Military Review

Baltic non-Tsushima

87
Baltic non-Tsushima

And it sounds in all - a terrible tragedy, miscalculations, unprofessionalism, stupidity, the wrong choice of the route ... As for me, it was a tragedy when 83,6% of the servicemen involved in the operation died in the Smolensk battle, and that one with signs of optimism - during this time we prepared for the defense of Moscow. It was a war of extermination, and its scale for a modern man, accustomed to a different value of human life, does not fit in the head. The exchange of half a million soldiers for a month of time that summer was considered normal, and the Germans will begin to do the same in 1945.


And the war in the Baltic - it, of course, is rich in losses, like the whole of 1941, but it does not attract a catastrophe, especially if you look not at the army, but at the fleet, which found itself in a unique position. Unique, because the fleet until 1940 existed in one reality, where it was required to defend one, albeit a huge city in the depths of the shallow Gulf of Finland, and in 1940 it ended up in another, where Hanko, the Baltic islands and the Baltic coast. Well, the naval staff, which grew too quickly with our traditional lack of bases and repair facilities.

The problem was solved: the year allotted for this case was not wasted in vain, so, the main base fleet became Tallinn, which was a wise choice - from there the fleet had free access to both the Baltic and the Gulfs of Finland and Riga, Libava was re-developed with its Tosmare shipyard, the Moonsund Islands and Hanko were fortified. But the solutions were not only not optimal, they could not be. The same Libava, where many Soviet ships have accumulated in anticipation of repair. And not only ships - BC, fuel oil, other supplies ... And where were they kept? Where to repair? In its own way, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was right when it used the Baltic to its full extent - the alternative would be to pull hundreds of ships to the Gulf of Finland, where they would stand uselessly and purposelessly.

prehistory



Everyone guessed about the possibility of war back in May, and immediately on June 19, the fleet moved to combat readiness number two, a partial evacuation of ships and mobilization supplies from Libava began, ship and air patrols were strengthened. The tasks of the fleet were approved back in April:

- to prevent enemy amphibious assault forces on the Baltic coast and on the islands of Ezel and Dago;

- together with the air forces of the Red Army, defeat the German fleet in its attempts to enter the Gulf of Finland;

- to prevent the penetration of enemy ships into the Gulf of Riga;

- to assist ground forces operating on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and on the Hanko Peninsula, providing their flanks and destroying enemy coastal defenses;

- be ready to ensure the transfer of one rifle division from the coast of Estonia to the Hanko Peninsula;

- the actions of the fleet in combination with defensive mine laying, as well as the setting of underwater minelayers of minelayers on the approaches to ports and bases, and on inland waterways - aviation - complicate the deployment and operations of the forces of the enemy fleet.

And at 23:37 on June 21, readiness number one was introduced. Where did the fleet go wrong? He allowed it, or rather, even two. The first was that the sailors did not take into account the possibility of a catastrophe of the land front, when already on the first day Libava with the naval base turned into a mousetrap, a week later Ventspils was lost, Riga fell on June 30, and on August 5 the defense of the Main Fleet Base began. But in all honesty - how could such a thing be taken into account? Now we are smart, but then for such thoughts it was possible to follow the stage, and rightly so, counting on a disaster at the front within a week - this is alarmism.

And the second mistake - the headquarters of the fleet was waiting for landings, waiting for the attack of Leningrad, waiting for the new Moonsund-1917, but did not expect mine laying and air strikes, which is logical - if the Red Army were slowly retreating, snapping at every step, the Germans would simply be forced to operate with large surface ships, so then three mine-artillery positions came in handy, and the Germans just would not be useful to the massed laying of mines - this is a hindrance to their own forces. And the air threat - the Baltic Fleet had 302 fighters. The fact that the Red Army Air Force would be burned in the first week was also somehow not planned, there were enough forces to cover the bases and ships. They didn’t believe only in Libau, but the detachment of light forces was removed from there, the minelayer "Marty" was taken away, the mob-reserve was taken out ... But the defective ships and submarines, if the defense had lasted a couple of weeks, and had the Germans had no overwhelming air supremacy, would have also been taken out.

In the end it turned out how it happened:

“The minelayers received an order for the final preparation for hostilities on June 19, and on June 21 a prearranged signal came to conduct an active mine-barrage operation. The laying of mines began at 23:30 on June 21. "

The Germans did not show up for the war for which we were preparing, and there was nothing to understand the situation and effectively fend off the mine threat - our lag in communications and sweeping equipment was superimposed on the rapid development of the catastrophe and inadequate decisions of Moscow, however, also caused by quite understandable reasons - communication. The Center received information from the localities incomplete and late, often without even knowing where the whole armies were.

Defense



Was Tallinn necessary to defend? A rhetorical question - of course, it is necessary. Firstly, this is the main base of the fleet, secondly, it is part of the defense of Leningrad, and those Germans who were near Tallinn were not in the main direction, and thirdly, this is the connection with Moonsund, thereby, which interfered to the fullest extent use the Gulf of Riga to the enemy, and from which Berlin was bombed, fifthly - this is a potential threat to German communications. Was there enough strength and reserves for this? Not. The ground defense of the city began to be prepared only on July 17, and for obvious reasons they did not have time, for three weeks in total. Garrison - a combined hodgepodge of the remnants of the 10th rifle corps (10 thousand people without heavy weapons), an Estonian workers' regiment, detachments of sailors, in total about 20 thousand people and a whole company tanks... Ships became the mainstay of defense in such conditions - both as an air defense system and as the backbone of artillery.

It cannot be said that the situation was not understood: 15 tons of cargo were removed from the city, 000 wounded were evacuated, minefields and the enemy's coastal battery on Cape Yumindanin interfered with more. And they also interfered with the Luftwaffe, in the complete absence of long-range fighters from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. So the defense without a break in the main direction was doomed, but neither the front nor the fleet had the right not to defend themselves. All this was clear and was reported upstairs on August 18:

“The continued withdrawal of the 8th Army has already led to the loss of our coastal channel and threatens to further deteriorate the general situation in the operational zone of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The enemy, leaving the Finnish skerries at night, has the opportunity with impunity to barrage with mines the only remaining sea route for us, for the protection of which it is required to have at least 20 patrol ships. Of the twelve basic minesweepers available, some require serious repair, and there are not enough MO boats. While the enemy, having closed skerry fairways in the Gulf of Finland, may not fear losses due to mines, our losses should increase. "

The main message is that there will be no landings, there will be mines, many mines, a lot of mines, we have a shortage of minesweepers, it's time to withdraw a detachment of light forces (a cruiser, two leaders, nine destroyers) to Leningrad. There is no hope for the army either, Tallinn cannot be held back. And the longer we delay, the more we lose. The fleet did everything it could - 13 shells against the enemy is evidence of this, but the sailors could not replace the army. And the scale of losses during the evacuation of Tallinn was roughly clear:

"Of the 40 ships and vessels navigating between Kronstadt and Tallinn behind the trawls, fourteen (or 35%) were lost and damaged from mine explosions, as well as from the actions of enemy bomber aircraft."

But, in fact, there was no choice. I repeat - the war for which the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was preparing did not take place, and Tributs and his comrades did not know how to deal with constant mining with the loss of the coast and without air cover. He had two old battleships, two cruisers, a bunch of other ships, but there were not enough minesweepers, which is not bad, there were also no normal trawls, and experienced crews, and the ability to rely on the army. The fleet was like a boxer who received a sudden knockout with a concussion: it is unclear where the opponent is floating in front of his eyes, one thing is clear - this is not a sports duel, and all the learned rules and techniques can be forgotten.

Breakthrough



In general, there were different approaches regarding the evacuation of troops in World War II, and they depended on what was more important - ships or people. If the British could afford to put part of the fleet near Crete, they lay down, but England had few ground forces, similarly to Dunkirk - one fleet could not hold the German landings and sacrificed the fleet. But the Americans abandoned their own in the Philippines, and the British Dieppe training is also not an example. Odessa was taken away from us, but Sevastopol was abandoned, Tallinn was taken out, but first of all protecting the warships. It sounds, of course, extremely cynical, but - we had enough infantry, and an extra corps did not make the weather, but there were no ships needed for the defense of Leningrad. And there was no opportunity to build quickly, “the king has a lot” - this is not about us. From there are priorities and decisions. Moreover, these same "cruiser, two leaders, nine destroyers" could not help the slow-moving merchants. Could beautifully and stupidly sink to the bottom next to them. Would that really help? There were no safe fairways and no safe routes.

More precisely, we now know, but in those days Tributs did not have a myelophon, and he made decisions based on intelligence and common sense. And common sense said that the southern route had not been used for a long time, according to the logic the Germans intensively mined it, plus coastal batteries. You cannot go in a narrow fairway, in a snail's way, under fire from the shore - this is suicide. The central fairway - the Germans can get from the shore at the limit and without aiming, there are mines, but convoys between Tallinn and Leningrad went regularly - which means, in principle, you can pass. The northern route - along the coast of Finland under fire from stationary coastal batteries and through minefields, plus attacks by aircraft and torpedo boats. Suicide again. So ... Tributs chose everything correctly.

Yes, and the transition itself - apart from the obvehivaniye of the fairway, everything was done correctly. And the milestones would not have helped much in those conditions: too many ships, too many threats and panic, too inexperienced civilian crews.

And the rest is past the checkout, the result is as follows:

“A cruiser (100%), two leaders (100%), five destroyers out of ten (50%), six patrol ships out of nine (66%), nine submarines out of eleven (82%), two gunboats from three (66%), ten base minesweepers (100%), sixteen low-speed minesweepers out of eighteen (89%), three electromagnetic minesweepers (100%), twenty-six boat minesweepers (100%), thirteen torpedo boats out of fourteen (93%) , twenty three MO boats out of twenty five (92%), three net minelayers (100%) and 32 ships out of 75 (43%). At the same time, of the 27 people taken on board the ships and vessels, about 800 people died, including a little more than 11 civilians. "

The combat core of the fleet was saved and helped to defend Leningrad, almost half of the convoy passed, and in those conditions this was clearly not a defeat, it could have been much worse. Losses? Yes, the losses are great, but for that summer and in that war, a third of the personnel was not a defeat, it was almost a success. It's not even close to Tsushima: if Rozhestvensky had spent such a percentage of warships and transports, it would have been a victory. The rest is reflection and distortion stories for the sake of politics, when heroes are passed off as cowards, and the dead as victims of butcher commanders. Meanwhile, then everyone did their duty, and no one could have done better without knowing the future. Which, however, does not exclude mistakes, but show me the ideal ones.
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  1. Andre___86
    Andre___86 April 27 2021 18: 22
    +7
    Well written ...
    1. credo
      credo April 27 2021 18: 35
      +2
      [quote = Andre ___ 86] Well written ... [quote] [/ quote]
      But why is it necessary to compare like this, as the Author did.

      [Quote] It's not even close to Tsushima: if Rozhestvensky spent such a percentage of warships and transports, it would be a victory. [[/ quote]

      It was enough to state that the actions of the Baltic Fleet at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War turned out to be correct and heroic, without unnecessary comparison with the Russian-Japanese war of 1905.
      1. Artyom Karagodin
        Artyom Karagodin April 27 2021 18: 38
        +14
        Why not compare? This is, firstly, and secondly, many who believe that during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin and his marshals with admirals stupidly drove people and equipment to slaughter, are regularly compared. and yelling good obscenities about the bloody Soviet regime. Publication is an adequate response to these smart guys. Point by point, not hushing up anything, but trying as objectively as possible to assess what was happening in the Baltic at the beginning of the war. So Roman is great!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2021 18: 44
          +12
          Quote: Artyom Karagodin
          Why not compare?

          Because the author could not even describe these events correctly, what comparisons are there ...
          1. Artyom Karagodin
            Artyom Karagodin April 27 2021 18: 46
            +4
            Then, Andrey, we are waiting for your publication on this topic.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2021 20: 32
              +9
              Quote: Artyom Karagodin
              Then, Andrey, we are waiting for your publication on this topic.

              Maybe. But - very, very soon.
              The fact is that in order to understand the actions of our fleet in the Second World War, we must first write articles 5 about its pre-war development. This is ... let's say, a very difficult and painful topic, and so far my understanding has not yet "matured" to a good cycle.
              1. Artyom Karagodin
                Artyom Karagodin April 27 2021 21: 32
                +3
                It's a shame, but anyway - thanks for the comment. I'm not in the subject at all, that's why I thought that what was written, in general, was true. Now I know that it is not so. Already something laughing
                1. 971
                  971 April 28 2021 00: 36
                  -1
                  Quote: Artyom Karagodin
                  Now I know that it is not so. Already something

                  at the bottom of the link to Morozov
                2. tihonmarine
                  tihonmarine April 28 2021 08: 38
                  +5
                  Quote: Artyom Karagodin
                  I’m not in the subject at all, so I thought that what was written, in general, was true.

                  This topic is complex, a lot has been written about it, but eyewitnesses, even in the mid-60s, could not tell, everything they saw and what was in reality. During the Tallinn passage, one of my teachers, P. Sukach, was in the convoy with the rank of 3rd rank captain, but he also spoke only what was in the official version.
              2. tihonmarine
                tihonmarine April 28 2021 08: 31
                +3
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                This is ... let's say, a very difficult and painful topic, and so far my understanding has not yet "matured" to a good cycle.

                You have noticed correctly, but try to describe it as much as possible.
        2. credo
          credo April 27 2021 18: 51
          +3
          Quote: Artyom Karagodin
          Why not compare? This is, firstly, and secondly - many who believe that during the Great Patriotic War, Stalin and his marshals with admirals stupidly drove people and equipment to slaughter, are regularly compared. and screaming good obscenities about the bloody Soviet regime.

          Why compare the incomparable or without it it is impossible to describe well-known events.
        3. Sunstorm
          Sunstorm April 27 2021 19: 59
          +6
          1st from St. Petersburg to Tsushima .. Atlantic + Indian Ocean, from Talin to Leningrad ... a little closer?
          2nd in the Soviet years there was a mania to yell about Tsushima, "Bloody Sunday" and so on, what is the difference between the screams from the 90s about "Bloody Scoop"?
          3 of them The author himself gave an emphasis "saved the ships" (by the way, I do not condemn this decision)
      2. antivirus
        antivirus April 27 2021 19: 05
        +2
        from the heroes of bygone days ..................
        what we could - did
    2. 971
      971 April 27 2021 23: 49
      +4
      Quote: Andre___86
      Well written ...

      don't bullshit hurt her
      it's not even an opus, but "the next passions for Zinovy"
  2. Alexander Morozov
    Alexander Morozov April 27 2021 18: 24
    +6
    Miroslav Morozov had an interesting detailed analysis of the Tallinn passage on Taktik media channel.
  3. Macsen_wledig
    Macsen_wledig April 27 2021 18: 40
    +11
    It seems to me that the author recently reread Bunich's "Tragedy in the Baltic": some of the phrases are too familiar. :)
    As for books, A.V. Platonov - "Tragedies of the Gulf of Finland".
    1. Engineer
      Engineer April 27 2021 19: 00
      +8
      Nothing at all in common.
      Neither the message, nor the drama, nor the accents coincide.
      In Bunich's journalistic book, the throwing, tragedy and heroism of ordinary sailors are well conveyed.
      This is not here
      Bunich directly accused Tributs of choosing the best minesweepers for the warships, and then abandoning the convoys and leaving at full speed for Kronstadt. In fairness, Tributs's reasons were also given.
      Ivanov removes all responsibility from the Tributsa
      Bunich describes in a completely different way the problem of choosing a fairway, etc. etc.
      Threat Platonov's book in relation to victims does not coincide at all with the works of Zubkov. Zubkov dealt with the problem in a more systematic way and gives noticeably large numbers.
      1. Macsen_wledig
        Macsen_wledig April 27 2021 19: 08
        +2
        Quote: Engineer
        Neither the message, nor the drama, nor the accents coincide.

        I said "turnovers", not content ... :)
        1. Engineer
          Engineer April 27 2021 19: 18
          +5
          There are no turnovers of Bunich either.
          Bunich's book is a chronicle novel. And the turnovers there are quite literary. I read it more than 15 years ago, but I still remember the images of Lieutenant Aleksandrov from Kirov and Lieutenant Amelko with his favorite ship and Captain 3rd Rank Efet. And a complete description of the leaden waters of the Baltic and the animal horror of drowning people and the courage of those who kept their cool.
          Ivanov has no "turnovers" at all. No epithets, no comparisons, no images, no stylistic figures. ... except of course #netsushima
          It's nothing.
    2. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine April 28 2021 08: 49
      +3
      Quote: Macsen_Wledig
      It seems to me that the author recently reread Bunich's "Tragedy in the Baltic"

      It looks like you are right. Well, Bunich is good for literary reading, not for historical reading. He has a lot of inaccuracies.
  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 27 2021 18: 43
    +20
    I'm sorry, but analytical articles about the fleet are not written that way. There are a lot of emotions, but facts ...
    The Finnish Navy, together with the German fleet, mined the Finnish. A total of 777 German and 1261 Finnish naval mines, 796 German mine defenders were planted. What did the Baltic Fleet do to counter? Why were they delayed with the evacuation, reaching the time when it was no longer possible to provide air cover?
    Tributs had no myelophone, and he made decisions based on intelligence and common sense. And common sense said that the southern route had not been used for a long time, according to the logic the Germans intensively mined it, plus coastal batteries. You can not go in a narrow fairway, in a snail's way, under fire from the shore - this is suicide

    Only now he chose not Tributs, but Voroshilov. The sailors, including Rear Admiral Rall, objected. Well, they were not at odds with common sense, believing that they could suppress the enemy's artillery, shipboard.
    In general, everything was much, no, MUCH more complicated than it was written by the author. And the author, alas, has a black-and-white propaganda paper, which is extremely far from both analytics and the real events of 1941.
    1. Artyom Karagodin
      Artyom Karagodin April 27 2021 18: 48
      +1
      I repeat again: Andrey, we are waiting for a deep analysis and more facts from you! Until now, you have not been noticed in bias, so I think your description of events will be closer to the truth.
    2. Comrade
      Comrade April 27 2021 23: 31
      +3
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      so analytical articles about the fleet are not written. A lot of emotions, but facts

      How is it that there are no facts?
      Here is Roman Ivanov writes:
      in those days Tributs did not have a myelophon, and he made decisions based on intelligence and common sense.

      It follows from the phrase that today (in contrast to "those days"), the myelophon already really exists.
      laughing
      Not that I find fault, we are all not without sin, just jarring and illiterate style of this self-confident "author".
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2021 07: 29
        +6
        Quote: Comrade
        Not that I find fault, we are all not without sin, just jarring and illiterate style of this self-confident "author".

        Me too:) hi
    3. Unknown
      Unknown April 28 2021 06: 47
      +1
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Only now he chose not Tributs, but Voroshilov. The sailors, including Rear Admiral Rall, objected. Well, they were not at odds with common sense, believing that they could suppress the enemy's artillery, ship

      You can learn more about the choice of the route and how Voroshilov influenced his choice. It turns out that for all their troubles, the command of the Navy blames everyone except itself. Despite the controversial assessment of Tributs, for the current situation around Tallinn, he is just the least to blame. “There was a clear duality of command on a general fleet scale in connection with the creation in Leningrad of a second command center (at the headquarters of the North-Western direction) headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Comrade Isakov. the area closest to it (all the more, directly commanding the main base), this second center gave directives and orders not only to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but often directly to the command of the Kronstadt naval base, as well as the Naval Defense of Leningrad and the lake regions located As a result, the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet sometimes learned retroactively about the activities on its far right flank and in the rear, which, in turn, created ambiguity and made unnecessary nervousness in the work. governing authorities, there will be no sense.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2021 07: 28
        +3
        Quote: Unknown
        You can learn more about the choice of the route and how Voroshilov influenced his choice.

        Everything is very simple - from July 14, 1941, Voroshilov commanded the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, i.e. Voroshilov was the immediate superior of Tributs
        1. Unknown
          Unknown April 28 2021 12: 51
          +3
          Tributsa [/ quote]
          [quote = Andrey from Chelyabinsk] It's very simple - since July 14, 1941, Voroshilov commanded the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, that is, Voroshilov was the immediate superior of Tributs [/ quote]

          Not so simple. KBVF was in operational subordination to the command of the north-western direction. N.G. was responsible for the fleet itself. Kuznetsov, as People's Commissar, Naval Headquarters I.A. Isakov and directly Tributs V.F, with the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Rear Admiral Panteleev. After the Second World War and the death of I.V. Stalin, all the listed admirals, all their blunders of the summer of 41 began to unanimously blame the command of the North-West Fleet, in particular, Voroshilov. But at the same time they sometimes let it slip ... Already in early July, the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet began to show concern for its rear, especially in the southern direction. The fleet commander reported [75] to me that telegraph and telephone communications with the ground forces had been disrupted. Air reconnaissance reported that enemy tanks were moving in two columns, one towards Pskov, the other towards Valk, that is, towards Tallinn. From the subsequent reports of the Military Council of the Fleet, one could conclude that the situation for the commander-in-chief of the North-West direction K. E. Voroshilov was also not clear, because he ordered the command of the Baltic Fleet: "Contact Pskov by plane, set up an ambush of land units south of Tallinn. I will inform you of the reconnaissance of the surplus ships to the east. I will inform you about the situation ... Let's leave the movement of the column of tanks to Tallinn on the conscience of the reconnaissance. But it was clearly ordered to remove the extra ships from the Tallinn base. Let's see what the leadership of the Navy is doing. situation in the Baltic theater, including the defense of Vyborg, made a proposal to transfer the FKP to the area of ​​the Luga Bay. But the People's Commissar has his own views ... About how to treat the proposal of the Military Council, we talked more than once with the deputy chief of the General Staff School V.A. Alafuzov and invariably came to the conclusion that if the Military Council left Tallinn, it could lead to a premature and indiscriminate evacuation. In the current situation, only the Military Council with the headquarters of the fleet could organize and lead the defense of the city and the base. After all, Tallinn was not only the main base, but also the capital of the Estonian SSR. In July 41, Voroshilov had other concerns, the Germans were rapidly moving to Leningrad by the shortest route in mobile units, leaving Estonia aside. He left naval affairs to the leadership of the Navy. After failures at sea with the cruiser Maxim Gorky, and an unclear mine situation, keeping large ships in Tallinn was inappropriate. The question is, why were they kept? With the beginning of the war, the old LKs were quickly overtaken to Kronstadt, and the new cruisers were kept for some reason. To support ground forces with artillery fire was not an expensive pleasure for this purpose. Kuznetsov's assertion about panic is not convincing, there was panic afterwards. Such memories are also interesting ....... As far as I remember, this issue was not specifically discussed at the Headquarters, however, reporting in mid-July the situation in the Tallinn area, I reported on the proposal of the KBF Military Council to transfer its FKP to Luga Bay and on the decision of the High Command In the northwest direction, leave the Military Council in Tallinn.

          “Tallinn must be defended with all our might,” JV Stalin remarked, and I understood his words as an approval of our decision. There are already links to Comrade. Stalin. So why were the ships kept in Tallinn? When you read the memoirs of military leaders, the known immediately comes to mind, they wanted the best, it turned out as always ... At the Military Council they argued for a long time, to the point of hoarseness, they considered the ranges of aviation from the nearest airfields and the firing range of German guns. It seemed that everything was taken into account and thought out. But no one knew how it would actually turn out. The old honored Rear Admiral Yuri Fedorovich Rall protested against the stupid decision, showing on the map that there was absolutely not enough strength for such a huge caravan to clear the minefields of such a high density of the obstacle. “The ships will be forced to go at low speed after slow minesweepers under the attacks of aviation. But to go straight along the coastline occupied by the Germans by the South Fairway is a straightforward reason. There are no mines there, and any coastal battery or many batteries will inevitably be destroyed by the fire of naval guns. " Panteleev was inclined to support Rall, but he was interrupted by a question from PMC Smirnov:
          - Do you have data from German intelligence?
          - Not. I only have a summary of the situation on the Northwest Front. The Germans bypassed Tallinn and are now trying to cover the Luga line. They need powerful weapons there, not here.
          - Doubtful, - said Smirnov and stared at Tributs.
          The fleet commander felt insecure. The People's Commissar of the Navy and the General Staff did not give specific recommendations. At stake were: the fleet, people and their own skin. “If the fleet is saved, the skin will be safe. People don't count. There is no war without losses, ”he obviously thought, making a decision. In this he never admits to anyone ... This is how the decision was made.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA April 28 2021 14: 46
            +2
            Quote: Unknown
            Not so simple. KBVF was in operational subordination to the command of the north-western direction.

            Only from 27.06.1941/14.07.1941/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
            On July 14, 1941, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from operational subordination to the Military Council of the Northern Front moved to direct subordination to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North-Western direction.
            So Marshal Voroshilov commanded the KBF. The southern fairway was closed on 12 August 1941 by order of the Military Council of the SZN. And the evacuation of Tallinn went on within the timeframe specified by Kliment Efremovich.
            Quote: Unknown
            The old honored Rear Admiral Yuri Fedorovich Rall protested against the stupid decision, showing on the map that there was absolutely not enough strength for such a huge caravan to clear the minefields of such a high density of the barrier. “The ships will be forced to go at low speed after slow minesweepers under the attacks of aviation. But to go straight along the coastline occupied by the Germans by the South Fairway is a straightforward reason. There are no mines there, and any coastal battery or many batteries will inevitably be destroyed by the fire of naval guns. "

            If you follow the Southern Fairway, then the KBF must pass the I-29 MZ and minefields behind Loksa.
            In addition, it is interesting how Rall planned to cover a column of 75 transports with available forces, trudging along the coast along the fairway at 8-10 knots? Especially taking into account the results shown by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the SFV on the "destruction of batteries" - the same shelling of Bjorke's batteries. In addition, it is possible to work even with howitzers on a slow-moving and maneuvering convoy of the TR. And since the time of the Dardanelles, they have been practically unaffected by ships.
            1. Unknown
              Unknown April 28 2021 18: 21
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              On July 14, 1941, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from operational subordination to the Military Council of the Northern Front passed into direct subordination to the commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction.
              So Marshal Voroshilov commanded the KBF.

              K.E. Voroshilov had miscalculations and mistakes, no one is immune from them, but you shouldn't make him look like a complete idiot, he doesn't deserve this. by the fleet of Vice Admiral V.F. Tributsa, having subordinated the troops of the 14th Rifle Corps to him. Decisions on the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were made only by the naval leadership. Kuznetsov and Isakov distanced themselves from the decision, placing everything on Tributs. The question is, why did they keep the ships, and not only the military, in Tallinn for so long? If in July they followed Voroshilov's instructions and began to unload the Tallinn roadstead from the accumulated ships, the crossing itself would not have taken place. Then Kuznetsov will dodge and shift the responsibility to others ..... I reported to the Headquarters about the critical situation in Tallinn, asked for permission to evacuate the main base of the Baltic Fleet. The high command of the North-West direction was supposed to report this and ask for sanctions. But for some reason it hesitated, and it was impossible to wait longer ... He washes his hands completely, report my affairs and then the Headquarters knows better. But he was the commander of the Navy and Tributs obeyed him.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA April 28 2021 18: 39
                +1
                Quote: Unknown
                Decisions on the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were made only by the naval leadership.

                Not. Let's analyze the situation using the example of the closure of the southern route.
                On August 10, the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet submitted to the Military Council proposals for changing the organization of communication between Tallinn and Kronstadt (in connection with the Germans reaching the coast at Loksa), which were approved by him on the same day.
                On the same day, the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in response to a request from the deputy commander-in-chief of the SZN troops for the naval unit, received the day before, reported to him on the measures taken to organize communication between Tallinn and Kronstadt.
                On August 11.08, the deputy commander-in-chief of the SZN troops for the naval unit reported to the commander-in-chief of the SZN troops on this issue.
                On the same day, the Military Council of the SZN sent a directive to the Military Council of the KBF.
                To carry out the tasks assigned to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in conditions when enemy units reached the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, maintaining the sea communication between Tallinn and Kronstadt is the central task.
                I order:
                To find and equip a new fairway from Tallinn to the 28 ° meridian outside the shelling from the southern coast. The fairway through the Roadsher shall be like a second.

                That is, all gestures of the headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Military Council of the Fleet passed through the Military Council of the SZN and demanded approval by the commander-in-chief of the SZN.
                Quote: Unknown
                Kuznetsov and Isakov distanced themselves from the decision, placing everything on Tributs.

                It's not about distancing. The KBF simply did not obey them - all decisions were endorsed by Voroshilov.
                Quote: Unknown
                He washes his hands completely, report my business and then the Headquarters knows better. But he was the commander of the Navy and Tributs obeyed him.

                Nope. KBF from July 14 was subordinate to Voroshilov. For the NK of the Navy there were supplies and so on.
                Likewise, the GABTU gritted its teeth as the infantry commanders ruined tank formations - but could do nothing but write reports upstairs about the need to stop misuse as soon as possible.
                1. Unknown
                  Unknown April 28 2021 20: 01
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  On August 10, the Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet submitted to the Military Council proposals for changing the organization of communication between Tallinn and Kronstadt (in connection with the Germans reaching the coast at Loksa), which were approved by him on the same day.

                  There is no need to advocate for the leadership of the Navy. Army commanders will not indicate which route the ships should take. In their right mind, no one will pull out the helm of the captain in a storm and tell which course to take. To fulfill the tasks assigned to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in conditions when enemy units reached the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, maintaining the sea communication between Tallinn and Kronstadt is the central task.
                  To find and equip a new fairway from Tallinn to the 28 ° meridian outside the shelling from the southern coast. Have a fairway through the Roadsher as a second ”[doc. No. 308].
                  Thus, it was not the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet that followed the order of the Military Council of the NWF to close the coastal fairway, but the Military Council of the NWF agreed with the decision of the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to close it.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  It's not about distancing. KBF simply did not obey them - all decisions were endorsed by Voroshilov

                  How did it not obey? On August 13, the Military Council of the Fleet appealed to the Headquarters with a proposal to transfer 20 thousand soldiers from Hanko to defend Tallinn. But on August 14, a directive was received from the People's Commissar of the Navy, demanding to remain in Tallinn and defend with the available forces. It was the People's Commissar, and they would try not to obey.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  Nope. KBF from July 14 was subordinate to Voroshilov. For the NK of the Navy there were supplies and so on.

                  Submitting and commanding are two different things. The naval command reluctantly obeyed the army command, could always refer to the People's Commissar of the Navy, and he always took the side of the navy.
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2021 14: 46
            +4
            Quote: Unknown
            This is how the decision was made.

            Sorry, but if you completely trust the "Tragedy of the Baltic Fleet", written by the children of the deceased during the Tallinn passage, who were not present at these meetings, and took information from journalism (see the list of used literature) then ... this is your right. Don't just pass it off as the ultimate truth.
            1. Unknown
              Unknown April 28 2021 18: 30
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Sorry, but if you completely trust the "Tragedy of the Baltic Fleet", written by the children of the deceased during the Tallinn passage, who were not present at these meetings, and took information from journalism (see the list of used literature) then ... this is your right. Don't just pass it off as the ultimate truth.

              Of course, you cannot completely trust what you have written. I took the information mainly from Kuznetsov's book "On the Course to Victory". But other information also needs to be analyzed.
    4. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine April 28 2021 09: 00
      +1
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      In general, everything was much, no, MUCH more complicated than it was written by the author.

      And why did Tributs stop the convoy near the island of Gogland for the night, and at dawn the German bombers staged a meat grinder. Tributs motivates that he was afraid of minefields for the night crossing.
      And there was another fairway, which was not used, in the area from Kund, leaving Ust Luga on the right and the exit already beyond Gogland. There was no mining there, and there were only 75 mm along the Estonian coast. army guns, aviation, the Germans used from Finnish airfields.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk April 28 2021 09: 34
        +2
        Quote: tihonmarine
        And why did Tributs stop the convoy near the island of Gogland for the night

        I say - everything is MUCH more complicated than it is written in the article.
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA April 28 2021 15: 25
        +2
        Quote: tihonmarine
        And why did Tributs stop the convoy near the island of Gogland for the night, and at dawn the German bombers staged a meat grinder.

        Because there was no nail in the forge. ©
        In the case of the Tallinn crossing, this nail turned out to be trawling milestones, which they forgot to load on minesweepers. And without them, each convoy crossed the minefield on its own course.
        It was precisely the order of movement "on the same course" that was outlined by the fleet transition plan. However, this plan did not provide for any navigation support. Consequently, the possibility of making the transition on the same course was made dependent on the accuracy of reckoning on ships and vessels, on the observance of alignment in the formation of the wake column. But all this, when crossing a dense minefield, could become a reality only with the use of floating landmarks.
        We have already "stumbled" more than once about these unfortunate trawling milestones. Have they forgotten about them again? The most annoying thing is that it is not. It was with the proposal to line the swept strip at about 11 o'clock on 28 August that the flagship miner of the Ministry of Defense arrived on the destroyer "Kalinin" to his direct superior. The commander of the Mine Defense, who is also the commander of the rearguard, did not object (!) To the setting of trawling milestones, but what a surprise - they were not on the minesweepers. And this despite the fact that in addition to several hundred ordinary ones, there were fifty more luminous trawling milestones in the warehouse! They were specially manufactured at the initiative of the flagship miner of the Ministry of Defense to ensure safe night escort behind the trawls. But all this wealth, invaluable for those conditions, was loaded from the coastal warehouse onto one of the transports. And how many lives these milestones would have saved!

        ... the trawling milestones until dark would serve as landmarks for escorting the II and III convoys behind the trawls, therefore, there would not be a long delay caused by the deliberate deviation of the minesweepers of the II convoy from the axis of the fairway, and the vessels of the II convoy would not crowd in minefield. Convoy III, provided that it was sent after the 10st convoy, could go at least 12-XNUMX miles further east. Ships and vessels of the IV convoy could also be guided by a line of trawling milestones that enclosed the edge of the trawl strip. By using a previously thought out system of placing boats (MO, KM, KLT) near the set trawling milestones with signals from them, for example, a green ratier, it was possible to try to ensure the night passage of II, III and IV convoys through the eastern part of the Yumindan minefield. Surely, this would not have done without single losses on mines, but they certainly did not have such a massive character.

        Moreover, the headquarters of the fleet did not have to invent anything - all of the above had been formalized for a year already as a valid manual.
        All of the above - the rarefaction of minefields by boats, ensuring the safety of minesweepers by placing boats with boat trawls in front of them, wrapping around the edges of the trawl strip, using guard ships and other floating landmarks - was provided for by the current statutory document NTShch-40. None of these activities were carried out.
        © Platonov
  5. Doctor
    Doctor April 27 2021 18: 59
    0
    Where did the fleet go wrong?

    Here.
    I repeat - the war for which the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was preparing did not take place, and Tributs and his comrades did not know how to deal with constant mining with the loss of the coast and without air cover. He had two old battleships, two cruisers, a bunch of other ships, but there were not enough minesweepers, which is not bad, there were also no normal trawls, and experienced crews, and the ability to rely on the army.

    Incorrect composition. They drove an ocean fleet into a large lake.
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig April 27 2021 19: 13
      +4
      Quote: Arzt
      They drove an ocean fleet into a large lake.

      Ocean?
      You have bent it a lot.
      For comparison, see the composition of the British Home Fleet or the Cunningham compound at Matapan.
      1. Doctor
        Doctor April 27 2021 20: 15
        +2
        Ocean?
        You have bent it a lot.
        For comparison, see the composition of the British Home Fleet or the Cunningham compound at Matapan.

        Oceanic in the sense of proportions. Give our fleet Cunningham and they would also leave it in the Baltic.
    2. moody
      moody April 28 2021 00: 15
      0
      Organization, communication, information exchange. Suffice it to recall the events with the first release of the OLS. The price of information not received in time: the death of Wrathful, the detonation of the Proud and Guardian, the torn off nose of M. Gorky.
  6. Shishkov
    Shishkov April 27 2021 19: 01
    +3
    But why is it necessary to compare like this, as the Author did. - It seems to me that the author is rather comparing the assessments of Rozhestvensky's actions and assessments of Tributs's actions, and not the actual actions themselves. Actually, the article is not about the actions of the fleet as such, but about their overly critical assessments. Although I agree, the accents could be placed a little differently
    1. 971
      971 April 27 2021 23: 47
      +1
      Quote: Shishkov
      it seems to me that the author is rather comparing the assessments of Rozhdestvensky's actions and assessments of Tributs's actions,

      exactly
      his spanking for "passion for Xenovius" wassat "in the trunk", will be soon
      with full smearing the author of this opus
      thin layer
      angry
  7. smaug78
    smaug78 April 27 2021 19: 46
    +7
    another delirium and the feeling that for money ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
  8. sevtrash
    sevtrash April 27 2021 21: 08
    0
    Quite a normal article, short and angry. According to the percentage of losses given by the author, the result of the transition is really not very catastrophic. Although the lost 62 ships and vessels out of 225 and 10 people are by no means small, it is not for nothing that the Tallinn crossing is called the Tallinn tragedy.
    And yet - the author is right - depending on what to compare. In 1941, the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army amounted to more than 3 million people, 8 aircraft, and tanks - 000. And the author highlighted the situation around.
    It is, of course, good to reason while sitting on the couch. You can also be smart. And then they fought with the most advanced military machine in the world, and their own army was very far from perfect.
    1. 971
      971 April 27 2021 23: 45
      +2
      Quote: sevtrash
      Quite a normal article, short and angry. According to the percentage of losses given by the author, the result of the transition is indeed not very catastrophic.

      You "modestly did not notice" with what insignificant forces the enemy inflicted such losses on us
      I emphasize - The biggest in the entire history of our fleet
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash April 28 2021 07: 58
        0
        Quote: 971
        You "modestly did not notice" with what insignificant forces the enemy inflicted such losses on us
        I emphasize - the largest in the history of our fleet

        You modestly did not notice what was written - depending on what you compare. The main reasons for the death of ships and vessels are aircraft and mines. Is it news for you - the total superiority of German aviation in the skies over the ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet? The Germans created a separate command (Ostsee) and allocated separate forces for this operation. Have you heard anything about the qualitative and quantitative shortage of minesweepers in the Baltic Fleet?
        1. 971
          971 April 28 2021 09: 18
          0
          Quote: sevtrash
          The main reasons for the death of ships and vessels are aircraft and mines. Is it news for you - the total superiority of German aviation in the skies over the ships and vessels of the Baltic Fleet?

          get off the armored car
          Morozov on this matter was exhaustively shown
          not to mention the statistics of losses - due to the poor level of training in naval targets, the Germans then drowned there only unguarded tonnage
          and the fleet (personally Panteleev) abandoned de facto transport
          1. sevtrash
            sevtrash April 28 2021 09: 34
            0
            Quote: 971
            get off the armored car

            Go down from Olympus)))
            Quote: 971
            due to the weak level of training for naval targets, the Germans then drowned only unguarded tonnage there

            And what do you think it means? That, as you said, the Germans fought with "insignificant forces"?
            1. 971
              971 April 28 2021 09: 36
              -1
              Quote: sevtrash
              And what do you think it means?

              it means that all opportunities for a breakthrough from Tallinn with the lowest losses at the BF were
              и the key reason for the disaster that happened is the complete disorganization of the work of the BF headquarters by its chief Panteleev
              1. sevtrash
                sevtrash April 28 2021 10: 01
                -1
                Quote: 971
                this means that the BF had all the opportunities for a breakthrough from Tallinn with the lowest losses

                This means that having said that the Germans acted "insignificant forces" - you were wrong))) The Germans and the Finns deployed 36 minefields with more than 2000 mines, more than 100 aircraft of a special group with a special command. And we got the result, once again - most of the losses - mines and aircraft.
                The fact that the Germans have worked better is understandable and clear from a long time ago. It is naive to believe that it was possible to achieve radically different results at the time of the start of the transition when choosing a different path or a radically different organization. Maybe it was possible to do something better, so that radically - no. For this, the fleet, army, and aviation had to go through a series of their mistakes, through battles, through the experience of victories and defeats.
                1. 971
                  971 April 28 2021 10: 53
                  -4
                  Quote: sevtrash
                  more than 100 aircraft of a special group with a special command

                  please continue
                  look forward to the "Historical Revelations" from YOUR training manuals wassat
                  1. sevtrash
                    sevtrash April 28 2021 11: 39
                    -1
                    Quote: 971
                    please continue
                    We look forward to "Historical Revelations" from YOUR training manual

                    Why wait? Read widely (very widely) available sources))). And, unlike you, they write there without errors))

                    .... According to the Barbarossa plan, the 1st Luftwaffe Air Fleet operated in the Leningrad direction with the 5st Air Corps attached to it [6]. From these forces, a separate command "Ostsee" was formed (commander - Oberst Wolfgang von Wild), the main task was to act against Soviet shipping in the Baltic. By the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, the command consisted of [1] [approx. one]:
                    806th Maritime Bomber Group Küstenfliegergruppe 806 (KGr.806), Ju-88A; com. - Oberst Lieutenant Hans Emig [approx. 2].
                    1st Squadron of the Combat Training Group of the 54th Fighter Squadron Grunhertz (Erg.Gr./JG54); Bf-109E; Chief Lieutenant Eggers.
                    125th Naval Reconnaissance Group (Aufkl.Gr. 125); seaplanes Non-114, Non-60 and Ag-95A; Oberst Lieutenant Gerhard Kolbe.
                    9th Naval Search and Rescue Squadron (9.Seenot-staffel); Do-23 and Non-59B.
                    In August-October 1941, KGr.806 was based in Riga [7]. It was the forces of the "Ostsee" command that inflicted the main damage on the ships that were crossing Tallinn-Leningrad ...

                    ... The command of the Luftwaffe practiced the formation of specialized bomber and assault units to solve certain tasks: operations at sea, support for ground forces, strategic reconnaissance, etc.
                    1. 971
                      971 April 28 2021 11: 41
                      -2
                      Quote: sevtrash
                      806th Maritime Bomber Group Küstenfliegergruppe 806 (KGr.806), Ju-88A; com. - Oberst Lieutenant Hans Emig

                      fool
                      and where YOU are there YOURS wassat 100 strike aircraft counted?!?!?!
                      even if with "messers"
                      1. sevtrash
                        sevtrash April 28 2021 12: 09
                        0
                        Quote: 971
                        and where are YOU there YOUR 100 strike aircraft counted?!?!?!

                        Dear, how much can you blunt?)) Are you able to find something yourself or are you used to doing everything for you? wassat
                        ... 110 German and 10 Finnish aircraft were hastily deployed at the airfields for operations on the ships of the Baltic Fleet (KBF) ...
                      2. 971
                        971 April 28 2021 12: 12
                        -4
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        ... 110 German and 10 Finnish aircraft were hastily deployed at the airfields for operations on the ships of the Baltic Fleet (KBF) ...

                        bunny, jump off the armored car
                        so how many Junkers were there? eh?
                      3. sevtrash
                        sevtrash April 28 2021 12: 15
                        -1
                        Quote: 971
                        so how many Junkers were there? eh?

                        So count it yourself)) If you are not used to communicating politely negative
                      4. 971
                        971 April 28 2021 12: 16
                        -3
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        Count it yourself))

                        Yes I link actually brought
                        below
                        but what wassat in your training manual wassat written - we are waiting
                      5. sevtrash
                        sevtrash April 28 2021 12: 32
                        0
                        Quote: 971
                        yes, I gave the link actually
                        below

                        And I gave the data above. Actually
                        Quote: 971
                        but what is written in your training manual - we are waiting

                        And why in the plural? Megalomania? fool
                      6. 971
                        971 April 28 2021 12: 47
                        -3
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        And I gave the data above. Actually

                        for those who have a delay line for a couple of hours, once again - HOW MANY JUNKERS HAVE BEEN?!?!?
                      7. sevtrash
                        sevtrash April 28 2021 18: 17
                        0
                        Quote: 971
                        for those who have a delay line for a couple of hours

                        Look for a delay in yourself)) I do not work for you and do not obey you, take a deep breath and relax
                      8. 971
                        971 April 28 2021 18: 21
                        -2
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        I do not work for you

                        weep for this happy event with joyful tears
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        I do not obey you,

                        a fortiori
                        for it would end with something like

                        Quote: sevtrash
                        deeper and relax

                        YOU don’t twist the sirloin
                        YOU were asked a very simple question - HOW MANY JUNKERS WERE (88)?!?!?
                        the answer to which, by the way, is - in my links
                      9. sevtrash
                        sevtrash April 28 2021 18: 31
                        0
                        Quote: 971
                        for it would end with something like

                        Blessed is he who believes))
                        Quote: 971
                        YOU were asked a very simple question

                        Didn't you confuse me with anyone? To demand an answer?
                        Quote: 971
                        the answer to which, by the way, is - in my links

                        You see how good it is - you asked yourself - you answered yourself. Self service, however. So stay on self-service. Why be so nervous))
                      10. 971
                        971 April 28 2021 18: 38
                        -1
                        Quote: sevtrash
                        See how good it is - you asked yourself

                        I see ... Monsieur Sevtrash prefers

                        but how dySal ... how dySal ... lol
                    2. sevtrash
                      sevtrash April 28 2021 18: 46
                      0
                      Quote: 971
                      ... cry ...

                      I am forced to leave your highly educated and noblest society, I cannot stay for so long in anticipation and delays of your answers. I just sob from the inability to listen / read your immensely profound and subtle remarks. Such an abyss of mind, such intelligent thoughts ... I move away ...
                      But, I will return, of course. From someone else, how not from you to pick up the immense pleasure of communication laughing
  • tihonmarine
    tihonmarine April 28 2021 16: 02
    +1
    Quote: 971
    You "modestly did not notice" with what insignificant forces the enemy inflicted such losses on us

    The Germans had the "old school" and senior officers with WWI experience, and most importantly, with the most competent staff. Operations were developed to the smallest detail, taking into account the previous battles of WWII. The main work was done by the Luftwaffe, and then by the Kriegsmarine.
  • nnm
    nnm April 27 2021 21: 18
    +3
    As for me, the tragedy when 83,6% of the servicemen involved in the operation were killed in the Battle of Smolensk, and that one with signs of optimism

    These are not just signs of optimism, this was the first significant step towards victory. For it was near Smolensk that the blitzkrieg ended with the publication by the Germans of 33,34 directives on the transition to flank attacks.
    Smolensk was given to us at an insanely high price, but those who passed it - commanders, soldiers - took the first serious step towards Berlin.
    I'm not ready to talk about 83.6% of losses, I could not find these figures in any reliable source. But yes, the loss ratio was appalling.
  • 971
    971 April 27 2021 23: 43
    +2
    just an enchanting opus angry
    before there were "passions for Zinovy", now - for the carcass of Mr. Panteleev (which relatives would better attach to the cinema)
    a bit of reality:



    и

    https://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=161&p=33#p1410965
  • Comrade
    Comrade April 28 2021 00: 38
    +3
    The combat core of the fleet has been saved. It's not even close to Tsushima: if Rozhestvensky had spent such a percentage of warships and transports, it would have been a victory.
    A cruiser (100%), two leaders (100%), five destroyers out of ten (50%) reached Kronstadt


    It is incorrect to compare the Baltic warships that forced the minefields with the warships of Admiral Rozhestvensky, who fought with the warships of Admiral Togo.
    A question to the author - what percentage of these ships would have reached Kronstadt if there were no minefields, but our warships would have been blocked by German surface and submarine ships? For example, the heavy cruisers "Admiral Hipper" and "Prinz Eugen", reinforced by two dozen submarines, whose commanders had almost two years of war behind them.

    Roman, is it like asking who is stronger, an elephant or a whale? In our case, it sounds like this - which is more effective, German-Finnish minefields or Japanese battleships?
    You, dear colleague, are comparing incomparable things.
  • Private SA
    Private SA April 28 2021 04: 10
    +1
    Here the author of an article about 18000 evacuated wounded noted.
    And on the "Vironia" their 800 wounded, did not go under the water?
    A cruiser with 300 people to suppress batteries on Yuminda-nina
    Tributsu was weak to send? And the battleship behind it? I suppose "Marat" would
    Rudel was not submerged from the air.
    Read by N. Kuznetsov. "There is a combat alert in the fleets."
    And the death of "Armenia" on the Black Sea? This is for October.
    Undermining "Britannic" on a mine in the 1st world is resting.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 28 2021 15: 49
      0
      Quote: Private SA
      A cruiser with 300 people to suppress batteries on Yuminda-nina
      Tributsu was weak to send?

      They have already sent them once - to the SFV. Thanks to the Finns - they did not allow the cruiser to blow up in a minefield.
      And about the suppression of batteries - see Platonov.
      Now about the effectiveness of the cruiser firing at the enemy's battery. For a short-term suppression of a standard field battery, at least 150 180-mm projectiles are required. But this is subject to knowledge of its location with an accuracy of 10 m and all other ideal conditions! Nobody knew where the battery actually was. Under these conditions, all the talk about the fact that the Kirov silenced the coastal battery is just idle fiction: the cruiser's shell could fly into the enemy's firing position only by accident. And the German artillery stopped firing, most likely because they simply did not see their bursts, which was undoubtedly facilitated by the installed smoke screens. In general, the German coastal artillery could really become a real threat only when following the southern route.

      By the way. the crew of the "Kirov" is almost 700 people.
      Quote: Private SA
      And behind him is the battleship?

      To scatter another 12 "shells through the forest? Thank you, a couple of LKs have been doing this for the entire SPV - without any success.
      Quote: Private SA
      Probably "Marat" would not be sunk to Rudel from the air.

      And what does Rudel have to do with it? Where do you find the minesweepers for this exit? At the coast - where there are no mines - too shallow for the LK. And where he can work normally, there are mines. Do you want to add the old LC to the Noviks that have gone to the bottom - halving the 12 "/ 52 of Kronstadt at once?
  • Private SA
    Private SA April 28 2021 08: 02
    -1
    Quote: Arzt
    Give our fleet Cunningham and they would also leave it in the Baltic.

    Give them H and Admiral Somerville's compound. But he would have been instantly shot in
    NKVD. Like Rychagova, Stern, etc. As Kuznetsov, Haller and others were later imprisoned.
    Here Tributs did not twitch, then sending submarines to mine-netting.
  • CastroRuiz
    CastroRuiz April 28 2021 09: 25
    0
    The article and the author are minus.
    Mixed horses with lyudmi and presents defeat as victory.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov April 28 2021 09: 44
    +1
    And the second mistake - the headquarters of the fleet was waiting for the landing, waiting for the attack of Leningrad, waiting for the new Moonsund-1917

    This is not a mistake of the Soviet command, but of the German one. Having a great superiority in surface ships and landing craft will not use them on the main front during the decisive period of the war - this is one of the major mistakes of the German command. You should never proceed in your plans from the fact that the enemy will make a mistake. So the KBF prepared correctly and expected the landing and attack of Leningrad from the sea.
    but did not expect mine laying, which is logical ... the Germans would not have needed a massive laying of mines - this is a hindrance to their own forces.

    Of course, the Germans prevented themselves on the basis of the wrong premise that the offensive on land should not be reinforced from the sea.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer April 28 2021 12: 25
      +5
      The Germans did everything right.
      They did not send a fleet to the Gulf of Finland according to the experience of the First World War, when Bayern almost died on a mine out of the blue. Therefore, the Germans were preparing only to prevent internment in Sweden, and not to climb into the Marquis's puddle.
      At the time of the transition, two battleships were already in Kronstadt and they could not be reached by surface ships in any case. And these are the main forces of the KBF.
      A fairly strong fleet was driven into Leningrad and locked up there until the end of the war, without attracting valuable surface ships of which there were not so many left after Norway.

      The massacre in the Tallinn passage was staged by several converted mines and one group of Ju-88s (the rest of the aircraft provided reconnaissance and cover), that is, they did not even have to distract from the support of the ground forces
  • Private SA
    Private SA April 28 2021 13: 55
    0
    Quote: Kostadinov
    So the KBF prepared correctly and expected the landing.

    Germans . as if they were waiting for the capture of Leningrad by von Leeb's troops.
    Krondstat and ships. By the way, the Germans took the Moonzund Archipelago.
    And the only time they took a real squadron to the Baltic Sea
    on the assumptions that the Soviet Baltic Fleet will rush out of
    Kronstadt to Sweden to intern. Auxiliary forces in the Baltic
    enough to isolate the Baltic Fleet. Finnish battleships
    coastal defense "Ilmarinen" (sunk by a raid by a pair of regiments
    bomber aviation).
    This is us later, in 1945, "Schlesien" torpedoed (according to the pilots
    KBF), and even then he ran aground.
  • ivan2022
    ivan2022 April 28 2021 15: 25
    0
    Instructive. "The broad masses", which 30 years ago shamefully squandered ... and betrayed everything that is possible and impossible ( including the results of the Second World War!) and since then have regularly confirmed "their loyalty to the choice they made," they argue in detail and "analyze" what was wrong and "not optimal" in the war won by their ancestors three quarters of a century ago ...
    If the ancestors rose from their graves, what would they say? They would say that giving birth to such offspring was "not optimal." It's pointless.
    1. Wertgan
      Wertgan April 28 2021 21: 19
      0
      The most adequate comment)
  • g1v2
    g1v2 April 28 2021 15: 56
    +2
    Helsinki is directly opposite Tallinn. It is the main industrial center of Finland. If at the very beginning of the battalion, our large ships began to bombard it, they could draw on themselves significant forces of enemy aviation and interfere with the actions of the enemy fleet. The enemy at sea was not great forces. And the then aviation to cope with large surface ships was extremely difficult. Or maybe the destruction of industrial and other infrastructure would force the Finns to even withdraw from the war, or at least reduce their opportunities. Destruction of Finland's ports would have narrowed the Germans' ability to supply the ally with equipment and resources. And at this time it would be possible to begin the evacuation of what could be from Estonia. Further, Tallinn had to be defended as much as possible. This again fettered the enemy's forces and gave them time. Of course, large warships helped in the blockade of Leningrad, but coastal batteries would be much cheaper and just as effective. An example is Sevastopol. The ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks did not fulfill their purpose. And this is a good lesson for us for the future in this theater of military operations.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 28 2021 18: 21
      0
      Quote: g1v2
      Helsinki is directly opposite Tallinn. It is the main industrial center of Finland. If at the very beginning of the battalion, our large ships began to bombard it, they could draw on themselves significant forces of enemy aviation and interfere with the actions of the enemy fleet.

      And what about our large ships with free maneuvering zones under 12 "/ 52 fire?
      These are 12 "/ 52:

      Helsingfors was the main base of the Empire's BF. And he went to the Finns with all the coastal defense.
      The 1st Coastal Artillery Regiment under the command of Colonel V. Marjanen (headquarters in Suomenlinna) consisted of two artillery divisions, whose headquarters were located on the islands of Miessari and Izosaari. The regiment covered the most strategically important area of ​​Helsinki, where the main base of the Finnish fleet was located. The regiment had 15 artillery batteries (152-, 254- and 305-mm guns) located on the islands of Makiluoto, Miessari, Russyankaari, Katayaluoto, Harmaya, Kuivassaari, Izosaari, Villinki, Santakhamina, Suomenlinna, Kustanmiekka and Makiluoto. Only 4 - 305 mm, 16 - 254 mm and 32 - 152 mm guns.
      © Shirokorad
      So the Germans and Finns could only dream of such a gift as the shelling of Helsinki.
      1. g1v2
        g1v2 April 28 2021 20: 44
        0
        I agree. It was dangerous. But their coastal artillery was mostly stationary. Its position could be pushed through. They were famous. Depths and sectors of fire too. Just because it was our former base. Again, aviation to help. One could even land troops on Isosaari and try to capture the batteries. The problem was, in my opinion, solvable. At the very least, it was possible to block the Finns access to the operational space. request
        Having a serious trump card on TVD, they still had to play aggressively. And so we were in fact blocked and the big ships became just batteries. request
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA April 29 2021 12: 09
          +1
          Quote: g1v2
          But their coastal artillery was mostly stationary. Its position could be pushed through. They were famous. Depths and sectors of fire too. Just because it was our former base.

          Tower 12 "batteries on the islands of Myakiluoto and Kuivasaari were built in the mid-30s. That is, it will not be possible to become attached to the pre-war positions.
          As for the intelligence data, it had an extremely vague idea of ​​the Finnish coastal defense. That is, the possible calibers of the guns were known, but where they are located - there is a great secret. Our valiant intelligence managed to oversleep even the construction of the 12 "battery near Vyborg by the Finns - its positions were discovered only after the inclusion of Vyborgskaya Lyan in the USSR. In the SFV BF was forced to risk ships - the same" Kirov "at Russare, to open the BO.
          Regarding the suppression of coastal defense - we are watching the shelling of Bjorke batteries.
          According to the report of the NSh KBF Yu.A. Panteleev, the squadron used up 402 305-mm (and not 800, as F.V.Borgmann claims - approx. P.P.) and 176 130-mm high-explosive shells (the latter fired the last leaders - approx.P.), and in total - 578 shells.
          Evaluating the firing of the LK, the commander of the Marat, SF Belousov, suggested: “It is known that the tower was hit, there is an 1 hit near the battery and another 4 hit”. The commission of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which worked after the war, came to the conclusion that no direct hit in the courtyards of the 254-mm Sahamenpya battery guns was achieved. In the area of ​​the firing positions and fortifications of the battery, there were many traces of the falling of LC shells, but most of them were flights. True, the body of the gun №6 was removed from the machine and with the cut off part of the trunk lay on the ground. But this was not the result of a direct hit, but rather indirect damage resulting from the rupture of a projectile in the December 10 battle. On the other hand, there was one hit of an 130-mm projectile in the shield of an 152-mm battery gun, located in the southeast of Fr. Bierke. This was probably the result of the work of the leaders "Minsk" and "Leningrad" during the December 13 battle (although the nature of the damage was such that the weapon was disabled for no more than a day).
          © "Battleships against batteries - operations of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet squadron in the Biyorki archipelago"
  • dgonni
    dgonni April 28 2021 20: 55
    -1
    Ndya! After that (all the more, these very "cruiser, two leaders, nine destroyers" could not help the slow-moving merchants. They could have beautifully and stupidly gone to the bottom next to them), it was not necessary to read!
    For why is the fleet needed? The task of the fleet in this passage was precisely to protect the transports.
    And in fact, the naval command manned with regulations and direct duties, abandoning the escorted ships with people and materials.
    Considering previous years?
    You can understand. For the loss of ships, they could have been put up against the wall.
    But the loss, as it were, of 40% of the combat base was forgiven and even rewarded.
    P.S. To understand the significance of the ships that broke through for the defense of Leningrad, just look at the recollections of the sailors on the site I remember.
    The cruisers and destroyers had to be covered with air defense batteries!
    Well, some of the crews ended up on the land front.
    But the fired corps fighters would be an order of magnitude more effective in defense.
  • Tavrik
    Tavrik April 28 2021 22: 17
    0
    And the second mistake - the headquarters of the fleet was waiting for the landing,

    And during the two years of the war, the Germans conducted many landing operations? Well, in Norway, maybe. And what is the landing potential of the Wehrmacht, did anyone take into account? And what will the landing supposedly by the Germans at Leningrad do in the absence of constant supply by sea? The Germans are not so stupid as to send troops to death.
  • geniy
    geniy April 29 2021 11: 14
    0
    And with Roman Ivanov, everything is always correct. And Rozhdestvensky did everything right, the defeats in the Baltic were also right.
    I'm now going to be transported to 1943 - our scouts could not find out that the Gulf of Finland was blocked by rows of nets - and why did they turn out to be so stupid? After all, the nets are standing for a reason - they are supported by thousands of floats - which are perfectly visible from the air by reconnaissance aircraft. And why not organize smart people to figure out how to solve the problem of networks - after all, these floats sink perfectly if they are shot. Or raised the bow of the submarine by trimming to the stern, just bend the net down with the weight of the hull and slide over it. Or simply cut the net with mechanical cutters from a submarine. But you can't shoot torpedoes at the net! This is complete idiocy!
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 29 2021 12: 29
      0
      Quote: geniy
      And why not organize smart people to figure out how to solve the problem of networks - after all, these floats sink perfectly if they are shot.

      They tried - they bombed the fence. And the PLO forces tried to storm. It all came down to the small capacity of the airfield on Lavensaari and the difficulty of delivering supplies to the island. And also in the fact that at the KBF, even in 1943, apart from the Il-2, the I-153 and I-15bis were used as attack aircraft.
      Quote: geniy
      Or raised the bow of the submarine by trimming to the stern, just bend the net down with the weight of the hull and slide over it.

      Uh-huh ... on a bright summer night in front of the amazed Germans and Finns.
      In May, there were four M-2 minesweepers, four escort ships (converted large fishing trawlers) and 35 to 18 small minesweepers of the KFK project, at positions along the network fence 20 miles west of it every day. Minesweepers and patrol boats were equipped with GAS operating in active mode, KFK - with lowered sound direction finders. Such a density of anti-submarine ships at one line was not previously created by the German command during the Second World War.
      © M. Morozov. The optimistic tragedy of 43.
      Quote: geniy
      Or simply cut the net with mechanical cutters from a submarine.

      They also tried. But the cutters often jammed.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA April 29 2021 12: 31
      0
      And most importantly, in addition to the network, there were also mines. A lot of mines.
      Front line - "Seeigel":
      On the site about. Gogland - about. B. Tyuters, our submarines had to force not one, as the compilers of the Plan believed, but 13-14 mine lines (depending on the course of the crossing), including two bottom non-contact lines. On the forcing route through the passage between about. B. Tyuters and Fr. Wigrund stood 9-10 lines of mines, including one non-contact line.

      ... even according to the most optimistic estimates, by the beginning of the 1943 campaign, there should have been at least 4000 - 4100 mines on the Seeigel. Considering this number not sufficient, in April 1943 the German command ordered to reinforce the Sea Urchin with another 1285 mines (including 218 non-contact mines) over the old anti-submarine barriers, which added three more mine lines on each of the crossing routes.

      The main line - "Nashorn":
      In total, from March 24 to April 30, the enemy placed 6864 mines on the Nashorn obstacle, including 1365 non-contact anchor mines. This pace and volume of performances has been unmatched since the outbreak of the Baltic Sea War. In May and June, this was followed by the setting of four more obstacles (1219 mines) - one at the entrance to Tallinn Bay, one blocking the shallow water between the Porkkala lighthouse and the Porkkala-Udd peninsula, and two of the bottom non-contact mines near the Valross network fence in those places where the nets didn't reach the bottom. By June 29 - the moment the enemy completed the staging at the Porkkalan-Kallboda - Fr. Naissar - including the mines that have survived since 1942, there were almost 10 thousand deadly surprises. The density of the obstacle was unprecedented - before reaching the network, following the fairway used in 1942, each submarine would have to cross the 31st Nashorn line!

      And between the front line and the main line - where our submarines in 1942 charged batteries - the Germans deployed patrol groups.
      On May 3, the commander of the German sweeping formations in the Baltic Sea (he also served as the commander of the German Navy in the Gulf of Finland and the northern part of the Baltic Sea) Rear Admiral Bemer gave the order to divide the central part of the gulf into three patrol zones (see diagram). Each of them was to deal with a patrol group consisting of three high-speed landing barges (BDB), armed with depth charges and lowered sound direction finders. The order directly stated: "the main task is to view as large an area of ​​the sea as possible and prevent the submarines from surfacing."
      (...)
      In addition to the Germans, two areas for anti-submarine patrolling of Finnish ships were established in the northern part of this section of the bay - area "D", which was usually occupied by one patrol boat and area "E", where a minelayer equipped with a sound direction finding station and one boat patrolled.
      © M. Morozov. The optimistic tragedy of 43.
  • Petrik66
    Petrik66 30 June 2021 13: 38
    0
    Credit to the author. great article.