Three big differences. Attitude to power in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
One historical legacy - different political cultures
An interesting point: the fundamental difference between political cultures in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. It’s just as though many would not understand this in one direction or the other, automatically transferring the realities of one country to another and making very far-reaching and, at the same time, very erroneous conclusions from this. So, the political culture and attitude to power in Kiev, Moscow and Minsk is very, very different!
Some may like this, some may not, but it is precisely in Russia that the culture of a European political compromise has taken root. When the first president of Russia won a decisive victory in the autumn of 1993 with a bad memory, he suddenly faced a certain political vacuum around him. Russia is not Latin America, and it doesn’t work for us like that.
Somehow, even Belarusians painfully recall the first victory of their main politician in 1994. And, they say, it was all over - stability began. Well, yes, but in Russia in 93 the glorious counter-revolution took place. And people were killed. But for some reason this did not lead to dictatorship ... It's strange, isn't it? It is worth recalling that the 90s for Russia is the era of two Chechen wars and numerous terrorist attacks. But for some reason, this did not lead to dictatorship either.
Despite the wild recession in the economy, gang violence and terrorist attacks, Russia was moving towards democracy. The strange thing is life. Nothing like the power of the guys "with heavy shoulder straps", as in Belarus, did not arise in Russia. How there was no lawlessness of “heroic” battalions-nationalists, as in Ukraine. Despite the fact that Russia really decided so many complex problems of national security. In very difficult conditions, but the dominance of certain heroes of “visible / invisible” fronts in Russia did not work out.
Although, for example, in the USA the “Patriotic Act” was adopted by Congress in much less dramatic conditions than the Russian 90s. They blew up two towers ... But the Act was passed. In Russia, the construction of democracy was carried out in some extremely difficult conditions, as far as possible from optimal. But it was done.
And here it is necessary to pay attention to the fundamentally different attitude to the very institution of power in Russia, on the one hand, and in Belarus and Ukraine, on the other. We understand this very differently. Almost immediately after the coup in Kiev, Lugansk was bombed, which caused a truly shocking reaction in Russia. By the way, in Ukraine this step is still no no questions. The approach there is very simple: if you seized power, then you can do anything. Power justifies all your actions.
There are no internal brakes. They are simply absent in the political structure of the state and society. That is why the struggle for power takes on such a fierce character, and that is why power behaves so shamelessly. That is, in our logic, the actions of the Maidan children are a national catastrophe, but from the point of view of the Ukrainians, everything is fine. You just need to seize power, and then do whatever you like. They have simply not yet reached the art of certain political compromises.
The power in modern Ukraine looks approximately as if everything in Russia would be decided by the FSB and the fighting squads of pro-government nationalists. A fairy tale sight. The fact that the economy of Ukraine after Maidan-2 dived sharply down is well known to everyone, but the fact of serious political degradation is much less noticeable. But for some reason this does not cause serious questions in Ukraine itself. Which is strange enough.
In Belarus, thank God, there were no wars, no revolutions, no uprisings, but in some strange way a very tough regime was formed, where any form of democracy (even Soviet) was not provided for in principle. Purely authoritarian regime. That is why in Belarus they react extremely painfully to любые proposals for political reform. This is impossible. An attempt to give more freedom can lead to the complete collapse of the entire watered. system. It is clear that no political compromises are and cannot be discussed. Initially, it didn’t. The country was very early divided into those in power and everyone else.
No dialogue between them is possible. If some are going to hold power indefinitely and rule, generally reckoning with no one and with nothing, while others have to meekly carry out their decisions, then any model of democracy is not interesting to anyone in the broad masses in principle. How the most important Belarusian likes to talk to the public: here, they say, when will be in power, and then you will make such decisions! Despite the fact that all elevators to power are tightly blocked, and elevator shafts are shot round by snipers around the clock.
That is, no dialogue and no compromises are provided for initially. And power is seen as a kind of holy grail. In such a system, democracy cannot arise in principle. And even hints of her. The system is pupping. The goal is not the achievement of certain political or economic markers, but the power itself. And everything else is beautiful fairy tales for fools who are endlessly led in a circle.
And by the way, above and below, a certain state of hopelessness and doom grows. Say, but in a different way you can’t ... Only this way! And no dialogue in such conditions is possible in principle, no joint work is possible.
In Belarus, a similar system developed back in the 2000s. In Ukraine, it finally took shape after Maidan-2. This is where the fundamental difference lies in the perception of power in Russia and in the two neighboring republics. In Russia, the seizure of power alone does not bring any holiness and infallibility.
By the way, this is precisely why both Kiev and Minsk make compromises in foreign policy relations. Because for them just power is not a compromise at all! Faced with the impossibility of a military victory in the Donbass, Ukrainian politicians continue to wave their fists and endlessly shout threats. In Russia, this is perceived quite oddly, but in Ukraine it is just quite normal. Even German generals during the WWII and WWII at some point began to lean toward a compromise. But not Ukrainian!
For "there is no such letter!" People just do not know how to do it. This, in any case, gives the impression. “Minsk-1” and “Minsk-2” were signed just after the defeat of the Ukrainian army and in the conditions of the collapse of the Ukrainian economy, but no real There was no inclination for compromise among Ukrainian politicians and generals. Although for objective reasons just them and a compromise was needed when the army, and the economy, and the state rolled into a compost pit. But no! We only need a victory!
The frank failures of the Lukashenko system in the field of economic planning and the growing discontent of the population generally had no consequences for the state course of the Republic of Belarus in the field of economics. This is something. In general, no compromises, no "NEP." Well, imagine: in peacetime (!) The economy is crashing openly, the population is rushing from poverty, but you refuse to make very obvious market decisions!
The simplest steps to privatize industrial giants and unprofitable collective farms would dramatically relieve the budget. Refuse from large government investment in the economy through external lending. And that’s it. Would not be such debt! But the authorities make any (generally any!) Decisions, without consulting anyone in principle. There is a certain principle of its sacredness, holiness and non-jurisdiction. And her reality from above ...
Mechanistic management approach
How can I still look at all this? Purely mechanically. Modern man constantly creates some automatic, self-regulating systems, and some of them work well, others are worse, and others are peddling. This refers to a variety of mechanisms - from a steam engine / windmill to homing systems for air-to-air missiles.
And when you look at the processes taking place in Ukraine and Belarus in the last thirty years, it becomes crystal clear that these countries cannot be successful. In principle, they can’t. There is no feedback as such in the system. A country can get poorer, an economy can fall apart, a population can run away, industry can degrade, but it does not directly lead to any consequences for the government and the state.
Some naive young men of pre-retirement age in Russia were sincerely convinced that failures in the economy and finances would force Kiev and Minsk to reconsider their course. But that did not happen. And why? But because Ukraine and Belarus are not small Russia, it is something completely different. No one asks bad questions like “What will happen to the Motherland and us?”. Already in the 2010s, the full and final de-industrialization of Ukraine and Belarus and the transfer of these powers to the “third world” took place. Which was accompanied by a wild decline in living standards and the complete dismantling of the remnants of the social system.
But damn it, it didn’t lead to any fundamental shifts in politics! The fierce fight for power on the deck of the sinking Titanic continues with relentless force. No Internal There are no prerequisites for changing the situation either in Belarus or in Ukraine. One hope is for a kind foreign uncle who will come and ruin everything and arrange a solid South Korea.
Here and there all the efforts of political players are aimed solely and exclusively at seizing and retaining power or its remnants. I would like to upset both the residents of the Republic of Belarus and the inhabitants of Ukraine: their countries themselves never will not be able to move up. It's impossible. It is absolutely useless for them to help and give loans (even irrevocable!). All this will be eaten and flushed down the toilet. Even if Russia had thrown another 180 billion dollars into Ukraine, this alone would not have allowed the Ukrainian system to develop. Money would be eaten and plundered.
The same goes for RB. Enormous direct assistance from Russia did not lead to any development. For a very long time, Belarusians had some kind of social guarantee in the “third world” country precisely due to this gratuitous help. Help ended - warranty ended. "Third World" remained. No foreign aid will ever make Finland out of them. This could be done only by the citizens of the country of Belarus.
The difference in the availability in Russia (historically!) Of internal mechanisms of demand from the government. It's not a joke. And even Ivan III (standing on the Ugra!) Contemporaries (including of despicable origin) openly reproached for the inability to solve foreign policy problems (nobody was happy with them). These charges were thrown almost in the face ... Failures in foreign policy (and this is inevitable in the event of a weakening state) inevitably called into question the legitimacy of power in Russia.
Nicholas II was hit very painfully primarily by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the inability to organize an empire for the First World War. In many ways, this undermined his legitimacy. As a result, the overthrow was very easy. During that great war, a mass of facts that were frankly shameful for the ruling dynasty was revealed. And that was the verdict.
And Yeltsin did not give up power voluntarily. Not that he was a man. By the way, Gorbachev also did not want to give up power to the last. But overt failures in governance and especially in foreign policy completely disavowed them. But Poroshenko, having lost (and drunk!) Everything that is possible and impossible, remained the pan president until the very end. And no one kicked him out of the residence with a boot in the ass, no Ukrainian patriots bayonets against Kiev. Mr. Lukashenko, having completely lost the economy and driven the country into a dead end domestic and foreign deadlock, retained both power and regalia! A person continues to maintain power when everyone already hates him.
Looking at all these failures and catastrophes, we are waiting for an internal click when the citizens “there” already realize that they are openly fooled and begin to act accordingly. And not a damn thing like that! Although it looks like Russia, it’s still not Russia ... The main thing there is to seize power at any cost, and then at least a flood, at least Konotop, at least grass does not grow. There is no internal correction mechanism. Well, look at Lukashenko (about Ukraine, and so everyone has heard): industry is gone, gold reserves are gone, the army is gone. The population flees from the country. The king is naked.
But the power system is still, in principle, quite stable. Its stability with the results of the board is in no way connected, which is why. In Ukraine, no theft and defeat at the front led to a political crisis or a change of power either. I.e story It unfolds slowly, and life is short, so you still need to be able to look abstractly at this situation. We cannot endlessly wait for the result over and over again.
So, it is purely abstract: if the system lacks responsibility for the results of the board, then there will be no development and no course correction. Neither in Kiev, nor in Minsk over the past quarter century have invented anything clever. And they will not be able to do this. The deplorable situation in which the former USSR and BSSR found themselves was absolutely inevitable under the very system of power organization. The fall could go along a different or completely different trajectory, but in fact it was absolutely inevitable. Good decisions are hard to make; bad decisions are easy. So, if there is no responsibility for a series of bad decisions, then good ones simply will not materialize. Nobody will accept them. Drinking is easier than preparing for an exam ...
The suicidal policies and very emotional rhetoric in recent years both in Belarus and Ukraine are explained by just a frank panic in the highest echelons of power. The system is peddling, but they simply don’t know what to do there.
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