Switzerland and its unfulfilled dream of a "neutral" atomic bomb
Nuclear club of the elite and its "dressing room"
Nowadays, everyone knows that there are only two nuclear superpowers (Russia and the United States), and it is unlikely (unless force majeure events like war, the eruption of the Yellowstone supervolcano or something like that happen) their number will change in the next 10-15 years. Neither China will be added to their number (despite the annual "horror reports" of the Pentagon to Congress, physically Chinese potential is growing extremely slowly), nor the United States will fall out of this group, despite all its extremely serious nuclearweapons problems, they are quite capable of solving them in the medium term. There are three "official" nuclear powers of the second plan: Great Britain, France and China. And here, serious changes are hardly possible, although China is likely to overtake France in the next couple of years, and Britain may still reduce its arsenal by several dozen more charges. There are also "unofficial" non-members of the "five" nuclear powers of the second plan: India and Pakistan, which are actively building up their potential and are quite capable in the coming years to overtake the waning Foggy Albion and move closer to the Chinese-French level. Of course, in terms of the number of charges, and not the quality of the arsenal and delivery vehicles, everything is far from the leaders' level.
There is Israel, the issue of whose nuclear weapons is controversial, and its very position of silence, and much more, and estimates of the size of the arsenal also differ. Adequate specialists, however, do not give the Jewish state even hundreds of charges. There is the DPRK, which the same USA, for example, "does not recognize" as a nuclear power, but North Korea is and will be - this is a fact, and you can dispute it as much as you like. These guys, according to the highest estimates, no more than 60-75 charges, mostly nuclear, but there are also boosted or thermonuclear ones. It is unlikely that in the next 10 years someone will be added to this "magnificent nine" of owners of the most powerful weapon on Earth, except that Iran will be finally "taken out", and there will be 10 nuclear countries. So at least they will no longer be offended, as now, when the guys do not have a proven (Bibi Netanyahu with his closet with evidence is like Poroshenko with a piece of a bus and Russian passports or Powell with a test tube) nuclear weapons program, but they have sanctions for it.
Those left on the doorstep
Many, of course, know that there were much more people wishing to acquire a "bomb". There was South Africa, which both acquired the coveted weapon, and managed to produce the initial batch of ammunition, and became the only country that actually renounced nuclear weapons. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan "renounced" what they did not control in essence, and neighboring "non-brothers" can tell at least as much as they like about "lost nuclear power", the "Budapest Memorandum" (not ratified by anyone and containing nothing serious), the "zrade" of those who signed it, the upcoming "peremogue" with the return of "nuclear status", which did not exist, and so on. In fact, these "nuclear powers" controlled this arsenal no more than the FRG - "Pershing-1A" and "Pershing-2" on its territory at one time, or the B61 bombs - now.
Also, a nuclear program existed in Argentina (under the very junta that organized the Falklands War), in Brazil, in Iraq in the 80s, and Libya. But there were also strict neutrals among those who desired the "nuclear club". In particular, Sweden was the first. The Russophobia of the Swedish leadership, in general, is understandable: it was Russia that lowered Sweden from the level of an empire to the level of a minor figure in world politics, although no one asked Sweden after the Northern War to start wars with Russia several times. It's your own fault. Sweden was working on the "non-peaceful atom" from 1945 to 1965, and the last research programs were curtailed already in 1972, when the kingdom had already signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for 4 years. But we're not talking about Sweden now.
Cheese-flavored atomic program
Switzerland was another neutral who dreamed of an atomic bomb. After the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Swiss military leaders wanted to supply their army with nuclear weapons. On November 5, 1945, the Federal Chancellor of Switzerland, Karl Kobelt, convened a conference at the Federal Palace, at which the Studienkommission für Atomenergie (SKA) was established. Professor Paul Scherrer, head of this commission, has become a key figure in the Swiss nuclear weapons program. Scherrer, by the way, was a very famous physicist who left a considerable mark on this science, and one of the founders of the famous CERN. During the war, he gave the Americans information about the Nazi nuclear program. And then he became a supporter of the Swiss "bomb". The same Kobelt on February 5, 1946, in a secret document on the nuclear issue, left the following lines: "... in addition, the Commission will seek to develop a Swiss bomb or other suitable means of warfare based on the principle of atomic energy."
The Swiss army seriously feared an invasion by the armies of the USSR or allies from Eastern Europe (future members of the Warsaw Pact) or a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in NATO military plans led to an increase in demand among Swiss officers in the mid-1950s for their own nuclear weapons. After the bloody Hungarian rebellion of 1956 and its suppression, anti-communism and Russophobia reached their peak in Switzerland. At a meeting of the Swiss National Defense Commission on November 29, 1957, the secret nuclear war plans were finally openly discussed. The then Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the country, Divisional General Etienne Primo, said: "If we had an aircraft like the Mirage (talking about a French fighter. - Ed.), Which could fly to Moscow with atomic bombs, delivery to enemy territory would be Then the enemy will know perfectly well that they will not only be bombed as soon as they cross the Rhine, but that bombs will also be dropped in their own country. ”But the USSR never did any hostile actions against Switzerland, and Switzerland did not was in any anti-Soviet military blocs.
One of the most delicate issues in these military plans and simulations was the issue of using nuclear weapons against the enemy already on their Swiss soil. During the discussion, Chief of the General Staff Louis de Montmollen noted that there are cases when nuclear weapons are absolutely necessary to be used, even if there is a risk of significant damage to their civilian population. He argued that taking into account the public interest alone was not enough to reject this option. Here is such a "neutrality" and a peaceful status. Apparently, they seriously believed that the USSR was asleep and saw how it was "dispossessing" the Swiss bankers.
Anti-communism caused a dangerous disorder of consciousness among some leaders of the Swiss army and the country. The use of nuclear weapons against the enemy on Switzerland's own territory would have devastating and fatal consequences for the population of such a small and densely populated country. On July 11, 1958, the Federal Council also issued a statement in which it spoke out unequivocally in favor of the possession of atomic bombs.
The pacifists then actively protested against the atomic insanity in the leadership, but most of the Swiss voters rejected the ban on nuclear weapons in a 1962 referendum.
Practical work
By 1963, planning had come to the point that detailed technical proposals, specific arsenals and cost estimates were made. On November 15, 1963, Dr. Paul Schmid prepared a 58-page report that laid out the theoretical foundations for Swiss nuclear weapons. On November 28, 1963, the deputy chief of staff estimated the cost of building a uranium bomb at 720 million Swiss francs over 35 years, initially including 20 million francs for pure research. He also calculated that if the decision was made for plutonium instead of highly enriched uranium, the estimate would be 2100 million francs over 27 years. On May 4, 1964, the joint military headquarters recommended deploying about 100 bombs (60-100 kt), 50 artillery shells (5 kt - very unrealizable estimates for the entry level) and 100 missiles (100 kt) over the next 15 years at a cost of about 750 million Swiss francs. There were plans to conduct 7 underground nuclear tests in the uninhabited mountain regions of Switzerland, in some place with a radius of 2-3 km (1,2-1,9 miles), "which can be completely blocked."
In addition, Switzerland purchased uranium and stored it in nuclear reactors purchased from the United States, the first of which was built in 1960. Between 1953 and 1955, Switzerland purchased about 10 tons of enriched uranium from the Belgian Congo with permission from the United States and Great Britain. Switzerland was also considering purchasing from the Union of South Africa. 5000 kg were stored in the Diorit reactor in Wührenlingen, while stocks of 3238 kg of uranium and 2283 kg of uranium oxide were stored at Wimmis until 1981, and this was not covered by international non-proliferation guarantees. In addition, in 1969, the Swiss government tried unsuccessfully to purchase 3 kg (6,6 lb) plutonium from Norway, which was not far from weapons grade. Switzerland had 20 kg (44 lb) of separated plutonium from reprocessed spent fuel from the DIORIT heavy water research reactor. It was stored for several decades under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency at the Paul Scherrer Institute, but this stock was not directly suitable for creating nuclear weapons. In February 2016, nearly three decades after the end of the nuclear program and in time for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the Swiss government shipped this surplus plutonium to the United States for disposal.
In the spring of 1964, a group working in the military department that approved nuclear tests in Switzerland presented a secret nuclear weapons plan to the Federal Council. At the first stage of the plan, 50 bombs with a yield of 60 to 100 kt were to be purchased. At the second stage, another 200 charges. Of course, the guys were not at all friendly with reality and assessed their capabilities through a thick magnifying glass, both technical and financial. To make it clear whether a nuclear test should be carried out in Switzerland, Chief of Staff Jacob Annason asked Federal Councilor Paul Chaudet, the head of the Ministry of Defense, to obtain an appropriation of 20 million Swiss francs from the Federal Council.
In addition to the main military goal of deterrence, the strategists assumed that Switzerland's nuclear strike potential would become part of a preventive war against the USSR and the OVD!
Dream collapse
But first the so-called Mirage case of 1964 happened - the purchase of the then "coveted" newest fighter, at the same time a nuclear carrier (in the French Air Force "Mirage-3E" were carriers of a nuclear bomb), which led to the fact that a scandal arose: purchase prices were seriously overpriced, the deal was corrupt. In the course of the investigation, the Minister of Defense, Chief of General Staff and Commander of the Air Force, as well as a number of other generals, were dismissed from their posts. The purchasing mechanism itself was changed, separating the customer from the actual money. The generals who came to replace the dismissed were either themselves not ardent supporters of the nuclear program, or were afraid to hint about it. Then Switzerland, whose nuclear plans, of course, did not escape the attention of the intelligence services of both superpowers, was given serious diplomatic pressure to close the development program. In 1969 Switzerland signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty under this pressure and ratified it.
The prolonged financial crisis in the country influenced the curtailment of work much more. And also a serious accident in 1969, which led to the partial melting of a small experimental reactor Lucens, after which the program began to curtail. But at the same time, albeit much more sluggish and secretive, research on the creation of nuclear weapons continued and were not officially closed until 1988!
Of course, the "Swiss bomb" had little chance of a successful implementation after the program was driven underground. The country was much less technologically advanced in key technologies for the nuclear program than the same Sweden. Lack of its own uranium, technological backwardness, lack of qualified scientists and limited financial resources did not allow Switzerland to fulfill the dream of creating its own atomic bomb. And thank God, because nothing good would come of it. If the Warsaw Pact divisions did not plan to make a "visit" to the country without the "bomb" (obviously leaving it "for later"), then with it the country would undoubtedly learn how beautifully nuclear mushrooms grow - just for prevention.
But the very example of a very paranoid desire of such countries to acquire a "big guy's toy" is, of course, indicative.
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