Military Review

1941. Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?

92

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), pd - infantry division td - tank division.


In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArkhVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, DF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, LVO - Leningrad Military District (Northern Front - Northern Front) , OdVO - Odessa Military District, OVO - Oryol Military District, PribOVO - Baltic Special VO, VVO - Volga VO, SAVO - Central Asian VE, SibVO - Siberian VO, North Caucasian Military District, UrVO - Ural VO, HVO - Kharkov VO .

Official version


79 years ago, the redeployment of the 16th Army from ZabVO began. Most memoirs and books talk about sending her west. For example, in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova:

On May 13, the General Staff issued a directive to the Military Depot to nominate troops west from the internal districts. The 22nd Army marched from the Urals to the Great Bow region; from PriVO to the Gomel region - the 21st army; from North Caucasian Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region — 19th Army; from the KhVO to the border of the Western Dvina - 25th sk; from Transbaikalia to Ukraine to the Shepetivka area - the 16th army ...

In 2018, historians discussed events that occurred on the eve of war. During the discussion, the question was asked: “Where did the 16th Army go?” In preparing the materials for the article, the author was unable to find documents that would unambiguously give an answer to this question.

Discussing pre-war events, they often refer to the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions”, using it as a reference. I will express my opinion about it: it seems that the authors placed in the book only those materials for which they were given permission. The book does not destroy the version that existed for many years, according to which intelligence provided all the necessary RM about the enemy troops. Based on reliable RMs, the spacecraft command, anticipating the outbreak of war in June, was perspicaciously trying to break through the permit to begin the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the western military forces to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done. The reasons for this behavior I.V. Stalin called different, but his behavior is not considered in terms of knowledge of the situation before the war.

In a series of articles on intelligence, the author presented a large number of materials showing that the pre-war RMs turned out to be unreliable. However, in the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions” there is not a word about the accuracy of the RM that came to the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR in May-June 1941. Mention of intelligence data ends in April 1941. The authors deliberately did not address this issue. This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the received RM: “... in March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan of the Barbarossa plan. In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR ... "

In March, the RM spoke of three versions of the design of the attack, but only one of them was correct. In addition, the fourth fantastic version is described in the report of the head of RU: “... after the victory over England, Germany, advancing against the USSR, intends to strike from two flanks: coverage from the north (meaning Finland) and from the Balkan Peninsula”.

Even a month later (25.4.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events related to the outbreak of war with the USSR:

The data leads me to believe that:
1. In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as yet another adversary.
2. The timing of the onset of the collision is perhaps shorter and, certainly within the current year. Another thing is that these plans and dates may come across something similar to Matsuoka’s trip ...
3. The next coming events of the Germans seem to me like this:
a) saddling turkey a pact of three or any similar to it;
b) accession to the pact of three Sweden, and, therefore, Finland, as the latter has long been ready to join him;
c) strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater;
d) whether the Germans plan extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to sayalthough officially such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed ...


The quote in the book that Germany refused to attack England is also a juggling of facts. Such information either appeared in the Republic of Moldova, or materials were again given with confirmation of the preparation of German troops for landing in England. Even the British intelligence services in early June 1941 could not clearly say: there will be an attack on England or not.

The book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions" says the following about the transportation of troops from deep districts: “On April 26, the General Staff gave preliminary orders to the Military Councils of the ZabVO and the Far Eastern Military District [it should be about DF. - Note auth.] be ready to send to the West the 5th mk, two sk (32nd and 31st) (a total of 9 divisions) and two (211st and 212nd) airborne brigades ... " and further information on their destinations in the west is indicated.

German troops on our border


Let’s try to figure out, based on published materials, whether there were prerequisites in May for the start of the transfer of troops of the 16th Army. The General Staff Directive on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41 and the sending of troops began on May 26.

Did something dangerous happen on the western border to decide on the transfer of troops from ZabOVO? On 25.4.41, according to intelligence, 95 ... 100 German divisions were on our border, on May 15 - 114 ... 119, on May 31 - 120 ... 122. It can be seen that since May 15, the rate of transfer of German troops to the border has significantly decreased. From June 1 to June 19 (inclusive), no more than 7 divisions were transported to our borders.


In fact, over 40 divisions arrived in East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were TD and MD. However, our intelligence was not able to detect their appearance at the border, although partially the transportation was recorded. In June, according to intelligence, the situation with an increase in the concentration of German troops at the border almost stabilized.

Also in June, RM began to arrive, mentioning various conditions and ultimatums from Germany to the USSR. In Moldova, it was said either about the imminent start of a war with the Soviet Union, then about an attack on England, then about German expansion to the Middle East and the African coast, then about the postponement of the start of the war with our country to July-August 1941.

Could the leadership of the SC on May 20-25 frighten the presence of about 120 German divisions at the border? Could the leadership of the spacecraft at this time break through the permission to transfer troops of the 16th Army?

The number of spacecraft divisions that should have been concentrated in western military units was determined by the General Staff on the basis of the number of German divisions that Germany could set up in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1940, when considering the options for military operations of German troops against the USSR, the enemy group was determined in 180 or more divisions (not counting the troops of possible allies of Germany).

According to intelligence, during the winter in Germany new divisions were formed. On the basis of the Republic of Moldova, as of 11.3.41, the General Staff considered that Germany would set up 200 divisions for war with the USSR. To counter this threat, the number of spacecraft divisions that should have been in the western districts, in the LVO and in the RGK troops was determined. Based on the concentration of 200 divisions at the border, in April 1941 the General Directives were sent out to develop plans for covering western districts.

An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):

I order you to begin developing a plan for the operational deployment of the ZapOVO armies, guided by the following instructions.
1. Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy it is now believed to provide a peaceful position on our western borders. The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. However, given:
a) the events in Europe - the German occupation of Bulgaria, their declaration of war on Yugoslavia and Greece;
b) suspicious German behavior in Finland and Romania;
c) the concentration by Germany of considerable forces towards the borders of the USSR;
d) the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance, the tip of which, in the presence of the above circumstances, can be directed against the USSR - when developing the USSR defense plan, it is necessary to keep in mind not only opponents such as Finland, Romania, England, but also of such possible opponents as Germany, Italy and Japan...
2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its 225 20 pd, 15 td and XNUMX pd, can be sent against our borders to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 PD, 20 TD and 15 MD ...

The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of signing the non-aggression treaty with Japan. It does not follow from the document that the war is unambiguously expected in the summer of 1941 and it is not explicitly stated that Romania and Finland will enter the war on the side of Germany. The document states that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany will send all of its tank and motorized divisions against our borders. Among the opponents is England, with which the USSR has no contractual obligations. The country's leadership should not have forgotten that in the spring of 1940 plans were being prepared in England for the bombing of Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.

On 13.4.41, a non-aggression pact was signed with Japan, which was ratified on April 25. The next day, General Staff Directives are sent to ZabVO and DF on preparations for the redeployment to the west from ZabVO of the 16th Army (32nd sk and 5th mk), with the DF of the 31st sk, 21st and 66th div , 211st and 212nd airborne brigades.

On May 25, the management of the 31st sk arrived in KOVO. In May, the 212nd Brigade arrived in the OdVO and became part of the 3rd Airborne Corps. It is likely that the 211st brigade arrived in KOVO in May 1941. The 21st SD was sent to the West only in August 1941, and the 66th SD remained in the Far East. All the SDFs had a population of about 10 thousand people and before the start of the war there was no call-up of enlisted personnel for training at the indicated divisions.

In May 1941, a draft Note by the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff was prepared with considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and its allies. The document contains a link to the RU report dated May 15, which could get to the note performer somewhere on May 16-17. The preparation of the note and its editing took place somewhere after May 17. Let's see what the note said about the number of German divisions in the event of a German attack on the USSR.

1941. Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?

When editing the Note, the number of German divisions was clarified with 189 to 180. In early May, General Directives on the development of cover plans were sent to western HE. Based on the information from the draft Note prepared after May 17, it can be said that plans should be developed based on the presence of 189-200 German divisions at our borders. In May-June, the leadership of the spacecraft could be sure that the German army had not yet completed its concentration before the grouping of 180 divisions. Therefore, on May 25, the grouping near our border did not have more than 60 divisions to the value defined in the General Staff. With a significant reduction in the rate of transfer of troops to our border, it was still too early to give an order to begin the redeployment on May 25 ...

Confirmation that the leadership of the RU and the spacecraft expected to see the number of divisions significantly exceeding the number 122 near the border at the beginning of the war can be seen in the RU report at 20-00 on 22.6.41. In the summary, the number of German troops concentrated to the front (i.e., to the border) is estimated at 167-173 divisions. Missing up to 180 (or more) divisions are probably masked in the following text: “Due to the fact that the June troop movements to the east were carried out from the western front, it must be considered that the composition of this reserve [17 divisions in central Germany. - Note auth.] saved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is quite possible from the west for use against the USSR... » The RU smoothly summed up the opinion of those reading the summary to the presence at the border of up to 173 divisions, i.e. to the number of divisions close to 180. The Germans simply decided to start the war without completing the redeployment of their troops ...

Soviet troops in the west


The planned number of spacecraft divisions, which should have been concentrated in the west, practically did not change from March 11 to May 17, 1941 in the Northern Fleet and in the armies of the RGK. This may indicate that the same divisions (armies) from different military units were to be advanced to the west. The difference lies in the disbandment of some SD and the formation of anti-tank and airborne brigades.



This draft Note considers the presence of four armies in the Northern Fleet and the North-Western Front — three armies each and in the Western Front. These armies are part of the military forces, although two of them are in the formation stage (4th and 13th).

The South-Western Front includes eight armies with only four armies in the district. In accordance with the Certificate on the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West (13.6.41), the OVVO, OrVO, KhVO and PrivO (9th, 18th, 20th and 21st armies) were included in the KOVO.

The RGC should have five armies. In the future, four armies will be formed: the 19th - on the basis of the North Caucasian Military District, the 22nd - in the UrVO, the 24th - in the Siberian Military District and the 28th - in the ArkhVO. The author does not know where the fifth army was supposed to come from. It is possible that it was formed on the basis of the ZakVO and SAVO troops being thrown to the west.

The German group at the border on May 25 should not have caused serious concern among the leadership of the spacecraft. At the same time, the question of how long it would take the German command to concentrate another 60 divisions at the border would be interesting.

This time depends on the option of concentrating the main group of German troops: in the north or in the south. If the Germans would concentrate the main grouping in the north (against PribOVO and ZAPOVO), then the railway capacity allowed them to complete the concentration within 12 days. In the case of the southern option, taking into account the deployment of part of the German troops in Romania, Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, it would take 52 days to additionally concentrate about 18 divisions in southern Poland. Since it was assumed that in case of war with the USSR the Germans would choose the southern option, there should be enough time for the transfer of troops from internal military forces located near Pribovo, Zapovo and KOVO ...

When considering options for the concentration of spacecraft troops in March 1938, Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote:

Our intelligence made by our probable opponents of concentration traffic will determine where their main forces will be deployedand therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change the options for our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of Polesie ...

Before the war, leaders at all levels were confident in the absolute accuracy of the data received from intelligence. Unfortunately, by 22.6.41 our intelligence services were unable to fully reveal the plans for waging Germany’s war with the USSR, the composition of the invasion force and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops at our border ... It can be assumed that the General Staff decided on May 25 in advance to begin the transportation of troops of the 16th army to the west, masking its transfer along the route through Central Asia. We will consider this version in the following two parts.

German Intelligence Plans


10.3.41 receives a message from Sophocles about the plans of Germany: “The German General Staff refused to attack the English islands, the immediate task set - capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be implemented in April-May of this year ... "

Capture of Baku can be carried out only from the border with Turkey or Iran. Since that time, extensive German misinformation begins about a possible attack on the Soviet Union from the Caucasus, the purpose of which could be to divert the attention of our intelligence from the western border and the desire to increase the grouping of the space forces in ZakVO.

Yeshenko March 15 reported:

Socor concludes: “The Germans fear performances of the USSR at that moment when they will go to Turkey. Wishing to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ...

This message was considered quite important, because a quote from it was inserted into the Report of the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan (20.3.41): “The Germans are afraid of the Soviet Union at the moment when they go to Turkey. Desiring to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ... "

On April 4, another message arrives from Sophocles about the concentration of troops near our border and about the possibility of disguising the conduct of German operations in the Balkans:

The concentration of German troops on the entire border with the USSR from the Black to the Baltic Sea, Romania’s undisguised revanchist statements about Northern Bukovina, ... the fact of the transformation of the Balkan countries into union states does not allow to exclude the idea of ​​Germany’s military intentions against our country ...
However, given that the information comes from German sources, its distribution was most widespread during the period of activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans, it can be assumed that Germany in preparing the next action in the Balkans by psychological influence compensates for the lack of real forces...

W. Churchill 7.4.41 wrote about the unlikelihood of a war between Germany and the USSR:

Our joint intelligence agency ... stated that rumors were circulating in Europe about the Germans' intention to attack Russia. Although Germany ... has considerable forces in the East, it can be expected that Sooner or later she will fight with Russia it seems unbelievable that she decided to open another big front now. According to the United Intelligence Agency, its main goal in 1941 remained the defeat of the United Kingdom...

On April 17, the Petty Officer said that “In connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Denmark, the mood of the circles advocating for speaking out against the Soviet Union has somewhat subsided, because now have the hope of winning the war with England through a blow to her life communications and oil sources in the Middle East... »

Yeshchenko on April 23 updates his information of March 15 about the German invasion of Ukraine and the Caucasus: “Hitler hesitated for a long time, but now he agreed with the military circles that proposed capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus... We will free a number of peoples from Bolshevik oppression. Ukrainian people and Armenians in the Caucasus waiting for us.

The refusal of the attack on the USSR in the near future is also mentioned in the message of the Elders on April 24: "At present, GS aviation almost ceased development of Russian objects and is intensively preparing for an action aimed against Turkey, Syria and Iraq, primarily. The action against the USSR seems to have been pushed into the background ... "

In the RU Summary dated April 26, the number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania is defined as 95-100 divisions. The armies in Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Egypt have up to 71 divisions. “In Bulgaria, there are 12 PD and 1 TD, of which 8 divisions are already concentrated on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. At the expense of the reserves brought to Bulgaria and the liberation of German units in Yugoslavia, an army is being created against Turkey ”.

A report by Zeus on April 27 indicated that the Germans were preparing a strike against the USSR. It is noted that "Germany will not allow the conclusion of a treaty of the USSR with Turkey».

Message from Savva (April 27):

German intelligence colonel Berchtold ... said: actions against us will begin on May 15 ... An uprising in Ukraine at the time of the conflict was prepared ... German political circles are talking about the upcoming ultimatum to Moscow to join the pact of three, with the separation of Ukraine ... Germans threaten turkey war in case of refusal to join the pact of three ... Ukrainian nationalists have an army of 100 thousand trained and trained by the Germans, staffed by captured soldiers of Ukrainian nationality ...

There are notes: "Install ... how accurate is the information about 100 thousand Ukrainian white army. Golikov»

On April 30, a note was prepared by the NKGB, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The note, citing a message from Corsican, states that “The Germans are taking all measures to include Turkey in the wake of German politics. The Germans promised Turkey part of Thrace, as well as the annexation of other territories ... The proposal of the Germans also included the rejection of certain Soviet regions in the Caucasus in favor of Turkey ... "

Multiple reports of Germans' interest in Turkey and our borders in the Caucasus should have caused increased attention of the leadership of the Soviet Union to this issue.

On April 29, Mars reported the displacement of German troops after the end of the operation in Yugoslavia. The head of RU left a note on the document: “It is especially important to trace where it is being thrown. troops from Yugoslavia ". Three days later, Mars announced German plans that were not related to an attack on the USSR in the near future:

Intensive German air operations and war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs force an attack on Iraq for the occupation of oil sources. For this purpose, an intensive transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and the concentration of troops in the Balkans is currently underway.
Offensive on Iraq is supposed to be carried out by Egypt and through Turkey or by transferring troops through the Dodecanese Islands and then by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors circulate in the high command circles that in the event of a successful attack on Iraq, an attack on the USSR will be launched, to the Caucasus from Turkey and to Ukraine from the west...


The RU Summary of May 5 notes:

The essence of the regroupings of German troops ... after the successful completion of the Balkan campaign and to this day comes down to:
1. To strengthen the group against the USSR throughout the western and southwestern borders, including Romania, as well as in Finland.
2. The further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North. Africa ...
The available forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. For the same purposes, up to two parachute divisions are concentrated with their likely use in Iraq ...

In the Balkans and Egypt, according to intelligence, there is a fairly large group of German troops, which is about 45% of the group concentrated near our border.

On May 5, the NKGB sent a Note with the text of the intercepted telegrams of the English ambassador to the USSR from 23.4.41: “The military ... are convinced that war is inevitable, but they crave a respite it’s at least until winter ... A counterbalance is the fear that we can conclude a separate peace provided that the Germans evacuate the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler freedom of hands in the East ... ”

In the late evening of May 10, Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could find out about this on May 11, which should have intensified the fear of the start of negotiations between Germany and England. Now the leadership of the USSR should have pursued an even more flexible policy in order to postpone the war with Germany, during which our country could remain alone against all of Europe, including England ...

Ramsay's May 6th post:

Ott told me that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part of the Soviet Union into his own hands as a grain and raw material base ... The ambassador and attaché agreed that two critical dates were approaching after the defeat of Yugoslavia in Germany’s relations with the USSR.
The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the end of sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment so that Germany can only reap a crop.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR will create any difficulties regarding Turkey’s acceptance of German requirements, then war will be inevitable. The possibility of a war at any moment is very high because Hitler and his generals are sure that a war with the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of a war against England ...

It was completely incomprehensible to our military leadership why the German command was not afraid of a war on two fronts, having at the border a little more than a hundred divisions against a large number of space forces and a huge mass of tanks ...

On May 9, the Zeus report first mentioned the movement of German troops through Turkey:

From Western Macedonia through Turkey officially go to Iraq German troops. On the Soviet-Polish border, 60 German divisions.
Germany is preparing to start military operations against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In 2 months, incidents should begin on the Soviet-Polish border. The blow will be delivered simultaneously from the territory of Poland, from the sea to Odessa and from Turkey to Baku ...
I think the first point is believable. The remaining items are difficult to verify ...


There are litters: “From Sofia, it was twice reported that German troops were officially marching through Turkey to Iraq. Is this true? Golikov " Probably, Zeus was asked to clarify the information, and on May 14 he additionally reported:

Belvedere claims that there are German troops in Turkey. He believes that at least 3-4 divisions are in Turkey on the way to Syria. The Belvedere was 30 km from the Greek-Turkish border in the Dede Agach region and itself observed the movement of large columns of troops for three days in the direction of the Turkish border. There is only one road in this area, and it goes directly to Turkey ...

The RU report of May 15 again refers to the grouping of German troops in Bulgaria with up to 15-16 divisions, of which 6 are located directly on the Turkish border. The army is allegedly commanded by General Reichenau.

May 19, Costa reports: “From the collected information it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. In early July, serious military actions are planned against Ukraine ... Today, very serious people said that Turkey accepted the German proposals. The Germans are concentrating pontoon boats to build bridges over the Dardanelles ... "

On the same day, Dora reported on a possible German attack on Ukraine (but not on the entire Soviet Union!):

Information about the alleged German campaign in Ukraine comes from the most reliable German circles and is true. Performance will happen only when the English fleet will not be able to enter the Black Sea and when the German army will gain a foothold in Asia Minor. The next goal of the Germans is the occupation of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, in order to expel the English fleet from the Mediterranean Sea ...

Our intelligence officers do not know the exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not. For example, Ramsay on May 21 reports: “... the war between Germany and the USSR could start already at the end of May ... This year the danger maybe pass».

Mars May 28 reports: “There are 6-7 German divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, of which 2 are TD, 2 MD, and 3 are mountain ... [Sources] They believe that the Germans will first capture Syria and Iraq, and only then they will oppose the USSR. I personally believe that the Germans themselves are spreading these rumors in order to distract our attention from their preparations for an attack on us.... »

Message from Yeshchenko (May 28):

Germany’s military action against the USSR continues to be systematically prepared ... Military preparations are going on as a clock mechanism and make the war likely to start back in June this year. Whether this huge mechanism that works against the USSR is only a maneuver or a prelude to a war that has already been resolved, no one knows except Hitler and his inner circle ...
How Germany should get its hands ... Baku and Batumi oil, this is not entirely clear. The German side is preparing an illegal action in the Caucasus region, as well as airborne parachute troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil fields by sabotage ...

In Moldova, there is an increase in the grouping of German troops near our western border. It is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion from these reports about the beginning of the war in June. The flow of misinformation through various sources about the preparation of the German strike on the communication of the British and for the capture of oil fields is intensifying. Quite a lot of messages come with information about flirting Germany with Turkey with the movement of German troops through Turkey, about the strike with Soviet Transcaucasia.

The British until the end of May still have no clarity in relations between the USSR and Germany. W. Churchill:

May 23 [United Intelligence Agency. - Note ed.] reported that rumors of an impending attack on Russia had subsided and there was evidence that these countries intend to conclude a new agreement. Management considered this likely, since the needs of a protracted war required the strengthening of the German economy. Germany could receive the necessary assistance from Russia either by force or as a result of an agreement. Management believed that Germany will prefer the latteralthough, to facilitate the achievement of this, the threat of the use of force will be launched. Now this force has accumulated ...
May 31. The Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia. Using them as a threat, they probably they will require concessions that could prove to be very dangerous for us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will come forward...

From Goebbels' diary: "May 31. Operation Barbarossa is developing. We begin the big disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things. I am forced to send the entire ministry in the wrong direction, risking, in case of failure, losing my prestige ... 14 divisions are heading west. We are gradually expanding the theme of the invasion [of England. - Note auth.]. I ordered to compose a song about the invasion, a new motive, to increase the use of English broadcasts, instructing propaganda companies in England, etc. Two weeks are given for everything ... "

To be continued ...
Author:
92 comments
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  1. cavl
    cavl 8 June 2020 05: 04 New
    17
    Thanks to the author for an interesting selection of materials.
    I would like to hope that the continuation will not have to wait a few weeks
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 8 June 2020 08: 27 New
      12
      Quote: cavl
      Thanks to the author for an interesting selection of materials.

      Yes, the most interesting materials: what kind of assumptions, conjectures and forecasts were not at all - both among us and the British.

      The graphs of the concentration of troops on the border of Germany and the USSR are very clear: explosive growth in the number of divisions (three times) in Germany since April 41 and practically none, growth in the number of divisions of the USSR.

      Indicative for evaluating subsequent events.

      And it's not even that intelligence missed this:
      Actually in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland over 40 divisions arrived in June, of which more than half were td and md


      Management was obligated to consider such a probable possibility of events, as The possibilities of enemy transport intrastructure were known. And that 100-200 km for the instant transfer of huge masses of troops is nothing. And we must act on the basis of this worst case

      And to act only on the basis of the taxiway and only in response to the arrival of enemy troops is a deliberate loss. Moreover, having built a two-year fighting army mobilized, unlike ours ....
      1. Tugarin
        Tugarin 8 June 2020 09: 29 New
        12
        The graphs of the concentration of troops on the border of Germany and the USSR are very clear: explosive growth in the number of divisions (three times) in Germany since April 41 and practically none, growth in the number of divisions of the USSR.

        Management was obligated to consider such a probable possibility of events, as The possibilities of enemy transport intrastructure were known. And that 100-200 km for the instant transfer of huge masses of troops is nothing. And we must act on the basis of this worst case

        That's right, the Space Command understood this. Eugene mentions this:
        Based on reliable RMs, the spacecraft command, anticipating the outbreak of war in June, was perspicaciously trying to break through the permission to begin the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the western military forces to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done.

        Here, apparently, Stalin was cautious and tried not to provoke. Remember the invitation to a dialogue, including through the press, and the dull silence from that side.
        1. Tugarin
          Tugarin 8 June 2020 09: 31 New
          10
          Thanks to the author for the material. hi good We look forward to continuing yes
        2. Olgovich
          Olgovich 8 June 2020 11: 03 New
          14
          Quote: Tugarin
          Here, apparently, Stalin was cautious and tried not to provoke.

          As if WORLD WARS begin because of ..... provocations. belay

          They begin exactly when the aggressor believes that he is ready. AND not a day before.

          With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
          1. cormorant
            cormorant 10 June 2020 01: 48 New
            -2
            They begin exactly when the aggressor believes that he is ready. And not a day earlier.

            With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
            good Very true remark! I was always surprised at this moment. What the hell can there be a provocation when such forces are concentrated on the border itself.
        3. Slavutich
          Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 42 New
          -14
          One question: the schedule that is being discussed, where is it from?
      2. knn54
        knn54 8 June 2020 11: 40 New
        16
        The army should be redeployed in the Caucasus to the border with Iran. However, along the way, the army was redirected first to the Oryol Military District, and then to the Kiev Special Military District.
        And an interesting moment, until 1944, 1 Wehrmacht division = 2-3 divisions of the Red Army. Accordingly, the Nazi army was almost inferior in strength to our front / district.
        The author, of course, PLUS.
        1. VS
          VS 8 June 2020 15: 42 New
          -10
          and WHERE DO YOU KNOW that the FINAL point of the conclusion of THIS 16th Army was Transcaucasia?)) A simple question - WHAT is the vegetable, AT THE SAME TIME, the army from SevKavVO is sent not to Transcaucasia - where IT - the 19th Army is easier and closer to go than to drive 16- u - but near KIEV?)) Do you even know HOW, by what road could the army from URAL be transported to Georgia - in those days was that?))) I’ll tell you - the roads from ASTRAKHANI are the same where you could send an army from the Urals, IN THESE days, for example, there WAS NOT an iron mine in Azerbaijan yet))) Only BEFORE Rostov and already there - a turn to the south))
          1. sleeve
            sleeve 9 June 2020 03: 38 New
            -5
            Right. I wanted to comment, but you were the first. 19th how and where in this hypothesis? Accordingly, the 16th drove to its destination. 2nd echelon. Riding quietly and slowly. An explosive schedule? Well yes. Only within the indicated timeframe, the starting numbers also differ. The Germans are closer to zero, and therefore the "arrival" is higher. True or not, the RD for June or May 41 no longer mattered. The decision to move out of the internal districts only testifies to the correct assessment of the situation. The result of the actions is a purely military confrontation with a stronger and more experienced enemy. And this enemy, no matter how strong and experienced, ended the war in his capital. In no small part because of what happened in the 41st.
  2. Lech from Android.
    Lech from Android. 8 June 2020 06: 27 New
    18
    Thanks Eugene for the extensive article with factual material ... very interesting. hi
    1. Slavutich
      Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 39 New
      -11
      no factual material: where do these graphs come from? no links, the author himself wrote earlier that he takes everything from Wikipedia and analyzes it: an excellent source! objective information! good
      1. VS
        VS 8 June 2020 15: 44 New
        -13
        but this nonsense is called - unique))) because besides VO it’s not published anywhere))
  3. antivirus
    antivirus 8 June 2020 09: 32 New
    +6
    there is only one conclusion from the whole RM mess: from death not to hide and not to hide, but where and when - one of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks will determine.
    the Germans succeeded in playing "the fool in the campaign to BVostok"
  4. Gardamir
    Gardamir 8 June 2020 09: 46 New
    +3
    There are two points, none of those writing about the situation on the eve of the war recalls the situation inside the country. How prepared are the Union, industry, agriculture for war. I really wanted the war, since it was inevitable to begin, as late as possible.
    Well, the second point. Imagine that Hitler officially declares war, that would be.
  5. BAI
    BAI 8 June 2020 10: 32 New
    -2
    As always in. What does the colorized photograph of tanks from Khalkhin Gol have to do with the article? Where is the 16th army and where is Khalkhin Gol? And the years are different 1939 in the photo and 1941 in the article. Or is the author's only photo of the Red Army from the Far East and Eastern Siberia?
    1. Slavutich
      Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 37 New
      -15
      The author somehow honestly wrote in the comments: he takes Wikipedia - analyzes it - adds his "analytics" and the article is ready.
      This article, if similar to analysis, is only an analysis of parallel reality.
      Nothing to discuss here: Wikipedia analysis! This is strong!
  6. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 36 New
    -14
    a false anonymous person will not calm down in any way (((They didn’t wait for the German attack in the Kremlin, and at least count him in the head ..)))

    Writes our "historian", a specialist in RM - "" Based on reliable RM, the SC command, awaiting the start of the war in June, shrewdly tried to break through a permit to start the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw troops from western military units to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done. "" -

    LYING! Stalin did not forbid the military to withdraw troops from the internal districts to the western and the facts and documents show that on May 13, the General Staff directives were signed on the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK - according to the operational plans of the General Staff - on the withdrawal to the western districts)))

    An anonymous author whose libels on intelligence are considered unique by the "owners" of the VO - apparently because of their deceit and this is clearly welcomed - writes: "" In a series of articles on intelligence, the author presented a large number of materials showing that the pre-war RM turned out to be unreliable ""))
    maladets) at first HE RECOGNIZED THAT IT !! DATA - THAT HE FIND MORE THAN MISSION FROM REAL RM, but right now HE ALREADY HIMSELVES TO BE THE SPECIAL SPECIAL ON RM))
  7. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 38 New
    -15
    the anonymous author writes: "" This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the RM received by them: "... in March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan" Barbarossa ". In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR ... "

    In March, RM spoke about three variants of the attack plan, but only one of them was correct. ""

    And FROM where do you know your native - WHICH of the options was recognized as true then? The crystal ball spit and the spirit of Stalin told you - in WHAT option did they believe?))
  8. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 44 New
    -15
    an anonymous author writes: "" Let us try, on the basis of published materials, to figure out whether there were prerequisites in May for the start of the transfer of troops of the 16th Army. ")) \ CHO for a STUPID question then ??)))

    THIS army is not more than ONE of the armies of the RGC that began to be withdrawn by the DIRECTIVE Politburo = STALIN from MAY 13)))

    That is, the anonym separating the withdrawal of THIS army from the general withdrawal of troops begun in APREL still - according to OPERPLAN, the General Staff is engaged in DIRECT juggling under his personal false anonymous nonsense of the counterfeiter from the fact that Hitler did not wait for the attack of Hitler on the summer of 41, and to him did not getting ready ...
  9. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 51 New
    -15
    the anonymous author writes another lie: "" The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of signing the non-aggression pact with Japan ""!

    1st - NATIVE, STALIN, April 13, DO NOT SIGN ANY NON-ATTACKS with Tokyo! TEACH the materiel before you climb clever is not the case)))
    2nd - THIS GS directive to Minsk - on the deployment plan - was written UNDER the GSH plan on PREVENTIVE shock and THIS plan was NOT REALIZED from the word NO, and this directive was not even sent to MINSK !! UCHI materiel)))
    You are an anonymous person if you don’t know what = you will study the topic then)) CHEKUNOV ABOUT THIS DIRECTIVE MANY years ago everything was clearly shown)))
  10. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 53 New
    -15
    an anonymous author writes nonsense: "" The directive of the General Staff on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41 and on May 26, the dispatch of troops began.

    Did something dangerous happen on the western border for the decision to transfer troops from ZabOVO? "))

    Well, there is NO kaneshno - they did not wait for the German attack on the SSR, and THESE ARMIES GK RESERVES were sent to the western districts by OPERPLANA General Staff - in order to attack themselves first in July !! AS Rezun bequeathed to our anonymous))
  11. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 58 New
    -17
    Daragi "owners" IN - and WHY do you publish false articles of another fan of Rezun then?

    I threw you an article on the results of the commanders' answers to "Pokrovsky's questions" on the grounds that the article was allegedly "not unique" because it had already been posted on another site on the network !!

    And to lay out the lying Rezun ravings and lies - is this YOUR uniqueness or something? Maybe enough propaganda and promotion of anti-Soviet deceitful to do it?

    With uv. Kozinkin O.Yu.
  12. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 01 New
    -15
    an anonymous person is lying: "" Our scouts do not have exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not. For example, Ramsay ""

    And WEAKLY to do ANALYSIS of all available from the EXPLORATION data available today for free where is the data from Sorge nothing more than a little scribble?
  13. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 11 New
    -14
    lie: "" Based on the concentration of 200 divisions near the border, in April 1941, the General Staff issued Directives to develop plans to cover the western districts.

    An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):

    I order to start developing a plan for the operational deployment of the armies of the ZAPOVO ""

    The software in the districts was developed LONG until APRIL and by May 1, the software for the districts was developed and approved by the General Staff! And this directive was given by Minsk - ethol is not a GNP. The directive is in PRINCIPLE! ALL THIS has long been shown by Chekunov the same))
  14. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 17 New
    -15
    another LIES of the anonymous author: "" it was assumed that in the event of a war with the USSR, the Germans would choose the southern option, ""

    The General Staff of the Red Army did not think that the Germans would choose the southern option! The anonymous author seems primitively DOES NOT UNDERSTAND what is at stake if he is talking nonsense that the Germans chose something there, and in our General Staff Cho there they "thought" about this!
    ABOUT WHAT option - southern or northern, and WHERE in the General Staff our military expected the MAIN forces of the Germans fully show "lessons and conclusions" and the same Marshal ZAKHAROV!

    Alas, the 0-fvkty speak clearly - in our General Staff they NEVER WAITED THE MAIN forces of the Germans south of Polesie !!! DO NOT LIE anonymous! "!

    See appendices 15 and 16 in the lessons - there it is clearly shown WHERE the main forces of the Germans were waiting for OUR plans for the General Staff and what the southern and northern options mean in the understanding of our military !!
  15. Eug
    Eug 8 June 2020 11: 18 New
    +6
    I don’t even know what I need to be in order to correctly understand this stream of conflicting information ... And yet - Ukraine always (long before the famous saying
    Brzezinski) played a crucial role in the plans of the West against Russia.
    1. VS
      VS 8 June 2020 11: 26 New
      -15
      just a smart person who analyzes ALL possible info and not just such scribbles from the false and illiterate anonymous anti-Svetchki))
  16. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 24 New
    -16
    Another FALSE of the anonymous author: "" At the beginning of May, General Staff Directives were sent to the western military units to develop cover plans. Based on information from the draft Note, prepared after May 17, it can be said that the plans should have been developed based on the presence of 189-200 German divisions at our borders. "


    The directives of NGOs and the General Staff on the development in the districts of the DEFENSE PLANS, which anonymously calls illiteracy or FALSE, cover plans went into the districts of May 4-5 and 14 and they have no relation to the plan of the preventive strike of GSh-Zhukov, which Vasilevsky began to write ONCE after he was signed a NEUTRALITY Agreement (and not non-aggression) with TOKYO - do not have it !!
  17. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 32 New
    -14
    FALSE: "" by 22.6.41 our intelligence services were unable to fully disclose the plans for waging war between Germany and the USSR, the composition of the invasion group and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops near our border ... "

    It was to such a FALSE that Marshal Golikov answered that he was responsible for the General Staff of the General Staff and whom FINGER NOBODY touched for his alleged report of a possible German attack on the USSR which, by the lies of another anonymous person, was not expected in the USSR and it was unexpected !!!

    "" In the historical literature one can find contradictory and often distorted judgments about the role of our military intelligence before the Great Patriotic War. Sometimes, even, intentionally or unintentionally, the leaders of military intelligence are credited with actions that in fact were not and could not be. In particular, that our military intelligence allegedly gave I.V. Stalin received incorrect information about the impending attack by Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union, that she did not report all the data to the General Staff, since she was personally subordinate to Stalin. All of this is fiction. In reality, this was the case.
    Firstly, military intelligence was able to timely reveal and report to the political and military leadership of the country the true plans and plans of the enemy, to establish its specific intentions. In a complex, dramatically changing environment, military intelligence, despite once making a serious mistake in the conclusion181, did not allow the enemy to get confused in the intricate network of misinformation, and consistently, step by step, and always timely reported to the leadership about the true plans of the enemy, his main efforts. In this regard, the timely disclosure of the contents of the Barbarossa plan and its main elements should be considered the crown of our military intelligence activities.
    Secondly, our military intelligence managed to establish and disclose not only the plans of the enemy and his intentions, but also the timing of their implementation, despite their repeated transfers. The culmination of intelligence in this regard is the timely establishment of the possible timing of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the timing of the implementation of the same Barbarossa plan. Thirdly, Soviet military intelligence with amazing accuracy for intelligence timely and fully revealed the general composition and grouping of the armed forces of Nazi Germany before the attack, its deployment and numbering of the main formations.

    86

    Fourth, with the outbreak of war, despite enormous organizational and technical difficulties and losses, our military intelligence was able to quickly switch to a military footing, sharply strengthen its operational link, correctly target all other links to solve the main tasks, and successfully provide political and military leadership in the new conditions.
    These are the facts that are irrefutably and convincingly proved by numerous archival documents and eyewitness accounts. "" (https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/354-zapiski-nachalnika-razvedupra-iyul-1940-goda-iyun-1941-goda.html)
  18. Operator
    Operator 8 June 2020 15: 26 New
    -16
    The author does not understand point-blank that the signs of the outbreak of war are objective circumstances (in the case of the German attack on the USSR, the concentration of German divisions on the border is above the control level established by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), and not the subjective opinions of agents, intelligence officers and military attaches.

    In addition, the author simply does not know that Hitler several times during April-June 1941 postponed the start of Operation Barbarossa due to circumstances beyond Germany's control, including because of the unexpected dragging out of the war with Greece and the declaration of war by Yugoslavia.

    It was with such introductory messages that Soviet intelligence reports connected with various dates of the German attack on the USSR - almost simultaneously with Hitler's change of intent.

    PS A separate statement was made by the author about the existence of a second front in Germany in 1941 in the form of a mouse sitting on an island under a broom of Britain (the transatlantic supply line of which was completely controlled by German submarines), but which supposedly concentrated all its forces for landing in Normandy or, according to at least amassed heavy bombers to strike the continent laughing
  19. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 15: 44 New
    -12
    Quote: Slavutich
    The author somehow honestly wrote in the comments: he takes Wikipedia - analyzes it - adds his "analytics" and the article is ready.
    This article, if similar to analysis, is only an analysis of parallel reality.
    Nothing to discuss here: Wikipedia analysis! This is strong!

    that's cool!!)))
  20. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 16: 00 New
    -14
    Quote: Operator
    The author does not understand point-blank that the signs of the outbreak of war are objective circumstances (in the case of the German attack on the USSR, the concentration of German divisions on the border is above the control level established by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), and not the subjective opinions of agents, intelligence officers and military attaches.

    In addition, the author simply does not know that Hitler several times during April-June 1941 postponed the start of Operation Barbarossa due to circumstances beyond Germany's control, including because of the unexpected dragging out of the war with Greece and the declaration of war by Yugoslavia.

    It was with such introductory messages that Soviet intelligence reports connected with various dates of the German attack on the USSR - almost simultaneously with Hitler's change of intent.

    PS A separate statement was made by the author about the existence of a second front in Germany in 1941 in the form of a mouse sitting on an island under a broom of Britain (the transatlantic supply line of which was completely controlled by German submarines), but which supposedly concentrated all its forces for landing in Normandy or, according to at least amassed heavy bombers to strike the continent laughing


    1 - it was not spelled out in the plan of the General Staff of the Red Army - that if the Germans collect so many German divisions on the border with the USSR, they will attack and if they do not collect, then you should not wait for the attack)))

    2nd - Hitler has never transferred the date of the attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic)) As Brauchitsch wrote down the date of the attack on the USSR in January 41st, both June 21 and Hitler attacked on June 0-21)))
    An anonymous avtar mentioned "lessons and conclusions" - the work of the DSP officers of the VNU General Staff from 1992, and there is Appendix 6, (https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody .html) where this Brauchitsch order is given))

    "" c) At the third stage (from April to the beginning of May), the command of the army groups and armies take over the zones designated for them in accordance with the directive for concentration, observing at first the camouflage measures.
    Preparatory work must be carried out in such a way that the offensive (day "B") can be launched on 21.6. ""))))
    The attack on Greece was at number 20 in barbarossa - at number 21. those. the operation with Greece was planned earlier than the attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic and the date of the attack on the Soviet Socialist Republic, prescribed in January - IMMEDIATELY after the signing of Barbarossa itself - was not transferred NEVER - nor officially supposedly - by Hitler)) There was no operation in Yugoslavia for the time-date of the attack on SSR did not affect))

    3rd - you, apparently, in principle, are not aware of what the intelligence reported on the timing), apparently you are like an anonymous author on VIKI like "you know" the topic)))
    read the new book by A.B. Martirosyan on this topic - "On the eve of the war. Could the tragedy have been avoided"))

    4th - anonymous author - vaasche maladets - cho it seems to him that is true))
    1. Operator
      Operator 8 June 2020 19: 31 New
      +8
      Learn the materiel - in directive No. 21 of 18.10.1940/15/1941, Supreme Commander Hitler (and not some Brauchitsch) approved the Barbarossa plan and set the date for the start of the operation as May 5, XNUMX in strict accordance with the strategic plan of the military company and the plans of the army command complete all hostilities within XNUMX months before the start of the autumn thaw.

      The order for the last postponement of the term to June 22, 1941 was signed by Hitler on June 10, 1941.
  21. ccsr
    ccsr 8 June 2020 16: 51 New
    -13
    Author:
    Eugene
    Even a month later (25.4.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events related to the outbreak of war with the USSR:

    This is a blatant lie that the author specifically distributes in his articles, because Tupikov made a detailed report in mid-March, which in terms of volume of material has no analogues at all in pre-war intelligence materials:
    In the second half of March 1941, Major General V. Tupikov sent to Moscow "Report on the combat and numerical strength of the deployed German army and its group as of 15.3.41."
    This report contains more than 100 sheets of typewritten text, 30 diagrams of the organizational structures of the combat units of the German army, a diagram of the grouping of forces of the German army, a diagram of the grouping of the air forces of Germany, a diagram of the organization of the German army corps, summary tables of the combat strength of the Wehrmacht artillery units, etc.
    The report of Major General V. Tupikov on the content, design and completeness of the data is unique evidence the fact that the former chief of staff of the Kharkov military district, who received intelligence skills in the first foreign special mission in Tallinn, completely completed the informational part of the task of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Data on the state of the German armed forces were accurate.
    In Moscow, a report by V.I. Tupikova was immediately processed, and on its basis in April 1941, an “Intelligence Report on Germany” was prepared. She was sent to the People’s Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and the commander of the western military districts.

    http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=10674353%40cmsArticle
    1. Operator
      Operator 8 June 2020 17: 50 New
      -14
      Our Israeli "friend" Eugene burns with napalm laughing
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 8 June 2020 18: 19 New
        -14
        Quote: Operator
        Our Israeli "friend" Eugene burns with napalm

        And I think where it stinks - now I understand ....
        And after all, mind you, again, not a single link to the material leads - cheats as always, and be sure to distort the facts. For example, he is brazenly lying:
        In fact, over 40 divisions arrived in East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were TD and MD. However, our intelligence was not able to detect their appearance at the border, although partially the transportation was recorded.

        But in fact, the Intelligence Directorate most accurately revealed the entire group of Germans concentrated against the USSR on June 22:
        It is interesting to compare the information on the number of German divisions concentrated against the USSR by June 1941 according to the then intelligence of our Intelligence Agency and today's data. Here is the book of the Publishing House of Political Literature "Soviet Army", a circulation of 100 thousand. We read on pages 155–156: “By the spring of 1941, the German army had 214 divisions, including 21 tank and 14 motorized ... And out of these 214 tested, fired divisions, 153, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, were sent to east, to the borders of the Soviet Union. " What did our Intelligence Directorate report about this almost 30 years ago? In the same intelligence number 5, it claimed that as of June 1, 1941, the Hitler command against the Soviet Union already had about 130-131 German divisions with a depth of 400 kilometers (including Finland and Romania) concentrated along our western borders (counting Finland and Romania). there is up to the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn, Elbing). At the same time, we indicated in the same document that "the German command continues (emphasized by me. - F.G.) the concentration of troops to the border strip with the USSR, making massive transfers of units from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans." And in the depths of Germany, as we argued in the same document, the main military command of Hitler Germany on June 1 had 44–48 divisions in its general strategic reserve. And in any case, at least half of them were intended against the USSR. Thus, the general composition of the forces of Nazi Germany, deployed and intended to begin operations against the Red Army, on June 1, 1941 amounted to at least 150–155 German divisions. As it is obvious, this calculation does not include the number of ground divisions and individual brigades of the then Hitler allies - Romania, Hungary and Finland. We knew their number exactly, as the book “Soviet Army” on page 156 correctly states, “in total 190 divisions were fully prepared against the Red Army ...” The accuracy of our data is the result of the exceptional conscientiousness of the local military intelligence and special checks of the information received by the employees of the Intelligence Agency.

        F.I.Golikov
        1. Operator
          Operator 8 June 2020 18: 51 New
          -15
          Now he will start to change his shoes in the air - like yesterday the CEO of Channel One with the film "Brother" laughing
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 8 June 2020 19: 07 New
            -13
            Quote: Operator
            Now start to change shoes in the air

            I think it won’t start - in the last article I convicted him of blatant lies about the number of divisions, so he pretended not to notice that his lie did not pass. And now the same thing will happen.
            1. Operator
              Operator 8 June 2020 19: 33 New
              -15
              Let's see - now the American spring has prevailed and all manuals are at once outdated laughing
        2. Tuzik
          Tuzik 8 June 2020 19: 41 New
          +8
          It seems to me that disputes about intelligence on the eve of the war have not been silent for so long, because there were so many explored and very controversial, now everyone chooses the ones he likes best for his article. The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the right reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 9 June 2020 12: 48 New
            -8
            Quote: Tuzik
            The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the correct reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.

            Suppose you do not believe Golikov, suspecting that he has distorted something. But then what compelled us to evaluate the intelligence activities of those who in modern Russia were no longer connected, but knew how the situation was then:
            ... the authoritative modern historian and political scientist Valentin Mikhailovich Falin said: "II Ilyichev, the head of strategic military intelligence (he was my boss in the Soviet Control Commission and in the Third European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) said, that intelligence data on the concentration of German troops along the front line at the time of the attack diverged from reality by only two divisions! Moreover, these two divisions were not deployed, they were only on the way. In other words, our intelligence was quite knowledgeable. "

            Why should Falin lie, especially since he had nothing to do with military intelligence?
            1. Tuzik
              Tuzik 9 June 2020 13: 01 New
              +2
              Quote: ccsr
              that intelligence data on the concentration of German troops along the front line at the time of the attack diverged from reality by only two divisions!

              So I mean that if you select after the war from that heap of reports all the intelligence that matches reality, then that is most likely. Here you will not dig into Golikov, so he confidently praised himself. But how did they choose and analyze before the day of judgment?
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 48 New
                -7
                Quote: Tuzik
                But how did they choose and analyze before the day of judgment?

                For this, the GRU has analytical structures, and naturally Golikov did not personally compile a summary - this final document was prepared by several experts under the guidance of the head of the information department. There was a very specific Lieutenant Colonel Rookie in the history of the GRU of that period, who fantasized a lot in his memoirs, but nevertheless very accurately described the work of information agencies:
                «FINISHING “MOBILE RECORDING IN GERMANY”, - recalls V.A. Rookie, - I carried it to Golikov. In the "note" we determined the scale of the deployment of the German army in two versions: for lightning war (blitzkrieg) and for a long one. "For a lightning war, we determined the number of divisions around 220, for a long one - 230. And we attached a map-diagram showing the existing German forces on our borders and possible options for the direction of their operations."

                Please note that we are talking about MOBZAPE, and not about the Wehrmacht's operational plans for June 1941 - only military professionals understand what their difference is and do not mold a hunchback, as the author of the statues Evgeny does, dumping everything in order to justify his false fabrications.
                1. Tuzik
                  Tuzik 9 June 2020 13: 55 New
                  +5
                  He presents his version of events. The more versions the more interesting!
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 9 June 2020 14: 02 New
                    -8
                    Quote: Tuzik
                    He presents his version of events. The more versions the more interesting!

                    The author of the articles is constantly lying, and this can be easily verified by the example of a previous article, where he lied that in 1938 there were a total of 111 divisions in Germany according to our GS estimates:
                    According to the estimates of the General Staff, in Germany there were 96 pd, 5 ppm, 5 cd and 30 TB (a total of 111 divisions).

                    I noticed this lie and gave an answer using a table, which he "did not notice":
                    It can be seen from the materials that as of 1.1.1939, there were no talk of any 111 divisions at all, so the lies about 96 infantry divisions, of which there were only 39, lay on the conscience of the author of these fabrications. However, I have always argued that he is a liar and you can not trust him.

                    However, you yourself can check it by the link:
                    https://topwar.ru/171298-nachalo-sosredotochenija-podvizhnyh-vojsk-vermahta-u-nashej-granicy.html
                    1. Tuzik
                      Tuzik 9 June 2020 14: 07 New
                      +2
                      There can be mistakes in counting divisions, some are already fighting, some are completing picking, some are just starting to take shape, some are only on paper.
  22. Tuzik
    Tuzik 8 June 2020 19: 35 New
    +2
    It was interesting to read, but I did not understand, the title of the article "Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?", And in the article itself there was a selective listing of intelligence information about the Germans. Where was the army preparing to go before coming to Ukraine? They turned her on the way, why sho?
    1. Ales
      Ales 8 June 2020 19: 53 New
      +8
      There is a link at the beginning of the article. Initially, the army was redeployed to Transcaucasia, and on June 10 it was redirected to the Oryol District. Then to the Kiev district.
      1. Tuzik
        Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 00 New
        +2
        Thanks for the answer. Do you mean the link to the article: "June 22: the results of the historical investigation of the RVIO, June 2018"? So read there for a day)) Okay, I'll try to start. ))
        1. AsmyppoL
          8 June 2020 20: 13 New
          13
          Tomorrow, see Part 2 on preparing for departure.
          Then wait 1-2 days and wait for the third part about the final goal. The fourth last with the docking of parts will be after June 4
          1. Tuzik
            Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 14 New
            +3
            Understood thanks. From far away you come. )))
            1. AsmyppoL
              8 June 2020 20: 19 New
              +6
              So the review is unique laughing
              This has not yet been published anywhere.
              Good luck!
              1. The comment was deleted.
        2. The comment was deleted.
      2. Tuzik
        Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 48 New
        +3
        "There is a link at the beginning of the article"

        I read a bit, there is a curse between historians, they can’t get together for more than two)) Here people are discussing in VO more interesting.
  23. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 18 New
    -13
    Quote: Operator
    Learn the materiel - in directive No. 21 of 18.10.1940/15/1941, Supreme Commander Hitler (and not some Brauchitsch) approved the Barbarossa plan and set the date for the start of the operation as May 5, XNUMX in strict accordance with the strategic plan of the military company and the plans of the army command complete all hostilities within XNUMX months before the start of the autumn thaw.

    The order for the last postponement of the term to June 22, 1941 was signed by Hitler on June 10, 1941.


    but can you quote - WHERE is there in Barbarossa - the GENERAL plan of the attack after which there was a SPECIFIC order establishing the EXACT date of the attack?))

    We look - what is indicated there in Barbarossa №21 - "" Preparations that require a longer time, if they have not yet begun, should be started now and finished by 15.05.41 ""

    Oops (((AND WHERE is DATA ATTACKS registered?)) For nerds, I’ll tell you - May 15 is the date of the END of the main PREPARATIONS, and not the date of the attack))) so - calm down the ignoramus - Hitler didn’t transfer the date of the ATTACK)) damn .. where the ignoramuses like you get out ??? (((
  24. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 21 New
    -13
    Quote: Tuzik
    It seems to me that disputes about intelligence on the eve of the war have not been silent for so long, because there were so many explored and very controversial, now everyone chooses the ones he likes best for his article. The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the right reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.

    judging by the fact that Golikov was sent to the United States to establish arms supplies i.e. enjoyed the great confidence of Stalin - the data he gave on time and accurate and complete for the Germans)))
    1. cavl
      cavl 8 June 2020 20: 52 New
      11
      Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?
      Why, ignoramus-quote-book, Kozinkin!
      Arguments on the verge of kindergarten ...
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 26 New
        -8
        Quote: cavl
        Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?

        Lying as always - this was not Golikov in the 60s who claimed, but this is intelligence data No. 5 dated June 15. And the number 285-296 is indicated there, that is, even in the details you can’t do without lies. But this is not the point, but the fact that no one has yet disproved these data, although any military professional understands that they reflect a general assessment of the combat potential of Germany on the eve of the war and this data is accurate.

        And against the British troops on different fronts, a figure of 120 divisions is indicated, and you, a liar, present them as ready to fight directly on the territory of England. This is how different "experts" of the history of the Second World War are made up of juggling, in which both of you and the author of the article have succeeded.
    2. Tuzik
      Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 55 New
      +8
      Maybe he was just a reliable, proven frame. Tymoshenko and Zhukov also forgave the defeat of the summer.
      1. AsmyppoL
        9 June 2020 04: 53 New
        +8
        Yes you are right. But I think that the main problem was I.V. Stalin.
        Stalin carefully read all intelligence reports. Unlike all other leaders, he received TWO copies of intelligence documents. At least from the intelligence department. What he counted there and thought we do not know. But in a mishmash of misinformation, he could only do wrong actions. And he allowed or did not allow all military decisions. Perhaps he considered himself one of the main culprits of the June 22 tragedy ...
        He sent the others involved in the main directions to the fronts, where they could not fix much until the first days of July ... He sent someone away so that they would not break firewood. For example, as the commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov or the same Golikov ...
        The military commanders were not able to think, trusted in intelligence and did not know how to competently fight ... For their experience, they were platiks with the blood of our soldiers, commanders, ordinary civilians ...
        The situation was similar with the encirclement of the southwestern front. The chief of staff of the front was a wonderful man, a competent military general Tupikov. A great scout, military attache in Germany. He escaped from Berlin on the eve of the war. German pilots received orders to bring down the plane, but did not find it in the night sky.
        Twice he turned to the chief of staff of the General Staff and directly, contrary to any order, to Stalin on measures to prevent the encirclement of a large group of troops. Shaposhnikov called him an alarmist. Two days later, the encirclement ring slammed shut. General Tupikov died with weapons in his hands .... A blessed memory to him and other fallen heroes!
        But Shaposhnikov was not injured for this, because The final decision was made by Stalin ...

        As the saying goes, the devil is hiding in the details. In the fourth part, all the pieces of the mosaic will settle down in one picture. Different parts that are usually not a single chain of events will be connected by a single chain
        1. VS
          VS 9 June 2020 09: 38 New
          -7
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          But in a mishmash of misinformation, he could only do wrong actions.

          do you judge a native anonymous by yourself? It is YOU on the meager information you are delusional, erroneous minimum conclusions ignorant. And Stalin, in contrast to you, was an SMART anonymous man and KNEW more accurately))) Or maybe it is necessary to judge by FACTS - by the actions that have been undertaken since the end of April - the begun withdrawal of the armies of the RGK from the General Staff plan is what?

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          he allowed or did not allow all military decisions. Perhaps he considered himself one of the main culprits of the June 22 tragedy ...

          ALL of his permissions or not permissions - were completely TRUE! both politically and militarily!

          STUDY military affairs - you can understand what were the orders of the General Staff from May)))

          but what did you think or thought from there - stop already being smart ... the spiritualist)) it turns out funny))
          SEE WHAT HE DID !!))


          Quote: AsmyppoL
          He sent someone away so that they wouldn’t break firewood. For example, as the commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov or the same Golikov ...

          but where could GOLIKOV be sent on June 23? ON THE FRONT or what? He started the RU General Staff Generally - he has his own specifics)) So he went to the SSHA - and this is not far away a = IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL task .. you are our anonymous thimble))

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Dead ends. A great scout, military attache in Germany. He escaped from Berlin on the eve of the war. German pilots received orders to bring down the plane, but did not find it in the night sky.
          Twice he turned to the chief of staff of the General Staff and directly, contrary to any order, to Stalin on measures to prevent the encirclement of a large group of troops. Shaposhnikov called him an alarmist. Two days later, the encirclement ring slammed shut. General Tupikov died with weapons in his hands .... A blessed memory to him and other fallen heroes!

          Why are you driving demagoguery? WHAT IS HERE Tupikov and the Kiev boiler then? Is there anything - the question between Tupikov and Shaposhnikov was SOLVED only? what are you doing falsification again ?? you still have a tear here, let the deceitful - through the innocent slain ...
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          But Shaposhnikov was not injured for this, because The final decision was made by Stalin ...

          well, kaneshnaya Ms. - Stalin is all for you .. guilty !!))) He didn’t want to plant and shoot capitalism (((The heirs climbed out of all the cracks ... the zuleiks were not finished)) STALIN is to blame for everything)))

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          In the fourth part, all the pieces of the mosaic will settle down in one picture. Different parts that are usually not a single chain of events will be connected by a single chain

          we will)))) Tell us that Stalin did not believe in German attack in general, and certainly on June 22, because he dreamed of attacking but did not have time - July 6 - for this he began to withdraw the army of the RGC from May 13?)))
        2. Tuzik
          Tuzik 9 June 2020 11: 40 New
          +2
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Stalin carefully read all intelligence messages

          Is there some kind of terminator when he did everything? Get into all the little things on all issues. They say that in technical data and in the production of any equipment, I rummaged no worse than specialists.
        3. ccsr
          ccsr 9 June 2020 14: 47 New
          -6
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Yes you are right. But I think that the main problem was I.V. Stalin.

          And I think that the main problem is not in Stalin, but that you constantly pervert the history of the Second World War and for this you do not disdain juggling, as it was with the number of German divisions according to our GS, or fantasize about the 16th army, the purpose of which was determined in the General Staff, and Marshal M.V. Zakharov writes about this:
          Thus, the second strategic echelon, which was the reserve of the High Command, included 16, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies; and they included 58 rifle, 13 armored and 6 motorized rifle divisions.
          The advance of the 19th and 16th armies to the Kiev direction shows that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated south of Polesie, according to the certificate "On the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the west", compiled by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin eight days before the start of the war, that is, June 13, 1941 ...
  25. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 26 New
    -12
    Quote: Ales
    There is a link at the beginning of the article. Initially, the army was redeployed to Transcaucasia, and on June 10 it was redirected to the Oryol District. Then to the Kiev district.

    garbage)) The exact place where she was going is the place where she came to you))
    At one time, Chekunov showed a milter on the forum - she went to the area BETWEEN ZAPOVO and KOVO)) And her shyness is the result of the Germans giving a note of protest to this army !! Like, why do you have an army from the Urals rushing to the WEST ??)) the answer was this - it goes to Wed. ASIA)) like we are waiting from the British for a trick)))
  26. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 31 New
    -12
    Quote: Tuzik
    Thanks for the answer. Do you mean the link to the article: "June 22: the results of the historical investigation of the RVIO, June 2018"? So read there for a day)) Okay, I'll try to start. ))

    this is not an article - this is a conversation in the RVIO in June 2018 where the young TIMIN yelled at me - to my words that the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK began in the middle of MAY in connection with the expectation of an attack by Hitler - WHERE did this army go ?? !! WHERE WAS IT ??)))
    He tried with these cries to prove that she did not go in expectation of an attack in principle, but if she did not go to the border at once, which was NOT the plan for the General Staff to give the armies of the RGK in principle - that means they did not wait for the attacks)) in general - carried the same a blizzard that carries an anonymous author)))
    1. cavl
      cavl 8 June 2020 20: 49 New
      11
      This is a conversation after which Kozinkin, after 10 years of studying quotes, could not tell where you were moving the 4 reserve armies.
      And Chekunov literally wrote the word "fuck" in the words of Kozinkin on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 31 New
        -8
        Quote: cavl
        And Chekunov literally wrote the word "fuck" in the words of Kozinkin on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.

        Well, many here consider you this - and I think it is not unfounded.
    2. Tuzik
      Tuzik 8 June 2020 21: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: V.S.
      where the young TIMIN cried out to me - in my words that the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK began in the middle of MAY in connection with the expectation of an attack by Hitler - WHERE did this army go ?? !! WHERE WAS IT ??)))

      This is where I finished reading. )))
  27. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 11 New
    -8
    Quote: sleeve
    Right. I wanted to comment, but you were the first. 19th how and where in this hypothesis? Accordingly, the 16th drove to its destination. 2nd echelon. Riding quietly and slowly. An explosive schedule? Well yes. Only within the indicated timeframe, the starting numbers also differ. The Germans are closer to zero, and therefore the "arrival" is higher. True or not, the RD for June or May 41 no longer mattered. The decision to move out of the internal districts only testifies to the correct assessment of the situation. The result of the actions is a purely military confrontation with a stronger and more experienced enemy. And this enemy, no matter how strong and experienced, ended the war in his capital. In no small part because of what happened in the 41st.


    alas - it's not that simple .. The pogrom of the 41st for the Red Army is not a consequence of the fact that someone was being withdrawn there late .. Isaev yells that it was necessary to withdraw in May and the internal districts too - so that there was happiness and victory! All the buttons were pressed and in a timely manner - more than a MONTH the withdrawal of troops began - the Armies of the RGK in the western districts, the second echelons of the districts went along the PP from June 11, and the date of the attack as an approximate - on the 20th of June - was also known in the Kremlin! BUT! The problem was in the plans of the General Staff, which the officers of the General Staff of the General Staff showed in the "lessons and conclusions" but that the anonymous avatar carefully ignored the idiots' nonsense that the attack was not expected at all because the Germans fooled our intelligence by changing the shoulder straps of the soldiers ...
  28. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 13 New
    -8
    Quote: cavl
    Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?
    Why, ignoramus-quote-book, Kozinkin!
    Arguments on the verge of kindergarten ...

    WHERE WAS GOING TO FIGHT - IN WHICH point of the world - these 120 divisions - NAME THEM a release clever .. in NORWAY and Prussia?
  29. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 15 New
    -8
    Quote: cavl
    This is a conversation after which Kozinkin, after 10 years of studying quotes, could not tell where you were moving the 4 reserve armies.
    And Chekunov literally wrote the word "fuck" in the words of Kozinkin on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.

    a miracle - this army went to the WESTERN okrugs - according to the GSh OPERPLAN)) Because they were WAITING for Hitler's ATTACK)) And the concrete station for unloading the army of the RESERVE GK on the GSh operplan does NOT have ANY value in this case))
  30. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 21 New
    -8
    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: V.S.
    where the young TIMIN cried out to me - in my words that the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK began in the middle of MAY in connection with the expectation of an attack by Hitler - WHERE did this army go ?? !! WHERE WAS IT ??)))

    This is where I finished reading. )))

    I at that moment simply did not understand - WHAT is he yelling at all about? what is the meaning of his ora - what does the minor want to say? (((((And only when his friend Isaev began a year later !!! to carry the blizzard that the army of the RGK turns out to BE NOT ABLE to go to the very border and THIS was the reason for the defeat of the Red Army - I I realized what this one yelled))
    The armies of the RGCs went as the second strategic echelon (by the way, by the way, there was no such term then) to their areas according to the General Staff plan to fulfill their next task - a retaliatory attack in the event of a German attack) And Timin and Isaev yelled that the conditional time had not gone to the border itself 16th Army - that means the attack did not wait yet)))

    and this is about trying to vtyuhivat and tutoshny anonymous author))
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 9 June 2020 12: 10 New
      -1
      Quote: V.S.
      And only when his friendship Isaev began a year later !!! bear the blizzard that the army of the RGK is not able to go to the very border and THIS was the reason for the defeat of the Red Army

      That he has been saying for ten years that the main reason for the defeat is not the tightly standing three echelons, and the holes from the bagels in the directions of the German attacks.
      And about Timin, I also did not like it, well, tell me your opinion where the army was going, cho to shout him ten times "where did she go?"
      You historians need to be less emotional in discussions, that’s why you are constantly insulting the author here, you can argue more culturally!
  31. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 23 New
    -7
    Quote: Tuzik
    Maybe he was just a reliable, proven frame. Tymoshenko and Zhukov also forgave the defeat of the summer.

    they didn’t forgive .. Tymoshenko - CHIEF COMMANDER of the first days - drove down to the front. Zhukov - A YEAR of no awards or titles))) if it were not for their position — the People’s Commissar and the General Staff by June 22 — Stalin would definitely put both of them on the wall ..
  32. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 43 New
    -7
    Quote: Gardamir
    There are two points, none of those writing about the situation on the eve of the war recalls the situation inside the country. How prepared are the Union, industry, agriculture for war. I really wanted the war, since it was inevitable to begin, as late as possible.
    Well, the second point. Imagine that Hitler officially declares war, that would be.

    if Hitler declares war - but he wanted to do it at 2 o'clock in Moscow but it didn’t work out - thanks to Stalin))) - if he declares it in a day, then he is an AGGRESSOR unambiguous and we can deliver bombing strikes against the Wehrmacht near the borders)))
  33. slasha
    slasha 9 June 2020 12: 21 New
    +8
    Good selection. And the analysis is present. Thank.
  34. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 00 New
    -4
    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Stalin carefully read all intelligence messages

    Is there some kind of terminator when he did everything? Get into all the little things on all issues. They say that in technical data and in the production of any equipment, I rummaged no worse than specialists.

    and he was also engaged in literature of architecture and many issues of metallurgy of the same and this is not Hochma)) If it weren’t for Stalin, you wouldn’t write comments here right now)) And this is not because he is the father of the peoples, but because he commanded the Soviet Socialist Republic during the war to the extermination of the Aces by the enlightened West ...
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 9 June 2020 19: 42 New
      +1
      smile I studied in a Soviet school. And only Russian historians read, except Liddle Garth.
  35. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 07 New
    -6
    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: V.S.
    And only when his friendship Isaev began a year later !!! bear the blizzard that the army of the RGK is not able to go to the very border and THIS was the reason for the defeat of the Red Army

    That he has been saying for ten years that the main reason for the defeat is not the tightly standing three echelons, and the holes from the bagels in the directions of the German attacks.
    And about Timin, I also did not like it, well, tell me your opinion where the army was going, cho to shout him ten times "where did she go?"
    You historians need to be less emotional in discussions, that’s why you are constantly insulting the author here, you can argue more culturally!

    if the autar is Lying on purpose and spits on what he tells him - what to do with it - despite the fact that he stupidly HIDES for a clique who is clearly afraid that his name will be known - that he is lying not just an anonym but a specific type?))

    According to Isaev - Isaev never showed THIS BEFORE May 2019 - - that the army of the GK reserve, the armies from the internal districts, supposedly MUST fill these same holes on the border !!))) they should, but they didn’t have time - because of intelligence and STALIN respectively!))
    read)) -
    https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/347-antiisaev.html

    When I began to delve into - Isaev carries it carefully there - he turned out to be engaged in this manipulation for more than 15 years! EXACTLY FITTING AND FALSE))
  36. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 08 New
    -6
    Quote: slasha
    Good selection. And the analysis is present. Thank.

    yes there’s no analysis here) I’m begging you))) a cheap fit for my ravings about the fact that they didn’t wait for the attack, they didn’t prepare for it, but if the troops were going somewhere, then apparently the first to attack)))
    A vulgar mixture of Rezonism and Isaevschina)))
  37. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 20: 38 New
    -6
    Quote: Tuzik
    smile I studied in a Soviet school. And only Russian historians read, except Liddle Garth.

    did I read my writings?)) Here - last year’s books - 2 pieces .. and in the same place but earlier laid out - there are still))))) I can throw off some fresh ones as well))) Only today the publishers took off the cover for a new book - it’ll be released in connection with this madhouse in the fall))
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 9 June 2020 23: 36 New
      +1
      No, I didn’t read yours, but somehow quite a while ago I tried Martirosyan, with a tempting name like the betrayal of generals. As I understand it, you are in the same stream with him. Throw a link to the article here, I'll see.
  38. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 08: 40 New
    -5
    Quote: cormorant
    They begin exactly when the aggressor believes that he is ready. And not a day earlier.

    With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
    good Very true remark! I was always surprised at this moment. What the hell can there be a provocation when such forces are concentrated on the border itself.

    the question of provocations is the question of WHO WILL BE recognized by the AGGRESSOR !! The USA declared that those PARTIES WHO WILL be recognized as the victim of aggression will help! Hitler stated in NOTA that he was defending himself from the constant attacks of the USSR on her innocence !! And if it were recognized that the USSR realistically and constantly behaves AGGRESSively towards its neighbors, then Germany’s strike will be PREVENTIVE and she would defend herself! SO it became clear - why in those days the question of provocations was relevant?))
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 10 June 2020 08: 57 New
      +1
      The US said that they will help THOSE PARTIES WHO WILL

      By the summer of 1941, the United States helped Great Britain in the war with Germany, right up to the construction of the AVE, the escort of goods by the US Navy ships, the participation of volunteers, in 1940 they developed a general strategy (plan "ABC") in the war, in the spring of 1941 American quartermasters were working in England to accommodate American troops.
  39. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 08: 42 New
    -5
    Quote: Tuzik
    No, I didn’t read yours, but somehow quite a while ago I tried Martirosyan, with a tempting name like the betrayal of generals. As I understand it, you are in the same stream with him. Throw a link to the article here, I'll see.


    website "Great slandered war" - https://liewar.ru/
    or just in Yandex, you type my surname)) Kozinkin O.
    And - do you believe that OUR generals could not at all wish the defeat of the USSR in the war with enlightened Europe?)))
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 10 June 2020 11: 10 New
      0
      Of course they couldn’t, just by the level they were weaker than the enemy, Bayern-Spartak type. The same Stalin said we have no Hindenburgs.
  40. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 15: 09 New
    -5
    Quote: strannik1985
    The US said that they will help THOSE PARTIES WHO WILL

    By the summer of 1941, the United States helped Great Britain in the war with Germany, right up to the construction of the AVE, the escort of goods by the US Navy ships, the participation of volunteers, in 1940 they developed a general strategy (plan "ABC") in the war, in the spring of 1941 American quartermasters were working in England to accommodate American troops.

    And what?? And then the SSR is from what side for the United States? (((What did they say that they would help the SSR if Stalin was the first to crash something? You’re just like a little kid (((
    YOU ARE IN THE COURSE HOW THE USA HELPED THE SSR, even though they recognized the SSR as VICTIM aggression in REALITY? Read the one who was engaged in negotiations with the United States on the subject of supplies and assistance from the United States to the USSR in the summer and autumn of the 41st - Golikov ..
  41. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 15: 13 New
    -5
    Quote: Tuzik
    Of course they couldn’t, just by the level they were weaker than the enemy, Bayern-Spartak type. The same Stalin said we have no Hindenburgs.

    and therefore they — individual generals — could not wish defeat for their country? ))) Are you aware of the lope of generals and senior officers rushed to the Germans in the very first weeks of the war surrendering their regiments and divisions and districts?
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 10 June 2020 19: 38 New
      +2
      That I say, read Martirosyan. )) And Solonina listened. I do not believe that the generals of the great armies would wish for defeat. Ambition will not give. The same traitor Vlasov, who, it seemed, could not stand the Communists, fought well, Stalin was pleased with him.
  42. VS
    VS 11 June 2020 08: 53 New
    -5
    Quote: Tuzik
    That I say, read Martirosyan. )) And Solonina listened. I do not believe that the generals of the great armies would wish for defeat. Ambition will not give. The same traitor Vlasov, who, it seemed, could not stand the Communists, fought well, Stalin was pleased with him.

    WHO told you that Stalin was pleased with Vlasov and that Vlasov fought well Before his captivity? Have you ever taken a WHO REFERENCE COURSE in the 80s WITHOUT a battle — did you restore capitalism and destroy the USSR? Do not be an ace (((
    1. Tuzik
      Tuzik 11 June 2020 16: 38 New
      +1
      One can even see the increase - the lump of the mechanized corps - the lump of the army - the front castle. In the film about the tragedy on Volkhov it was said that Stalin sent him to lead the front, but he refused, so they sent him an army to save something that wasn’t very cunning.
  43. VS
    VS 13 June 2020 10: 23 New
    -2
    Quote: Tuzik
    One can even see the increase - the lump of the mechanized corps - the lump of the army - the front castle. In the film about the tragedy on Volkhov it was said that Stalin sent him to lead the front, but he refused, so they sent him an army to save something that wasn’t very cunning.

    Yes, you never know who raised anyone if there was no one stupid to put in positions ((Do you think Stalin himself decided WHERE where to put it from above on the building or what?)) He brought a subordinate idea - who to put where he is, not really bothering - trusting the subordinate and if there were no DIRECT jambs - and signed the order)))