1941. Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?
The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), pd - infantry division td - tank division.
In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArkhVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, DF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, LVO - Leningrad Military District (Northern Front - Northern Front) , OdVO - Odessa Military District, OVO - Oryol Military District, PribOVO - Baltic Special VO, VVO - Volga VO, SAVO - Central Asian VE, SibVO - Siberian VO, North Caucasian Military District, UrVO - Ural VO, HVO - Kharkov VO .
Official version
79 years ago, the redeployment of the 16th Army from ZabVO began. Most memoirs and books talk about sending her west. For example, in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova:
On May 13, the General Staff issued a directive to the Military Depot to nominate troops west from the internal districts. The 22nd Army marched from the Urals to the Great Bow region; from PriVO to the Gomel region - the 21st army; from North Caucasian Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region — 19th Army; from the KhVO to the border of the Western Dvina - 25th sk; from Transbaikalia to Ukraine to the Shepetivka area - the 16th army ...
In 2018, historians discussed events that occurred on the eve of war. During the discussion, the question was asked: “Where did the 16th Army go?” In preparing the materials for the article, the author was unable to find documents that would unambiguously give an answer to this question.
Discussing pre-war events, they often refer to the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions”, using it as a reference. I will express my opinion about it: it seems that the authors placed in the book only those materials for which they were given permission. The book does not destroy the version that existed for many years, according to which intelligence provided all the necessary RM about the enemy troops. Based on reliable RMs, the spacecraft command, anticipating the outbreak of war in June, was perspicaciously trying to break through the permit to begin the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the western military forces to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done. The reasons for this behavior I.V. Stalin called different, but his behavior is not considered in terms of knowledge of the situation before the war.
In a series of articles on intelligence, the author presented a large number of materials showing that the pre-war RMs turned out to be unreliable. However, in the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions” there is not a word about the accuracy of the RM that came to the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR in May-June 1941. Mention of intelligence data ends in April 1941. The authors deliberately did not address this issue. This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the received RM: “... in March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan of the Barbarossa plan. In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR ... "
In March, the RM spoke of three versions of the design of the attack, but only one of them was correct. In addition, the fourth fantastic version is described in the report of the head of RU: “... after the victory over England, Germany, advancing against the USSR, intends to strike from two flanks: coverage from the north (meaning Finland) and from the Balkan Peninsula”.
Even a month later (25.4.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events related to the outbreak of war with the USSR:
The data leads me to believe that:
1. In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as yet another adversary.
2. The timing of the onset of the collision is perhaps shorter and, certainly within the current year. Another thing is that these plans and dates may come across something similar to Matsuoka’s trip ...
3. The next coming events of the Germans seem to me like this:
a) saddling turkey a pact of three or any similar to it;
b) accession to the pact of three Sweden, and, therefore, Finland, as the latter has long been ready to join him;
c) strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater;
d) whether the Germans plan extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to sayalthough officially such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed ...
1. In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as yet another adversary.
2. The timing of the onset of the collision is perhaps shorter and, certainly within the current year. Another thing is that these plans and dates may come across something similar to Matsuoka’s trip ...
3. The next coming events of the Germans seem to me like this:
a) saddling turkey a pact of three or any similar to it;
b) accession to the pact of three Sweden, and, therefore, Finland, as the latter has long been ready to join him;
c) strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater;
d) whether the Germans plan extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to sayalthough officially such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed ...
The quote in the book that Germany refused to attack England is also a juggling of facts. Such information either appeared in the Republic of Moldova, or materials were again given with confirmation of the preparation of German troops for landing in England. Even the British intelligence services in early June 1941 could not clearly say: there will be an attack on England or not.
The book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions" says the following about the transportation of troops from deep districts: “On April 26, the General Staff gave preliminary orders to the Military Councils of the ZabVO and the Far Eastern Military District [it should be about DF. - Note auth.] be ready to send to the West the 5th mk, two sk (32nd and 31st) (a total of 9 divisions) and two (211st and 212nd) airborne brigades ... " and further information on their destinations in the west is indicated.
German troops on our border
Let’s try to figure out, based on published materials, whether there were prerequisites in May for the start of the transfer of troops of the 16th Army. The General Staff Directive on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41 and the sending of troops began on May 26.
Did something dangerous happen on the western border to decide on the transfer of troops from ZabOVO? On 25.4.41, according to intelligence, 95 ... 100 German divisions were on our border, on May 15 - 114 ... 119, on May 31 - 120 ... 122. It can be seen that since May 15, the rate of transfer of German troops to the border has significantly decreased. From June 1 to June 19 (inclusive), no more than 7 divisions were transported to our borders.
In fact, over 40 divisions arrived in East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were TD and MD. However, our intelligence was not able to detect their appearance at the border, although partially the transportation was recorded. In June, according to intelligence, the situation with an increase in the concentration of German troops at the border almost stabilized.
Also in June, RM began to arrive, mentioning various conditions and ultimatums from Germany to the USSR. In Moldova, it was said either about the imminent start of a war with the Soviet Union, then about an attack on England, then about German expansion to the Middle East and the African coast, then about the postponement of the start of the war with our country to July-August 1941.
Could the leadership of the SC on May 20-25 frighten the presence of about 120 German divisions at the border? Could the leadership of the spacecraft at this time break through the permission to transfer troops of the 16th Army?
The number of spacecraft divisions that should have been concentrated in western military units was determined by the General Staff on the basis of the number of German divisions that Germany could set up in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1940, when considering the options for military operations of German troops against the USSR, the enemy group was determined in 180 or more divisions (not counting the troops of possible allies of Germany).
According to intelligence, during the winter in Germany new divisions were formed. On the basis of the Republic of Moldova, as of 11.3.41, the General Staff considered that Germany would set up 200 divisions for war with the USSR. To counter this threat, the number of spacecraft divisions that should have been in the western districts, in the LVO and in the RGK troops was determined. Based on the concentration of 200 divisions at the border, in April 1941 the General Directives were sent out to develop plans for covering western districts.
An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):
I order you to begin developing a plan for the operational deployment of the ZapOVO armies, guided by the following instructions.
1. Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy it is now believed to provide a peaceful position on our western borders. The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. However, given:
a) the events in Europe - the German occupation of Bulgaria, their declaration of war on Yugoslavia and Greece;
b) suspicious German behavior in Finland and Romania;
c) the concentration by Germany of considerable forces towards the borders of the USSR;
d) the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance, the tip of which, in the presence of the above circumstances, can be directed against the USSR - when developing the USSR defense plan, it is necessary to keep in mind not only opponents such as Finland, Romania, England, but also of such possible opponents as Germany, Italy and Japan...
2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its 225 20 pd, 15 td and XNUMX pd, can be sent against our borders to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 PD, 20 TD and 15 MD ...
1. Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy it is now believed to provide a peaceful position on our western borders. The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. However, given:
a) the events in Europe - the German occupation of Bulgaria, their declaration of war on Yugoslavia and Greece;
b) suspicious German behavior in Finland and Romania;
c) the concentration by Germany of considerable forces towards the borders of the USSR;
d) the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance, the tip of which, in the presence of the above circumstances, can be directed against the USSR - when developing the USSR defense plan, it is necessary to keep in mind not only opponents such as Finland, Romania, England, but also of such possible opponents as Germany, Italy and Japan...
2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its 225 20 pd, 15 td and XNUMX pd, can be sent against our borders to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 PD, 20 TD and 15 MD ...
The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of signing the non-aggression treaty with Japan. It does not follow from the document that the war is unambiguously expected in the summer of 1941 and it is not explicitly stated that Romania and Finland will enter the war on the side of Germany. The document states that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany will send all of its tank and motorized divisions against our borders. Among the opponents is England, with which the USSR has no contractual obligations. The country's leadership should not have forgotten that in the spring of 1940 plans were being prepared in England for the bombing of Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.
On 13.4.41, a non-aggression pact was signed with Japan, which was ratified on April 25. The next day, General Staff Directives are sent to ZabVO and DF on preparations for the redeployment to the west from ZabVO of the 16th Army (32nd sk and 5th mk), with the DF of the 31st sk, 21st and 66th div , 211st and 212nd airborne brigades.
On May 25, the management of the 31st sk arrived in KOVO. In May, the 212nd Brigade arrived in the OdVO and became part of the 3rd Airborne Corps. It is likely that the 211st brigade arrived in KOVO in May 1941. The 21st SD was sent to the West only in August 1941, and the 66th SD remained in the Far East. All the SDFs had a population of about 10 thousand people and before the start of the war there was no call-up of enlisted personnel for training at the indicated divisions.
In May 1941, a draft Note by the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff was prepared with considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and its allies. The document contains a link to the RU report dated May 15, which could get to the note performer somewhere on May 16-17. The preparation of the note and its editing took place somewhere after May 17. Let's see what the note said about the number of German divisions in the event of a German attack on the USSR.
When editing the Note, the number of German divisions was clarified with 189 to 180. In early May, General Directives on the development of cover plans were sent to western HE. Based on the information from the draft Note prepared after May 17, it can be said that plans should be developed based on the presence of 189-200 German divisions at our borders. In May-June, the leadership of the spacecraft could be sure that the German army had not yet completed its concentration before the grouping of 180 divisions. Therefore, on May 25, the grouping near our border did not have more than 60 divisions to the value defined in the General Staff. With a significant reduction in the rate of transfer of troops to our border, it was still too early to give an order to begin the redeployment on May 25 ...
Confirmation that the leadership of the RU and the spacecraft expected to see the number of divisions significantly exceeding the number 122 near the border at the beginning of the war can be seen in the RU report at 20-00 on 22.6.41. In the summary, the number of German troops concentrated to the front (i.e., to the border) is estimated at 167-173 divisions. Missing up to 180 (or more) divisions are probably masked in the following text: “Due to the fact that the June troop movements to the east were carried out from the western front, it must be considered that the composition of this reserve [17 divisions in central Germany. - Note auth.] saved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is quite possible from the west for use against the USSR... » The RU smoothly summed up the opinion of those reading the summary to the presence at the border of up to 173 divisions, i.e. to the number of divisions close to 180. The Germans simply decided to start the war without completing the redeployment of their troops ...
Soviet troops in the west
The planned number of spacecraft divisions, which should have been concentrated in the west, practically did not change from March 11 to May 17, 1941 in the Northern Fleet and in the armies of the RGK. This may indicate that the same divisions (armies) from different military units were to be advanced to the west. The difference lies in the disbandment of some SD and the formation of anti-tank and airborne brigades.
This draft Note considers the presence of four armies in the Northern Fleet and the North-Western Front — three armies each and in the Western Front. These armies are part of the military forces, although two of them are in the formation stage (4th and 13th).
The South-Western Front includes eight armies with only four armies in the district. In accordance with the Certificate on the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West (13.6.41), the OVVO, OrVO, KhVO and PrivO (9th, 18th, 20th and 21st armies) were included in the KOVO.
The RGC should have five armies. In the future, four armies will be formed: the 19th - on the basis of the North Caucasian Military District, the 22nd - in the UrVO, the 24th - in the Siberian Military District and the 28th - in the ArkhVO. The author does not know where the fifth army was supposed to come from. It is possible that it was formed on the basis of the ZakVO and SAVO troops being thrown to the west.
The German group at the border on May 25 should not have caused serious concern among the leadership of the spacecraft. At the same time, the question of how long it would take the German command to concentrate another 60 divisions at the border would be interesting.
This time depends on the option of concentrating the main group of German troops: in the north or in the south. If the Germans would concentrate the main grouping in the north (against PribOVO and ZAPOVO), then the railway capacity allowed them to complete the concentration within 12 days. In the case of the southern option, taking into account the deployment of part of the German troops in Romania, Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, it would take 52 days to additionally concentrate about 18 divisions in southern Poland. Since it was assumed that in case of war with the USSR the Germans would choose the southern option, there should be enough time for the transfer of troops from internal military forces located near Pribovo, Zapovo and KOVO ...
When considering options for the concentration of spacecraft troops in March 1938, Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote:
Our intelligence made by our probable opponents of concentration traffic will determine where their main forces will be deployedand therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change the options for our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of Polesie ...
Before the war, leaders at all levels were confident in the absolute accuracy of the data received from intelligence. Unfortunately, by 22.6.41 our intelligence services were unable to fully reveal the plans for waging Germany’s war with the USSR, the composition of the invasion force and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops at our border ... It can be assumed that the General Staff decided on May 25 in advance to begin the transportation of troops of the 16th army to the west, masking its transfer along the route through Central Asia. We will consider this version in the following two parts.
German Intelligence Plans
10.3.41 receives a message from Sophocles about the plans of Germany: “The German General Staff refused to attack the English islands, the immediate task set - capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be implemented in April-May of this year ... "
Capture of Baku can be carried out only from the border with Turkey or Iran. Since that time, extensive German misinformation begins about a possible attack on the Soviet Union from the Caucasus, the purpose of which could be to divert the attention of our intelligence from the western border and the desire to increase the grouping of the space forces in ZakVO.
Yeshenko March 15 reported:
Socor concludes: “The Germans fear performances of the USSR at that moment when they will go to Turkey. Wishing to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ...
This message was considered quite important, because a quote from it was inserted into the Report of the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan (20.3.41): “The Germans are afraid of the Soviet Union at the moment when they go to Turkey. Desiring to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ... "
On April 4, another message arrives from Sophocles about the concentration of troops near our border and about the possibility of disguising the conduct of German operations in the Balkans:
The concentration of German troops on the entire border with the USSR from the Black to the Baltic Sea, Romania’s undisguised revanchist statements about Northern Bukovina, ... the fact of the transformation of the Balkan countries into union states does not allow to exclude the idea of Germany’s military intentions against our country ...
However, given that the information comes from German sources, its distribution was most widespread during the period of activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans, it can be assumed that Germany in preparing the next action in the Balkans by psychological influence compensates for the lack of real forces...
However, given that the information comes from German sources, its distribution was most widespread during the period of activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans, it can be assumed that Germany in preparing the next action in the Balkans by psychological influence compensates for the lack of real forces...
W. Churchill 7.4.41 wrote about the unlikelihood of a war between Germany and the USSR:
Our joint intelligence agency ... stated that rumors were circulating in Europe about the Germans' intention to attack Russia. Although Germany ... has considerable forces in the East, it can be expected that Sooner or later she will fight with Russia it seems unbelievable that she decided to open another big front now. According to the United Intelligence Agency, its main goal in 1941 remained the defeat of the United Kingdom...
On April 17, the Petty Officer said that “In connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Denmark, the mood of the circles advocating for speaking out against the Soviet Union has somewhat subsided, because now have the hope of winning the war with England through a blow to her life communications and oil sources in the Middle East... »
Yeshchenko on April 23 updates his information of March 15 about the German invasion of Ukraine and the Caucasus: “Hitler hesitated for a long time, but now he agreed with the military circles that proposed capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus... We will free a number of peoples from Bolshevik oppression. Ukrainian people and Armenians in the Caucasus waiting for us.
The refusal of the attack on the USSR in the near future is also mentioned in the message of the Elders on April 24: "At present, GS aviation almost ceased development of Russian objects and is intensively preparing for an action aimed against Turkey, Syria and Iraq, primarily. The action against the USSR seems to have been pushed into the background ... "
In the RU Summary dated April 26, the number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania is defined as 95-100 divisions. The armies in Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Egypt have up to 71 divisions. “In Bulgaria, there are 12 PD and 1 TD, of which 8 divisions are already concentrated on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. At the expense of the reserves brought to Bulgaria and the liberation of German units in Yugoslavia, an army is being created against Turkey ”.
A report by Zeus on April 27 indicated that the Germans were preparing a strike against the USSR. It is noted that "Germany will not allow the conclusion of a treaty of the USSR with Turkey».
Message from Savva (April 27):
German intelligence colonel Berchtold ... said: actions against us will begin on May 15 ... An uprising in Ukraine at the time of the conflict was prepared ... German political circles are talking about the upcoming ultimatum to Moscow to join the pact of three, with the separation of Ukraine ... Germans threaten turkey war in case of refusal to join the pact of three ... Ukrainian nationalists have an army of 100 thousand trained and trained by the Germans, staffed by captured soldiers of Ukrainian nationality ...
There are notes: "Install ... how accurate is the information about 100 thousand Ukrainian white army. Golikov»
On April 30, a note was prepared by the NKGB, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The note, citing a message from Corsican, states that “The Germans are taking all measures to include Turkey in the wake of German politics. The Germans promised Turkey part of Thrace, as well as the annexation of other territories ... The proposal of the Germans also included the rejection of certain Soviet regions in the Caucasus in favor of Turkey ... "
Multiple reports of Germans' interest in Turkey and our borders in the Caucasus should have caused increased attention of the leadership of the Soviet Union to this issue.
On April 29, Mars reported the displacement of German troops after the end of the operation in Yugoslavia. The head of RU left a note on the document: “It is especially important to trace where it is being thrown. troops from Yugoslavia ". Three days later, Mars announced German plans that were not related to an attack on the USSR in the near future:
Intensive German air operations and war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs force an attack on Iraq for the occupation of oil sources. For this purpose, an intensive transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and the concentration of troops in the Balkans is currently underway.
Offensive on Iraq is supposed to be carried out by Egypt and through Turkey or by transferring troops through the Dodecanese Islands and then by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors circulate in the high command circles that in the event of a successful attack on Iraq, an attack on the USSR will be launched, to the Caucasus from Turkey and to Ukraine from the west...
Offensive on Iraq is supposed to be carried out by Egypt and through Turkey or by transferring troops through the Dodecanese Islands and then by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors circulate in the high command circles that in the event of a successful attack on Iraq, an attack on the USSR will be launched, to the Caucasus from Turkey and to Ukraine from the west...
The RU Summary of May 5 notes:
The essence of the regroupings of German troops ... after the successful completion of the Balkan campaign and to this day comes down to:
1. To strengthen the group against the USSR throughout the western and southwestern borders, including Romania, as well as in Finland.
2. The further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North. Africa ...
The available forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. For the same purposes, up to two parachute divisions are concentrated with their likely use in Iraq ...
1. To strengthen the group against the USSR throughout the western and southwestern borders, including Romania, as well as in Finland.
2. The further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North. Africa ...
The available forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. For the same purposes, up to two parachute divisions are concentrated with their likely use in Iraq ...
In the Balkans and Egypt, according to intelligence, there is a fairly large group of German troops, which is about 45% of the group concentrated near our border.
On May 5, the NKGB sent a Note with the text of the intercepted telegrams of the English ambassador to the USSR from 23.4.41: “The military ... are convinced that war is inevitable, but they crave a respite it’s at least until winter ... A counterbalance is the fear that we can conclude a separate peace provided that the Germans evacuate the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler freedom of hands in the East ... ”
In the late evening of May 10, Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could find out about this on May 11, which should have intensified the fear of the start of negotiations between Germany and England. Now the leadership of the USSR should have pursued an even more flexible policy in order to postpone the war with Germany, during which our country could remain alone against all of Europe, including England ...
Ramsay's May 6th post:
Ott told me that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part of the Soviet Union into his own hands as a grain and raw material base ... The ambassador and attaché agreed that two critical dates were approaching after the defeat of Yugoslavia in Germany’s relations with the USSR.
The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the end of sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment so that Germany can only reap a crop.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR will create any difficulties regarding Turkey’s acceptance of German requirements, then war will be inevitable. The possibility of a war at any moment is very high because Hitler and his generals are sure that a war with the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of a war against England ...
The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the end of sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment so that Germany can only reap a crop.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR will create any difficulties regarding Turkey’s acceptance of German requirements, then war will be inevitable. The possibility of a war at any moment is very high because Hitler and his generals are sure that a war with the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of a war against England ...
It was completely incomprehensible to our military leadership why the German command was not afraid of a war on two fronts, having at the border a little more than a hundred divisions against a large number of space forces and a huge mass of tanks ...
On May 9, the Zeus report first mentioned the movement of German troops through Turkey:
From Western Macedonia through Turkey officially go to Iraq German troops. On the Soviet-Polish border, 60 German divisions.
Germany is preparing to start military operations against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In 2 months, incidents should begin on the Soviet-Polish border. The blow will be delivered simultaneously from the territory of Poland, from the sea to Odessa and from Turkey to Baku ...
I think the first point is believable. The remaining items are difficult to verify ...
Germany is preparing to start military operations against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In 2 months, incidents should begin on the Soviet-Polish border. The blow will be delivered simultaneously from the territory of Poland, from the sea to Odessa and from Turkey to Baku ...
I think the first point is believable. The remaining items are difficult to verify ...
There are litters: “From Sofia, it was twice reported that German troops were officially marching through Turkey to Iraq. Is this true? Golikov " Probably, Zeus was asked to clarify the information, and on May 14 he additionally reported:
Belvedere claims that there are German troops in Turkey. He believes that at least 3-4 divisions are in Turkey on the way to Syria. The Belvedere was 30 km from the Greek-Turkish border in the Dede Agach region and itself observed the movement of large columns of troops for three days in the direction of the Turkish border. There is only one road in this area, and it goes directly to Turkey ...
The RU report of May 15 again refers to the grouping of German troops in Bulgaria with up to 15-16 divisions, of which 6 are located directly on the Turkish border. The army is allegedly commanded by General Reichenau.
May 19, Costa reports: “From the collected information it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. In early July, serious military actions are planned against Ukraine ... Today, very serious people said that Turkey accepted the German proposals. The Germans are concentrating pontoon boats to build bridges over the Dardanelles ... "
On the same day, Dora reported on a possible German attack on Ukraine (but not on the entire Soviet Union!):
Information about the alleged German campaign in Ukraine comes from the most reliable German circles and is true. Performance will happen only when the English fleet will not be able to enter the Black Sea and when the German army will gain a foothold in Asia Minor. The next goal of the Germans is the occupation of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, in order to expel the English fleet from the Mediterranean Sea ...
Our intelligence officers do not know the exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not. For example, Ramsay on May 21 reports: “... the war between Germany and the USSR could start already at the end of May ... This year the danger maybe pass».
Mars May 28 reports: “There are 6-7 German divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, of which 2 are TD, 2 MD, and 3 are mountain ... [Sources] They believe that the Germans will first capture Syria and Iraq, and only then they will oppose the USSR. I personally believe that the Germans themselves are spreading these rumors in order to distract our attention from their preparations for an attack on us.... »
Message from Yeshchenko (May 28):
Germany’s military action against the USSR continues to be systematically prepared ... Military preparations are going on as a clock mechanism and make the war likely to start back in June this year. Whether this huge mechanism that works against the USSR is only a maneuver or a prelude to a war that has already been resolved, no one knows except Hitler and his inner circle ...
How Germany should get its hands ... Baku and Batumi oil, this is not entirely clear. The German side is preparing an illegal action in the Caucasus region, as well as airborne parachute troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil fields by sabotage ...
How Germany should get its hands ... Baku and Batumi oil, this is not entirely clear. The German side is preparing an illegal action in the Caucasus region, as well as airborne parachute troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil fields by sabotage ...
In Moldova, there is an increase in the grouping of German troops near our western border. It is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion from these reports about the beginning of the war in June. The flow of misinformation through various sources about the preparation of the German strike on the communication of the British and for the capture of oil fields is intensifying. Quite a lot of messages come with information about flirting Germany with Turkey with the movement of German troops through Turkey, about the strike with Soviet Transcaucasia.
The British until the end of May still have no clarity in relations between the USSR and Germany. W. Churchill:
May 23 [United Intelligence Agency. - Note ed.] reported that rumors of an impending attack on Russia had subsided and there was evidence that these countries intend to conclude a new agreement. Management considered this likely, since the needs of a protracted war required the strengthening of the German economy. Germany could receive the necessary assistance from Russia either by force or as a result of an agreement. Management believed that Germany will prefer the latteralthough, to facilitate the achievement of this, the threat of the use of force will be launched. Now this force has accumulated ...
May 31. The Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia. Using them as a threat, they probably they will require concessions that could prove to be very dangerous for us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will come forward...
May 31. The Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia. Using them as a threat, they probably they will require concessions that could prove to be very dangerous for us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will come forward...
From Goebbels' diary: "May 31. Operation Barbarossa is developing. We begin the big disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things. I am forced to send the entire ministry in the wrong direction, risking, in case of failure, losing my prestige ... 14 divisions are heading west. We are gradually expanding the theme of the invasion [of England. - Note auth.]. I ordered to compose a song about the invasion, a new motive, to increase the use of English broadcasts, instructing propaganda companies in England, etc. Two weeks are given for everything ... "
To be continued ...
Information