About the "Zhukov Plan" from May 15 to 1941
It is believed that the disclosure of archives can help solve many riddles. stories. This is true. But there is another consequence of the publication of new historical sources: they give rise to new riddles. This was exactly the fate of one document, which at the beginning of 90's became known to the world. This is a proposal that in the middle of May 1941 was received by I.V. Stalin from the top military leadership of the USSR. Riddles began with the fact that there is no date on the document. There are no signatures under it, although two people are designated to sign it: this is Marshal of the USSR Defense and Commissar Marshal SK Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov. There is no Stalin resolution on the document. An additional sensational feature of the archival find was given by a special circumstance: in 90-s in Russia there was a sharp discussion around the allegations that in 1941, it was not Germany that committed aggression against the USSR, but Stalin allegedly planned to attack Germany, but did not. At the same time, in the heat of the controversy, it was often forgotten that the authors of this version, designed to justify Nazi aggression against the USSR, were the leaders of the Third Reich - the German Chancellor and Nazi Führer A. Hitler, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop and Reich Minister of Propaganda Y. Goebbels.
The debate on the "preventive war" began with the advent of VB works. Rezun, a former Soviet military intelligence officer, crossed over to the West in 1978 and appropriated the pseudonym V. Suvorov. His books, published at the end of 80-x - the beginning of 90-s in Germany and England [1], caused an ambiguous reaction: most Western researchers reacted to V. Suvorov very critically or simply did not consider his work scientific, and therefore worthy attention. However, a small group of historians from the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria — E. Topić, V. Maser, J. Hoffman, V. Post [2] with the support of the publicist of influential West German newspaper Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, G. Gillesssen [3] immediately took over the works of Suvorov armament. But, paradoxically, Suvorov found the widest audience in Russia, where the book [4] was published later than in the West, and became for many people, especially young people, one of the main sources of knowledge about the war: in conditions of liberation society from the "state monopoly on the truth" any point of view different from the official caused a strong public response.
The official Russian science for a long time considered below its dignity to seriously argue with Rezun. However, the “preventive war” controversy also engulfed Russian historians [5], among whom a small group of supporters of Suvorov [6] was designated. At scientific conferences and on academic journal journals inaccessible to the general reader, a discussion of “preventive war” [7], reflecting different points of view, began, which helped to attract public attention to the works of Suvorov and his associates. The first book in Russian, scientifically from a critical point of view analyzing and completely exposing the version of Suvorov, was the monograph of the Israeli researcher G. Gorodetsky [8].
And here in the archive there is a genuine document, in which it is written in black and white that Tymoshenko and Zhukov offered to strike at the German troops on the border!
Note that several pages from this document were published in 1992 by V.N. Kiselev in the Military History Journal [9], but very important for a correct understanding of the content of the text were omitted. The following year, the document was fully published in the journal "New and Newest History" in the annex to the article by Yu.A. Gorkov [10], and then in his book [11], as well as in the collection "1941 Year" [12]. The document in question is used in the fiction work of the military writer V.V. Karpov [13]. The German translation of the document was published in Austria [14] and in Germany [15].
What is the source we are considering? This is a note on the 15 pages [16]. It is written by hand on the form of the People's Commissar of Defense. It is not difficult to determine who wrote the note: the original beaded handwriting with which it was written is well known to specialists - this is the handwriting of AM Vasilevsky, the future marshal of the Soviet Union, then the major general and the deputy chief of the operational department of the general staff. There are really no signatures, they are only, as the bureaucrats say, "patched up", but not delivered. However, this happened in practice, since such secret materials were compiled in a single copy and only the compilers and the addressee knew about them. The addressee was also the only one - Stalin. However, as already noted, his visa or resolution on the document is not. Maps are attached, on one of which is the date "May 15 of the year 1941". This allows you to date the note no later than this day. The official title of the document was missing. The text began as follows: "To the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade Stalin. I submit for your consideration the considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies" [17].
The meaning of this document, prepared by the General Staff, is as follows: Zhukov (the document, of course, should be called Zhukov's plan, because it was Zhukov's function that included military planning) reported that Germany had already deployed "about 230 infantry, 22 tank, 20 motorized, 8 air and 4 cavalry divisions, for a total of about 284 divisions. Of these, on the borders of the Soviet Union, as of 15.5.41, up to 86 infantry, 13 tank, 12 motorized and 1 cavalry divisions are concentrated, and only 120 divisions. "[18] Describing the combat deployment of the Wehrmacht, Zhukov considered it possible to be inflicted by the German troops of a surprise attack on the Red Army. "In order to prevent this and defeat the German army (the italicized words in the original are deleted from the text - LB)," Zhukov suggested, "I consider it necessary in no case to give initiative to the German Command, (this word is underlined in the text of the original by two lines - LB) the enemy in deployment and attack and defeat (the words in italics are deleted from the text - LB} the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and not will still manage to organize the front and the interaction of the combat arms "[19].
Despite the fact that Zhukov prudently decided to delete the word “crush” from the text, the meaning of the plan is clear: according to Zhukov’s plan, the main pre-emptive strike was to be delivered by the South-Western Front (the former Kiev Special Military District - PSB) PSB) with the following task: "Defeat of the main forces of the German army deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line and exit to 30 operations day at the front of Ostroleka, Narev river, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Oppeln, Olomouc" [20].
It was explained that a strike in the direction of Krakow - Katowice would cut off Germany from its southern allies, i.e. Romania and Hungary. This blow will mean the defeat of the German army west of the Vistula River and on the Cracow direction, the exit to the Narew River and the seizure of Katowice, that is, the industrially developed Silesia. By itself, this plan is already grandiose, for it envisaged the elimination of the entire offensive group gathered by Hitler. The Red Army had to go through all of Poland from east to south-west and reach the borders of Germany. At the same time, German troops would be cut off from the Balkans, and above all from Romanian oil. But it was only the first goal. The draft plan read as follows: “The subsequent strategic goal is to have: an attack from the Katowice region in the north or north-west direction to defeat large forces of the center and north wing of the German front and seize the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia” [21].
This phrase was personally added by Zhukov to the text written by Vasilevsky [22]. The 150-160 of the Soviet divisions were to make a battle not only a victorious march from east to south-west across the whole of Poland, but also to reach the border of East Prussia - to go the good 500 kilometers! But this was not the end of the offensive of the Red Army: it should have ended with the defeat of the East Prussian bastion of the German Reich.
To achieve his goals, Zhukov proposed sending 152 rifle divisions into battle. True, this figure was subsequently deleted by him - apparently, he did not want to limit the size of the offensive group. In total, the structure of the Northern, North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts was supposed to have 210 divisions: 136 infantry, 44 tank, 23 motorized and 7 cavalry. As part of the reserve of the High Command for the Western and South-Western Fronts, 48 divisions remained. Aviation also brought the main forces to the south-western direction - 144 of the 216 air regiments.
It is believed that the draft plan was not longer than two weeks. Was it a hasty improvisation? No, Zhukov’s plan was not born out of nothing. To understand its origin, it is necessary to take into account that since the 1938, and then in August-October, the General Staff developed and approved the main documents of Soviet strategic planning. They actually laid the idea of Zhukov [1940]. The plan, adopted in March 23, provided that after repelling the military invasion of the enemy, the Soviet troops, namely the formations and units of the Western OBO and the Kiev OBO, acting on one of the options (southern), must deliver a crushing counter-attack and go to the Kovel area -Lviv-Grodno-Dubno and further develop success towards Lublin [1938]. In 24, it was the southern offensive option that was confirmed by 1940 March 11 [1941].
Thus, Zhukov’s idea of rushing to the southwest was not an improvisation. Only the sequence of tasks changed: to strike in order to “cut off Germany from the southern allies,” was proposed not as a response to the Reich attack, but proactively.
Why did Zhukov decide on this bold proposal? Of course, Stalin's speech to graduates of military academies, delivered by 5 in May 1941, pushed him to such a decision [26]: Stalin aimed the commanders of the Red Army to prepare not only defensive but also offensive operations. About the direct connection of "Considerations on a strategic deployment plan" with this Stalin speech to the author of the article was told by Army General N. Lyashchenko, referring to the words of Tymoshenko, told to him in 60-s [27].
About the connection of a note from 15 in May 1941 with the speech of Xalinum 10 days before Stalin’s speech, Zhukov spoke to military historians when he met with them in the last years of his life. As the Marshal in 1965 told historian V.A. Anfilov, the idea to prevent Hitler’s attack came from Zhukov and Tymoshenko in connection with Stalin’s speech on 5 in May on 1941 in front of graduates of military academies, who spoke about the possibility of acting in an offensive manner. The specific task was set Vasilevsky. On May 15, he reported to Tymoshenko and Zhukov the draft directive [28].
The actions of both military leaders were logical. Indeed, much in terms of Zhukov would have liked Stalin. First, a bold turn in military planning. Secondly, the prospect of a successful long-range action. This, of course, was different plan. No wonder Zhukov added a phrase about turning to the north in order to seize the territory of Poland and East Prussia. Stalin could not help but remember that in previous versions of strategic plans it was proposed to respond with a “blow to blow” either in the north or in the south. And here - both that and another: and an exit to the Czechoslovak border, and mastering East Prussia! It seemed that Stalin’s negative reaction and the fact that the General Staff didn’t receive new indications of an “offensive military policy” given by the 5 in May 1941 could cause a negative reaction.
The formulation of the question "what would be if" is considered unacceptable in historical studies: history does not know the subjunctive mood. But, nevertheless, going beyond the framework defined by the researcher by the real course of historical events, let us ask ourselves: what would happen if Stalin approved Zhukov’s plan, and the Red Army launched an offensive in the early summer of 1941?
With this approach, the first and rather unusual aspect of the problem immediately manifests itself: the Soviet offensive would be completely unexpected for Germany. Hitler once complained that "the Soviet Union cannot be provoked to attack" [29]. The High Command of the German Ground Forces (OKH) not only did not take into account the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike, but even regretted that "the Russians would not render us the service of an offensive" [30]. In the directive from 22 in January 1941, the General Staff of the OKH predicted defensive tactics of the Red Army at the [31] border. 13 June 1941 The Department of Foreign Armies of the East of the General Staff of the OKH repeated that "in general, we should expect defensive behavior from the Russians" [32]. So, the German high command of the Soviet preemptive offensive was not expected. Zhukov knew about it. But this is what Zhukov did not know: assuming that he would hurt the "core" of the future German offensive to the south-west and, agreeing with Stalin in this assessment, did not know that he was mistaken, and radically. In fact, the Wehrmacht’s grouping was different: its “core” was not in the south, but in the center. According to the 31 Directive OKH on January 1941, General Army Field Marshal F. von Bock’s Army Group Center delivered the main blow, which consisted of German divisions 47 (including 10 tank, 5 motorized and 1 cavalry division of the Wehrmacht, as well as the SS Division "Dead Head"), while Army Group South, Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt, had only 38 German divisions (of which 5 tank and 2 motorized Wehrmacht divisions, as well as the SS division Germany "). This distribution of forces and assets was largely maintained until June 22 1941 [33].
Thus, the Soviet South-Western Front, rushing to Krakow, Lublin and further to the south-west, would automatically “set up” its northern flank under the blow of the German Army Group Center. At the same time, the Soviet Western front could not oppose anything to the main attack of the enemy in the direction of Minsk and then on Moscow. The Soviet High Command and the troops of the North-Western Front (Baltic District) could not successfully resist the German Army Group "North", Field Marshal V. von Leeb, aimed at the Baltic States and Leningrad, which, without taking into account the OKH reserve, had German 26 divisions, of which 3 tank, 2 motorized and SS division "Reich" [34]. In addition, in the group prepared for the attack on the USSR there were Finnish, Hungarian, and Romanian divisions.
Of course, today, armed with the sad experience of 1941 and knowledge of the real history of the entire war, we can only build assumptions about the prospects for the implementation of Zhukov’s plan. Only one detail: for the march from Oppeln to Koenigsberg, the Red Army had to travel hundreds of kilometers. Logically, this march was not provided. The 15 plan from May 1941 even contained a hint: "fuel reserves destined for western districts are echeloned in significant numbers (due to lack of capacity in their territory) in the inner districts" [35]. What does this mean? The Western OBO was released, as its commander informed, "the required amount of fuel", but it was stored in Maikop, several thousand kilometers from the theater of operations. The mechanized corps of the Red Army were provided with equipment only at 30 percent, and the equipment was outdated. In the Kiev ObVO, only 2 mechanized corps had new T-34 and KB tanks, and even then in insufficient quantities [36].
Bottom line: if the 15 plan was implemented in May 1941, the Red Army could suffer even greater failure than after the German attack on the USSR, which began on June 22 1941. The unrealistic plan of the Soviet command would be multiplied by the real enemy weapon quality and combat experience of the enemy. Having broken into "foreign territory" to defeat with "little blood", Soviet troops would have left their territory open, for which they would have paid with "big blood" to soldiers and civilians.
Frankly, the author of the article was not easy to write these lines. Should he, a humble front-line soldier, a retired captain, criticize famous Soviet military leaders? Doesn't he take on a lot, predicting the disastrous consequences of the 15 plan in May if it is adopted and implemented? [37] But the author was unexpectedly helped by his colleague, the front-line historian V.A. Anfilov. It turns out when V.A. Anfilov talked with Zhukov, the marshal said about Stalin’s reaction to the proposed plan: “It's good that Stalin did not agree with us. Otherwise we would get something similar to Kharkov in 1942 year” [38].
Certificate V.A. Anfilov confirms military historian N.A. Svetlyshin, who on behalf of the Institute of Military History repeatedly spoke with Zhukov in 1965-1966. and wrote down the words of the marshal that the last day after the delivery of the note from 15 to May Stalin, the latter ordered his secretary A.N. Poskrebysheva call Zhukov. Poskrebyshev said (followed by Zhukov’s words) that "Stalin was very angry with my report and instructed me to send me to continue such notes" for the prosecutor "no longer wrote; that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was more aware of the prospects of our relations with Germany than the Chief of the General Staff that the Soviet Union still has enough time to prepare for a decisive battle with fascism. And the realization of my proposals would only be in the hands of the enemies of Soviet power "[39].
Preparing his memoirs, the marshal expounded the essence of the disputes between him and Stalin: “I remember Stalin’s words well when we reported him about suspicious actions of the German troops:“ Hitler and his generals are not such fools to fight on two fronts at the same time, on which the Germans broke his neck in the First World War ... Hitler does not have enough strength to fight on two fronts, and Hitler will not go on an adventure "" [40].
To break through the blank wall of Stalin’s mistrust, Zhukov literally broke his head how to make Stalin understand the danger of the situation? That is why one can see in this regard another desperate attempt to draw Stalin’s attention to the real threat of German aggression, to convince him of the need to prepare for its reflection. At the risk of incurring the highest anger, Zhukov wanted only one thing: to get Stalin to approve active actions in the face of the threat that was already on the threshold. Only in this way can one understand all the inconsistencies and internal contradictions of the proposed plan.
To this day, among Russian military historians there is a battle over the fate of the proposal of Tymoshenko and Zhukov. It continues, in particular, because, although there are no signatures under the document, there is no formal rejection of the “Zhukov plan”.
The criticism of the source, which we call the “Zhukov plan,” cannot ignore the fact that the “Considerations on a strategic deployment plan” handwritten text by Vasilevsky contains several important insertions and deletions. It is hard to imagine that Vasilevsky, a tidy man, distinguished by a high culture of staff work, could have presented a “dirty” document to Stalin. However, in the archives it was not found another, overwhelmed with the rewritten text. According to V.D. Danilov, the text with the revision was stored in Vasilevsky's personal safe and was returned to the General Staff archive only in 1948, when Vasilevsky was the Chief of the General Staff.
Researchers who believe that the “Zhukov plan” was nevertheless accepted by Stalin, cite as evidence in their favor that after the 15 of May 1941, the transfer of troops, including to the Kiev Military District, was carried out strengthening border groups. These facts are especially "pedaling" by supporters of the concept of Suvorov, without any grounds declaring that the Red Army was preparing to cross the western border of the USSR and the beginning of the "giant liberation campaign" to Europe 6 July 1941 [41].
There is a logical principle: "after this - but not as a result of this." It applies to the May-June 1941 situation as well. Of course, the new military units were hastily moved west from the rear districts. But their combat missions did not contain any instructions about the upcoming "preventive" offensive battles. The directives issued for the troops of the Red Army strictly forbade crossing the state border "without special orders" [42]. Even at dawn on 22, June 1941, there was no special order ...
The only real trace left by Zhukov’s plan can be seen — and the chief of staff could be pleased with this — that the position on the border was taken out of the taboo category. They began to talk about the forthcoming possible German attack in military circles and write in command directives.
What actually was done after the submission of Tymoshenko and Zhukov on the 15 project of May 1941? To answer this question, it is not enough just to know the formal side of the matter: whether the project was approved by Stalin or not.
First of all, it is impossible to pull ideas of the high command of the Red Army out of the general military-political context in which Stalin operated, and with him, Tymoshenko and Zhukov. From January to June 1941, the strategic deployment of the Red Army went through three stages.
The first stage (January-March) - repeated decisions on the reorganization and modernization of the army, the adoption under the pressure of Tymoshenko and Zhukov of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) from 8 March 1941 on the call for large training fees 900 thousand troops from the reserve. Measures were taken to reorganize the air defense troops, armored troops. Mechanized corps were formed, the industry received orders for new weapons, in particular for the production of KB and T-34 tanks. However, all these measures have not yet touched the troops of the first echelon of the cover, the second strategic echelon and the reserve of the High Command. Stalin’s demand “not to give the Germans a reason” to aggravate relations was faithfully observed.
The second stage (April - beginning of June) - open mobilization and advance of the armies of the second strategic echelon cover to the border areas. In April, three corps were redeployed from the Far East to the West, and from May 13 began the advancement of four second-tier armies (19, 16, 22 and 21) to the West and Kiev PSBs. Preparations began for the advancement of the control of four more armies, which included 28 divisions.
The third stage (the beginning of June - 22 June) - under great pressure from the military leadership, Stalin agreed to openly mobilize and advance the second-tier armies of the Western and Kiev PSBs, as well as to increase the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border [43].
What has changed since the appearance of the “Strategic Deployment Plan Considerations” project on 15 in May 1941? Not so much. The directives on the advancement of four armies began to enter the troops even earlier - from 13 in May, the Far Eastern divisions moved westwards from April. Consequently, those who see evidence of the fact that Stalin actually accepted Zhukov’s plan in the advancement of troops are wrong. Moreover: after 15 in May 1941, all border military districts - Leningrad, Baltic, Odessa, Kiev OBO and Western OBO received important directives of the People's Commissar of Defense on preparing defense plans and covering the border [44]. All of them (with minor differences) proposed to urgently develop and from 25 to 30 in May to submit to the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff the plans of the state border defense and air defense with the aim of:
"1. To prevent the invasion of both ground and air enemy in the district.
2. The stubborn defense of fortifications along the state border should firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops.
3. Air defense and aviation operations ensure the normal operation of railways and the concentration of troops ...
Ii. To organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following guidelines:
1. The basis of the defense should be the stubborn defense of fortified areas and field fortifications created along the state border, using all the forces and capabilities to further develop them. Defense give the character of active action. Any attempts by the enemy to break through the defense immediately eliminate counterattacks corps and army reserves.
2. Pay special attention to anti-tank defense. In the event of a breakthrough of the defense front by large enemy moto-mechanics, combat them and eliminate the breakthrough by direct order of the District Command, for which it is massive to use most of the anti-tank artillery brigades, mechanized corps and aircraft "[45].
Noteworthy is the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense for the Kiev ObVO — it was to this district that Zhukov’s plan determined the decisive role in the preemptive strike. In the new directive, everything looks different - the troops of the Kiev OBO were assigned a purely defensive task of organizing four cover areas in the border zone of the okrug:
"1. Cover Area No. 1. The Head of the Cover Area is the commander of 5 army ... The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Wlodawa, Ustmilug, Krystynopil, not allowing the enemy to invade our territory ...
2. Cover Area No. 2. The head of the cover area is the commander of 6 army ... The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Krystynopol, Makhnov, Sieniawa, Radymno, not allowing the enemy to break through to our territory ...
3. Cover Area No. 3. The head of the cover area is the commander of 26 army ... The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Radymno, Przemysl, excluding Lyutowiska, not allowing the enemy to invade our territory.
4. Cover Area No. 4. The head of the cover area is the commander of 12 army ... The task is to defend the state border on the front of Lyutovisk, Uzhok, Vorokhta, Volchinets, Lipcani, not allowing the enemy to invade our territory ... [46].
But these new, purely defensive tasks were not exhausted. The troops of the Kiev OBO ordered:
"Obregnoktsirovat and prepare the rear defensive lines for the entire depth of the defense to the Dnieper River inclusive. Develop a plan to bring to combat readiness of Korostensky, Novgorod-Volynsky, Letychivsky and Kiev fortified areas, as well as all the fortified areas of 1939 construction of the year. In case of forced departure, develop a creation plan anti-tank barriers for the entire depth and the plan for mining bridges, railway junctions and points of possible enemy concentration (troops, headquarters, hospitals, etc.) "[47].
So, in the directive there is no question of preparing or delivering a preemptive strike. It was allowed only "under favorable conditions, to be ready, on the instructions of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes in order to defeat enemy groups, transfer combat actions to its territory and seize advantageous lines." Only aviation was assigned the task of "destroying railway bridges, Katowice, Kielce, Czestochok, Krakow knots, as well as actions by enemy groupings to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of its troops", while the troops of 5, 6, 12- th, 26 armies of the Kiev OBO would organize defensive lines from the western border to the Dnieper [48].
The fact that Zhukov’s plan was not adopted brought even more confusion and inconsistency in the actions of the Soviet high command. The situation was most serious: at the end of spring - early summer of 1941, Germany completed the final preparations according to the plan of "Barbarossa", as reported by Soviet intelligence [49]. At the same time, the people's commissar of defense of the USSR and the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, on the one hand, advanced large military units from the eastern regions of the country to the western border of the USSR and regrouped the forces of border districts, but did not prepare to preempt the enemy and thus put their troops under his first on the other hand, they ordered to take measures to equip defensive lines in the rear — which they did not have time to do. On the one hand, the headquarters of the Kiev OBO put forward its command post in Tarnopol, closer to the western border, on the other - from the district headquarters received "retarding" orders. Thus, 11 June 1941, the Chief of the General Staff handed over to the Commander of the Kiev Military District Military District, Colonel-General I.P. Kirponosu order of the People's Commissar of Defense: "1). Do not take up the band of the assumption without special orders from the field and level [50]. Protect the facilities by the sentry service and patrolling. 2). and bring to 16 June 1941 Zhukov "[51].
24 May 1941, the Stalin held an important meeting of the High Command of the Red Army. Did Zhukov’s plan discuss it? Unfortunately, the archival documents of the results of this meeting have not yet been found, and in the memoirs of the military commanders who took part in it there is no information. However, the logic of the events that followed shows: it was not discussed. After all, if a Soviet attack was being prepared, then at least the commanders and staffs of the border districts should have known about this! In fact, the command, headquarters and troops of the Red Army did not receive any missions for the preparation of a local preventive strike, and even more so - for a general attack on the German armed forces.
The preemptive strike failed. That was the real state of affairs. All assumptions about Stalin’s “preventive war” against Hitler can be classified as - at best - fictional exercises
Notes.
[1] Suworow W. Der Eisbrecher. Stuttgart. 1989; Suvorov V. Ice-breaker. London, 1990.
[2] Topitsch E. Stalins Krieg. Munchen, 1985. Maser W. Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Munchen, 1994; Hoffmans J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg. 1941-1945. Munchen, 1995; Post W. Unternehmen "Barbarossa". Deutsche und sowjetische Angriffsplane 1940 / 1941. Munchen, 1995.
[3] Gillessen G. Der Krieg der Diktatoren. // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 20.8.1986; idem. Krieg zwischen zwei Angeifern. // FAZ, 4.3.1993.
[4] Suvorov V. Ledokol. Who started the second world war? M., 1992.
[5] Bobylev PN What war was preparing the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941? // Domestic history, 1995, No. 5, p. 3-20; Wischlew O. Am Vorabend des 22.6.1941. // Deutsch-russische Zeitenwende. Krieg und Frieden 1941-1995. Baden-Baden, 1995, S. 91-152.
[6] Mertsalov L.N. Inoi Zhukov. M., 1994; Nevezhin V. A. Metamorphosis of Soviet propaganda in 1939-1941. // Teaching history at school, 1994, No. 5, p. 54-69; his own The speech of Stalin 5 May 1941, and the apology of offensive war. // Domestic history, 1995, No. 2, p. 54-69; his own Speech by Stalin 5 in May 1941 and a turn in propaganda. Analysis of policy materials. // Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion. Collection of materials. Comp. V.A. Nevezhin. M., 1995, p. 147-167; Meltyukhov M.I. Ideological documents of May-June 1941 about the events of the Second World War. // Domestic history, 1995, No. 2, p. 70-85: VD Danilov. The Stalinist strategy of the outbreak of war; plans and reality. // Domestic history, 1995, No. 3, p. 33-38: Nikitin M. Evaluation by the Soviet leadership of the events of the Second World War. (According to ideological documents of May-June 1941). Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler, p. 122-146.
[7] For a version on the preparation of a "preventive war," see: Hoffman, J. Preparing the Soviet Union for an offensive war. 1941 year. // Domestic history, 1993, No. 4, p. 19-31. The opposite point of view, see: Gorkov Yu.A. Did Stalin prepare a preemptive strike against Hitler in 1941. // New and newest history, 1993. No. 3; Gareev M.A. Once again to the question: did Stalin prepare a preemptive strike in 1941. // New and newest history, 1994, No. 2.
[8] Gorodetsky G. Myth about the "Icebreaker". M., 1995.
[9] Kiselev V.N. Stubborn facts of the outbreak of war. // Military History Journal, 1992. No. 2.
[10] Gorkov Yu.A. Decree. cit.
[11] Gorkov Yu.A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff. Tver, 1995.
[12] 1941 year. Documents. A collection of documents in 2-x so ed. V.P. Naumova, T. 2, M .. 1998. with. 215-220.
[13] Karpov V.V. Marshal Zhukov. M., 1994, p. 223.
[14] Danilow W. Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee einen Praventivkrieg gegen Deulschland vorbereitet? // Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 1993. No. 1. S. 41-51.
[15] Maser W. Op. cit, S. 406-422; Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Hrsg. von G. Uberschar und L. Bezymenskij. Darmstadt, 1998. S. 186-193.
[16] Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - TsAMO RF), f. 16 A, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1-15; 1941 year. Documents, t. 2, p. 215-220.
[17] ZAMORF, f. 16A, op. 2951, d. 237, l. 1.
[18] In the original, the number of 112 divisions was first indicated. - Ibid, l. 6. Compare: Considerations for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies. // New and newest history, 1993, No. 3, p. 40.
[19] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A. on. 2951, d. 237, l. 3. Compare: Considerations for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies. // New and newest history, 1993, No. 3, p. 41; Praventivkriegsplan der Fuhrung der Roten Armee vom 15. Mai 1941. // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. S. 187.
[20] New and recent history. 1993. No. 3, p. 41, 60.
[21] Ibid.
[22] According to Yu.A. Gorkov, these words were inscribed in the text by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. - Ibid, with. 41, approx. 2. In the collection "1941 year. Documents" the author of the inserts is named G.K. Zhukov. - 1941 year. Documents, t. 2, p. 215-220.
[23] Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 73, op. I, d. 46, l. 59; 1941 year. Documents, t. I, p. 181-193, 236-253, 288-290.
[24] 1941 year. Documents, t. 2, p. 557.
[25] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 741.
[26] See. LA Bezymensky What did Stalin say 5 on May 1941? // New time, 1991, No. 19, p. 36-40; Besymenski L. Die Rede Stalins am 5. Mai 1941. Dokumentiert und inlerpretiert. // Osteuropa; Zeitschrift fur Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens, 1992, No. 3. S. 242-264. Vishlev O.V. Speech I.V. Stalin May 5 1941 (Russian documents). // New and recent history, 1998, No. 4; his own Western versions of the statements of I.V. Stalin 5 May 1941 g. According to the materials of the German archives. // Ibid, 1999, No. 1.
[27] According to the memoirs of Army General Lyashchenko, who talked with Tymoshenko in 60-ies, Marshal recalled that Stalin "approached Zhukov and started yelling at him:" Have you come to scare us with war or do you want war, you have few awards, or ranks? ". Zhukov lost his composure, and he was taken to another room. Stalin returned to the table and rudely said:" Tymoshenko does all this, he sets everyone up for war, we should shoot him, but I know him as a good warrior civil war ". I told him," continued Tymoshenko, "You told everyone that war is inevitable meeting with graduates of academies. You see, ”Stalin said, turning to the politburo,“ Tymoshenko is healthy and has a big head, and her brains are apparently small ... I said this for the people, we must raise their vigilance, but you need to understand that Germany never go alone to fight with Russia. That you must understand ", - and left. Then he opened the door, stuck his speckled head and said: “If you are on the border to tease the Germans, move the troops without our permission, then heads will fly, keep in mind,” and slammed the door. ”- Recording the author’s conversation with General of the Army N. Lyashchenko - From the archive of the author.
[28] V. Anfilov The road to the tragedy of the forty-first. M., 1997, p. 166.
[29] M. Gareev Decree, Op., P. 201.
[30] Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941, S. 223.
[31] Ibid., S. 253.
[32] Ibid., S. 280.
[33] Draft OKH directive from 31 in January 1941 according to the Barbarossa plan, with an approximate calculation of forces. - See: Ibid., S. 254-269.
[34] Ibid., S. 267-269.
[35] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A, op. 2591. d. 237, l. 15. See also: New and Newest History, 1993, No. 3, p. 45.
[36] Gorkov Yu.A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff, p. 85.
[37] Biographer Marshal Zhukov V.V. Karpov believes that Zhukov’s plan should have brought success to the Red Army. - Karpov V.V. Decree, Op., P. 223.
[38] V. Anfilov New version and reality. // Independent Newspaper, 7. Iv. 1999.
[39] Svetlyshin N.A. Steep steps of fate. Khabarovsk. 1992, p. 57-58.
[40] Year 1941. Documents, t. 2, p. 500.
[41] Suvorov V. Day-M. When did the second world war begin? M., 1994.
[42] TsAMO RF, f. 48, op. 3408, d. 14, l. 432.
[43] Gorkov Yu.A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff, p. 70-72.
[44] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A. op. 2591, d. 242. l 46-70; op. 2956. d. 262, l. 22-49; on. 2551. d. 227. l 1-35; see also: Yu.A. Gorkov, Yu.N. Semin. On the nature of the military operational plans of the USSR on the eve of World War II. // New and Newest History, 1997, No. 5.
[45] 1941 year. Documents, t. 2, p. 227.
[46] Ibid., 234-235.
[47] Ibid, 236.
[48] Ibid.
[49] The secrets of Hitler on the table by Stalin. March-June 1941 M., 1995; New documents from the archives of the SVR and FSB of Russia on Germany’s preparation for a war with the USSR 1940-1941. // "New and Newest History", 1997, No. 4; Bezymenskij L. Der Sowjetische Nachrichtendienst und der Kriegsbeginn von 1941. // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941, S. 103-115.
[50] Military units of fortified areas (SD).
[51] 1941 year. Documents, t. 2, p. 346.
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