1941. Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?


The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), pd - infantry division td - tank division.


In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArkhVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, DF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, LVO - Leningrad Military District (Northern Front - Northern Front) , OdVO - Odessa Military District, OVO - Oryol Military District, PribOVO - Baltic Special VO, VVO - Volga VO, SAVO - Central Asian VE, SibVO - Siberian VO, North Caucasian Military District, UrVO - Ural VO, HVO - Kharkov VO .

Official version


79 years ago, the redeployment of the 16th Army from ZabVO began. Most memoirs and books talk about sending her west. For example, in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova:

On May 13, the General Staff issued a directive to the Military Depot to nominate troops west from the internal districts. The 22nd Army marched from the Urals to the Great Bow region; from PriVO to the Gomel region - the 21st army; from North Caucasian Military District to the Belaya Tserkov region — 19th Army; from the KhVO to the border of the Western Dvina - 25th sk; from Transbaikalia to Ukraine to the Shepetivka area - the 16th army ...

In 2018, historians discussed events that occurred on the eve of war. During the discussion, the question was asked: “Where did the 16th Army go?” In preparing the materials for the article, the author was unable to find documents that would unambiguously give an answer to this question.

Discussing pre-war events, they often refer to the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions”, using it as a reference. I will express my opinion about it: it seems that the authors placed in the book only those materials for which they were given permission. The book does not destroy the version that existed for many years, according to which intelligence provided all the necessary RM about the enemy troops. Based on reliable RMs, the spacecraft command, anticipating the outbreak of war in June, was perspicaciously trying to break through the permit to begin the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the western military forces to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done. The reasons for this behavior I.V. Stalin called different, but his behavior is not considered in terms of knowledge of the situation before the war.

In a series of articles on intelligence, the author presented a large number of materials showing that the pre-war RMs turned out to be unreliable. However, in the book “1941: Lessons and Conclusions” there is not a word about the accuracy of the RM that came to the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR in May-June 1941. Mention of intelligence data ends in April 1941. The authors deliberately did not address this issue. This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the received RM: “... in March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan of the Barbarossa plan. In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR ... "

In March, the RM spoke of three versions of the design of the attack, but only one of them was correct. In addition, the fourth fantastic version is described in the report of the head of RU: “... after the victory over England, Germany, advancing against the USSR, intends to strike from two flanks: coverage from the north (meaning Finland) and from the Balkan Peninsula”.

Even a month later (25.4.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events related to the outbreak of war with the USSR:

The data leads me to believe that:
1. In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as yet another adversary.
2. The timing of the onset of the collision is perhaps shorter and, certainly within the current year. Another thing is that these plans and dates may come across something similar to Matsuoka’s trip ...
3. The next coming events of the Germans seem to me like this:
a) saddling turkey a pact of three or any similar to it;
b) accession to the pact of three Sweden, and, therefore, Finland, as the latter has long been ready to join him;
c) strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater;
d) whether the Germans plan extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to sayalthough officially such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed ...


The quote in the book that Germany refused to attack England is also a juggling of facts. Such information either appeared in the Republic of Moldova, or materials were again given with confirmation of the preparation of German troops for landing in England. Even the British intelligence services in early June 1941 could not clearly say: there will be an attack on England or not.

The book "1941: Lessons and Conclusions" says the following about the transportation of troops from deep districts: “On April 26, the General Staff gave preliminary orders to the Military Councils of the ZabVO and the Far Eastern Military District [it should be about DF. - Note auth.] be ready to send to the West the 5th mk, two sk (32nd and 31st) (a total of 9 divisions) and two (211st and 212nd) airborne brigades ... " and further information on their destinations in the west is indicated.

German troops on our border


Let’s try to figure out, based on published materials, whether there were prerequisites in May for the start of the transfer of troops of the 16th Army. The General Staff Directive on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41 and the sending of troops began on May 26.

Did something dangerous happen on the western border to decide on the transfer of troops from ZabOVO? On 25.4.41, according to intelligence, 95 ... 100 German divisions were on our border, on May 15 - 114 ... 119, on May 31 - 120 ... 122. It can be seen that since May 15, the rate of transfer of German troops to the border has significantly decreased. From June 1 to June 19 (inclusive), no more than 7 divisions were transported to our borders.


In fact, over 40 divisions arrived in East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were TD and MD. However, our intelligence was not able to detect their appearance at the border, although partially the transportation was recorded. In June, according to intelligence, the situation with an increase in the concentration of German troops at the border almost stabilized.

Also in June, RM began to arrive, mentioning various conditions and ultimatums from Germany to the USSR. In Moldova, it was said either about the imminent start of a war with the Soviet Union, then about an attack on England, then about German expansion to the Middle East and the African coast, then about the postponement of the start of the war with our country to July-August 1941.

Could the leadership of the SC on May 20-25 frighten the presence of about 120 German divisions at the border? Could the leadership of the spacecraft at this time break through the permission to transfer troops of the 16th Army?

The number of spacecraft divisions that should have been concentrated in western military units was determined by the General Staff on the basis of the number of German divisions that Germany could set up in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1940, when considering the options for military operations of German troops against the USSR, the enemy group was determined in 180 or more divisions (not counting the troops of possible allies of Germany).

According to intelligence, during the winter in Germany new divisions were formed. On the basis of the Republic of Moldova, as of 11.3.41, the General Staff considered that Germany would set up 200 divisions for war with the USSR. To counter this threat, the number of spacecraft divisions that should have been in the western districts, in the LVO and in the RGK troops was determined. Based on the concentration of 200 divisions at the border, in April 1941 the General Directives were sent out to develop plans for covering western districts.

An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):

I order you to begin developing a plan for the operational deployment of the ZapOVO armies, guided by the following instructions.
1. Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, between the USSR and Italy it is now believed to provide a peaceful position on our western borders. The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think to attack the USSR in the near future. However, given:
a) the events in Europe - the German occupation of Bulgaria, their declaration of war on Yugoslavia and Greece;
b) suspicious German behavior in Finland and Romania;
c) the concentration by Germany of considerable forces towards the borders of the USSR;
d) the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance, the tip of which, in the presence of the above circumstances, can be directed against the USSR - when developing the USSR defense plan, it is necessary to keep in mind not only opponents such as Finland, Romania, England, but also of such possible opponents as Germany, Italy and Japan...
2. In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its 225 20 pd, 15 td and XNUMX pd, can be sent against our borders to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 PD, 20 TD and 15 MD ...

The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of signing the non-aggression treaty with Japan. It does not follow from the document that the war is unambiguously expected in the summer of 1941 and it is not explicitly stated that Romania and Finland will enter the war on the side of Germany. The document states that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany will send all of its tank and motorized divisions against our borders. Among the opponents is England, with which the USSR has no contractual obligations. The country's leadership should not have forgotten that in the spring of 1940 plans were being prepared in England for the bombing of Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus.

On 13.4.41, a non-aggression pact was signed with Japan, which was ratified on April 25. The next day, General Staff Directives are sent to ZabVO and DF on preparations for the redeployment to the west from ZabVO of the 16th Army (32nd sk and 5th mk), with the DF of the 31st sk, 21st and 66th div , 211st and 212nd airborne brigades.

On May 25, the management of the 31st sk arrived in KOVO. In May, the 212nd Brigade arrived in the OdVO and became part of the 3rd Airborne Corps. It is likely that the 211st brigade arrived in KOVO in May 1941. The 21st SD was sent to the West only in August 1941, and the 66th SD remained in the Far East. All the SDFs had a population of about 10 thousand people and before the start of the war there was no call-up of enlisted personnel for training at the indicated divisions.

In May 1941, a draft Note by the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff was prepared with considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with Germany and its allies. The document contains a link to the RU report dated May 15, which could get to the note performer somewhere on May 16-17. The preparation of the note and its editing took place somewhere after May 17. Let's see what the note said about the number of German divisions in the event of a German attack on the USSR.

1941. Where was the 16th Army preparing to redeploy?

When editing the Note, the number of German divisions was clarified with 189 to 180. In early May, General Directives on the development of cover plans were sent to western HE. Based on the information from the draft Note prepared after May 17, it can be said that plans should be developed based on the presence of 189-200 German divisions at our borders. In May-June, the leadership of the spacecraft could be sure that the German army had not yet completed its concentration before the grouping of 180 divisions. Therefore, on May 25, the grouping near our border did not have more than 60 divisions to the value defined in the General Staff. With a significant reduction in the rate of transfer of troops to our border, it was still too early to give an order to begin the redeployment on May 25 ...

Confirmation that the leadership of the RU and the spacecraft expected to see the number of divisions significantly exceeding the number 122 near the border at the beginning of the war can be seen in the RU report at 20-00 on 22.6.41. In the summary, the number of German troops concentrated to the front (i.e., to the border) is estimated at 167-173 divisions. Missing up to 180 (or more) divisions are probably masked in the following text: “Due to the fact that the June troop movements to the east were carried out from the western front, it must be considered that the composition of this reserve [17 divisions in central Germany. - Note auth.] saved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is quite possible from the west for use against the USSR... » The RU smoothly summed up the opinion of those reading the summary to the presence at the border of up to 173 divisions, i.e. to the number of divisions close to 180. The Germans simply decided to start the war without completing the redeployment of their troops ...

Soviet troops in the west


The planned number of spacecraft divisions, which should have been concentrated in the west, practically did not change from March 11 to May 17, 1941 in the Northern Fleet and in the armies of the RGK. This may indicate that the same divisions (armies) from different military units were to be advanced to the west. The difference lies in the disbandment of some SD and the formation of anti-tank and airborne brigades.



This draft Note considers the presence of four armies in the Northern Fleet and the North-Western Front — three armies each and in the Western Front. These armies are part of the military forces, although two of them are in the formation stage (4th and 13th).

The South-Western Front includes eight armies with only four armies in the district. In accordance with the Certificate on the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West (13.6.41), the OVVO, OrVO, KhVO and PrivO (9th, 18th, 20th and 21st armies) were included in the KOVO.

The RGC should have five armies. In the future, four armies will be formed: the 19th - on the basis of the North Caucasian Military District, the 22nd - in the UrVO, the 24th - in the Siberian Military District and the 28th - in the ArkhVO. The author does not know where the fifth army was supposed to come from. It is possible that it was formed on the basis of the ZakVO and SAVO troops being thrown to the west.

The German group at the border on May 25 should not have caused serious concern among the leadership of the spacecraft. At the same time, the question of how long it would take the German command to concentrate another 60 divisions at the border would be interesting.

This time depends on the option of concentrating the main group of German troops: in the north or in the south. If the Germans would concentrate the main grouping in the north (against PribOVO and ZAPOVO), then the railway capacity allowed them to complete the concentration within 12 days. In the case of the southern option, taking into account the deployment of part of the German troops in Romania, Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, it would take 52 days to additionally concentrate about 18 divisions in southern Poland. Since it was assumed that in case of war with the USSR the Germans would choose the southern option, there should be enough time for the transfer of troops from internal military forces located near Pribovo, Zapovo and KOVO ...

When considering options for the concentration of spacecraft troops in March 1938, Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote:

Our intelligence made by our probable opponents of concentration traffic will determine where their main forces will be deployedand therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change the options for our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of Polesie ...

Before the war, leaders at all levels were confident in the absolute accuracy of the data received from intelligence. Unfortunately, by 22.6.41 our intelligence services were unable to fully reveal the plans for waging Germany’s war with the USSR, the composition of the invasion force and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops at our border ... It can be assumed that the General Staff decided on May 25 in advance to begin the transportation of troops of the 16th army to the west, masking its transfer along the route through Central Asia. We will consider this version in the following two parts.

German Intelligence Plans


10.3.41 receives a message from Sophocles about the plans of Germany: “The German General Staff refused to attack the English islands, the immediate task set - capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be implemented in April-May of this year ... "

Capture of Baku can be carried out only from the border with Turkey or Iran. Since that time, extensive German misinformation begins about a possible attack on the Soviet Union from the Caucasus, the purpose of which could be to divert the attention of our intelligence from the western border and the desire to increase the grouping of the space forces in ZakVO.

Yeshenko March 15 reported:

Socor concludes: “The Germans fear performances of the USSR at that moment when they will go to Turkey. Wishing to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ...

This message was considered quite important, because a quote from it was inserted into the Report of the head of the Republic of Uzbekistan (20.3.41): “The Germans are afraid of the Soviet Union at the moment when they go to Turkey. Desiring to prevent danger from the USSR, the Germans want to take the initiative and be the first to strike, to capture the most important economic regions of the USSR, and above all Ukraine ... "

On April 4, another message arrives from Sophocles about the concentration of troops near our border and about the possibility of disguising the conduct of German operations in the Balkans:

The concentration of German troops on the entire border with the USSR from the Black to the Baltic Sea, Romania’s undisguised revanchist statements about Northern Bukovina, ... the fact of the transformation of the Balkan countries into union states does not allow to exclude the idea of ​​Germany’s military intentions against our country ...
However, given that the information comes from German sources, its distribution was most widespread during the period of activity of German diplomacy in the Balkans, it can be assumed that Germany in preparing the next action in the Balkans by psychological influence compensates for the lack of real forces...

W. Churchill 7.4.41 wrote about the unlikelihood of a war between Germany and the USSR:

Our joint intelligence agency ... stated that rumors were circulating in Europe about the Germans' intention to attack Russia. Although Germany ... has considerable forces in the East, it can be expected that Sooner or later she will fight with Russia it seems unbelievable that she decided to open another big front now. According to the United Intelligence Agency, its main goal in 1941 remained the defeat of the United Kingdom...

On April 17, the Petty Officer said that “In connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Denmark, the mood of the circles advocating for speaking out against the Soviet Union has somewhat subsided, because now have the hope of winning the war with England through a blow to her life communications and oil sources in the Middle East... »

Yeshchenko on April 23 updates his information of March 15 about the German invasion of Ukraine and the Caucasus: “Hitler hesitated for a long time, but now he agreed with the military circles that proposed capture of Ukraine and the Caucasus... We will free a number of peoples from Bolshevik oppression. Ukrainian people and Armenians in the Caucasus waiting for us.

The refusal of the attack on the USSR in the near future is also mentioned in the message of the Elders on April 24: "At present, GS aviation almost ceased development of Russian objects and is intensively preparing for an action aimed against Turkey, Syria and Iraq, primarily. The action against the USSR seems to have been pushed into the background ... "

In the RU Summary dated April 26, the number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania is defined as 95-100 divisions. The armies in Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Egypt have up to 71 divisions. “In Bulgaria, there are 12 PD and 1 TD, of which 8 divisions are already concentrated on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. At the expense of the reserves brought to Bulgaria and the liberation of German units in Yugoslavia, an army is being created against Turkey ”.

A report by Zeus on April 27 indicated that the Germans were preparing a strike against the USSR. It is noted that "Germany will not allow the conclusion of a treaty of the USSR with Turkey».

Message from Savva (April 27):

German intelligence colonel Berchtold ... said: actions against us will begin on May 15 ... An uprising in Ukraine at the time of the conflict was prepared ... German political circles are talking about the upcoming ultimatum to Moscow to join the pact of three, with the separation of Ukraine ... Germans threaten turkey war in case of refusal to join the pact of three ... Ukrainian nationalists have an army of 100 thousand trained and trained by the Germans, staffed by captured soldiers of Ukrainian nationality ...

There are notes: "Install ... how accurate is the information about 100 thousand Ukrainian white army. Golikov»

On April 30, a note was prepared by the NKGB, which was sent to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The note, citing a message from Corsican, states that “The Germans are taking all measures to include Turkey in the wake of German politics. The Germans promised Turkey part of Thrace, as well as the annexation of other territories ... The proposal of the Germans also included the rejection of certain Soviet regions in the Caucasus in favor of Turkey ... "

Multiple reports of Germans' interest in Turkey and our borders in the Caucasus should have caused increased attention of the leadership of the Soviet Union to this issue.

On April 29, Mars reported the displacement of German troops after the end of the operation in Yugoslavia. The head of RU left a note on the document: “It is especially important to trace where it is being thrown. troops from Yugoslavia ". Three days later, Mars announced German plans that were not related to an attack on the USSR in the near future:

Intensive German air operations and war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs force an attack on Iraq for the occupation of oil sources. For this purpose, an intensive transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and the concentration of troops in the Balkans is currently underway.
Offensive on Iraq is supposed to be carried out by Egypt and through Turkey or by transferring troops through the Dodecanese Islands and then by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors circulate in the high command circles that in the event of a successful attack on Iraq, an attack on the USSR will be launched, to the Caucasus from Turkey and to Ukraine from the west...


The RU Summary of May 5 notes:

The essence of the regroupings of German troops ... after the successful completion of the Balkan campaign and to this day comes down to:
1. To strengthen the group against the USSR throughout the western and southwestern borders, including Romania, as well as in Finland.
2. The further development of operations against England through the Middle East (Turkey and Iraq), Spain and North. Africa ...
The available forces of the German troops for operations in the Middle East at this time are expressed in 40 divisions, of which 25 in Greece and 15 in Bulgaria. For the same purposes, up to two parachute divisions are concentrated with their likely use in Iraq ...

In the Balkans and Egypt, according to intelligence, there is a fairly large group of German troops, which is about 45% of the group concentrated near our border.

On May 5, the NKGB sent a Note with the text of the intercepted telegrams of the English ambassador to the USSR from 23.4.41: “The military ... are convinced that war is inevitable, but they crave a respite it’s at least until winter ... A counterbalance is the fear that we can conclude a separate peace provided that the Germans evacuate the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler freedom of hands in the East ... ”

In the late evening of May 10, Hess flies to England. The Soviet leadership could find out about this on May 11, which should have intensified the fear of the start of negotiations between Germany and England. Now the leadership of the USSR should have pursued an even more flexible policy in order to postpone the war with Germany, during which our country could remain alone against all of Europe, including England ...

Ramsay's May 6th post:

Ott told me that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part of the Soviet Union into his own hands as a grain and raw material base ... The ambassador and attaché agreed that two critical dates were approaching after the defeat of Yugoslavia in Germany’s relations with the USSR.
The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the end of sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment so that Germany can only reap a crop.
The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR will create any difficulties regarding Turkey’s acceptance of German requirements, then war will be inevitable. The possibility of a war at any moment is very high because Hitler and his generals are sure that a war with the USSR will not in the least prevent the conduct of a war against England ...

It was completely incomprehensible to our military leadership why the German command was not afraid of a war on two fronts, having at the border a little more than a hundred divisions against a large number of space forces and a huge mass of tanks ...

On May 9, the Zeus report first mentioned the movement of German troops through Turkey:

From Western Macedonia through Turkey officially go to Iraq German troops. On the Soviet-Polish border, 60 German divisions.
Germany is preparing to start military operations against the USSR in the summer of 1941 before the harvest. In 2 months, incidents should begin on the Soviet-Polish border. The blow will be delivered simultaneously from the territory of Poland, from the sea to Odessa and from Turkey to Baku ...
I think the first point is believable. The remaining items are difficult to verify ...


There are litters: “From Sofia, it was twice reported that German troops were officially marching through Turkey to Iraq. Is this true? Golikov " Probably, Zeus was asked to clarify the information, and on May 14 he additionally reported:

Belvedere claims that there are German troops in Turkey. He believes that at least 3-4 divisions are in Turkey on the way to Syria. The Belvedere was 30 km from the Greek-Turkish border in the Dede Agach region and itself observed the movement of large columns of troops for three days in the direction of the Turkish border. There is only one road in this area, and it goes directly to Turkey ...

The RU report of May 15 again refers to the grouping of German troops in Bulgaria with up to 15-16 divisions, of which 6 are located directly on the Turkish border. The army is allegedly commanded by General Reichenau.

May 19, Costa reports: “From the collected information it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border. In early July, serious military actions are planned against Ukraine ... Today, very serious people said that Turkey accepted the German proposals. The Germans are concentrating pontoon boats to build bridges over the Dardanelles ... "

On the same day, Dora reported on a possible German attack on Ukraine (but not on the entire Soviet Union!):

Information about the alleged German campaign in Ukraine comes from the most reliable German circles and is true. Performance will happen only when the English fleet will not be able to enter the Black Sea and when the German army will gain a foothold in Asia Minor. The next goal of the Germans is the occupation of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, in order to expel the English fleet from the Mediterranean Sea ...

Our intelligence officers do not know the exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not. For example, Ramsay on May 21 reports: “... the war between Germany and the USSR could start already at the end of May ... This year the danger maybe pass».

Mars May 28 reports: “There are 6-7 German divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, of which 2 are TD, 2 MD, and 3 are mountain ... [Sources] They believe that the Germans will first capture Syria and Iraq, and only then they will oppose the USSR. I personally believe that the Germans themselves are spreading these rumors in order to distract our attention from their preparations for an attack on us.... »

Message from Yeshchenko (May 28):

Germany’s military action against the USSR continues to be systematically prepared ... Military preparations are going on as a clock mechanism and make the war likely to start back in June this year. Whether this huge mechanism that works against the USSR is only a maneuver or a prelude to a war that has already been resolved, no one knows except Hitler and his inner circle ...
How Germany should get its hands ... Baku and Batumi oil, this is not entirely clear. The German side is preparing an illegal action in the Caucasus region, as well as airborne parachute troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil fields by sabotage ...

In Moldova, there is an increase in the grouping of German troops near our western border. It is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion from these reports about the beginning of the war in June. The flow of misinformation through various sources about the preparation of the German strike on the communication of the British and for the capture of oil fields is intensifying. Quite a lot of messages come with information about flirting Germany with Turkey with the movement of German troops through Turkey, about the strike with Soviet Transcaucasia.

The British until the end of May still have no clarity in relations between the USSR and Germany. W. Churchill:

May 23 [United Intelligence Agency. - Note ed.] reported that rumors of an impending attack on Russia had subsided and there was evidence that these countries intend to conclude a new agreement. Management considered this likely, since the needs of a protracted war required the strengthening of the German economy. Germany could receive the necessary assistance from Russia either by force or as a result of an agreement. Management believed that Germany will prefer the latteralthough, to facilitate the achievement of this, the threat of the use of force will be launched. Now this force has accumulated ...
May 31. The Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia. Using them as a threat, they probably they will require concessions that could prove to be very dangerous for us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will come forward...

From Goebbels' diary: "May 31. Operation Barbarossa is developing. We begin the big disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things. I am forced to send the entire ministry in the wrong direction, risking, in case of failure, losing my prestige ... 14 divisions are heading west. We are gradually expanding the theme of the invasion [of England. - Note auth.]. I ordered to compose a song about the invasion, a new motive, to increase the use of English broadcasts, instructing propaganda companies in England, etc. Two weeks are given for everything ... "

To be continued ...
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  1. cavl 8 June 2020 05: 04 New
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    Thanks to the author for an interesting selection of materials.
    I would like to hope that the continuation will not have to wait a few weeks
    1. Olgovich 8 June 2020 08: 27 New
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      Quote: cavl
      Thanks to the author for an interesting selection of materials.

      Yes, the most interesting materials: what kind of assumptions, conjectures and forecasts were not at all - both among us and the British.

      Очень наглядны графики сосредоточения войск на границе Германии и СССР: взрывной рост числа дивизий ( в три раза) Германии с апреля 41 и практически никакой, рост числа дивизий СССР.

      Indicative for evaluating subsequent events.

      И дело даже не в том, что разведка пропустила это :
      Actually in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland over 40 divisions arrived in June, of which more than half were td and md


      Management was obligated to consider such a probable possibility of events, as The possibilities of enemy transport intrastructure were known. And that 100-200 km for the instant transfer of huge masses of troops is nothing. And we must act on the basis of this worst case

      And to act only on the basis of the taxiway and only in response to the arrival of enemy troops is a deliberate loss. Moreover, having built a two-year fighting army mobilized, unlike ours ....
      1. Tugarin 8 June 2020 09: 29 New
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        The graphs of the concentration of troops on the border of Germany and the USSR are very clear: explosive growth in the number of divisions (three times) in Germany since April 41 and practically none, growth in the number of divisions of the USSR.

        Management was obligated to consider such a probable possibility of events, as The possibilities of enemy transport intrastructure were known. And that 100-200 km for the instant transfer of huge masses of troops is nothing. And we must act on the basis of this worst case

        That's right, the Space Command understood this. Eugene mentions this:
        Based on reliable RMs, the spacecraft command, anticipating the outbreak of war in June, was perspicaciously trying to break through the permission to begin the transfer of troops from internal military units closer to the border and to withdraw the western military forces to the border. Stalin did not allow this to be done.

        Here, apparently, Stalin was cautious and tried not to provoke. Remember the invitation to a dialogue, including through the press, and the dull silence from that side.
        1. Tugarin 8 June 2020 09: 31 New
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          Thanks to the author for the material. hi good We look forward to continuing yes
        2. Olgovich 8 June 2020 11: 03 New
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          Quote: Tugarin
          Here, apparently, Stalin was cautious and tried not to provoke.

          As if WORLD WARS begin because of ..... provocations. belay

          Они начинаются ровно тогда, когда агрессор считает, что он готов. И not a day before.

          With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
          1. cormorant 10 June 2020 01: 48 New
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            They begin exactly when the aggressor believes that he is ready. And not a day earlier.

            With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
            good Very true remark! I was always surprised at this moment. What the hell can there be a provocation when such forces are concentrated on the border itself.
        3. Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 42 New
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          One question: the schedule that is being discussed, where is it from?
      2. knn54 8 June 2020 11: 40 New
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        Армия должна передислоцироваться в Закавказье на границу с Ираном., Однако в пути армию перенаправили сначала в Орловский военный округ, а затем в Киевский особый военный округ.
        И интересный момент- вплоть до 1944 года 1 дивизия Вермахта = 2-3 дивизиям РККА .Соответственно нацистская армия практически не уступала по силе нашему фронту/округу.
        The author, of course, PLUS.
        1. VS
          VS 8 June 2020 15: 42 New
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          а ОТКУДА ВЫ ЗНАЕТЕ что КОНЕЧНЫЙ пункт вывода ЭТОй 16 армии был - Закавказье ?)) Простой вопрос - а НА КОЙ овощ в ЭТО ЖЕ время армию с СевКавВО - отправляют не в Закавказье - куда ЕЙ - 19 армии проще и ближе ехать чем гонять 16-ю - а под КИЕВ?)) Вы вообще в курсе КАК , по КАКОЙ дороге можно было армию из УРАЛА перегнать в Грузию - в ТЕ дни было?))) Подскажу - дороги с АСТРАХАНИ той же, куда можно был направить с Урала армию, в ТЕ дни например в Азербайджан железной НЕ БЫЛО еще))) Только ДО Ростова а уже там - поворот на юга))
          1. sleeve 9 June 2020 03: 38 New
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            Верно. Хотел о комментировать,но вы были первым. 19ая то как и куда в этой гипотезе? Соответственно 16ая ехала по назначению. 2ой эшелон. Тихо ехала и медленно. Взрывной график? Ну да. Только в обозначенные сроки стартовые цифры то же разнятся. У немцев ближе к нулю,потому и "приход" выше. Верны или не верны РД на июнь или май 41 уже не играло роли. Принятое решение о выдвижении из внутренних округов-свидетельствует лишь о правильной оценке ситуации. Результат же действий-чисто военное противостояние с более сильным и опытным противником. И противник этот сколь бы силен и опытен не был закончил войну в своей столице. В немалой степени из за того, что происходило в 41ом.
  2. Lech from Android. 8 June 2020 06: 27 New
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    Thanks Eugene for the extensive article with factual material ... very interesting. hi
    1. Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 39 New
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      no factual material: where do these graphs come from? no links, the author himself wrote earlier that he takes everything from Wikipedia and analyzes it: an excellent source! objective information! good
      1. VS
        VS 8 June 2020 15: 44 New
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        but this nonsense is called - unique))) because besides VO it’s not published anywhere))
  3. antivirus 8 June 2020 09: 32 New
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    из всей мешанины РМ вывод один --от смерти не укрыться и не спрятаться, а где и когда --один ЦК ВКПб определит.
    удалась немцам игра в "дурачка в походе на БВосток".
  4. Gardamir 8 June 2020 09: 46 New
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    There are two points, none of those writing about the situation on the eve of the war recalls the situation inside the country. How prepared are the Union, industry, agriculture for war. I really wanted the war, since it was inevitable to begin, as late as possible.
    Well, the second point. Imagine that Hitler officially declares war, that would be.
  5. BAI
    BAI 8 June 2020 10: 32 New
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    As always in. What does the colorized photograph of tanks from Khalkhin Gol have to do with the article? Where is the 16th army and where is Khalkhin Gol? And the years are different 1939 in the photo and 1941 in the article. Or is the author's only photo of the Red Army from the Far East and Eastern Siberia?
    1. Slavutich 8 June 2020 13: 37 New
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      The author somehow honestly wrote in the comments: he takes Wikipedia - analyzes it - adds his "analytics" and the article is ready.
      This article, if similar to analysis, is only an analysis of parallel reality.
      Nothing to discuss here: Wikipedia analysis! This is strong!
  6. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 36 New
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    лживый аноним ну никак не угомонится((( Вот не ждали нападение Германии в Кремле - и хоть кол об голову ему теши..)))

    Пишет наш "историк", спец по РМ - ""На основе достоверных РМ командование КА, ожидая начала войны в июне, прозорливо пыталось пробить разрешение о начале переброски войск из внутренних ВО ближе к границе и о выводе к границе войск западных ВО. Сталин не позволял этого сделать. "" -

    ЛОЖЬ! Сталин не запрещал военым выводить войска из внутренних округов в западные и факты и документы показывают - с 13 МАЯ были подписаны директивы ГШ на вывод армий РГК - по оперативным планам ГШ - на вывод в западные округа)))

    Аноним чьи пасквили на разведку "хозяева" ВО считают уникальными - видимо по своей лживости и это приветствуется явно - пишет : "" В серии статей о разведке автор представил большое количество материалов, показывающих, что довоенные РМ оказались недостоверными"" ))
    маладэц) вначале ОН ПРИЗНАВАЛ ЧТО ЕГО!! ДАННЫЕ - ТЕ ЧТО он НАШЕЛ НЕ БОЛЕЕ ЧЕМ МИЗЕР ОТ РЕАЛЬНЫХ РМ а щас ОН УЖЕ СЕБЯ главным СПЕЦОМ СЧИТАЕТ ПО РМ))
  7. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 38 New
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    the anonymous author writes: "" This is indirectly evidenced by the distortion of the incoming RM: “... in March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan of the Barbarossa plan. In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR ... "

    In March, the RM spoke of three versions of the design of the attack, but only one of them was correct. ""

    А ОТКУДА ты родной знаешь - КАКОЙ из вариантов был признан верным то? Шар хрустальный вертел и дух Сталина тебе и поведал - в КАКОЙ вариант они поверили?))
  8. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 44 New
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    аноним пишет: ""Попробуем на основе опубликованных материалов разобраться, были ли предпосылки в мае для начала переброски войск 16-й армии. " ))\ ЧО за ДУРАЦКИЙ вопрос то??)))

    THIS army is not more than ONE of the armies of the RGC that began to be withdrawn by the DIRECTIVE Politburo = STALIN from MAY 13)))

    Т.е аноним отделяя вывод ЭТОЙ армии от общего вывода войск начатого в АПРЕЛЕ еще - по ОПЕРПЛАНУ ГШ занимается ПРЯМОЙ подтасовкой под ЕГО личный лживый анонимный БРЕД фальсификатора от том что НАПАДЕНИЕ Гитлера Сталин на лето 41-го, на июнь не ждал и к нему не готовился ...
  9. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 51 New
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    the anonymous author writes another lie: "" The document was clearly prepared before 13.4.41, before the date of signing the non-aggression treaty with Japan ""!

    1-е -- РОДНОЙ, СТАЛИН 13 апреля НЕ ПОПИСЫВАЛ с Токио НИКАКИХ договоров о НЕНАПАДЕНИИ ! УЧИ матчасть прежде чем лезешь умничать не по делу)))
    2nd - THIS GS directive to Minsk - on the deployment plan - was written UNDER the GSH plan on PREVENTIVE shock and THIS plan was NOT REALIZED from the word NO, and this directive was not even sent to MINSK !! UCHI materiel)))
    Ты аноним если чего не знаешь = ты поизучай тему то)) ЧЕКУНОВ об ЭТОЙ ДИРЕКТИВЕ МНОГО лет назад четко все показал)))
  10. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 53 New
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    the anonymous author writes nonsense: "" The General Staff Directive on the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army at the headquarters of the ZabVO was received on 25.5.41 and the sending of troops began on May 26.

    Did something dangerous happen on the western border to decide on the transfer of troops from ZabOVO? "))

    Ну канешна же НЕТ -- НАПАДЕНИЕ Германии на ССР не ждали а ЭТИ АРМИИ РЕЗЕРВА ГК отправили в западные округа тпо ОПЕРПЛАНУ Генштаб - чтоб самим напасть первыми в июле!! КАК Резун и завещал нашему анониму))
  11. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 10: 58 New
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    Daragy "hosts" IN - and why are you publishing false articles of another Rezun fan then?

    Я Вам скидывал статью по итогам ответам командиров на "вопросы Покровского" на том основании что статья якобы "не уникальна" потому что она уже выложена на другом сайте в сети !!

    А выкладывать лживые резунские бредни и ложь - это по ВАШЕМУ есть уникальность что ли? Может хватит пропагандой и продвижением антисоветчины лживой заниматься то?

    With uv. Kozinkin O.Yu.
  12. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 01 New
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    anonymous lies: "" The exact information about whether there will be a war with Germany or not, our scouts do not own. For example, Ramsay ""

    А СЛАБО сделать АНАЛИЗ ВСЕХ имеющихся на сегодня в свободном доступе данных от РАЗВЕДКИ где данные от Зорге не более чем писчинка?
  13. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 11 New
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    false: "" Based on the concentration of 200 divisions near the border, in April 1941 the General Directives were sent out to develop plans for covering western districts.

    An example is the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff (April 1941):

    I order you to begin developing a plan for the operational deployment of the armies of the Zapovo ""

    ПП в округах разрабатывали ЗАДОЛГО до АПРЕЛЯ и к 1 мая ПП округов были отработаны и утверждены в ГШ! А данная директива дял Минска - этол не гна ПП директива в ПРИНЦИПЕ! ВСЕ ЭТО давно показал Чекунов тот же ))
  14. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 17 New
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    очередная ЛОЖЬ анонима: ""предполагалось, что в случае войны с СССР немцы выберут южный вариант, ""

    В ГШ РККА НЕ СЧИТАЛИ что немцы выберут южный вариант! Аноним похоже примитивно НЕ ПОНИМАЕТ о чем речь идет коли несет чушь что немцы чо то там выбирали а в нашем ГШ чо то там "думали" по этому поводу!
    О том КАКОЙ вариант - южный или северный и ГДЕ в ГШ наши военные ждалт ГЛАВНЫЕ силы немцев вполне показывают "уроки и выводы " и тот же маршал ЗАХАРОВ!

    Увы 0- фвкты говорят четко - в нашем ГШ НИКОГДА НЕ ЖДАЛИ ГЛАВНЫЕ силы немцев южнее Полесья!!! НЕ НАДО ВРАТЬ аноним!"!

    См. приложения 15 и 16 в уроках - там ЧЕТКО показано ГДЕ ждали главные силы немцев в НАШИХ планах ГШ и что означает южный и северный вариант в понимании наших военых!!
  15. Eug
    Eug 8 June 2020 11: 18 New
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    Даже не знаю, кем надо быть, чтобы правильно разобраться в этом потоке противоречивой информации... И еще - Украина всегда (задолго до известного высказывания
    Бжезинского) играла важнейшую роль в планах Запада против России.
    1. VS
      VS 8 June 2020 11: 26 New
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      просто умным человеком который ВСЮ возможную инфу анализирует а не только такие вот писанины от лживых и безграмотных анонимов антисоветчкиков))
  16. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 24 New
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    Очередная ЛОЖЬ анонима: ""В начале мая в западные ВО были разосланы Директивы ГШ на разработку планов прикрытия. Основываясь на информации из проекта Записки, подготавливаемой после 17 мая, можно сказать, что планы должны были разрабатываться исходя из наличия у наших границ 189-200 немецких дивизий."


    Директивы НКО и ГШ на отработку в округах ПЛАНОВ ОБОРОНЫ кои аноним по безграмотности или ЛЖИВОСТИ называет Планами прикрытия ушли в запокруга 4-5 и 14 МАЯ и ОНИ НИКАКОГО ОТНОШЕНИЯ к плану превентивного удара ГШ-Жукова, который Василевский начал писать КАК РАЗ после того как был подписан Договор НЕЙТРАЛИТЕТЕ (а не о ненападении) с ТОКИО - не имеют!!
  17. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 11: 32 New
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    FALSE: "" our intelligence services by 22.6.41 could not fully reveal the plans for waging Germany’s war with the USSR, the composition of the invasion force and the direction of action of the shock mobile groups, the fact of the complete concentration of German troops on our border ... "

    Именно на такую вот ЛОЖЬ и ответил маршал Голиков что отвечал за РУ ГШ и коего ПАЛЬЦЕМ НИКТО НЕ ТРОНУЛ за его якобы не донесение о возможном нападении Германии на СССР которое по вранью анонима очередного не ждали в СССР и оно стало неожиданным!!!

    "" In historical literature one can find conflicting and often distorted opinions about the role of our military intelligence before the Great Patriotic War. Sometimes, even intentionally or unintentionally, military intelligence leaders are credited with actions that actually did not and could not be. In particular, that our military intelligence allegedly gave I.V. To Stalin, incorrect information about the impending attack of Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union, which did not report all the data to the General Staff, as it was personally subordinate to Stalin. All of this is fiction. In reality, this was the case.
    Firstly, military intelligence was able to timely reveal and report to the political and military leadership of the country the true plans and plans of the enemy, to establish its specific intentions. In a complex, dramatically changing environment, military intelligence, despite once making a serious mistake in the conclusion181, did not allow the enemy to get confused in the intricate network of misinformation, and consistently, step by step, and always timely reported to the leadership about the true plans of the enemy, his main efforts. In this regard, the timely disclosure of the contents of the Barbarossa plan and its main elements should be considered the crown of our military intelligence activities.
    Secondly, our military intelligence managed to establish and disclose not only the plans of the enemy and his intentions, but also the timing of their implementation, despite their repeated transfers. The culmination of intelligence in this regard is the timely establishment of the possible timing of an attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the timing of the implementation of the same Barbarossa plan. Thirdly, Soviet military intelligence with amazing accuracy for intelligence timely and fully revealed the general composition and grouping of the armed forces of Nazi Germany before the attack, its deployment and numbering of the main formations.

    86

    Fourth, with the outbreak of war, despite enormous organizational and technical difficulties and losses, our military intelligence was able to quickly switch to a military footing, sharply strengthen its operational link, correctly target all other links to solve the main tasks, and successfully provide political and military leadership in the new conditions.
    Таковы факты, которые неопровержимо и убедительно доказываются многочисленными архивными документами и свидетельствами очевидцев. "" (https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/354-zapiski-nachalnika-razvedupra-iyul-1940-goda-iyun-1941-goda.html )
  18. Operator 8 June 2020 15: 26 New
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    The author does not understand point-blank that the signs of the outbreak of war are objective circumstances (in the case of the German attack on the USSR, the concentration of German divisions on the border is above the control level established by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), and not the subjective opinions of agents, intelligence officers and military attaches.

    In addition, the author simply does not know that Hitler postponed the start of Operation Barbarossa several times during April-June 1941 due to circumstances independent of Germany, including due to the unexpected prolongation of the war with Greece and the declaration of war by Yugoslavia.

    It was with such introductory messages that Soviet intelligence reports connected with various dates of the German attack on the USSR - almost simultaneously with Hitler's change of intent.

    PS A separate statement was made by the author about the existence of a second front in Germany in 1941 in the form of a mouse sitting on an island under a broom of Britain (the transatlantic supply line of which was completely controlled by German submarines), but which supposedly concentrated all its forces for landing in Normandy or, according to at least amassed heavy bombers to strike the continent laughing
  19. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 15: 44 New
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    Quote: Slavutich
    The author somehow honestly wrote in the comments: he takes Wikipedia - analyzes it - adds his "analytics" and the article is ready.
    This article, if similar to analysis, is only an analysis of parallel reality.
    Nothing to discuss here: Wikipedia analysis! This is strong!

    that's cool!!)))
  20. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 16: 00 New
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    Quote: Operator
    The author does not understand point-blank that the signs of the outbreak of war are objective circumstances (in the case of the German attack on the USSR, the concentration of German divisions on the border is above the control level established by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), and not the subjective opinions of agents, intelligence officers and military attaches.

    In addition, the author simply does not know that Hitler postponed the start of Operation Barbarossa several times during April-June 1941 due to circumstances independent of Germany, including due to the unexpected prolongation of the war with Greece and the declaration of war by Yugoslavia.

    It was with such introductory messages that Soviet intelligence reports connected with various dates of the German attack on the USSR - almost simultaneously with Hitler's change of intent.

    PS A separate statement was made by the author about the existence of a second front in Germany in 1941 in the form of a mouse sitting on an island under a broom of Britain (the transatlantic supply line of which was completely controlled by German submarines), but which supposedly concentrated all its forces for landing in Normandy or, according to at least amassed heavy bombers to strike the continent laughing


    1-е - не было в плана ГШ РККА прописано - что если немцы соберут на границе с СССР столько-то немецких дивизий то они нападут а если не соберут - то и не стоит ждать нападение)))

    2-е - ГИТЛЕР НИ РАЗУ НЕ ПЕРЕНОСИЛ дату нападения на ССР)) Как прописал Браухич дату нападения на СССР в январе 41-го как 21 июня 0 так 21-21 июня Гитлер и напал)))
    Анонимный автар упомянул "уроки и выводы" - работу ДСП офицеров ВНУ ГШ от 1992 года а там и приводится Приложение 6, (https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html ) где сей приказ Браухича приводится))

    "" c) At the third stage (from April to the beginning of May), the command of army groups and armies take the bands intended for them, in accordance with the directive on concentration, first observing masking measures.
    Подготовительные работы нужно провести таким образом, чтобы наступление (день «Б») могло быть начато 21.6. "" ))))
    Операция нападения на Грецию была под № 20 в барбаросса - под №21 . т.е. операция с грецией была спланирована РАНЬШЕ чем нападение на ССР и дата нападения на ССР прописанная в январе - СРАЗУ после подписания самой Барбароссы - не переносилась НИ РАЗУ - ни официально не предположительно - Гитлером)) Естесено операция в Югославии НИКАКИМ образом на срок-дату нападения на ССР не повлияла))

    3-е - вы судя по всему в принципе не в курсе чо там разведка по срокам докладывала) видимо вы как и анонимный автар по ВИКИ типа "знаете" тему)))
    read the new book by A.B. Martirosyan on this subject - "On the eve of the war. Could tragedy have been avoided"))

    4-е - автар анонимный - вааще маладэц - чо ему кажется то и верно))
    1. Operator 8 June 2020 19: 31 New
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      Teach the materiel - in Directive No. 21 dated 18.10.1940/15/1941, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Hitler (and not Brauchitsch there) approved the Barbarossa plan and set the start date for the operation as May 5, XNUMX, in strict accordance with the strategic plan of the military company and the plans of the army command complete all hostilities within XNUMX months before the start of the autumn thaw.

      The order for the last postponement of the term to June 22, 1941 was signed by Hitler on June 10, 1941.
  21. ccsr 8 June 2020 16: 51 New
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    Author:
    Eugene
    Even a month later (25.4.41), the military attaché in Germany, General Tupikov, could not name an unambiguous scenario for the development of events related to the outbreak of war with the USSR:

    This is a blatant lie that the author specifically distributes in his articles, because Tupikov made a detailed report in mid-March, which in terms of volume of material has no analogues at all in pre-war intelligence materials:
    In the second half of March 1941, Major General V. Tupikov sent to Moscow "Report on the combat and numerical strength of the deployed German army and its group as of 15.3.41."
    This report contains more than 100 sheets of typewritten text, 30 diagrams of the organizational structures of the combat units of the German army, a diagram of the grouping of forces of the German army, a diagram of the grouping of the air forces of Germany, a diagram of the organization of the German army corps, summary tables of the combat strength of the Wehrmacht artillery units, etc.
    The report of Major General V. Tupikov on the content, design and completeness of the data is unique evidence the fact that the former chief of staff of the Kharkov military district, who received intelligence skills in the first foreign special mission in Tallinn, completely completed the informational part of the task of the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Data on the state of the German armed forces were accurate.
    In Moscow, a report by V.I. Tupikova was immediately processed, and on its basis in April 1941, an “Intelligence Report on Germany” was prepared. She was sent to the People’s Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and the commander of the western military districts.

    http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=10674353%40cmsArticle
    1. Operator 8 June 2020 17: 50 New
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      Our Israeli "friend" Eugene burns with napalm laughing
      1. ccsr 8 June 2020 18: 19 New
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        Quote: Operator
        Our Israeli "friend" Eugene burns with napalm

        And I think where it stinks - now I understand ....
        And after all, mind you, again, not a single link to the material leads - cheats as always, and be sure to distort the facts. For example, he is brazenly lying:
        In fact, over 40 divisions arrived in East Prussia and former Poland in June, of which more than half were TD and MD. However, our intelligence was not able to detect their appearance at the border, although partially the transportation was recorded.

        But in fact, the Intelligence Directorate most accurately revealed the entire group of Germans concentrated against the USSR on June 22:
        It is interesting to compare the information on the number of German divisions concentrated against the USSR by June 1941 according to the then intelligence of our Intelligence Agency and today's data. Here is the book of the Publishing House of Political Literature "Soviet Army", a circulation of 100 thousand. We read on pages 155–156: “By the spring of 1941, the German army had 214 divisions, including 21 tank and 14 motorized ... And out of these 214 tested, fired divisions, 153, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, were sent to east, to the borders of the Soviet Union. " What did our Intelligence Directorate report about this almost 30 years ago? In the same intelligence number 5, it claimed that as of June 1, 1941, the Hitler command against the Soviet Union already had about 130-131 German divisions with a depth of 400 kilometers (including Finland and Romania) concentrated along our western borders (counting Finland and Romania). there is up to the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn, Elbing). At the same time, we indicated in the same document that "the German command continues (emphasized by me. - F.G.) the concentration of troops to the border strip with the USSR, making massive transfers of units from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans." And in the depths of Germany, as we argued in the same document, the main military command of Hitler Germany on June 1 had 44–48 divisions in its general strategic reserve. And in any case, at least half of them were intended against the USSR. Thus, the general composition of the forces of Nazi Germany, deployed and intended to begin operations against the Red Army, on June 1, 1941 amounted to at least 150–155 German divisions. As it is obvious, this calculation does not include the number of ground divisions and individual brigades of the then Hitler allies - Romania, Hungary and Finland. We knew their number exactly, as the book “Soviet Army” on page 156 correctly states, “in total 190 divisions were fully prepared against the Red Army ...” The accuracy of our data is the result of the exceptional conscientiousness of the local military intelligence and special checks of the information received by the employees of the Intelligence Agency.

        F.I.Golikov
        1. Operator 8 June 2020 18: 51 New
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          Now he will begin to change shoes in the air - as yesterday the general director of Channel One with the film "Brother" laughing
          1. ccsr 8 June 2020 19: 07 New
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            Quote: Operator
            Now start to change shoes in the air

            Думаю не начнет - я его в прошлой статье уличил в наглом вранье по поводу числа дивизий, так он сделал вид что не заметил того, что его ложь не прошла. И сейчас то же самое будет.
            1. Operator 8 June 2020 19: 33 New
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              Let's see - now the American spring has prevailed and all manuals are at once outdated laughing
        2. Tuzik 8 June 2020 19: 41 New
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          It seems to me that disputes about intelligence on the eve of the war have not been silent for so long, because there were so many explored and very controversial, now everyone chooses the ones he likes best for his article. The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the right reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.
          1. ccsr 9 June 2020 12: 48 New
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            Quote: Tuzik
            The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the correct reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.

            Suppose you do not believe Golikov, suspecting that he has distorted something. But then what compelled us to evaluate the intelligence activities of those who in modern Russia were no longer connected, but knew how the situation was then:
            ... authoritative contemporary scientist-historian and political scientist Valentin Mikhailovich Falin said: "I. I. Ilyichev, head of strategic military intelligence (he was my boss in the Soviet Control Commission and in the Third European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) said, that intelligence data on the concentration of German troops along the front line at the time of the attack diverged from reality by only two divisions! Moreover, these two divisions were not deployed, they were only on the way. In other words, our intelligence was knowledgeable enough. "

            Why should Falin lie, especially since he had nothing to do with military intelligence?
            1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 13: 01 New
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              Quote: ccsr
              that intelligence data on the concentration of German troops along the front line at the time of the attack diverged from reality by only two divisions!

              So I mean that if you select after the war from that heap of reports all the intelligence that matches reality, then that is most likely. Here you will not dig into Golikov, so he confidently praised himself. But how did they choose and analyze before the day of judgment?
              1. ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 48 New
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                Quote: Tuzik
                But how did they choose and analyze before the day of judgment?

                Для этого в ГРУ существуют аналитические структуры, и естественно Голиков не лично составлял сводку - этот итоговый документ готовили несколько специалистов под руководством начальника информационного направления. Был в истории ГРУ того периода весьма специфический подполковник Новобранец, который многое нафантазировал в своих мемуарах, но тем не менее весьма точно описал работу информационных органов:
                «FINISHING “MOBILE RECORDING IN GERMANY”, - recalls V.A. Rookie, - I carried it to Golikov. In the "note" we determined the scale of the deployment of the German army in two versions: for lightning war (blitzkrieg) and for a long one. "For a lightning war, we determined the number of divisions around 220, for a long one - 230. And we attached a map-diagram showing the existing German forces on our borders and possible options for the direction of their operations."

                Please note that we are talking about MOBZAPE, and not about the Wehrmacht's operational plans for June 1941 - only military professionals understand what their difference is and do not mold a hunchback, as the author of the statues Evgeny does, dumping everything in order to justify his false fabrications.
                1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 13: 55 New
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                  He presents his version of events. The more versions the more interesting!
                  1. ccsr 9 June 2020 14: 02 New
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                    Quote: Tuzik
                    He presents his version of events. The more versions the more interesting!

                    The author of the articles is constantly lying, and this can be easily verified by the example of a previous article, where he lied that in 1938 there were a total of 111 divisions in Germany according to our GS estimates:
                    According to the estimates of the General Staff, in Germany there were 96 pd, 5 ppm, 5 cd and 30 TB (a total of 111 divisions).

                    I drew attention to this lie and gave the answer using a table, which he "did not notice":
                    It can be seen from the materials that as of 1.1.1939, there were no talk of any 111 divisions at all, so the lies about 96 infantry divisions, of which there were only 39, lay on the conscience of the author of these fabrications. However, I have always argued that he is a liar and you can not trust him.

                    However, you yourself can check it by the link:
                    https://topwar.ru/171298-nachalo-sosredotochenija-podvizhnyh-vojsk-vermahta-u-nashej-granicy.html
                    1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 14: 07 New
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                      There can be mistakes in counting divisions, some are already fighting, some are completing picking, some are just starting to take shape, some are only on paper.
  22. Tuzik 8 June 2020 19: 35 New
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    It was interesting to read, but I did not understand the title of the article “Where was the 16th Army preparing to be redeployed?”, And the article itself contains a selective listing of intelligence about the Germans. And where was the army preparing to go before arriving in Ukraine? Her way turned, chi sho?
    1. Ales 8 June 2020 19: 53 New
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      There is a link at the beginning of the article. Initially, the army was redeployed to Transcaucasia, and on June 10 it was redirected to the Oryol District. Then to the Kiev district.
      1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 00 New
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        Thanks for the answer. Do you mean the link to the article: "June 22: the results of the historical investigation of the RVIO, June 2018"? So there to read a day)) Okay, I'll try to start. )))
        1. AsmyppoL 8 June 2020 20: 13 New
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          Tomorrow, see Part 2 on preparing for departure.
          Then wait 1-2 days and wait for the third part about the final goal. The fourth last with the docking of parts will be after June 4
          1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 14 New
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            Understood thanks. From far away you come. )))
            1. AsmyppoL 8 June 2020 20: 19 New
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              So the review is unique laughing
              This has not yet been published anywhere.
              Good luck!
              1. The comment was deleted.
        2. The comment was deleted.
      2. Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 48 New
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        "There is a link at the beginning of the article"

        I read a bit, there is a curse between historians, they can’t get together for more than two)) Here people are discussing in VO more interesting.
  23. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 18 New
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    Quote: Operator
    Teach the materiel - in Directive No. 21 dated 18.10.1940/15/1941, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Hitler (and not Brauchitsch there) approved the Barbarossa plan and set the start date for the operation as May 5, XNUMX, in strict accordance with the strategic plan of the military company and the plans of the army command complete all hostilities within XNUMX months before the start of the autumn thaw.

    The order for the last postponement of the term to June 22, 1941 was signed by Hitler on June 10, 1941.


    а может приведете цитатку - ГДЕ там в Барбароссе - ОБЩЕМ плане нападения после которого и был КОНКРЕТНЫЙ приказ устанавливающий ТОЧНУЮ дату нападения?))

    We look - what is indicated there in Barbarossa No. 21 - "" Preparations requiring a longer time, if they have not already begun, should start now and finish by 15.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX. ""

    Oops (((AND WHERE is DATA ATTACKS прописана?)) Для кретинов подскажу - 15 мая это дата ОКОНЧАНИЯ основных ПРИГОТОВЛЕНИЙ, а не дата нападения))) так что - успокойтесь неуч - ГИТЛЕР НЕ ПЕРЕНОСИЛ ни разу дату НАПАДЕНИЯ)) блин.. откуда такие неучи как Вы вылезают???(((
  24. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 21 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    It seems to me that disputes about intelligence on the eve of the war have not been silent for so long, because there were so many explored and very controversial, now everyone chooses the ones he likes best for his article. The same Golikov could not blame himself, he had the right reports and the wrong ones, but we don’t know what he really reported to Stalin and what conclusions he made.

    судя по тому что Голиков был отправлен в США налаживать поставки оружия т.е. пользовался БОЛЬШИМ доверием СТАЛИНА - данные он дал вовремя и точные и полные по немцам)))
    1. cavl 8 June 2020 20: 52 New
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      Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?
      Why, ignoramus-quote-book, Kozinkin!
      Arguments on the verge of kindergarten ...
      1. ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 26 New
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        Quote: cavl
        Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?

        Lying as always - this was not Golikov in the 60s who claimed, but this is intelligence data No. 5 dated June 15. And the number 285-296 is indicated there, that is, even in the details you can’t do without lies. But this is not the point, but the fact that no one has yet disproved these data, although any military professional understands that they reflect a general assessment of the combat potential of Germany on the eve of the war and this data is accurate.

        And against the British troops on different fronts the figure of 120 divisions is indicated, and you, a liar, present them as ready to fight directly on the territory of England. This is how the "experts" make up the history of the Second World from the fraud, in which both of you and the author of the statues succeeded.
    2. Tuzik 8 June 2020 20: 55 New
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      Maybe he was just a reliable, proven frame. Tymoshenko and Zhukov also forgave the defeat of the summer.
      1. AsmyppoL 9 June 2020 04: 53 New
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        Yes you are right. But I think that the main problem was I.V. Stalin.
        Stalin carefully read all intelligence reports. Unlike all other leaders, he received TWO copies of intelligence documents. At least from the intelligence department. What he counted there and thought we do not know. But in a mishmash of misinformation, he could only do wrong actions. And he allowed or did not allow all military decisions. Perhaps he considered himself one of the main culprits of the June 22 tragedy ...
        He sent the others involved in the main directions to the fronts, where they could not fix much until the first days of July ... He sent someone away so that they would not break firewood. For example, as the commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov or the same Golikov ...
        The military commanders were not able to think, trusted in intelligence and did not know how to competently fight ... For their experience, they were platiks with the blood of our soldiers, commanders, ordinary civilians ...
        The situation was similar with the encirclement of the southwestern front. The chief of staff of the front was a wonderful man, a competent military general Tupikov. A great scout, military attache in Germany. He escaped from Berlin on the eve of the war. German pilots received orders to bring down the plane, but did not find it in the night sky.
        Twice he turned to the chief of staff of the General Staff and directly, contrary to any order, to Stalin on measures to prevent the encirclement of a large group of troops. Shaposhnikov called him an alarmist. Two days later, the encirclement ring slammed shut. General Tupikov died with weapons in his hands .... A blessed memory to him and other fallen heroes!
        But Shaposhnikov was not injured for this, because The final decision was made by Stalin ...

        As the saying goes, the devil is hiding in the details. In the fourth part, all the pieces of the mosaic will settle down in one picture. Different parts that are usually not a single chain of events will be connected by a single chain
        1. VS
          VS 9 June 2020 09: 38 New
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          Quote: AsmyppoL
          But in a mishmash of misinformation, he could only do wrong actions.

          по себе родной аноним судишь? Это ТЫ по мизеру инфы городишь бредовые, ошибочные минимум выводы неуча. А Сталин в отличи от тебя анонима УМНЫЙ был и ЗНАЛ больше точно))) А может по ФАКТАМ судить надо - по тем действиям что предпринимались с конца апреля - начатый вывод армий РГК по оперплану ГШ - это о чем ?

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          he allowed or did not allow all military decisions. Perhaps he considered himself one of the main culprits of the June 22 tragedy ...

          ВСЕ его разрешения или не разрешения - были вполне ВЕРНЫМИ! и политически и с военной точки зрения!

          ИЗУЧАЙ военое дело - может поймешь о чем были приказы ГШ с мая месяца)))

          а что от там думал или считал - прекрати уже мудрить.. спиритист )) смешно получается))
          SEE WHAT HE DID !!))


          Quote: AsmyppoL
          He sent someone away so that they wouldn’t break firewood. For example, as the commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov or the same Golikov ...

          а куда ГОЛИКОВА то можно было отправить 23 июня? НА ФРОНТ что ли? Он нач РУ ГШ вообще то - у него своя спицифика )) Вот он и поехал в СЩА - и это не подальше а = ВАЖНОЕ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕННОЕ задание .. наперсточник вы наш анонимный))

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Dead ends. A great scout, military attache in Germany. He escaped from Berlin on the eve of the war. German pilots received orders to bring down the plane, but did not find it in the night sky.
          Twice he turned to the chief of staff of the General Staff and directly, contrary to any order, to Stalin on measures to prevent the encirclement of a large group of troops. Shaposhnikov called him an alarmist. Two days later, the encirclement ring slammed shut. General Tupikov died with weapons in his hands .... A blessed memory to him and other fallen heroes!

          ты чо демагогию гонишь то ? ПРИ ЧЕМ ТУТ Тупиков и Киевский котел то? Там что - РЕШАЛСЯ вопрос между Тупиковым и Шапошниковым только ? ты чо опять фальсификацией занимаееся?? ты еще слезу тут пусти лживую - по невино убиеным ...
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          But Shaposhnikov was not injured for this, because The final decision was made by Stalin ...

          ну канешна жа - СТАЛИН во всем вам .. виноватый!!))) Мало он ков что мечтали о капитализме сажал и расстреливал((( Наследнички повылезали из всех щелей ... зулейхи недобитые)) СТАЛИН ВАМ виноватый во всем)))

          Quote: AsmyppoL
          In the fourth part, all the pieces of the mosaic will settle down in one picture. Different parts that are usually not a single chain of events will be connected by a single chain

          поржем))) Раскажешь нам что СТАЛИН не верил в напалдение Германи вообще и точно на 22 июня, потому что САМ мечтал напасть но не успел - 6 июля - для этого он армии РГК начал выводить с 13 МАЯ?)))
        2. Tuzik 9 June 2020 11: 40 New
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          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Stalin carefully read all intelligence messages

          Is there some kind of terminator when he did everything? Get into all the little things on all issues. They say that in technical data and in the production of any equipment, I rummaged no worse than specialists.
        3. ccsr 9 June 2020 14: 47 New
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          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Yes you are right. But I think that the main problem was I.V. Stalin.

          А я считаю что главная проблема не в Сталине, а в том что вы постоянно извращаете историю второй мировой и для этого не гнушаетесь подтасовками, как это было с количеством немецких дивизий по оценке нашего ГШ, или фантазируете по поводу 16 армии, назначение которой было определено в ГШ, и об этом пишет Маршал М.В.Захаров:
          Thus, the second strategic echelon, which was the reserve of the High Command, included 16, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies; and they included 58 rifle, 13 armored and 6 motorized rifle divisions.
          The advance of the 19th and 16th armies to the Kiev direction shows that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated south of Polesie, according to the certificate "On the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war in the West," compiled by Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin eight days before the start of the war, that is, June 13, 1941 .
  25. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 26 New
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    Quote: Ales
    There is a link at the beginning of the article. Initially, the army was redeployed to Transcaucasia, and on June 10 it was redirected to the Oryol District. Then to the Kiev district.

    garbage)) The exact place where she was going is the place where she came to you))
    В свое время Чекунов показывал на форуме милитера - шла она в район МЕЖДУ ЗапОВО и КОВО)) А ее шараханья - это результат того что немцы на ЭТУ армию дали Ноту протеста!! Мол, почему у вас армия с Урала прет на ЗАПАД??)) ответ был таким - она идет в Ср. АЗИЮ)) типа мы от англичан подлянки ждем))
  26. VS
    VS 8 June 2020 20: 31 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Thanks for the answer. Do you mean the link to the article: "June 22: the results of the historical investigation of the RVIO, June 2018"? So there to read a day)) Okay, I'll try to start. )))

    это не статья - это беседа в РВИО в июне 2018 года где малолетний ТИМИН вопил мне - на мои слова что вывод армий РГК начался с середины МАЯ в связи с ожиданием нападения Гитлера - КУДА шла эта армия ??!! КУДА шла??)))
    Он пытался этими воплями доказать что шла она не в ожидании нападения в принципе а если и шла то раз не на границу СРАЗУ - чего НЕ БЫЛО в планах ГШ дял армий РГК в принципе - то значит нападения не ждали)) в общем - нес ту же пургу что и анонимный автар несет )))
    1. cavl 8 June 2020 20: 49 New
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      This is a conversation after which Kozinkin, after 10 years of studying quotes, could not tell where you were moving the 4 reserve armies.
      And Chekunov literally wrote Kozinkin’s words on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.
      1. ccsr 9 June 2020 13: 31 New
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        Quote: cavl
        And Chekunov literally wrote Kozinkin’s words on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.

        Well, many here consider you this - and I think it is not unfounded.
    2. Tuzik 8 June 2020 21: 02 New
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      Quote: V.S.
      where the young TIMIN cried out to me - in my words that the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK began in the middle of MAY in connection with the expectation of an attack by Hitler - WHERE did this army go ?? !! WHERE WAS IT ??)))

      This is where I finished reading. )))
  27. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 11 New
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    Quote: sleeve
    Верно. Хотел о комментировать,но вы были первым. 19ая то как и куда в этой гипотезе? Соответственно 16ая ехала по назначению. 2ой эшелон. Тихо ехала и медленно. Взрывной график? Ну да. Только в обозначенные сроки стартовые цифры то же разнятся. У немцев ближе к нулю,потому и "приход" выше. Верны или не верны РД на июнь или май 41 уже не играло роли. Принятое решение о выдвижении из внутренних округов-свидетельствует лишь о правильной оценке ситуации. Результат же действий-чисто военное противостояние с более сильным и опытным противником. И противник этот сколь бы силен и опытен не был закончил войну в своей столице. В немалой степени из за того, что происходило в 41ом.


    увы - не так все просто.. Погром 41-го для РККА это не следствие того что кто то там поздно выводился.. Исаев вопит что надо был в мае выводить и внутренние округа тоже - чтоб было счастие и победа! Все кнопки нажаты были и своевременно вполне - боле чем за МЕСЯЦ начался вывод войск - Армий РГК в западные округа, вторые эшелоны запокругов пошли по ПП с 11 июня, и дату нападения как примерную - на 20-е числа июня - тоже знали в Кремле! НО! Проблема была в самих планах ГШ о коих показали офицеры ВНУ ГШ в "уроках и выводах" но что старательно игнорирует анонимный автар втюхивая идиотам бред что нападение не ждали вообще потому что немцы обдурили нашу разведку тем что меняли погончики на погонах солдат....
  28. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 13 New
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    Quote: cavl
    Yah? Is this the Golikov who claimed in the 60s that intelligence correctly determined the presence of up to 296 German divisions on May 31, 1941, of which more than 120 were preparing to fight the British troops?
    Why, ignoramus-quote-book, Kozinkin!
    Arguments on the verge of kindergarten ...

    ГДЕ СОБИРАЛИСЬ воевать - в КАКОЙ точке мира - эти 120 дивизий - НАЗОВИ ИХ дослокацию умник.. в НОРВЕГИИ и Пруссии ?
  29. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 15 New
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    Quote: cavl
    This is a conversation after which Kozinkin, after 10 years of studying quotes, could not tell where you were moving the 4 reserve armies.
    And Chekunov literally wrote Kozinkin’s words on the Military Literature forum. That's all he wanted to show Kozinkin with his childhood understanding of history.

    чудо - эта армия шла в ЗАПАДНЫЕ округа - по ОПЕРПЛАНУ ГШ)) Потому что ЖДАЛИ НАПАДЕНИЕ Гитлера)) А конкретная станция разгрузки армии РЕЗЕРВА ГК по оперплану ГШ - НЕ ИМЕТ в данном случае НИКАКОГО значения))
  30. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 21 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: V.S.
    where the young TIMIN cried out to me - in my words that the withdrawal of the armies of the RGK began in the middle of MAY in connection with the expectation of an attack by Hitler - WHERE did this army go ?? !! WHERE WAS IT ??)))

    This is where I finished reading. )))

    я в тот момент просто не понял - О ЧЕМ он вообще вопит то? в чем смысл его ора - чо сказать то хочет малолетний?(( ((( И только когда его дружбан Исаев начал спустя год!!! нести пургу что армии РГК оказывается НЕ УСПЕЛИ выйти на САМУ ГРАНИЦУ и в ЭТОМ была причина разгрома РККА - я понял о чем вопил этот ))
    Армии РГК шли как второй стратегичный эшелон (такого термина кстати тогда и не было) в свои районы по оперплану ГШ для выполнения своих последующих задача - ответного наступления в случае нападения германии ) А Тимин и Исаев вопили о том что раз не на саму границу шла условная 16-я армия - то значит и нападение не ждали еще)))

    and this is about trying to vtyuhivat and tutoshny anonymous author))
    1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 12: 10 New
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      Quote: V.S.
      And only when his friendship Isaev began a year later !!! bear the blizzard that the army of the RGK is not able to go to the very border and THIS was the reason for the defeat of the Red Army

      That he has been saying for ten years that the main reason for the defeat is not the tightly standing three echelons, and the holes from the bagels in the directions of the German attacks.
      And about Timin, I didn’t like it either, well tell me your opinion where the army was going, cho yelling him ten times “where did she go?”
      You historians need to be less emotional in discussions, that’s why you are constantly insulting the author here, you can argue more culturally!
  31. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 23 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Maybe he was just a reliable, proven frame. Tymoshenko and Zhukov also forgave the defeat of the summer.

    не простили.. тимошенко - ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩИЙ первые дни - поехал с понижением на фронт. Жуков - ГОД не наград ни званий))) если бы не их положение - наркома и нач ГШ к 22 июня - к стенке поставил бы СТАЛИН обоих точно..
  32. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 09: 43 New
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    Quote: Gardamir
    There are two points, none of those writing about the situation on the eve of the war recalls the situation inside the country. How prepared are the Union, industry, agriculture for war. I really wanted the war, since it was inevitable to begin, as late as possible.
    Well, the second point. Imagine that Hitler officially declares war, that would be.

    если Гитлер объявляет войну - а он это сделать хотел в 2 часа по Москве но не получилось - спасибо сталину ))) - если он ее объявит за сутки то он АГРЕССОР однозначный а мы могем нанести бомбовые удары по вермахту у границ)))
  33. slasha 9 June 2020 12: 21 New
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    Good selection. And the analysis is present. Thank.
  34. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 00 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Stalin carefully read all intelligence messages

    Is there some kind of terminator when he did everything? Get into all the little things on all issues. They say that in technical data and in the production of any equipment, I rummaged no worse than specialists.

    а еще он занимался литературой архитектурой и многим вопросами металургии той же и это не хохма )) Если бы не был Сталина вы б щас тут не писали коменты)) И это не потому что он отец народов а потому что ОН командовал в ССР во время войны на истребление тузиков просвещенным Западом...
    1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 19: 42 New
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      smile I studied in a Soviet school. And only Russian historians read, except Liddle Garth.
  35. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 07 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Quote: V.S.
    And only when his friendship Isaev began a year later !!! bear the blizzard that the army of the RGK is not able to go to the very border and THIS was the reason for the defeat of the Red Army

    That he has been saying for ten years that the main reason for the defeat is not the tightly standing three echelons, and the holes from the bagels in the directions of the German attacks.
    And about Timin, I didn’t like it either, well tell me your opinion where the army was going, cho yelling him ten times “where did she go?”
    You historians need to be less emotional in discussions, that’s why you are constantly insulting the author here, you can argue more culturally!

    если автар ВРЕТ специально и плюет на то что ему указывает - чо с ним делать - при том что он тупо ПРЯЧЕТСЯ за кликухой явно опасаясь что будет известно его имя - что врет не просто аноним а конкретный тип?))

    По Исаеву - Исаев никогда ДО мая 2019 года не показывал вот ЭТО - - ЧТО АРМИИ РЕЗЕРВА ГК, армии из внутрених округов, якобы ДОЛЖНЫ были заполнять эти самые дырки на границе!!))) должны типа но не успели - по ВИНЕ разведки и СТАЛИНА сответственно!))
    read)) -
    https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/347-antiisaev.html

    Когда я стал вникать - чо там несет Исаев боле внимательно - оказалось он этой подтасовкой БОЛЕЕ 15 лет занимается! ИМЕННО ПОДТАСОВКОЙ и ЛОЖЬЮ))
  36. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 17: 08 New
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    Quote: slasha
    Good selection. And the analysis is present. Thank.

    да нет тут никакого анализа) я васс умоляю))) дешевая подгонка под свои бредни о том что - нападение не ждали что к нему не готовились а если войска куда то и шли то - видимо чт напасть первыми)))
    A vulgar mixture of Rezonism and Isaevschina)))
  37. VS
    VS 9 June 2020 20: 38 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    smile I studied in a Soviet school. And only Russian historians read, except Liddle Garth.

    мои писанины читали?)) Вот тут - прошлогодние книги - 2 штуки .. и там же но раньше выложено - еще есть))))) Могу скинуть и свежее в том числе))) Только сегодня обложку скинули издатели на новую книгу - выйдет в связи с этим дурдомом осенью ))
    1. Tuzik 9 June 2020 23: 36 New
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      No, I didn’t read yours, but somehow quite a while ago I tried Martirosyan, with a tempting name like the betrayal of generals. As I understand it, you are in the same stream with him. Throw a link to the article here, I'll see.
  38. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 08: 40 New
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    Quote: cormorant
    They begin exactly when the aggressor believes that he is ready. And not a day earlier.

    With the same success, you can try not to provoke the Sun-at sunrise ....
    good Very true remark! I was always surprised at this moment. What the hell can there be a provocation when such forces are concentrated on the border itself.

    вопрос о провокациях это вопрос о том КТО БУДЕТ признан АГРЕССОРОМ!! США заявили что помогать будут ТОЙ СТОРОН КТО БУДЕТ признан жертвой агрессии! Гитлер заявил в НОТЕ что нападает ЗАЩИЩАЯСЬ от постоянных нападений СССР на ее невинность!! И если бы было признано что СССР реально и постоянно ведет себя АГРЕССИВНО по отношению к соседям то удар Германии имено ПРЕВЕНТИВНЫЙ и она ЗАЩИЩАЯСЬ напала! ТАК стало понятне - почему в те дни вопрос о провокациях был актуален?))
    1. strannik1985 10 June 2020 08: 57 New
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      The US said that they will help THOSE PARTIES WHO WILL

      By the summer of 1941, the United States was helping Great Britain in the war with Germany, including the construction of air defense units, escorting cargoes by the US Navy ships, and volunteer participation. In 1940, they developed a common strategy (the ABC plan) in the war. In the spring of 1941, American quartermasters worked to deploy American troops.
  39. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 08: 42 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    No, I didn’t read yours, but somehow quite a while ago I tried Martirosyan, with a tempting name like the betrayal of generals. As I understand it, you are in the same stream with him. Throw a link to the article here, I'll see.


    site "Great slandered war" - https://liewar.ru/
    или просто в яндехе набираете фамилию мою)) Козинкин О.
    And - do you believe that OUR generals could not at all wish the defeat of the USSR in the war with enlightened Europe?)))
    1. Tuzik 10 June 2020 11: 10 New
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      Of course they couldn’t, just by the level they were weaker than the enemy, Bayern-Spartak type. The same Stalin said we have no Hindenburgs.
  40. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 15: 09 New
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    Quote: strannik1985
    The US said that they will help THOSE PARTIES WHO WILL

    By the summer of 1941, the United States was helping Great Britain in the war with Germany, including the construction of air defense units, escorting cargoes by the US Navy ships, and volunteer participation. In 1940, they developed a common strategy (the ABC plan) in the war. In the spring of 1941, American quartermasters worked to deploy American troops.

    И чо?? А ССР то тут с какого боку для США?((( Они что - заявили что будуть помогать ССР если СТАЛИН ПЕРВЫМ врежет что ли? Вы прям как дите малое(((
    ВЫ в КУРСЕ КАК США помогали ССР даже притом что они признали ССР ЖЕРТВОЙ агрессии в РЕАЛЬНОСТИ? Почитайте того кто занимался переговорами с США по теме поставок и помощи от США в СССР летом-осенью 41-го - Голикова..
  41. VS
    VS 10 June 2020 15: 13 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    Of course they couldn’t, just by the level they were weaker than the enemy, Bayern-Spartak type. The same Stalin said we have no Hindenburgs.

    и поэтому они - отдельные генералы не могли желать поражения своей стране? ))) Вы в курсе скока генералов и старших офицеров ломанулось к немцам в первые же недели войны сдавая свои полки и дивизии и округа?
    1. Tuzik 10 June 2020 19: 38 New
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      That I say, read Martirosyan. )) And Solonina listened. I do not believe that the generals of the great armies would wish for defeat. Ambition will not give. The same traitor Vlasov, who, it seemed, could not stand the Communists, fought well, Stalin was pleased with him.
  42. VS
    VS 11 June 2020 08: 53 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    That I say, read Martirosyan. )) And Solonina listened. I do not believe that the generals of the great armies would wish for defeat. Ambition will not give. The same traitor Vlasov, who, it seemed, could not stand the Communists, fought well, Stalin was pleased with him.

    КТО вам сказал что Сталин был доволен ВЛАСОВЫМ и что Власов воевал хорошо До своего плена? Вы вообще в КУРСЕ КТО в 80-е страну сдал БЕЗ боя - проводил реставрацию капитализма и уничтожение СССР? Не будьте тузиком(((
    1. Tuzik 11 June 2020 16: 38 New
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      One can even see the increase - the lump of the mechanized corps - the lump of the army - the front castle. In the film about the tragedy on Volkhov it was said that Stalin sent him to lead the front, but he refused, so they sent him an army to save something that wasn’t very cunning.
  43. VS
    VS 13 June 2020 10: 23 New
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    Quote: Tuzik
    One can even see the increase - the lump of the mechanized corps - the lump of the army - the front castle. In the film about the tragedy on Volkhov it was said that Stalin sent him to lead the front, but he refused, so they sent him an army to save something that wasn’t very cunning.

    да мало ли кого повышали если тупо некого было ставить на должности(( А вы думаете СТАЛИН сам решал КОГО куда с корпуса на выше ставить что ли? )) Ему принес подчиненныей представление - кого куда сунуть вот он не особо заморачиваясь - доверяя подчиненному и если не было ПРЯМЫХ косяков - и подписывал приказ)))