Allow me to doubt about food, especially since it would be necessary to feed the urban population. The fate of Leningrad is an example of this, but there was no complete blockade there.

[Konnick]

Do not confuse Ukraine with its food resources with Leningrad. And then Leningrad stood for 900 days.

[Sergey Valov]

Do not confuse peacetime Ukraine and surrounded Kiev with an army of 600. Leningrad without the Road of Life would have died out already in 1941.

[Sergey Valov]

"So there were stocks in warehouses for months" Do you have information about the location of warehouses in the surrounding area and their stocks? Share. Do not confuse the spacecraft encirclement area with the district territory.

[chenia]

Quote: Sergey Valov

in a week will turn any army into an uncontrollable crowd.

Say it 6 PA Wehrmacht (and not in warm September).
especially since

Quote: Konnick

So there were stocks in warehouses for months

[Konnick]

You do not compare the district warehouses of the Kiev district with the stretched supply lines of the 6th army of Paulus. And Paulus would have held out in the cauldron for a long time, like the 2 Army Corps near Demyansk, but an air supply corridor was established in the Demyansk cauldron, and at Stalingrad, German aviation was suppressed by ours, for the first time air supremacy was ours. In addition, the primary targets of long-range tank raids were enemy airfields, remember the Tatsinsky raid.

[chenia]

Quote: Konnick

You do not compare the district warehouses of the Kiev district

You, is it for me? I just assert that Kiev was in a more advantageous position (and not only the city, but the area where the Dnieper is a wonderful rokada). And the troops of the SWF were in a shallow operational environment, and could constantly "pull" the German together with the remnants of the SWF, BF, and the Russian Federation (well, if the Germans decided to continue their attack on Moscow (but they would not have kept the ring).

[Konnick]

Sorry, misunderstood. The defeat of the Russian Federation and the ZF was also provided by the Luftwaffe. They also concentrated aviation on the direction of the main attack, not allowing our personnel divisions to leave the forests, and in the directions
along the highways, our strategists "managed" to place the divisions of the people's militia, Zhukov wrote to justify that they could not determine the direction of the main attack, but
how could you not have guessed that the Germans always advance along the roads.
And divisions NO were practically without heavy weapons, Konev and Lukin tried to use probably the tactics of "Battle on the Ice", but combat-ready divisions remained in the forest, in an "ambush". And in the case of Kiev, the built air defense system of the South-Western Front would not have allowed the Germans to do this in the air. The most truthful memoirs about the defense of Kiev and the battles of Dubno were written by Popel, maybe Zhukov did not like him for this.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: chenia

Withdrawal (by the way, our troops are only retreating, but not retreating) is the most difficult event, which was very difficult for ours. Since they did not have time to leave, the best (second) solution would be not to leave at all.
And the nemchura would freeze.

Yeah? Did it really "hang"?
SWF was a disorganized mass, what, nafig, defensive orders are you fantasizing about?

September 21, 17 hours 12 minutes

“The army is surrounded. With the army, all the rear of the South-Western Front were surrounded, uncontrollable, fleeing in panic, choking all the paths by introducing chaos into the troops. All attempts to break through to the east were unsuccessful. We make our last effort to break through at the Orzhitsa front ... no real assistance will be provided by an auxiliary strike from the east, a catastrophe is possible.

Shtarm 26 - Orzhitsa.

[chenia]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

SWF was a disorganized mass, what, nafig, defensive orders are you fantasizing about?

If you do not understand something, ask me to explain.
That. what you described. this is already the result of a withdrawal. This is when you got out of a cozy trench. and in a marching column (and this is still the science of organizing marches with the possibility of meeting an enemy who can attack from any side).
We were defeated in a bare field (that's why so quickly), and not in defensive positions.
Just in case, once again carefully re-read what I wrote.

[bk0010]

Quote: chenia

This is one of our biggest mistakes.

What you are proposing is exactly what is required for a successful blitzkrieg - stubborn and heroic sitting on the defensive. The cure for the blitzkrieg was found only after the war - mobile defense, but its implementation required comparable mobility of units and other commanders. As a result, the blitzkrieg either stopped itself, since it was imperative to take the defending city (Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad) or could not start (the awesome defense on the Kursk Bulge prevented it). The Germans could not stop our blitzkrieg at 44 either.

[Konnick]

How can you explain the mass capture of hundreds of thousands of Red Army men and commanders of the Red Army?

This can be partly explained by the place where these hundreds of thousands were called. Many were released by the Germans to their homes for agricultural work to grow crops for the German army. The rest tried to get out and get out, there was no solid ring. And with Kirponos, the story of his death is murky.

[chenia]

Quote: Timofey Charuta

From 600 thousand (according to German data) taken prisoner, it would be much more useful in the defense of Kiev. Street fighting = not driving tanks across an open field or bombing retreating infantry columns from the air

I'm also trying to explain. that the worst of the three options is chosen. And our troops in columns, in an open field, were rolled out with tanks in 10 days. And so I would have choked, if not the entire Wehrmacht, then GA "YUG" for sure. And so for at least three months, and taking into account the Moscow battle (and it could not take place in the given circumstances) in general could have been released.

[The leader of the Redskins]

Good. And if we assume a variant of the defense of Kiev surrounded? Some kind of giant splinter in the rear of the Wehrmacht rushing further east?
The potential of the city and the region would allow supplying the units for a few more months.
I remember reading an article in my childhood, and then I saw a memorial plaque (it was not allowed to go further to see the time) about the defense by a separate pillbox of a section of the Odessa highway on the outskirts of Kiev, even when the city fell!
Local residents helped with supplies, and once there was even a rotation of units of the Red Army!

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

And if we assume a variant of the defense of Kiev surrounded?

I think it's called a "siege."

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Some kind of giant splinter in the rear of the Wehrmacht rushing further to the east?

Not seriously. It is utopia to improvise with the organization of defense in this blocked "giant splinter" with a mess, destroyed logistics and lack of responsible leadership. Syndrome of the "Brest Fortress", which allegedly held back someone there for several months, distracting, like, "significant forces of the Germans"?

[The leader of the Redskins]

Well, why Brest ... Odessa is a historical example. And Sevastopol is there too. The Nazi forces pulled back a lot.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

And Sevastopol is there too.

The defense of the SVMB was not an improvisation. And it collapsed due to the circumstances that had come, which would have been the starting point for the defense of Kiev.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Odessa is a historical example. And Sevastopol is there too. The Nazi forces pulled back a lot.

There is little to do - to provide Kiev with a safe supply by sea.
For Sevastopol held out as long as it could be supplied and as long as the supply route was covered from the air.

[Liam]

Quote: Alexey RA

For Sevastopol held out as long as it could be supplied and as long as the supply route was covered from the air.

Come on ... Sevastopol held out while the Germans were distracted by the Crimean front, the Maritime Army and other landings. Approximately half a million people in total. How the Hunt for the Bustard ended Sevastopol fell instantly.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Liam

Come on ... Sevastopol held out while the Germans were distracted by the Crimean front, the Maritime Army and other landings. Approximately half a million people in total. How the Hunt for the Bustard ended Sevastopol fell instantly.

You're right. The defeat of the Red Army forces in the east of Crimea solved a whole range of German problems: it removed the threat of a blow to the rear of the forces blocking Sevastopol, released the troops chained in front of the Kerch Peninsula and deprived the city of the last supply route.

[Konnick]

How the Bustard Hunt ended Sevastopol fell instantly

Well, not instantly, but two months later, and then after the order to evacuate.
Again, the air supremacy of the Luftwaffe did not allow the supply of Sevastopol in sufficient volume. The Black Sea Fleet did not show itself to the full. Weak anti-aircraft weapons on the main ships and the lack of air cover forced the Black Sea Fleet to withdraw to the Caucasus, respectively, failing the evacuation from Sevastopol. The short range of our fighter aircraft did not allow us to escort transports and warships near the coast of Crimea, while there were airfields near Kerch, the supply was still coping, but with the loss of a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula, Sevastopol was doomed, and then the reserves were enough for two months of defense. The success of Operation Bustard Hunt was ensured by an aviation group assembled from the entire southern flank of the German troops. The same group, having done its dirty deed in destroying the control of the Crimean Front, defeating the headquarters and communication centers, three days later was sent to Kharkov, where it blocked the supply of our tank brigades and also defeated the communication headquarters. And again our army turned into a crowd of armed people forced to break through at night from the encirclement. Another disaster.

[chenia]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Not seriously. It is utopia to improvise with the organization of defense in this blocked "giant splinter" with a mess, destroyed logistics and lack of responsible leadership.

All this was during the departure (to explain what it is, and when you are almost surrounded by a long and tedious). But to organize the defense, it just happened. Here we must also understand that our grouping is 600 tons and this is not a deep operational encirclement (50-70 km, and sometimes even less ours).
So that the Germans would have to throw all their strength into "digesting" the Kiev cauldron. Or only by the forces of GA Yug to keep our grouping, and try to "rush" to Moscow.
Knowing how everything was there (near Moscow) in real life, the Wehrmacht received a semblance of Stalingrad already in 1941.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Good. And if we assume a variant of the defense of Kiev surrounded? Some kind of giant splinter in the rear of the Wehrmacht rushing further east?

Ours tried to do this in Mogilev, creating from it a "fortress Mogilev" with a hundred thousandth garrison.
Nothing good came of it: German mobile units pushed into the city, stumbled upon the defenses - and, bypassing the city, drove on, allocating a small part of the forces to guard the "future cauldron." And then the infantry approached and in a week defeated the Red Army formations blocked in the city.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Lech from Android.

It is interesting how a further German offensive against Moscow would have developed if Stalin had agreed to leave Kiev and in time to withdraw troops to the line of the r. Psel.

Then the "catastrophe in the steppes", predicted by Shaposhnikov, could have happened.
It was not for nothing that the General Staff was against the withdrawal of SWN units to a new line. Moscow was afraid that, taking advantage of the greater mobility of their mechanized and infantry formations, the Germans would seize communication centers and crossings with forward detachments, cut the retreating units, push them into difficult terrain and push them to rivers, forcing our formations to either surrender or abandon heavy weapons and equipment. and scatter, going out in small groups.
There was nothing to promptly fend off German actions during our retreat to the SWN. BTV in the south burned down in July 1941, and only a couple of tank brigades got from the reserve to the direction.

[Konnick]

Moscow was afraid that, taking advantage of the greater mobility of their mechanized and infantry formations, the Germans would seize communication centers and crossings with forward detachments, cut off the retreating units, push them into difficult terrain and press them to the rivers, forcing our formations to either surrender or abandon heavy weapons and equipment. and scatter, going out in small groups.

This is what happened, unfortunately. Panic fear of the surroundings played a role. They abandoned everything, well-established logistics, communications, re-storage depots of ammunition, with months-long supplies of food and fuel. I believe that if they remained on the defensive, albeit under siege, the advanced tank units of the Wehrmacht could themselves face supply problems. And using the active defense, the South-Western Front could influence the enemy's communications very effectively, which would force the Germans to keep significant forces to contain the "cauldron" in the UR. They would not even have been able to cut the grouping apart without tanks. And the anti-tank defense of the Kiev UR was good, as was the air defense.

[place]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Hitler's throwing and desperate resistance from the Red Army gave time for our state to organize defense and mobilize the country ... all this cost our people dearly.

At one time, Guderian wrote that the hopeless defense of Kiev was not advisable for the Red Army. But he immediately noticed that the Germans in similar situations at the end of the war behaved in no way smarter. When there is no strength, any decision corresponds to the saying "wherever you go, everywhere there is a wedge."

[knn54]

The Soviet command believed that the main blow would be on Ukraine, and not in the center. Hitler not in vain turned his units to the south.
Otherwise, Army Group Center could have been hit "in the underbelly" from the south.
By this time, the Bryansk Front would have been ready for an offensive with newly formed units.
And the situation at the SWF would have been completely different.
The author omitted an important point - one of the main reasons for our failures (including with the Bryansk Front) was the air supremacy of German aviation.

[Konnick]

The author omitted an important point - one of the MAIN reasons for our failures is the overwhelming advantage of German aviation.

I completely agree. It is possible to retreat with the active influence of enemy aircraft only at night, but in the forest-steppe zone it is impossible to hide such a mass of troops for a day. Our memoir generals rarely described the actions of aviation, but in fact it played a large role. As at the beginning of the war for the Germans and from the middle of the war, starting from Stalingrad for us. Stalin did not allow the encirclement of Paulus to begin without gaining air supremacy.

[Olgovich]

G.K. Zhukov, end of July 1941:

- The Southwestern Front now needs to be completely withdrawn beyond the Dnieper. At the junction of the Central and Southwestern Fronts, concentrate the reserves of at least five reinforced divisions.

- But what about Kiev? Stalin asked, looking straight at me. "What other counterstrikes are there, what nonsense?" - Stalin was indignant. - Experience has shown that our troops do not know how to attack ...
— And suddenly, in high tones, he threw: - How could you think of surrendering Kiev to the enemy?

I could not restrain myself and answered:

- If you think that the chief of the General Staff is capable of nothing but nonsense, then he has nothing to do here. I ask you to relieve me of my duties as chief of the General Staff and send me to the front. There I, apparently, will be of greater benefit to the Motherland.

There was another painful pause.

“You’re not getting excited,” Stalin said. - But by the way ... we got along without Lenin, and even more so we can do without you ...

- I am a military man and I am ready to carry out any decision of the Headquarters, but I have a firm point of view on the situation and methods of waging war, I am convinced of its correctness and reported as I think myself and the General Staff.

Stalin did not interrupt me, but he listened without anger and remarked in a calmer tone:

- Go to work, we will consult here and then we will call you. After collecting the cards, I left the office with a heavy feeling of my own powerlessness. About half an hour later, I was invited to the Supreme.

“That's what,” Stalin said, “we consulted and decided to relieve you of your duties as chief of the General Staff.

Due to political ambitions (and Kiev - the strongest reputational blow), time was lost for the retreat and rescue of armies and resources. In the event of a timely retreat, most likely, neither the Kharkov catastrophe and the terrible retreat of 42 g to the Volga would have taken place and the course of the war would have gone differently ...

And so the Soviet people learned the TRUTH about the losses near Kiev and it was not at all a conscientious media:

Sovinformburo. During September 25, our troops fought the enemy along the entire front.

Another fake of the Nazis about Soviet losses

Fascist chatterboxes from the main command of the German army on September 24 broke out with yet another fake. Now they are no longer satisfied with dozens of "destroyed" Soviet tanks and thousands of "captured" Red Army soldiers. The German public is so accustomed to such nonsense that it can no longer be surprised by such a lie, which is so common for the Nazis. Taking this into account, the Nazis decided to lie better. Hand they are solemnly broadcasting joy to themselves about the seizure of 570 Soviet tanks and 380 thousand prisoners in the Kiev region ... The essence of the stupid nonsense of the German fascists is that they pass off their plan as reality.

There were another 100 thousand more prisoners for the war.

[Serg koma]

Quote: Olgovich

There were another 100 thousand more prisoners for the war.

And who checked?

[Region-25.rus]

And who checked?

And Ol'govich just needs to blurt out. And everyone is obliged to believe immediately. And to check, well, this is not his lot. His destiny is to dip a brush into a bucket of slops and smear the USSR. And it doesn't matter for what.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Region-25.rus

And Ol'govich just needs to blurt out. And everyone is obliged to believe immediately.

So refute it, business.

Quote: Region-25.rus

And it doesn't matter for what.

Indeed .... In the largest cauldron in the history of wars, a whole front has been boiled because of the stupidity of the high command - nonsense, we will beat the timpani and burst into pathos.
Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Tupikov, 13.09.41/XNUMX/XNUMX:

The beginning of a disaster you understand is a matter of a couple of days

Answer from Bet:

To the commander of the South-Western Front [South-Western Front], a copy to the Chief of the South-Western Front [South-Western direction]. Major General Tupikov presented a panicky report to the General Staff. The situation, on the contrary, requires the preservation of exceptional composure and self-control of commanders of all levels. It is necessary, without succumbing to panic, to take all measures to maintain the position and especially firmly hold the flanks. We must force Kuznetsov (21 A) and Potapov (5 A) to stop retreating. It is necessary to instill in the entire composition of the front the need to fight stubbornly, without looking back, it is necessary to follow the instructions of Comrade. Stalin, given to you on 11.9.

This "bucket of slops", actually, not at Olgovich's, but under the table of the SVGK.

[Liam]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

.... in the largest cauldron in the history of war

Largest-Vyazemsky

[Serg koma]

Quote: Olgovich

G.K. Zhukov, end of July 1941 :

(July 29, 1941 Zhukov (according to his memoirs) proposed to withdraw the troops of the South-Western Front to the east and leave Kiev)
Unconditionally believe the memoirs ???

On July 10, 1941, Budyonny was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southwestern direction, which included the South and Southwestern Fronts. Their task was to hold Kiev and, in general, the line along the Dnieper. Initially, the fronts quite successfully coped with their task. The situation began to change for the worse at the end of August, when, on the orders of Hitler, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group turned from the Moscow direction to the south, with the aim of reaching the flank and rear of the Soviet group defending Kiev. On September 11, the divisions of Kleist's 1st tank group launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead to meet Guderian from the Kremenchug bridgehead.

on the night of September 11. Marshal Baghramyan, at that time a major general and chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, restored it from copies of telegrams and his own memoirs. It turns out that it was not Zhukov, but Marshal Budyonny, who gave a telegram to Stalin: "The Military Council of the Southwestern Front believes that in the current situation it is necessary to allow a general withdrawal of the front to the rear line ..." Of the Southwestern Front may lead to the loss of troops and a huge amount of material.In an extreme case, if the issue of withdrawal cannot be revised, I ask permission to withdraw at least troops and rich equipment from the Kiev UR, these forces and means will certainly help Yugo -Western Front to resist the encirclement ").

[Olgovich]

Quote: Serg Koma

July 29, 1941 Zhukov (according to his memoirs) proposed to withdraw the troops of the South-Western Front to the east and leave Kiev
Unconditionally believe the memoirs ???

witnesses.

Quote: Serg Koma

... It turns out that this is not Zhukov, but Marshal Budyonny gave a telegram to Stalin:

and Budyonny gave after Zhukov's proposal and the result is the same.

Someone for the sake of politics neglected the requirements of reality

Quote: Serg Koma

The situation began to change for the worse at the end of August, when, on the orders of Hitler, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group turned from the Moscow direction to the south, in order to reach the flank and rear of the Soviet group defending Kiev. On September 11, the divisions of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group launched an offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead to meet Guderian from the Kremenchug bridgehead.

they knew about Guderian and prepared for his blow.
A complete surprise was the crushing blow of Kleist from the Krmenchug bridgehead (where there was only infantry), where it was transferred as soon as possible from near Nikolaev.

[DenVB]

Quote: Olgovich

and Budyonny gave after Zhukov's proposal and the result is the same.

Only Zhukov proposed (allegedly suggested, no one knows for sure) on July 29 (when even the Uman cauldron had not yet closed), and Budyonny - on September 11. By the way, it was most likely because of the critical situation near Uman that Stalin removed Zhukov from the General Staff. And by no means because of the fabulous warnings about the threat of the fall of Kiev.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

Due to political ambitions (and Kiev - the strongest reputational blow), time was lost for the retreat and rescue of armies and resources.

This moment was sorted out. Zhukov's proposal did not change anything in further events, since the 1st and 2nd TGr met at one and a half to two hundred kilometers east of Zhukov's proposed line of withdrawal of parts beyond the Dnieper.

The withdrawal beyond the Dnieper meant, firstly, the withdrawal of the 5th army of M.I. Potapov and the 27th rifle corps from the Pripyat region, and maintaining positions in Darnitsa. But nothing more. Zhukov's proposal could not solve the problem of defending against the Cannes by forces of the 1st and 2nd tank groups. The towns of Bakhmach, Romny, Lokhvitsa, through which the route of Guderian's tanks passed, lie much to the east of the line of withdrawal of troops proposed by G.K. Zhukov. To eliminate the threat of encirclement of the Southwestern Front in the form in which it materialized in September, it was necessary to withdraw from the Dnieper line beyond Sula or Psel.

From an operational point of view, GK Zhukov's proposal has both its pluses and its significant minuses. The withdrawal of the army of M.I. Potapov and the corps of P.D. But at the same time, such a withdrawal also freed up the German formations, which were forced to conduct tactically disadvantageous battles in the Pripyat region. The loss of a political face with the surrender of Kiev is absolutely not worth the advantages that the surrender of the KiUR and the construction of the defense strictly along the Dnieper line gives. Further proposals of G.K. Zhukov, put forward already as commander of the Reserve Front, were reduced to holding the line along the Dnieper River and parrying the threat of encirclement with a counterattack on the flank of the 2nd Panzer Group. This option was implemented in practice, moreover, G.K. Zhukov took an active part in its implementation, pinning down the main forces of the XXXXVI motorized corps of the Germans with the 43rd Army.

© Isaev

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

Zhukov's proposal could not solve the problem of defending against the Cannes by forces of the 1st and 2nd tank groups. The towns of Bakhmach, Romny, Lokhvitsa, through which the route of Guderian's tanks passed, lie much to the east of the line of withdrawal of troops proposed by G.K. Zhukov. Isaev

this is also Isaev:

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (Headquarters of the High Command) did much to contain Guderian's offensive into the flank of the Southwestern Front. Guderian's there were no chances to close the encirclement ring on their own, without the help of other mechanized formations... ... that the 1st Panzer Group would suddenly jump out of the box to meet him, they did not expect

и

It is known that Georgy Zhukov proposed to surrender Kiev and the Kiev fortified area on the right bank of the Dnieper. In his opinion, this would free up 100 thousand soldiers of the 37th Army, and this reserve could be used in any direction.

those. and against Kleist.

With the withdrawal of Zhukov, a completely different situation would have developed within a whole month

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

и

It is known that Georgy Zhukov proposed to surrender Kiev and the Kiev fortified area on the right bank of the Dnieper. In his opinion, this would free up 100 thousand soldiers of the 37th Army, and this reserve could be used in any direction.

those. and against Kleist.

We continue to quote Isaev:

However, in my opinion, there was also a pragmatic calculation. In the event of the surrender of Kiev, not only our 37th Army was released, but also the German troops that stormed the capital of Soviet Ukraine. Where would the Germans have sent them? One can only guess. Therefore, I believe that the decision to hold Kiev was more sober calculation than stubbornness. By the way, Stalin was supported in this matter by Shaposhnikov, a highly professional person.

The problem is that use in any direction the released forces were extremely difficult. For sedentary rifle divisions were released, with which it would not have been possible to parry the critical blow of 1 TGr - it was necessary to guess exactly from which of the 7 bridgeheads the Germans would introduce their Panzerwaffe into battle. And if you do not guess, then the SD will simply not be in time. And if you guess, then where is the guarantee that the Germans will not change their foothold again. And again they do not have time for a new place of SD.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

We continue to quote Isaev

until the end then:

Another thing is that the transfer of Kleist's tank group to the bridgehead formed on the Dnieper confused all these pragmatic calculations ...

Those. all the "sober" calculations of the "highly professional"
(in nothing "highly professional" did not show) Shaposhnikov and Stalin turned out to be harmful zilch.

Quote: Alexey RA

would not work

this is already a fortune-telling with a lot of "would".

And the fact is a military catastrophe caused by the unwillingness to leave Kiev.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

Those. all the "sober" calculations of the "highly professional"
(in nothing "highly professional" did not show) Shaposhnikov and Stalin turned out to be harmful zilch.

As well as Zhukov's calculations to build up a defense on the Dnieper.
Understand a simple thing: the situation in which the SWP found itself did not have a winning solution for us. After the loss of the BTV, the direction fell into zugzwang: any action led to a loss.
Defending Kiev - see the real story.
We are withdrawing troops from Kiev and building a front along the Dnieper - Kleist hits from the bridgehead with the worst defense, and our infantry reserves simply do not have time to seal the hole before he joins Guderian (remember: 3-5 km is the speed of the artillery march on agricultural tractors, and all compounds of which it is included). Or even simpler: GA "Yug" uses the formations released near Kiev for demonstrative and restraining actions, pulls apart the reserves of the YuZN - and then enters into battle 1 TGr.
We are withdrawing troops from the Dnieper in advance and in an organized manner - the Germans are repeating what they did with Potapov's army, but on a front scale. If the enemy has a tank group, the Red Army will learn to retreat with infantry only in a year.
Wherever you throw - everywhere a wedge.

[Liam]

Quote: Alexey RA

Zhukov's calculations to build up a defense on the Dnieper.

I would not so blindly trust Zhukov's words about his proposals to Stalin. Marshal too often lied in his memoirs, especially about when there were no witnesses)

Quote: Alexey RA

After the loss of BTV, the direction fell into zugzwang: any action led to a loss

And before the loss of the BTV, things were going better than the type?

Quote: Alexey RA

We are withdrawing troops from Kiev and building a front along the Dnieper - Kleist hits from the bridgehead with the worst defense

In the event of a diversion across the river, it is not a fact that the bridgehead would have been, and certainly not with the worst defense.

Quote: Alexey RA

If the enemy has a tank group, the Red Army will learn to retreat with infantry only in a year.

Yes ... they learned so skillfully that Comrade Stalin had to issue an order.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Liam

And before the loss of the BTV, things were going better than the type?

Like yes - you could either quickly try to cut the wedge or at least reinforce the defense with tanks.

Quote: Liam

In the event of a diversion across the river, it is not a fact that the bridgehead would have been, and certainly not with the worst defense.

The Kremenchug bridgehead was captured by the Germans on August 31. Our reserves came only on September 6th. As a result, while trying to eliminate the bridgehead on September 9, the advancing forces of the Red Army met eight German infantry divisions. The Germans really accumulated forces faster than ours were transferring them. However, it is not surprising - their 8-ton bridge across the Dnieper was ready on September 4, and from September 9 to 11, a 16-ton two-kilometer bridge was built in Kremenchug.
Moreover, the Germans captured as many as 7 of the bridgeheads.

Quote: Liam

Yes ... they learned so skillfully that Comrade Stalin had to issue an order.

So this successful retreat by the infantry from the tanks was organized and sanctioned from above - for it began after the Order.

[Liam]

Quote: Alexey RA

Like yes - you could either quickly try to cut the wedge or at least reinforce the defense with tanks

))) We tried from the very border, with known results, and another year after trying, with similar results.

Quote: Alexey RA

So this successful retreat by the infantry from the tanks was organized and sanctioned from above - for it began after the Order

Seriously? After the Order which was called Not One Step Back?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Liam

))) We tried from the very border, with known results, and another year after trying, with similar results.

Nope. According to the experience of the same 6A, Leningrad and Stalingrad, while there were tanks, the defense could still be held. Retreat, but keep.

Quote: Liam

Seriously? After the Order which was called Not One Step Back?

Absolutely. Comrade Budyonny knocked out of the Headquarters permission to withdraw to the line of the Main Caucasian Ridge, EMNIP, a day after the publication of Order No. 227.
And for organized withdrawing units, the order did not work, since only unauthorized withdrawal was prohibited by the order:

From now on, the iron law of discipline for each commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be a requirement - not a step back without orders from high command.
Company, battalion, regiment, division commanders, relevant commissars and political workers, retreating from a combat position without orders from aboveare traitors to the Motherland. Such commanders and political workers should be treated like traitors to the Motherland.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:
1. The military councils of the fronts and, above all, the commanders of the fronts:
a) to unconditionally eliminate the retreat in the army and with an iron hand to stop the propaganda that we can and must supposedly retreat further east, that there will be no harm from such a retreat;
b) unconditionally remove from their posts and send them to Headquarters in order to bring to a military court the commanders of the armies who allowed unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, without an order from the front command;

etc.

[Liam]

Quote: Alexey RA

Absolutely. Comrade Budyonny knocked out of the Headquarters permission to withdraw to the line of the Main Caucasian ridge

I understand, of course, that in the heat of an argument there is a lot to say ... but just read a few pages 1942 ... training to find out how Budyonny's troops retreated in an organized manner in the summer of 42 and why even tanks could not catch up with them.
Pikul described it very colorfully (who this time did not dream up)

Valentin Pikul writes: “... it was, perhaps, a spontaneous flight of a mass of people dressed in military uniforms, and all this crowd (you cannot say otherwise) skidded to the Caucasus, and in Essentuki the detachments even had to fight off“ attacks ”on wine warehouses, on an elevator and a cannery ”.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

As well as Zhukov's calculations to build a defense on the Dnieper

these are your guesses and fortune-telling on a daisy.

Quote: Alexey RA

After losses of armored vehicles the direction fell into zugzwang: any action led to a loss.
Defending Kiev - see the real story.
We are withdrawing troops from Kiev and building a front along the Dnieper - Kleist is striking from the bridgehead with the worst defense,

not at all the BTV was stopped and stopped, as a result, the tanks of the Nazis near the same Moscow by the same Rokossovsky ..

And around the very few small bridgeheads it was possible to create defenses, incl. and VET. You can't maneuver much across the Dnieper

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

And around the very few small bridgeheads it was possible to create defenses, incl. and VET. You can't maneuver much across the Dnieper

In the nine days from the moment of its capture to the approach of our reserves and the beginning of the operation to eliminate it, the Germans transferred eight divisions to the Kremenchug bridgehead. On a front 30 km long. As a result, the 38A offensive quickly turned into a retreat.

What do you want to build VET? By August 1, 1941, the Red Army had lost 7766 45-mm anti-tank vehicles. Or more than half of their presence at the beginning of the war. Not from the good life in the 04/600 state division there are only 18 PTPs left.

And about the maneuver - it took the Germans two days to build an 8-ton bridge across the Dnieper with a length of 1250 m. And exactly the same amount for the construction of a 16-ton bridge 2 km long - the sappers had time exactly to the approach of Kleist's tanks.

Quote: Olgovich

not at all the BTV was stopped and stopped, as a result, the tanks of the Nazis near the same Moscow by the same Rokossovsky ..

The reaction time of the Red Army reserves at the Kremenchug bridgehead was 6 days for arrival and another 2 days for organizing the strike. With this you propose to parry the strikes of German motorized parts?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Olgovich

And around the very few small bridgeheads it was possible to create defenses, incl. and VET. You can't maneuver much across the Dnieper

In the nine days from the moment of its capture to the approach of our reserves and the beginning of the operation to eliminate it, the Germans transferred eight divisions to the Kremenchug bridgehead. On a front 30 km long. As a result, the 38A offensive quickly turned into a retreat.

What do you want to build VET? By August 1, 1941, the Red Army had lost 7766 45-mm anti-tank vehicles. Or more than half of their presence at the beginning of the war. Not from the good life in the 04/600 state division there are only 18 PTPs left.

And about the maneuver - it took the Germans two days to build an 8-ton bridge across the Dnieper with a length of 1250 m. And exactly the same amount for the construction of a 16-ton bridge 2 km long - the sappers had time exactly to the approach of Kleist's tanks.

Quote: Olgovich

not at all the BTV was stopped and stopped, as a result, the tanks of the Nazis near the same Moscow by the same Rokossovsky ..

The reaction time of the Red Army reserves at the Kremenchug bridgehead was 6 days for arrival and another 2 days for organizing the strike. With this you propose to parry the strikes of German motorized parts?

1. the bridgehead would simply not have existed in the Zhukov withdrawal.

2. PTO is shaved out not only by PTA guns.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

1. the bridgehead would simply not have existed in the Zhukov withdrawal.

Where will they go? What will prevent the Germans from capturing a foothold at Kremenchug in real life?
Or will the rifle formations withdrawn from Kiev (and there are no others there) will magically learn to teleport, so as to try to eliminate the German bridgehead immediately after the crossing, and not nine days later, when it expanded to 30 km and eight German divisions are already sitting on it?
If you mean the greater density of defense along the Dnieper due to the inclusion of former "Kiev inmates" in it, then let me remind you that the Germans are also freeing their infantry formations. And near Kremenchug, then ours can meet not 8, but 10-12 German infantry divisions.

Quote: Olgovich

2. PTO is shaved out not only by PTA guns.

And with the rest of the VET, too, strained. There are no armor-piercing shells for 76-mm divisional guns, there are practically no tanks left at the South-Western Forces, there is little hope for the Air Force.

[Petrik66]

If you look at the latest "historical" research, then everything revolves in 1941, when our troops were defeated. And nowhere, there is absolutely no summary that the Germans, winning battles., Already in August began to lose the war.

[DenVB]

Quote: Petrik66

And nowhere, there is absolutely no summary that the Germans, winning battles., Already in August began to lose the war.

Doubtful statement. I believe that the Germans had a chance to win the war until the defeat at Stalingrad.

[Petrik66]

It is your opinion.

[DenVB]

Quote: Petrik66

It is your opinion.

No, actually. There was such an official concept in Soviet historiography - "a radical change in the Second World War". The counter-offensive at Stalingrad was considered the beginning of it.

[place]

Quote: DenVB

the Germans had a chance to win the war until the defeat at Stalingrad.

Hitler saw a chance to win the War even in 1945. They have already begun testing atomic weapons and there is evidence that they are successful. There are always adventurous chances. But if the war turns from a well-founded solid enterprise into an adventure, it usually ends in failure. This is just an empirical fact.

[place]

Quote: Petrik66

Reach nowhere, there is absolutely no summary that the Germans were winning battles., already in August they began to lose the war.

According to Guderian, the war was strategically lost when Barbarossa's plan near Moscow failed ..... By the way, similar to the events of 1812.

But our "patriots" think differently. They are not at all embarrassed by the fact that Stalin and his generals are being poured with shit for the same thing, for which Kutuzov is extolled. Which surrendered Moscow to the French in September for the sake of preserving the army.

[prior]

With the historical past, everything is more or less clear.
But with the present ...
Why does the current Kiev authorities not celebrate the liberation of Kiev from the Soviet occupation by the Nazis in 1941? Anniversaries of the birth of any fascist henchmen are celebrated, but such a "holy" date for them, no?
Zelensky. You, as a Jew aspiring to NATO and the EU, shouldn't forget about such a significant date, because Kiev was "liberated" by the whole Europe united by Hitler.
We urgently need to arrange a celebration and hold it demonstratively, in Babi Yar.
Ukrainian fascists should not forget the "exploits" of the German fascists.
You are worthy of your teachers.

[ufpb]

In that environment, my grandfather's elder brother went missing. Now, knowing the history, I realize that if I was captured, I was killed.

[Gvardeetz77]

Just think about the numbers of losses (dead and taken prisoner) !!! This is almost the payroll of the entire modern RA, from Kaliningrad to Iturup, together with Znamenka 19 !! Healthy men and women (according to the modern category A, B, C) and only near Kiev ...

[niksfromru]

"According to data published in 1993 by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, our losses amounted to over 700 thousand people, of which 627 thousand were irretrievable. According to German data, only over 600 thousand people were captured."
I wonder how this is possible if the ALL number of Soviet troops near Kyiv at the beginning of the operation was 627 thousand, and about 120 thousand came out of the encirclement?