The hard summer of the 41st: how the "obscene world" did not take place
Churchill came up with it all
June 22, 1941, a few hours after the invasion of Germany and its satellites in the USSR, at 21:00 GMT, British Prime Minister W. Churchill spoke on BBC radio.
“... At 4 o'clock this morning Hitler attacked Russia. All of his usual perfidy formalities are met with scrupulous accuracy. Suddenly, without declaring war, even without an ultimatum, German bombs fell from the sky onto Russian cities, German troops crossed the Russian borders, and an hour later the German ambassador, who literally the day before generously lavished his assurances of friendship and almost alliance to the Russians, paid a visit to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and said that Russia and Germany are at war.
... I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and protecting the fields that their fathers plowed from time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray - because at such a time everyone is praying for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, and their protectors.
... This is not a class war, but a war into which the entire British Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations were drawn into by the Nazis, without distinction of race, religion or party.
... We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can, and we will provide it. We must urge all our friends and allies to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadily and steadily as we will, to the very end.
... We have already offered the government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance that we are able to provide, and which will be useful to him. ”
... I see Russian soldiers standing on the border of their native land and protecting the fields that their fathers plowed from time immemorial. I see how they guard their homes; their mothers and wives pray - because at such a time everyone is praying for the preservation of their loved ones, for the return of the breadwinner, patron, and their protectors.
... This is not a class war, but a war into which the entire British Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations were drawn into by the Nazis, without distinction of race, religion or party.
... We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help we can, and we will provide it. We must urge all our friends and allies to follow a similar course and pursue it as steadily and steadily as we will, to the very end.
... We have already offered the government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance that we are able to provide, and which will be useful to him. ”
Of course, the main thing in the statement of the “military” prime minister was that from now on Great Britain and its dominions are allies of the USSR. The Soviet leadership could understand that the British would not go to peace with the Nazis, and the Soviet Union would not be left alone in the struggle with almost all of continental Europe, which fell under Hitler’s heel.
However, in Moscow that day, and for the next two weeks, frightening silence remained "at the highest level." Unless, of course, the announcement of the announcer Yuri Levitan about the beginning of the Nazi invasion, as well as the statement of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov about the outbreak of the war, made only at noon on June 22. Incidentally, a statement completely free from any emotions.
As you know, the tragic events on the Soviet-German front in the summer and even in the fall of 1941 in the USSR were invariably officially explained by "treacherous", "sudden" aggression and similar cliches. But after all, the silence of the highest Soviet leadership until July 3, 1941, had to be due to something. And this, most likely, was not at all confusion and not even a search for some alternative options or the consequence of severe contradictions in the ranks of the Soviet elite.
East vector
Not the most original, but unexpected assessment of the “Kremlin silence” was put forward at one time by the head of Vichy France, who is called “hero and traitor”, Marshal F. Petain. Researchers did not begin to replicate his point of view either in the USSR, let alone in France, where they confined themselves to the simple publication of his memoirs with very caustic comments.
It was Petain who first linked the pause, most likely taken personally by the leader of the peoples, with complete "uncertainty about how events will unfold in the coming days at the front with the German coalition." Also, Stalin at that time had almost no idea of the positions of Iran and Turkey, which were unclear during the first two years of the World War.
It is known that for a long time Moscow did not receive information about them from the United States and Great Britain, but when it became clear that such potential opponents were not too difficult to neutralize, this was done very quickly. Especially in relation to Iran, overflowing with German agents, where the USSR and England had entered troops already at the end of the summer of 1941. (Tehran 41: unclassified operation "Consent") Turkey, it was decided to just keep on a short diplomatic leash.
In Moscow, it was not without reason that they feared invasion by both states, given their very close relations with Germany and Italy. However, the Soviet leadership before the war most likely overestimated the military assistance from the Fuhrer and the Duce to Iran and Turkey and the potential power of their armies. But the established ties with Churchill and Roosevelt, at first through intermediaries, quickly opened their eyes to Stalin and his entourage.
However, one cannot but recall in this connection that Germany and Turkey, just four days before the Germans began implementing the Barbarossa plan, signed an agreement on friendship and non-aggression in Ankara. And by July 14, the concentration of Iranian troops on the border with the USSR had already ended: by that time, their numbers near the Soviet border, as well as on the southern coast of the Caspian, had grown one and a half times.
New batches of weapons and ammunition arrived there. All this was confirmed by the data of the Soviet embassy in Iran and numerous reports from the border of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, which were sent to the USSR people's commissariats of defense and foreign affairs.
The difficult situation in the early hours of the war was also aggravated by the fact that Hungary, Romania, and Finland officially declared war on the USSR between June 23 and 27. They were joined by puppet regimes, which the Germans established in the territories of present-day Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia.
Obviously, in this situation, someone could not help but arise, let’s say, the “ghost” of the second Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918. This, though not directly, but quite convincingly, is confirmed by one of the sources, which is very widely used by researchers, but is used very selectively.
This refers to the memoirs and documents of the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer, Lieutenant General of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Pavel Sudoplatov. As you know, repressed only four months after the death of Stalin - until August 1968. Much of the June foreign policy situation of 1941 is objectively indicated, for example, in Sudoplatov’s explanatory note dated August 7, 1953 to the USSR Council of Ministers.
Pavel Sudoplatov. He was called the "wolfhound" of Stalin
“A few days after the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, I was summoned to the office of the then then People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria. He told me that there was a decision of the Soviet government: unofficially find out under what conditions Germany would agree to end the war against the USSR.
This is necessary in order to gain time and give due rebuff to the aggressor. Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR I. Stamenov, who had connections with the Germans and was well known to them. "
This is necessary in order to gain time and give due rebuff to the aggressor. Beria ordered me to meet with the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR I. Stamenov, who had connections with the Germans and was well known to them. "
Bulgarian trail
Bulgaria since its independence has skillfully maneuvered between Russia and Germany, and its mediation seemed quite logical. Ivan Stamenov (1893-1976), mentioned in Sudoplatov’s note, was the Bulgarian ambassador to the USSR from July 11, 1940 to September 8, 1944. However, he served in Moscow until October 1944, after which, for obvious reasons , until the end of his life remained under house arrest.
We read from Sudoplatov:
“Beria ordered me to raise four questions in an interview with Stamenov: 1. Why did Germany, in violation of the non-aggression pact, start a war against the USSR; 2. Under what conditions does Germany agree to end the war; 3. Will the transfer arrange for Germany and its allies the Baltic states, Ukraine, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the Karelian Isthmus; 4. If not, what territories does Germany additionally claim "(see RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 171. D. 466).
What Beria himself confirmed at the interrogation on August 11, 1953: "Stalin called me on June 24 and asked:" Are there still Stamenov in Moscow? " Upon learning that in Moscow, Stalin wanted to find out through his connections in Berlin: “What is Hitler trying to achieve, what does he want?”
What Beria himself confirmed at the interrogation on August 11, 1953: "Stalin called me on June 24 and asked:" Are there still Stamenov in Moscow? " Upon learning that in Moscow, Stalin wanted to find out through his connections in Berlin: “What is Hitler trying to achieve, what does he want?”
Stamenov's reports could hardly reconcile Stalin with Hitler
Two days later, Beria was again questioned about this. Beria said that "he carried out the direct task of Stalin, but it was not about the whole of Ukraine and the Baltic states, but only about their part, and nothing was said about Belarus, Bukovina and the Karelian Isthmus." But Sudoplatov claimed the presence in that register of all the mentioned regions of the USSR. Stating at the same time that "if I were not sure that this task was from the Soviet government, I would not have carried it out." The conversation between Sudoplatov and Stamenov took place in the well-known Moscow restaurant Aragvi on June 28 (see RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 171. D. 466-467).
But the competent authorities preferred, for obvious reasons, not to risk the confrontation of Beria and Sudoplatov ...
Do not spare life itself
As for Stamenov, at the request of the USSR PVA Secretary I. Pegov, who arrived in Sofia, on August 2, 1953, sent a letter to the USSR Embassy in Sofia, confirming the meeting with Sudoplatov and "discussion of four questions and proposals of the Soviet government about a possible peace." But in Berlin, they were so enthusiastic about their first military victories in the USSR that, although they received those proposals, they refused to negotiate (see RGASPI. Fund 17. Inventory 171. Case 465).
According to Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria in Khrushchev and Brezhnev times, Stamenov could well have been brutal. But most likely, he was "saved" for the final discredit of Stalin, planned by Khrushchev already at the next, XXIII Congress of the CPSU (in 1966). Khrushchev’s resignation canceled these plans, but Stamenova, who was connected with Soviet intelligence in the 1940s, continued to zealously guard the Bulgarian KGB to prevent his Soviet colleagues from eliminating it.
Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria from 1962 to 1971
Bashev noted that the Brezhnev leadership abolished Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist policy and its projects, but in fact saved Stamenov’s life. However, he had to commit himself to the KGB of Bulgaria not to write memoirs and not to get involved with the Western, including emigrant, media. And Stamenov kept his word.
Confirmations of Ivan Bashev’s estimates and Khrushchev’s plans are also supported by the fact that, firstly, it was in the early 60s that the closest associates of Stalin were excluded from the CPSU by the decision of Khrushchev from the first “ruling” figures of his era: Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov .
Secondly, the “original” proposal made by the dear Nikita Sergeyevich to the Polish leader Vladislav Gomulka can be considered not such direct evidence. Neither more nor less than publicly accuse Stalin of the Katyn execution. Moreover, Khrushchev admitted that he really did not have any documents really confirming this. We will not once again repeat what all the “documents” that appeared later are worth, but Gomulka cannot but be given his due, he had the intelligence and honor to refuse.
And finally, thirdly, what is Khrushchev’s statement that has now become quite well-known, “anticipating” Stalin’s final discredit at a reception in honor of the head of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Janos Kadar on July 19, 1964: “The efforts of those who are trying to defend Stalin are in vain ( "the leadership of the PRC, Albania, the DPRK, and a number of foreign Communist Parties. - Approx. Aut.) You can’t wash off a black dog."
After all that has been written, is it worth proving that the second Brest peace could hardly have taken place at all? It did not take place, thanks primarily to the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops. Despite a series of heavy defeats, they not only stopped the enemy at the gates of Moscow, but in the very first campaign of the war went on the counterattack.
The USSR made unprecedented sacrifices on the altar of common victory, but the Soviet leadership, and with it the whole people, gained confidence in the inevitable defeat of the aggressor in the summer of 1941. It was such confidence that sounded quite distinctly in Stalin’s speech on the radio on July 3, 1941.
Information