Operation "Winter Thunderstorm" in the assessments of modern historians


The battle of Stalingrad is a decisive battle of the Great Patriotic War. This fact is recognized by both sides of that conflict.


Over the past 65 years from the day of victory история World War II was subjected to repeated philosophical, political science, historical, sociological analysis. Today, some politicians and historians are attempting to rethink the history of World War II. EAT. Fradlin, in the article “The Truth of the Fact and the Truth of the History,” claims the existence of a “Victory philosophy”, in the light of which attempts to rewrite the history of the war in an anti-Soviet vein are blasphemous [1, p. 2].

History will always be distorted. The history of wars is the history of the past of the peoples who waged them. The past can be not only with an individual person, but also with nations. A successful person wants to have a positive self-esteem. Self-esteem consists of many components, one of which is belonging to a nation. Reasonable self-criticism always contributes to the growth of personality, but if it becomes constant “self-flagellation” and self-torture for the mistakes of the past, if it degenerates into a constant complex of guilt, then we are doomed to wander in the gloomy mazes of the past. It is impossible to feel comfortable thinking that your fathers and grandfathers are murderers and rapists, thieves and bandits, people without conscience, honor and dignity, that the people to which you yourself are vile and nasty.

Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that the truth of historical science cannot be a simple correspondence of knowledge of reality. Such an understanding of the truth is more in line with the sciences of nature. As for the sciences of the spirit, which influence the formation of a person’s worldview, a certain conventional agreement on the interpretation of certain facts and events in a particular society becomes true. An attempt to comprehend history in a scientistic manner causes, as a rule, the discontent of politicians and scientists.

The most interesting thing in the history of battles is the lessons they give the modern generation. Great victories are great conclusions. Fighting the Iraqi army, American officers carried photographs of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, and not Montgomery, who ultimately defeated him, and tried to use the principles of the desert war laid down by Rommel. Military historians remember Hannibal and rarely remember Scipio who defeated him, just as the whole world remembers Napoleon and rarely remembers his victorious under Waterloo Wellington and Blucher.

One cannot try to kill history, one must strive to open new chapters, pages in it, to open questions. In battles you can always find something that could turn out to be unnoticed, missed or forgotten. Of great interest to them is always the dynamics of thinking of generals trying to confuse each other and know how to confuse historians, often people of civilian professions. The idea of ​​this article is an attempt to reveal the true intentions of the commander.

Not only domestic but also German historians and generals are trying to give a different meaning to history. As an example, we can take the memoirs of the German field marshal E. Manstein, where he writes in the chapter "The Stalingrad Tragedy" about how A. Hitler, who did not want to leave the Volga, and the passive commander F. Paulus prevented him from freeing the encircled 6th German army . However, historians have more and more questions about whether this is really so. Why did the Germans fail in Stalingrad? As you know, a victory consists of many components, including miscalculations of rivals. Let's try to figure out those long-standing events.

If you look closely at the military battle maps at the end of 1942, it becomes clear that the shortest distance between the encircled and the troops of E. Manstein passed between the village of Nizhnechirskaya and the village of Marinovka. The Soviet command assumed that the Germans would strike at the shortest distance between the external and internal fronts of the encirclement. By that time, the distance between the defense line of the 6th Army and the front on the Chir River was about 40 km. The assumption of a German strike in the shortest direction was put forward by the commander of the Southwestern Front, N.F. Vatutin [2, p. 361]. In this case, having gathered all the forces of the 48th and 57th tank corps, E. Manstein could deliver a powerful blow, which could be supported by a counter strike 100 tanks Paulus from the Marinovka area. Especially considering that the Paulus army began to have problems with fuel. Of course, the Soviet Army had many troops on this section of the front, but they were in the bare steppe, where it is difficult to dig a trench in the winter and have nowhere to hide the artillery battery. At the same time, the Germans in 1942 had an advantage in artillery and aviation not only in the number and caliber of guns, but mainly in instrumental and aviation reconnaissance purposes. Thanks to this, they not only shot a lot, but also very accurately shot at our fighters.

However, E. Manstein makes a different decision. He decided to strike the main blow with the forces of the 57th Panzer Corps, not along the shortest route, but from Kotelnikovo in the direction of Stalingrad, which was 130 km from those encircled. Manstein was probably counting on surprise — the best friend of success. In addition, he planned a strike from the Nizhnechirskaya region and the bridgehead on the Don and Chir rivers in the direction of Kalach. This blow was to be delivered by parts of the 48th tank corps as an auxiliary. At a certain point in time, according to the “Thunderclap” signal, Paulus had to direct his forces towards 57 because Manstein.

By analyzing E. Manstein’s plan “Winter Thunderstorm”, several contradictions can be revealed, indicating that the genius Field Marshal did not set the goal of simply liberating the 6th Army, but something else that he did not want to recall in his book.

In order to better understand this issue of history and try to clarify the truth in E. Manstein’s “truth”, it will be necessary to return to the events of the second half of November 1942.

After the Soviet counterattack on the Volga River, Hitler decided to immediately change the commander here. Instead of Baron M. Weichs, Field Marshal E. Manstein was appointed to the post of commander of Army Group B. The very fact of the change of leadership indicated that Hitler attached great importance to the battle of Stalingrad.

Colonel-General K. Zeitzler in his memoirs about the Battle of Stalingrad notes that, despite all the logical arguments, Hitler did not want to give the order for the 6th Army to leave Stalingrad [4, p. 228]. If Hitler wanted to simply withdraw his encircled army, then he would entrust this simple task to M. Weichs and allow F. Paulus to go on a breakthrough as early as the 20th of November. But instead, the Führer calls his favorite, the winner of the Battle of Sevastopol, E. Manstein, who is able to win big victories with small forces. Hitler wants his field marshal not only to combine the forces of the 6th Army with the rest of the forces of Army Group B, but he still wanted to win the Battle of Stalingrad, hoping to miraculously turn the tide of history and win Turkey to his side. Leaving Stalingrad meant losing face, so E. Manstein creates such a cunning plan that is incomprehensible to our command.

The first thing that attracts attention is the offensive from Kotelnikov. If it was a question of simple release, then the strike would be supported by those around, but they have no tanks in this place. The 14th Panzer Corps of the 6th Army is concentrated in Marinovka and is directed towards the bridge to Kalach, to which 25 km [5, p. 324]. This is confirmed by data from German sources. So, the intelligence officer of the 8th Army Corps of the 6th German Field Army I. Wieder in his memoirs indicates:

“The breakthrough plan developed at the army headquarters was not much different from the same plan adopted in the first days after encirclement. The three divisions, which retained the highest combat efficiency in our conditions, were supposed to break through the ring southwest of Karpovka and enter the steppes to join the advancing Gotha tank army ”[6, 45].

If you look at the German maps depicting the "cauldron", then we will see that 14 etc., the 3rd and 29th motorized divisions of the Germans are located near the villages of Marinovka, Karpovka. This is also confirmed by the fact that when E. Manstein demands that F. Paulus make a breakthrough in the direction of the 57th tank corps, the latter asks for 6 days to prepare [5, p. 379]. If we take into account that the tank divisions were made elsewhere and to defeat the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts, they would have to make throws along the front line, and then meet the forces of E. Manstein on off-road and snow, the complaints of F. Paulus about the lack of fuel become clear.

Regarding the fact that Manstein ordered Paulus to make a breakthrough, and Paulus refused, historians have even more doubts. Archives of Field Marshal Paulus and other documents irrefutably indicate that the 6th Army did not receive such an order from Manstein. Now Manstein himself does not cite as a proof a copy of the order, as well as the very plan of Operation Winter Thunder.

Regarding the fuel, which was allegedly enough for Paulus tanks only 30 km, there are even more questions. In his book, “Lost Victories,” E. Manstein writes:

“General Paulus reported that for his tanks, of which about 100 were still fit for use, he had fuel for no more than 30 km of travel. Therefore, he will be able to launch an offensive ... when his fuel reserves are replenished and when the 4th Panzer Army approaches the encirclement line at a distance of 30 km ... it was impossible to wait until the fuel reserve of the 6th Army was brought to the required size (4000 tons) "[ 3, p. 399].

As a result, when the release group approached only 50 km to Stalingrad, the Germans refused to break through due to lack of fuel, which does not hold water. If 100 tanks can cover 30 km, then 60 tanks will cover 50 km, if gas is drained from 40 tanks. The heaviest German Paulus T-4 tank burned 100 liters of gasoline per 500 km of off-road. To refuel these tanks for 50 km, each required 250 liters. Even taking into account the fact that along with tanks 700 armored personnel carriers, gun tractors and vehicles will move into the breakthrough, the number of 4000 tons looks like an exaggeration. 100 tons of fuel would be quite sufficient, especially since, according to Manstein himself, from 50 to 150 tons of various cargoes were delivered to the boiler every day by air.

Our attention is also drawn to the fact that, as follows from the Winter Thunderstorm plan, the 48th Panzer Corps should attack the Kalach instead of meeting the encircled people. If you take a pencil and draw a direct line from Kotelnikov to Stalingrad, and from Marinovka and Nizhnechirskaya to Kalach, then the troops of the Stalingrad Front are potentially surrounded. In the future, after their destruction, together with units of the 6th Army, the field marshal could strike the flank and rear of the Southwestern Front.

So, we assume that Manstein was trying not only to carry out the release operation, as he writes in his memoirs and as many military historians thought for a long time, but he tried to combine the release with the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet forces blocking the Paulus army. Surrounding the Soviet blocking forces, Manstein created a boiler in a boiler, a bag with a double bottom. Only in one place of his memoirs did he let slip that the 6th Army had the following tasks:
“... on a certain day after the advance of the 57th Panzer Corps, which will be indicated by the headquarters of the army group, break through on the southwestern section of the encirclement front towards the Don Tsaritsa River, join the 57th Panzer Corps and take part in the defeat of the southern or western encirclement front and in capturing the crossing of the Don near Kalach ”[3, p. 362].

So it was about the defeat of the Soviet troops and victory on the Volga.

The question remains: why did Field Marshal E. Manstein hide the whole truth in his memoirs? Apparently, he felt that, as a professional, he made a mistake by underestimating the strength of the enemy. He knew that he could save a lot of people, but personal ambition prevailed over common sense. True German sources began to be perceived as the truth of history, but an elementary analysis of the facts proves the opposite.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC LIST

1. Fradlina E. M. The truth of fact and the truth of history // Volgograd truth, April 21, 2010.
2. Isaev A. V. Stalingrad. There is no land beyond the Volga for us. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008 .-- 443s.
3. Manstein E. Lost victories. - M .: ACT; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999 .-- 895 p.
4. Fatal decisions of the Wehrmacht. - Smolensk: Rusich, 2001 .-- 400 p.
5. Mukhin Yu. I. Crusade to the east. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005 .-- 352s.
6. Wieder I. Disaster on the Volga. Memoirs of the reconnaissance officer of the 6th Army Paulus. Per. with him. A.V. Lebedev and N.S. Portugalov. - M .: Veche, 2010 .-- 304 s.
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  1. Uncle lee 29 January 2020 06: 15 New
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    It was smooth on paper ... Not one Manstein lost!
    1. Alexander Suvorov 29 January 2020 07: 32 New
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      Uncle Lee (Vladimir)
      It was smooth on paper ... Not one Manstein lost!
      So everyone lost, all these "geniuses of the offensive and defense", "old cavalrymen", "daddy goths", etc. It was then that they all sat down together for memoirs (by the way, not all, some did not live up to the memoirs) and began to paint how they were prevented from fighting, either personally Adolf Hitler, then frost, or muddy, well, the staunchness of the Russians sometimes interfered with the most honest.
  2. Mavrikiy 29 January 2020 06: 22 New
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    Fine! Authors +.
    1. rich 29 January 2020 10: 03 New
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      Pretty interesting. Easy to read. A peculiar author's "handwriting" is felt. The bibliographic list was especially pleased
  3. Vladimir_2U 29 January 2020 06: 23 New
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    Did Manstein hide the whole truth in his memoirs? Apparently, he felt that as a professional he made a mistake by underestimating the strength of the enemy. He knew he could save a lot of peoplebut personal ambition prevailed over common sense
    Kolya from Urengoy unconditionally agrees with Manstein’s grief, and I’m just glad because the Germans became people for me only after our Victory, and that’s not all.
  4. rocket757 29 January 2020 06: 39 New
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    Who built what plans ??? Only one plan was realized, not a plan, but a fact. Paulus's army was defeated! This is a great victory for our army.
  5. parusnik 29 January 2020 06: 53 New
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    Well, he hid it ..., in any case, he didn’t fulfill the task ... despite his genius ...
  6. Den717 29 January 2020 07: 09 New
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    Another piece of evidence that memoir literature, from whoever it comes from, should always be taken critically. Any authoritative and high-ranking boss has ambitions for infallibility in thoughts and actions, which he tries to affirm on paper. If political expediency is added here, there is less and less space for a true story. And, which is characteristic, the majority of memoirists, including Soviet, German, and American, suffer from such subjectivity. Especially those who wrote about the war. Therefore, the memoirs of military leaders must be read in parallel with the analysis of documents about the same events from military historians.
  7. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 07: 42 New
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    To think for Manstein 77 years after the STRATEGIC operation near Stalingrad is the wrong simplest. The battle of Stalingrad is the most studied and analyzed in military and military-historical science. The authors, as it was fashionable now, told us about the loser - Manstein, but forgot to point out that the Battle of Stalingrad was carried out “under the dictation” of the Soviet command, which had previously calculated the enemy’s actions in many ways and was ready for the enemy’s actions in most cases. At that moment, Hitler and Manstein did not break the circle of encirclement, and the political allegations of the losers are no longer history. And I want to add - dear authors, if you are considering such topics, do not forget that in addition to the Germans and their "European friends" there was also the Soviet army on the battlefield !!!! Yes, and tanks, unlike airplanes, do not move through the air, but over a specific terrain, the terrain of which can be difficult for tanks ... Sometimes it is better to make a roundabout maneuver of 100 km on flat terrain than to get stuck in ravines !!!! Sorry, but this topic is considered very one-sided.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 January 2020 07: 56 New
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      About the impassable relief - he laughed heartily. The authors of the article directly indicate that it was the steppe, where in the winter a trench to dig out a problem. The German intelligence officer in his memoirs directly indicates - the steppe, and the authors cite him. How did you read the article? By the principle of "I have not read, but condemn"?
      1. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 08: 04 New
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        Dear Andrey! Have you ever been in those parts to laugh? Look at the map published in the article, where the rivers are specially marked out for “laughing people” .... And as for the Volga steppes, this is not a “flat table” but hilly terrain in some places + swamps and salt marshes can be found in some places. And even a small stream "digs" very large ravines ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 January 2020 08: 30 New
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          I had to be in the Volga steppes, as in Stalingrad itself. As you know, the hills and small frozen rivers / marshes in winter cannot serve as an obstacle to the action of tanks. The main thing is that the Germans themselves considered the area tank-accessible, Wieder directly writes about the "Gott tanks in the steppe" on the connection with which they intended to break through. hi
          1. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 09: 19 New
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            Dear Andrey! Have you ever had the experience of serving or working on tanks or tank-based equipment? If you have experience, then it should be clear to you that the tank in the snow is very limited in its movement, on ice - like a “skating cow”. Snow in the steppes brings small gullies and turns them into tank traps, and the loss of speed and maneuver makes the tank more vulnerable to PTS. To pour frosty winter on a not very steep hill, pour some water and the tank will not rise on it ... Or do you think that German generals and officers were so stupid that they did not take into account this factor, as well as many other elementary special military knowledge and combat experience? I repeat-the Soviet Army replayed under the Stalinist Hitler Army at the strategic level, and not at the operational-tactical level, and even more so not at the political ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 January 2020 11: 24 New
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              Dear Vitaliy! I believe that Paulus was more visible on the spot than you and me, and he knew better about the capabilities of the Panzerwaffe tanks than we did. And if the headquarters of the 6th Army was planning to break through southwest of Karpovka, hoping to meet Gott's tank group there, then he had reason for it.
              I don’t understand why you are referring to the German generals, because they just clearly saw the possibility of a tank breakthrough on the "short" route. And, by virtue of the citations given in the article, it is obvious that if Manstein chose a different path, then it is clearly influenced by other factors.
              To say that the Red Army outplayed the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad at a strategic level, in my opinion, is incorrect.
              A strategic victory was achieved during the Battle of Moscow, as a result of which the blitzkrieg crashed, and the Germans lost the opportunity to win the war. Their plan for 1942 was already initially flawed, since on the one hand, it was not backed up by resources for its implementation, and on the other, even when completed, it did not lead to victory over the USSR. The defeat at Stalingrad was nevertheless operational-tactical, but brought a psychological change.
              During the defense of Stalingrad, the Germans, in their own skin, were convinced that they were not the highest race. And the operation to encircle the 6th Army showed the Wehrmacht that the Red Army had mastered the theory and practice of modern maneuver warfare, and in this respect was already in no way inferior to the Wehrmacht.
              In other words, Stalingrad demonstrated that henceforth the Germans will have to fight against an equal enemy
              1. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 13: 58 New
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                Dear Andrey! I know very well the capabilities of tank equipment and its capabilities, I was even a political officer of a tank company in one of the hot spots (maybe no worse than the same pauls, ready and manshteins) Although I am more familiar with engineering techniques based on tanks (IMR, MT-55A, ) and tracked (MDK, BAT). Therefore, in contrast to the authors, I can assess the possibility of using tanks in winter + I live in the North Caucasus and have often been to the places about which the authors write. Add to this that he studied military history at a military school (and she considers history from a completely different perspective) and the Battle of Stalingrad took up a very large amount of course time. As for your statement that the Battle of Stalingrad was not of strategic importance, you are mistaken because you did not study the Battle of Stalingrad not from the “textbooks” of military history, but from the “textbooks” of general history. I don’t want to give examples confirming that the Battle of Stalingrad is a strategic battle, and not an operational tactical FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, you already know them (oil, Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan, etc. - the political aspect, the liberation of the territory of the North Caucasus and more a number of distracting operations along the entire line of contact, etc. - the military aspect). And a little about the German generals who "just clearly saw the possibility of a tank breakthrough on the" short "route (your words) - they began to see well only after they got in the face and raised their hands to surrender to the Red Army and our Western allies in May 1945.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 January 2020 17: 02 New
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                  Hello again, dear Vitaliy!
                  Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
                  As for your statement that the Battle of Stalingrad was not of strategic importance, you are mistaken

                  I will not argue with you. In terms of military terminology, the Battle of Stalingrad was strategic. It seemed to me that you use the term “strategic” in a slightly different sense, but this is probably my problem :))))
                  Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
                  And a little about the German generals who "just clearly saw the possibility of a tank breakthrough on the" short "route (your words) - they began to see well only after they got in the face

                  Well, why? In fact, Manstein struck two blows - one from Kotelnikovo, the second precisely along the shortest route, from the bridgehead on the Don / Chir and on Kalach. Moreover, the 48th tank corps took part in this strike. He was minor, this blow, but he was.
                  1. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 18: 34 New
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                    You correctly reminded, I knew about it, and correctly noted that it was a distraction, but predictable. By the way, when our command planned the Stalingrad operation, several tank-dangerous directions were supposed, from which the Germans would go on a breakthrough, but they didn’t know for sure, but they were ready - otherwise the Germans would break through the encirclement. At one time, I met with an ordinary participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, so he told us that there was no solid front line on both sides of the ring, but there were our units that were ready on command to march and take up defense in any of the tank dangerous directions ... in one of these units, he served - he said that they had a ski battalion of athletes (as I remember).
          2. icant007 29 January 2020 10: 42 New
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            Have Kalach been to the bend of the Don? Have you heard about such chalk mountains?

            https://vpk.name/images/i338897.html

            These are the mounds.
            1. BAI
              BAI 29 January 2020 22: 26 New
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              On these mounds on the UAZ Patriot had a chance to ride. In case of rain (in summer) - impassable. I think that on icy roads (in winter) - too.
              1. Fisherman 30 January 2020 12: 00 New
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                Was in the region of Kalach-on-Don about 5 years ago. It was a little higher (north), Rumino-Krasnoyarsk. We went fishing in two cars. So there are sands, and the sands are sooo funny. I got stuck on my front-wheel drive several times, though I was easily pulled out. So it’s hard to go there, slowed down a bit and arrived. It is advisable to drive at a constant speed. Caterpillars of the German tanks were Already than our 34-ok and KaVeshek. I think, more precisely, I’m sure that their T-3s and T-4s could easily land in these sands and even more so in the snow.
                1. icant007 30 January 2020 12: 45 New
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                  There is still a settlement Peskovatka, it is not by chance called. Somewhere south there, too, in the dark, I somehow buried myself. True, I managed to drive about a kilometer and a half along this sand before getting stuck. Fortunately, the Volgograd military camp was near, some engineering Ural pulled us off. Did not have time to be sad, as they drew in the dark)
          3. icant007 29 January 2020 10: 43 New
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            Don Bend 1942
        2. Rakovor 29 January 2020 12: 58 New
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          However, in the summer of 42 all this, in your opinion, "hard-to-reach" terrain for tanks, did not prevent the Germans from breaking through to Stalingrad, why should it have been otherwise in winter?
          1. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 14: 05 New
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            However, in the summer of 42 all this, in your opinion, "hard-to-reach" terrain for tanks, did not prevent the Germans from breaking through to Stalingrad, why should it have been otherwise in winter?

            because after the defeat of the Soviet troops near Rostov and Voronezh in the southern sector there was no one to fight with the Germans, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Spaniards, Slovaks ... didn’t you know about this ????
            1. Rakovor 29 January 2020 14: 22 New
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              You contradict yourself? It seems that the conversation was not about who to fight with, but about whether the tanks would pass or not. Have passed in the summer, and what prevents in the winter?
              1. icant007 29 January 2020 15: 04 New
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                No one says that the tanks will not pass. We are talking about the fact that in the south-west direction (that is, from Kotelnikovo) the Germans were more convenient attack from all points of view, including from the point of view of the landscape and tactical situation.

                My emphasis on relief is directed towards those who believe that there are only minor mounds in the steppes there in the Stalingrad direction.
                But in fact there are cliffs, steep descents, a mass of beams and ravines.
                And in the summer also sands.

                Watch "They Fought for the Homeland", at first there is a feeling that the action takes place in the mountains. A movie was shot about 70 km north of Kalach.
                1. Fisherman 30 January 2020 12: 06 New
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                  I confirm. In those parts, the forest is only near rivers, and mainly steppes and sand. I wrote above about Ryumino-Krasnoyarsk. There even somehow locals call these sands.
              2. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 15: 05 New
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                What Misha do I contradict myself? Is it snow and frost in winter and dry and warm in summer? Sit on the levers of the tank yourself and ride a little first in winter, and then in the summer to feel the difference .... and even do basic MOT in winter and summer .... and so you don’t ask silly questions at all - take a sledgehammer in white handles and change the truck first in the summer at a temperature of +26 - +32 degrees, and then in the winter on a steppe carriage and knee-deep in the snow frost for 20 degrees. That's when you try it (I had to) then we'll talk soldier
                1. Rakovor 29 January 2020 16: 46 New
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                  Yes, you scratch your tongue skillfully, like all the politicians. He waved a sledgehammer, to whom you tell stories, I saw these political leaders.
                  1. icant007 29 January 2020 16: 59 New
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                    Quote: Rakovor
                    Yes, you scratch your tongue skillfully, like all the politicians. He waved a sledgehammer, to whom you tell stories, I saw these political leaders.



                    And where are you from such an impolite uncle. I watch the borzometer in your comments is off scale in relation to everyone. Someone offended in childhood?
                    1. Rakovor 29 January 2020 17: 15 New
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                      I kinda didn’t touch you, what are you climbing?
                      1. icant007 29 January 2020 17: 56 New
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                        It feels like I'm talking to a teenager, honestly. I asked you why you are so impolite?
                        Zampolitas do not like?

                        I will give you two surnames offhand: Demakov and Shornikov, both political leaders. Heroes of the Soviet Union (posthumous) Afghanistan.
                      2. Rakovor 29 January 2020 18: 09 New
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                        Well, you can leave your feelings to yourself.
                        And about politeness - see the comments above. I didn’t write anything like this to your friend Vitalik, but he’s in political words “leverage, frost, sledgehammers, stupid questions, little white hands”, etc. Well, who didn’t politely answer anyone? So, as they say, I got an answer, let him follow the bazaar.
                2. Vitaly Tsymbal 29 January 2020 18: 18 New
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                  And you yourself who, in the army, where and by whom did you serve, or did you see the politicians only on modern TV shows? And by the way, if you served at least next to the tank, you should see (I don’t say what to know) that the geese are being changed by the whole crew, regardless of ranks and positions, otherwise nothing .... by the way, waving a sledgehammer in this case is the easiest job ....
              3. ccsr 30 January 2020 12: 06 New
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                Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
                That's when you try it (I had to) then we'll talk

                That's right - you answer the "theoretician" as a "practitioner", but he will not understand this, because he himself has never encountered this. By the way, one of the reasons why the Wehrmacht was better trained than the Red Army, is precisely because the German climate is much more suitable for training troops than our conditions, when we spend enormous forces time on warming up or clearing snow, and fewer resources for combat training remain.
              4. Fisherman 30 January 2020 12: 08 New
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                Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
                +26 - +32 degrees

                It's still a cold summer. I was in those parts, so this weather in September, at the end. And in the summer under 40 and above.
  8. ccsr 29 January 2020 12: 08 New
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    Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
    At that moment, Hitler and Manstein did not break the circle of encirclement, and the political allegations of the losers are no longer history.

    I completely agree with this conclusion, so the speculation about the fact that it was necessary to drain gasoline suggests that the authors do not understand that this option was studied by the Germans on the battlefield. The point is not only in gasoline, although you cannot fight without fuel, but in the fact that there are many more reasons why the breakthrough failed, but the authors do not pay attention to this.
    Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
    Sorry, but this topic is considered very one-sided.

    I agree, especially given the reverence where the authors scatter in compliments of the genius of the German top leadership.
    We can definitely say that the German high military command, which participated in the development of the Barbarossa directive, showed themselves to be such mediocre military commanders in the strategy that they could not only correctly assess the military power of the USSR, but also laid down such terms for the war taking into account our territory and climate which is not surprising why they subsequently lost all strategic battles.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 29 January 2020 17: 11 New
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      Quote: ccsr
      I agree, especially given the reverence where the authors scatter in compliments of the genius of the German top leadership.

      So it was five minutes brilliant
      Quote: ccsr
      We can definitely say that the German high military command, which participated in the development of the Barbarossa directive, showed themselves in strategy to be such mediocre military leaders

      Barbarossa really does not draw on a brilliant plan, but the fact is that those troops that the Germans expected to see in front of them - they eliminated or defeated during the barbarossa, but reconnaissance errors are hardly worth blaming the Wehrmacht command.
      The Germans created a magnificent fighting vehicle under excellent control. This does not mean that they never made mistakes, but the British, Poles, French, Americans and the Red Army arr 1941-42 made many more mistakes.
      If it were different, we would not have to convince Hitler for how long he was wrong for 4 long years.
      1. ccsr 30 January 2020 11: 57 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Barbarossa really doesn’t draw on a brilliant plan,

        Then what is the "genius" of the German military, if they were initially mistaken even in planning?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        but the fact is that those troops that the Germans expected to see in front of them — they liquidated or defeated during the barbarossa,

        And what is the study of the enemy’s military potential is no longer the responsibility of the top military leadership in developing a war plan? This is where it is written in military science?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        but reconnaissance errors are hardly worth blaming the Wehrmacht command.

        A strange approach, especially given the fact that our troops in the thirties participated in the hostilities, and the German military had to study what the Red Army was like.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The Germans created a magnificent fighting vehicle under excellent control.

        You can not argue with this - in tactical and operational terms, they were the best army in the world, and this is a fact. But the strategic mistake, originally laid down in the plan of war against the USSR, ultimately led to the collapse of the Wehrmacht and all of Germany in 1945.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 30 January 2020 18: 53 New
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          Quote: ccsr
          Then what is the "genius" of the German military, if they were initially mistaken even in planning?

          Well, let's start from the beginning.
          How long did the Poles last against the Wehrmacht? Of course, the Germans had one and a half times superiority in the number of troops and yes, the Poles deployed the army very poorly. But the Poles cannot be blamed for the lack of valor on the battlefield, they really fought - nevertheless, less than 2,5 weeks later, the Polish government was forced to flee. Total, the Wehrmacht's debut in a large-scale conflict ended in a resounding success.
          How long did the French last against the Wehrmacht? The French campaign was miserably lost after a breakthrough near Sedan. This breakthrough is truly ingenious, the Germans were able to anticipate the actions of the enemy (the left flank of the allies, made up of mobile troops, would rush to help in Belgium and would be cut off where no attack was expected, because the Ardennes were considered inaccessible terrain). “Gelb” is much more elegant than Schlieffen’s plan, which was considered exemplary, and he, unlike the latter, brilliantly succeeded. This is an obvious victory for the German staff genius of the Wehrmacht generals.
          Weserubung. Landing in Norway in the face of the many times the strongest Royal Navy. Kriegsmarin suffered heavy losses, but Norway was captured, and even the dominance of the British at sea did not allow her to return, despite the limited German contingents. Brilliant German operation.
          Quote: ccsr
          And what is the study of the enemy’s military potential is no longer the responsibility of the top military leadership in developing a war plan? This is where it is written in military science?

          How, excuse me, should army generals study this potential? :)))) They depend on intelligence that they themselves cannot get. And intelligence about the USSR was extremely scarce, read Tippelskirch, he talks about it very well.
          Given the secrecy in the USSR, the usual methods of collecting information did not work from the word "no way." In order to learn something about the potential of the USSR, it was necessary to deploy a network of very serious residency, and these were “slightly” different skills, different from those given to the Wehrmacht general. German scouts greatly underestimated the USSR. However, the USSR greatly overestimated Germany, assuming before the war that the Wehrmacht consisted of twice as many divisions than it actually was.
          Quote: ccsr
          A strange approach, especially given the fact that our troops in the thirties participated in the hostilities, and the German military had to study what the Red Army was like.

          They have studied. The very clumsy actions of the Red Army during the "Polish campaign" of 1939 and the completely disastrous, extremely unprofessional "winter war" with the Finns. The reasons for this were completely objective, but in general, nothing foreshadowed the fact that by 1941 the Red Army would learn to at least be tolerant of fighting.
          Yes, there was, of course, Khalkhin Gol, but who then took the Japanese seriously? By the way, their ground forces were indeed a very miserable sight, able to fight according to the principles of the 1st World War. But even the Red Army did not cope with those in 2,5 weeks.
          As a result ... the Red Army in 1941 was obviously inferior in terms of combat capability to the Wehrmacht, but the Germans turned out to be very shocking that the Red Army was noticeably better than the French and Poles. This moment, by the way, is very well seen in Halder's military diary. Something like "in France and Poland we could very freely interpret the charter, and everything worked out, but you have to fight with the Russians according to all the rules and with full exertion, otherwise they will punish you."
          1. ccsr 30 January 2020 19: 37 New
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            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            How long did the Poles last against the Wehrmacht?

            This is not an argument at all, so we will not start from this.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Brilliant German operation.

            No one denies the German "brilliant operations" against a weak enemy, who, incidentally, was not going to fight until the last soldier, but surrendered even when it was still possible to fight.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            How, excuse me, should army generals study this potential? :)

            In addition to intelligence sources, you can use official directories, statistics, observation of the doctrine, the media and even reports of party congresses - this is how all the intelligence services in the world acted.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In order to learn something about the potential of the USSR, it was necessary to deploy a network of very serious residency,

            And she was, and not alone, on the territory of the USSR. Check out at least German agent stations

            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            However, the USSR greatly overestimated Germany, assuming before the war that the Wehrmacht consisted of twice as many divisions than it actually was.

            This was not the case - the error was 2-3 divisions according to various sources.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            As a result ... the Red Army in 1941 was obviously inferior in terms of combat capability to the Wehrmacht, but the Germans turned out to be very shocking that the Red Army was noticeably better than the French and Poles.

            This is what speaks of the unprofessionalism of the Wehrmacht’s top military leadership - one cannot approach the study of any opponent so blithely. For this they paid in 1945.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 31 January 2020 16: 23 New
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              Quote: ccsr
              This is not an argument at all, so we will not start from this.

              Why - not an argument? Because you do not like him and do not fit into your picture of the world? Well, I'm sorry :)))) From this, my argument does not become less weighty.
              Quote: ccsr
              No one denies the German "brilliant operations" against a weak enemy, who, incidentally, was not going to fight until the last soldier, but surrendered even when it was still possible to fight.

              In this case, you have made as many as 2 fundamental errors. The first is that neither the French nor the Poles were a weak adversary. Those Poles coped well with the Red Army in the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921. They fought very hard during the Warsaw Uprising. The uprising itself, of course, was a provocation of pure water by the British and the Polish government in exile, but the Poles in their capital fought to the death. And the Polish Army revived in the USSR fought quite nicely, earning excellent reviews from such Soviet military commanders as V.I. Chuykov
              But in 1939, during the German invasion, did the Poles “suddenly” become weak? :))) I’m sorry, but this doesn’t happen, and the same applies to the French, although this is somewhat less obvious.
              the Germans won the campaigns in Poland and France not because the French or Poles were weak. But because the Germans were strong.
              Your second mistake is that you are comparing incomparable things. We are talking about the genius of the German military leaders, which can be confirmed or disproved by the quality of their combat plans. So, the same Gelb didn’t get any worse from the fact that the French did not fight as hard as the Soviet troops did. The German plan for a breakthrough near Sedan would work regardless of how staunch the troops would oppose it. Because only the strength of the troops will not decide the outcome of the battle. Soviet troops in the Crimea were dead, but Manstein nevertheless captured the Crimea, although he had significantly less power than the Red Army.
              Fortitude of troops + combat experience + competent planning for their use, taking into account both the strengths and weaknesses of soldiers and materiel - this is the basis of victory. So the Germans were able to do this, and therefore beat the very valiant Poles and the "right" fought the French. And the Red Army, until the troops gained experience, and our military leaders did not increase the ability to fight.
              Quote: ccsr
              In addition to intelligence sources, you can use official directories, statistics, observation of the doctrine, the media and even reports of party congresses - this is how all the intelligence services in the world acted.

              Once again I say - read Tippelskirch. I specifically do not suggest that you go into the statistical directories and open publications of the USSR of those years, although they are now freely available. Because it is long and boring and difficult for you. Although, if you nevertheless do this work, you will see that Tippelskirch was absolutely right, and it was impossible to learn anything from the word "in general" from open sources in the USSR about the Armed Forces. The number of divisions, states, arms supplies - all the mystery behind 7 seals. If any information nevertheless passed, then in relative terms, that is, as a percentage of the previous period. Well, this is what helps you in the analysis to know that in 1939, for example (conditionally), the number of tanks in the troops grew by 200% compared to 1938, if you do not know how many of these tanks were in 1938 - three thousand, or twenty?
              Quote: ccsr
              And she was, and not alone, on the territory of the USSR. Check out at least German agent stations

              Excuse me, do you seriously think that if you bought a katana, then you became a samurai? What does the walkie-talkie have to do with it? I am talking about the RESIDENCE, which recruits senior officials, the military, and receives intelligence information from them. And the Germans did not have this developed network in the USSR.
              Quote: ccsr
              This was not the case - the error was 2-3 divisions according to various sources.

              What are you? :))))))) google Special communication of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the direction of development of the armed forces of Germany and changes in their condition
              11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX - and you will be happy. Only one passage from there
              The total strength of the German army by September 1940 was about 228 divisions, including 15-17 tank and 8-10 motorized.
              According to reports, over the past winter, the German command additionally formed 25 infantry, 5 tank, 5 motorized divisions. In addition, due to the infantry divisions, apparently, up to 5 motorized divisions were formed. Thus, the total number of divisions of the German army as of March 1, 1941 was about 263 divisions, of which: 221 infantry, 22 tank and 20 motorized divisions

              And here is an excerpt from the plan of the General Staff of the Red Army March 11.03.41, XNUMX
              Germany currently has 225 deployed infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, with a total of up to 260 divisions, 20000 field guns of all calibers, 10000 tanks and up to 15000 aircraft ...
              1. ccsr 31 January 2020 18: 17 New
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                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Why - not an argument? Because you do not like him and do not fit into your picture of the world? Well sorry

                Because it is necessary to compare at least proportional armies and approximately the same order of the economy of the warring countries.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                In this case, you have made as many as 2 fundamental errors. The first is that neither the French nor the Poles were a weak adversary.

                No, precisely because they were weak, the Germans easily captured them. The reason for this weakness is not very interesting to me. By the way, the Germans could not destroy the army of Tito until the end of the war - here is an example of a war when they fight until the last soldier.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                We are talking about the genius of the German military leaders, which can be confirmed or disproved by the quality of their combat plans.

                In a strategic war for the survival of two different social systems, a mistake in planning a war is fatal, and this was proved by the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Because it is long and boring and difficult for you.

                It’s not for you to judge this - not everyone to judge by yourself.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                and from open sources in the USSR about the Armed Forces it was impossible to learn anything from the word "in general".

                Nonsense - you just don’t know how experts do it. By the way, in the USSR it was forbidden to write local newspapers abroad - this is for you so that you understand why you did it. But those who worked here had access to many reference materials.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Well, this is what helps you in the analysis to know that in 1939, for example (conditionally), the number of tanks in the troops grew by 200% compared to 1938, if you do not know how many of these tanks were in 1938 - three thousand, or twenty?

                This is easily installed with the agent working on the railway. and knowing the schedule for the delivery of platforms to the tank factory - you're just not in the subject.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                What does the walkie-talkie have to do with it? I am talking about the RESIDENCE, which recruits senior officials, the military, and receives intelligence information from them.

                Despite the fact that without any communications, any agent is an empty phrase - the NKVD residency faced this after the outbreak of the war, who worked in Germany and could not transmit reports until the spring of 1942.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                What are you? :))))))) google a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the direction of development of the German armed forces and changes in their condition
                11.03.1941

                Have you ever seen other materials of a later period? Enlighten for a start:
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 31 January 2020 23: 11 New
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                  Sagging, and I'm with him as an adult ...
                  Quote: ccsr
                  Because it is necessary to compare at least proportional armies and approximately the same order of the economy of the warring countries.

                  Complete nonsense. The French and English armies on the continent were quite commensurate with the German and economies, too. But the Red Army during the winter war was formally significantly stronger than the Finnish army, and the Soviet economy also exceeded the Finnish one. So what?
                  I understand that you have already forgotten that the conversation actually began with an assessment of the genius of the German General Staff. Where is the comparability of armies or economies? Take the same Japan - it miserably lost the United States in terms of the economy, is that detracting from the dignity of its admirals?
                  Quote: ccsr
                  No, precisely because they were weak, the Germans easily captured them. The reason for this weakness is not very interesting to me.

                  In general, you are of little interest, as I look, and least of all - historical research. And I understand perfectly well that, for example, to give a comparative assessment of the Schliffen and Gelb plan is completely useless for you - you just don’t understand what it is all about. And how many absurdities you have piled up in one comment - this is a simple finish.
                  Quote: ccsr
                  By the way, the Germans could not destroy the army of Tito until the end of the war - here is an example of a war when they fight until the last soldier.

                  In order to give examples, it would not be bad for you to begin to study how the army differs from the partisan detachment. Then - find out when the army appeared in Tito. It's also nice to find out exactly who Tito fought with.
                  And now, after you figure out that for the most part the Yugoslav partisans slaughtered with collaborationist regimes, that the German “troops” consisted for a long time of three occupation divisions (that is, slightly better than the militia), which is when the Germans (1943) regular units were still attracted, the Yugoslavs became very painful, and they suffered permanent defeats, but the Eastern Front did not allow the Wehrmacht to engage seriously and that, in fact, when the Wehrmacht appeared, the Yugoslavs were defeated and rolled back to par tizanschine etc. - You will understand what nonsense they wrote.
                  Quote: ccsr
                  In a strategic war for the survival of two different social systems, a mistake in planning a war is fatal, and this was proved by the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945.

                  That's just the reason for this - not the competence of the German General Staff :)))
                  Quote: ccsr
                  It’s not for you to judge this - not everyone to judge by yourself.

                  And you do not need to be offended by the truth. You need to learn to work with sources, so as not to sit in a puddle, like here:
                  .
                  Quote: ccsr
                  Have you ever seen other materials of a later period? Enlighten for a start:

                  You yourself will be enlightened, there is only one leaf. But since you didn’t succeed, I will give you a brief extract from the document.
                  Soviet intelligence discovered as many as 286-296 divisions, of which 120-122 divisions were deployed against the USSR and 122-126 against England. The rest, although this is not explicitly stated, but it can be assumed that they are in the process of formation and combat coordination - that is, about 50 divisions not ready to conduct military operations. That is, according to intelligence, the Fuhrer against the USSR deployed LESS HALF OF VARIOUS DIVISIONS.
                  In reality, Germany had 208 divisions, of which 156 divisions were deployed against the USSR, and the remaining 52 were either occupying or newly formed units. That is, in fact, Germany concentrated ALL FUN DIVISIONS AT THE BORDER OF THE USSR.
                  Do you even understand what the difference is? Or will you continue to talk about effective intelligence of the USSR, "miscalculated for a couple of divisions"?
                  Quote: ccsr
                  Nonsense - you just don’t know how experts do it.

                  Really nonsense. Instead of LEARNING a story, you THINK it. There is a perfect fact - the Germans were extremely mistaken in assessing the military potential of the USSR. The reasons for this are stated by Tippelskirch, and if you didn’t even read it (maybe you and Müller-Gillebrand are unfamiliar? :)))) then why argue? You need to learn the materiel, and fantasize on the topic “what could have been” - this is on an alternative history.
                  Quote: ccsr
                  This is easily installed with the agent working on the railway. and knowing the schedule for the delivery of platforms to the tank factory - you're just not in the subject.

                  Yeah :)) True, there is one caveat - first you need to find out where the Russian tank factories are. About the other nuances (for example, counting tanks at night, empirical selection of newly produced tanks from the total number that left the factory, because no one canceled the factory repair) about which "professionals" like you do not even think about, I will not even mention.
                  Quote: ccsr
                  Despite the fact that without any communications, any agent is an empty phrase - the NKVD residency faced this after the outbreak of war

                  I suggest - such information in peacetime is simply merged through diplomatic channels. Without the slightest difficulty. In general, see fewer spy movies, the resident’s work is “a bit different”, and there’s very little romance “with walkie-talkies, daggers and yads”
                  1. icant007 1 February 2020 10: 48 New
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                    That's just the reason for this - not the competence of the German General Staff :)))


                    Even as a competence.

                    There is such a thing - military statistics.


                    - the branch of social statistics (See. Social statistics), which studies the quantitative side of military phenomena in preparation for war, during the war, and after its end, inextricably linked with their qualitative side. The most important tasks of S. century: analysis of statistical data revealing the level of economic, moral, political and military potentials of the countries studied, their degree of preparation for war; identification of the country's military and mobilization capabilitiesmilitary training of the population; quantitative analysis of the state of the armed forces of the state, the features of their organization, the ratio of the types of armed forces and arms, the availability of reserves; the study of versatile indicators to help strategy, operational art and tactics for the development of operational-tactical standards, preparation, organization and conduct of combat and operations, as well as for the purposes of military-historical research. In Russia, the beginning of S. century It is connected with the name of D. A. Milyutin, who wrote the capital work “The First Experiments of Military Statistics” (books 1-2, 1847–48).

                    And this subject has been studied since ancient times in the academies of the General Staff.

                    The work of collecting military statistics is an integral part of intelligence.
                    The stupidity of the German General Staff was that they planned to end the war in six months, perfectly understanding the economic, mobilization and geographical potential of the USSR.
                    About this, by the way, your beloved Tippelskirch repeatedly writes, saying that any prolongation of the war is fatal for Germany.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 11: 04 New
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                      Quote: icant007
                      The work of collecting military statistics is an integral part of intelligence.
                      The stupidity of the German General Staff was that they planned to end the war in six months, perfectly understanding the economic, mobilization and geographical potential of the USSR.

                      Once again I say - learn history !!!!
                      The German General Staff could not collect statistics on the USSR, because it was strictly secret in the military unit, unlike other countries. Accordingly, the Germans did not understand what they were getting into, AND KNEW that they did not understand. But the order is the order, and Hitler ordered to cook Barbarossa, so they focused on the minimum that they had.
                      Quote: icant007
                      About this by the way, your favorite Tippelskirch repeatedly writes.

                      Tippelskirch writes
                      To determine at least approximately the military power of the Soviet Union was almost impossible. Too many factors, from which, under normal conditions, it would be possible to compose a complex picture of the mobilization capabilities of the armed forces and their economic sources, were covered with an impenetrable secret. For twenty years, the Soviet Union, already fenced off by the iron curtain from the rest of the world, lived its own special life. He provided information about himself only insofar as it was in his interests, and they were often embellished, and where it seemed advantageous, the situation was portrayed much less favorable than it was in reality. The desired result was achieved: in such crucial areas of the economy as, for example, transport and the military industry, the capabilities of the Russians were greatly underestimated. The technical equipment of the army remained a secret that was not revealed at least partially, as in other states, in clear draft budgets, in parliamentary debates and in press reports. Every success achieved of any kind was reported annually only in comparative percentages, and not in absolute [238] values. Such information served only the purposes of propaganda, practically they had no value, since they lacked a key - the original digital data.

                      In the peacetime army, the secrecy regime was so strict that the regiments did not even have numbers. Severe punishments for espionage, the complete isolation of leading circles from the outside world and the Slavic nature of suspicion towards foreigners made the circle of those who knew about the real state of affairs completely inaccessible.

                      Espionage, which in other countries was conducted under the guise of harmless private economic activity, did not find for itself in the Soviet Union in the conditions of centralized economic management no field of activity. Business or pleasure trips were not possible in a country with strict control over foreigners. Therefore, it is not surprising that the assessment of the Russian armed forces posed exceptional difficulties for those dealing with this issue not only in the German General Staff, but also in the General Staffs of other countries.
                    2. ccsr 1 February 2020 12: 20 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      The German General Staff could not collect statistics on the USSR, because it was strictly secret in the military unit, unlike other countries.

                      Lies - active intelligence against tsarist Russia was carried out on the eve of World War I, and a huge number of agents worked for the Wehrmacht from among the former Russian citizens, as well as those who managed to recruit during trips abroad or on the territory of the USSR even during the war. For example, the radiofeed intelligence network farthest from the front had a transmitter in Omsk and maintained contact with the German intelligence center.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      But the order is the order, and Hitler ordered to cook Barbarossa, so they focused on the minimum that they had.

                      An enchanting conclusion - German military professionals could introduce Hitler all the nuances of the upcoming war and describe in detail at least the difficulties that they will have to face, which means to immediately show that the blitzkrieg will not work. And there it is still unknown how Hitler would behave - so the incompetence of the German military is obvious.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Therefore, it is not surprising that the assessment of the Russian armed forces posed exceptional difficulties for those dealing with this issue not only in the German General Staff, but also in the General Staffs of other countries.

                      All these slogans of Tippelskirch are just a miserable attempt to justify before history that Germany suffered a crushing defeat from the USSR. Let me remind various "experts" of German intelligence that on the eve of World War I in St. Petersburg, the Siemens building (it still stands on Nevsky) was equipped with an illegal radio station that maintained secret communications with Berlin for almost the entire WWII .. And we are being tried by slogans here vparivat about the lack of intelligence at a later time - well, well ...
                    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 13: 24 New
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                      Quote: ccsr
                      Lies - active intelligence against tsarist Russia was conducted on the eve of World War I.

                      a very "wonderful" argument - given that tsarist Russia had an extremely funny idea of ​​military secrets :)))
                      Quote: ccsr
                      and a huge number of agents worked for the Wehrmacht from among the former Russian citizens, as well as those who managed to recruit during trips abroad or on the territory of the USSR even during the war

                      No need about the "time of war" - tell us (preferably with reference to sources) about the German agents BEFORE the Second World War :))))
                      Quote: ccsr
                      An enchanting conclusion - German military professionals could introduce Hitler all the nuances of the upcoming war and describe in detail at least the difficulties that they will have to face, which means to immediately show that the blitzkrieg will not work.

                      it was impossible to draw such conclusions based on the available information.
                      Quote: ccsr
                      All these slogans of Tippelskirch are just a miserable attempt to justify before history that Germany suffered a crushing defeat from the USSR.

                      No, slogans are what you write here in the comments. And the conclusions of Tippelskirch are excellently confirmed by the preserved data and documents from the USSR - in the statistical directories and other sources for a wide range of consumers there is practically no information about the USSR Armed Forces.
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Let me remind you of various "experts" in German intelligence, which is still on the eve of the First World War.

                      I’ll remind a specific “expert” that only the person who absolutely doesn’t know what he is comparing can compare the conditions under which German residents worked before the first and before the Second World War in tsarist Russia and the USSR. Secrecy in the USSR was enormous; in the Republic of Ingushetia, it can be said that it was not at all.
                    4. ccsr 1 February 2020 18: 20 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      very "beautiful" argument

                      This argument shows that the German military was well aware of the role of intelligence in military affairs, long before Hitler's rule.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      No need about the "time of war" - tell us (preferably with reference to sources) about the German agents BEFORE the Second World War :))))

                      Learn to get started:
                      Different days of secret war and diplomacy. 1941 year
                      Sudoplatov Pavel Anatolevich
                      Chapter 10. GERMAN SPECIAL SERVICES AGAINST THE USSR ON THE EVE OF THE ATTACK
                      ..... In spring and early June 1941, the Abwehr, admittedly, fulfilled its mission of reconnaissance of the frontline strip as a whole. He possessed data supplied by minibus agents and the local population. The Germans were aware of the location of our troops, the location of airfields, the location of oil depots thanks to the well-established work of aerial reconnaissance, radio services and visual reconnaissance. In the asset of the Abwehr, it is necessary to record the failure of the communication centers of the Red Army on June 22.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      . Secrecy in the USSR was enormous; in the Republic of Ingushetia, it can be said that it was not at all.

                      It’s complete nonsense, because even in tsarist Russia they monitored the regime of secrecy, it was not in vain that military counterintelligence appeared:
                      On June 8, 1911, Minister of War Vladimir Sukhomlinov signed the "Regulation on Counter-Intelligence Units" created at the headquarters of the military districts.
                      The foundation was laid for the systematic activity of military counterintelligence in Russia. This, of course, does not mean at all that before that no one in Russia had caught spies who were interested in military secrets. They fought with them, but there were no specially involved bodies. General Nikolai Batyushin, a well-known counterintelligence officer, recalled: "Before the Russo-Japanese War, counterintelligence was entirely in the hands of a political investigation (gendarmes), being its auxiliary affair. This explains the fact that the fight against enemy spies was unsystematic, espionage processes were rare" .
                    5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 18: 53 New
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                      Quote: ccsr
                      This argument shows that the German military was well aware of the role of intelligence in military affairs, long before Hitler's rule.

                      They knew her both during Hitler and after Hitler.
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Learn to get started:

                      I read this, almost 20 years ago, when you still walked under the table :)))) And yes, LEARN TO READ THE SOURCES YOU QUOTE !!! am
                      Quote: ccsr
                      In spring and early June 1941, the Abwehr, admittedly, fulfilled its mission of reconnaissance of the front line as a whole.

                      In the frontline. In areas that have recently come under the control of the USSR and are teeming with agents. In the conditions when, on the orders of the IVS of the Red Army, it was forced to endure constant raids of enemy air reconnaissance under the guise of “Oh, we accidentally flew”
                      The difference with the intelligence of industrial and military potential is understandable, "professional"? :)))
                      But it’s already frankly unclear to me, are you so clumsy to get out, or are you so devoid of thoughts that you don’t see the difference?
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      . Secrecy in the USSR was enormous; in the Republic of Ingushetia, it can be said that it was not at all.

                      You contradicted my words in a quote from Sudoplatov (although he really is not). But you are not even able to understand that if you approach the issue with such a measure (that the military potential of the USSR, that the front line is all the same), then you just ... refuted yourself, saying that the German General Staff could not reconnaissance :))))))
                      But Sudoplatov believes that he could, and you believe Sudoplatov, you quote him to me here? :))))
                      In short, you are an extremely boring interlocutor - not a single common sense, complete ignorance of the hardware, and, worst of all, the absence of any tendency to logical thinking (I am silent about analytics in general).
                      Quote: ccsr
                      It’s complete nonsense, because even in tsarist Russia they monitored the regime of secrecy, it was not in vain that military counterintelligence appeared:

                      laughing fool I’m just bleeding with you. If the Germans have a walkie-talkie, then they also have an effective intelligence, if counterintelligence was created in tsarist Russia, then the secrecy regime was automatically ensured ... In fact, even children in kindergarten are already taught not to make such generalizations.
                      Z. Frankly, I see no reason to continue to spend my time on you
                    6. ccsr 1 February 2020 19: 11 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      They knew her both during Hitler and after Hitler.

                      And why, then, did the Soviet military potential be so poorly explored?
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      This I read, almost 20 years ago,

                      Apparently sclerosis did not allow you to remember this, I sympathize.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      The difference with the intelligence of industrial and military potential is understandable, "professional"? :)))

                      You generally have no idea how it was conducted against the USSR, and not only in the border regions.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      In short, you are extremely boring interlocutor

                      Judging by how you wriggle here, all your argumentation is designed for amateurs, and you seem to understand this already, since you started singing like that.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      I’m just bleeding with you.

                      Glad I gave you pleasure. It’s funny for me to look at your pathetic attempts to pretend to be a military specialist - this time it didn’t pass ...
                    7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 10: 40 New
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                      Quote: ccsr
                      And why, then, did the Soviet military potential be so poorly explored?

                      Because of the strictest secrecy in the USSR :))) Really I did not say this? :))))
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Apparently sclerosis did not allow you to remember this, I sympathize.

                      You mixed everything up again. When a person who read a source 20 years ago, on the fly, can poke his opponent’s nose into the fact that he could not figure out this source, this is not sclerosis. You google what sclerosis is :)))
                      Quote: ccsr
                      You generally have no idea how it was conducted against the USSR, and not only in the border regions.

                      No matter how you say halva, your mouth will not be sweeter.
                      Quote: ccsr
                      Judging by how you wriggle here, all your argumentation is for amateurs

                      All right, "professional", let those who read our correspondence judge. And I, perhaps, am tying up - you could not defend even one of your thesis, and even you are unable to understand that the arguments you have presented testify against you. But continue to stand your ground.
                    8. ccsr 2 February 2020 12: 17 New
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                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Due to the strictest secrecy in the USSR:

                      How can you hide the movement of a train with armored vehicles from even those who have been working on the railway for many years? And the arrival at the terminal station and its participation in the exercises? Dream about "secrecy" ....
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      All right, "professional", let those who read our correspondence judge. And I’m probably tying

                      The third time you tie? Never say never ....
        2. icant007 1 February 2020 13: 21 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          For twenty years, the Soviet Union, already fenced off by the iron curtain from the rest of the world, lived its own special life.


          Tippelskirch is disingenuous. He writes a story for his own.

          In the USSR, in the prewar years, a huge number of foreign, including German, specialists worked. Including at the Ural factories.

          The Germans actively came to the USSR under the guise of tourists. For example, German climbers actively studied the Caucasus.

          Tippelskirch's memories are generally quite superficial. Although there are certainly many interesting things.
          And like any former German general in his memoirs, he is trying to hide the miscalculations of his command under the guise of not knowing the real situation in the USSR.
        3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 17: 56 New
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          Quote: icant007
          Tippelskirch is disingenuous. He writes a story for his own.

          His "craftiness" is excellently confirmed by documents, newspapers, and state reference books of that era, which I read very, very much.
          Quote: icant007
          In the USSR, in the prewar years, a huge number of foreign, including German, specialists worked. Including at the Ural factories.

          :)))) But the tanks of the USSR, in fact, were produced at Kharkov, Stalingrad, St. Petersburg (Kirov) plants :))))
          Quote: icant007
          And like any former German general in his memoirs, he is trying to hide the miscalculations of his command under the guise of not knowing the real situation in the USSR.

          No question, please provide sources that could confirm this your statement.
        4. icant007 1 February 2020 22: 14 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          :)))) But the tanks of the USSR, in fact, were produced at Kharkov, Stalingrad, St. Petersburg (Kirov) plants :))))


          You were so glad that I also mentioned the Ural factories. Just like a boy.

          When I wrote, I remembered about our intelligence officer Kuznetsov, who "trained" on the Germans in the Urals.

          This of course does not mean that the Germans were only in the Urals)


          You didn’t even have an understanding that “including” - this is a subset of the whole set of plants.

          You generally entered this topic laughing at the so-called "impassable" relief of the Volga steppes.
          This once again confirms the lightness of your approach to the study of a topic. It didn’t even occur to you once again to look at a physical map, read about the features of the area.
          That's just like your brilliant German generals.

          The classic situation is "it was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines."
        5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 10: 25 New
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          Quote: icant007
          You were so glad that I also mentioned the Ural factories. Just like a boy.

          And you start to freak out like a girl, but I don’t make you any complaints :)))
          Quote: icant007
          You didn’t even have an understanding that “including” - this is a subset of the whole set of plants.

          I have enough knowledge to know that the Germans did not have developed agents in the USSR.
          Quote: icant007
          You generally entered this topic laughing at the so-called "impassable" relief of the Volga steppes.
          This once again confirms the lightness of your approach to the study of a topic. It didn’t even occur to you once again to look at a physical map, read about the features of the area.

          No, it’s enough for me to know that the 48th German tank corps was advancing there :))))) And you continue to study history on the globe of the city of Moscow, no question :))))
          You see, I EXACTLY KNOW that the terrain was tank-passable because German tanks passed through it :)))) And you don’t know, but blame me for being lightweight :))) And wonder why it’s funny to me :)))
        6. icant007 2 February 2020 11: 16 New
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          You again do not understand what I am telling you. Probably a journalistic illness - to hear only yourself.
          I did not write that this area for tanks is not passable.
          I talked about the fact that the relief there is different, and in some places quite complicated, and when planning the operation, the terrain features are naturally taken into account. what imposes restrictions on the use of moving parts.
          No more no less.
        7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 17: 45 New
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          Quote: icant007
          You again do not understand what I am telling you. Probably a journalistic illness - to hear only yourself.

          Are you a journalist? :)
          Quote: icant007
          I did not write that this area for tanks is not passable.
          I talked about the fact that the relief there is different, and in some places quite complicated

          Let's not get away from the topic - you do it very poorly. You reproached me with the lightness of the approach on the grounds that
          Quote: icant007
          You generally entered this topic laughing at the so-called "impassable" relief of the Volga steppes.

          It turns out I did not look at the map :)))
          However, I said what I said in response to my opponent’s phrase
          Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
          Yes, and tanks, unlike airplanes, do not move through the air, but over a specific terrain, the terrain of which can be difficult for tanks ... Sometimes it is better to make a roundabout maneuver of 100 km on flat terrain than to get stuck in ravines !!!!

          so, if the Germans, and none other than Manstein, one of the best generals of the 3rd Reich, no matter what sent the 48th corps there, it means that he could attack there and this was justified. I can only recall that the Ardennes were generally considered a tank-inaccessible place, but Manstein (it was he who invented the Gelb) proposed holding tanks there - and received a breakthrough near Sedan, after which the war in France, one might say, ended
        8. icant007 2 February 2020 18: 09 New
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          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Are you a journalist? :)
          Quote: icant007
          I did not write that this area for tanks is not passable.
          I talked about the fact that the relief there is different, and in some places quite complicated

          Let's not get away from the topic - you do it very poorly.

          Are you just still moving away from the topic with your Mars, Moon and what else is there? )

          And I returned you to the knolls)

          Journalists have the disadvantage of not digging into the truth, but of thinking about how to apply the information they have obtained.
          So you decided to laugh) well, there must be a place for a joke)

          By the way, I'm not a journalist.

          Well, you stamp articles quite cheerfully. Once every three days.
          Talent)))

          And was Vitaly Tsymbal wrong?

          I say again, he and I expressed some considerations for which it was more convenient to outline a breakthrough in the south-west direction. No one denies that 48 mk could act anywhere, even in the mountains of the Caucasus, even in the Ardennes, even on your beloved Moon.
          Each decision has its own rationale.

          And here you are beating like you are losing a cow.
          Or you have a keen sense of your own rightness. Or you think that you are mentally closer to the German generals, so you know exactly what considerations they had.

          By the way, tanks began to be produced at ChTZ in 1940)
  9. icant007 1 February 2020 23: 17 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: icant007
    And like any former German general in his memoirs, he is trying to hide the miscalculations of his command under the guise of not knowing the real situation in the USSR.

    No question, please provide sources that could confirm this your statement.


    So he himself writes:
    The directive breathes optimism, which should be explained by the impression of victories over Poland and France. Therefore, she ascribes to the enemy the same passive role that Germany has already become accustomed to in the two past wars. They again hoped that the lightning-fast war imposed on the enemy would circumvent Moltke’s position that “no operational plan can remain unchanged after the first meeting with the main enemy forces”.
    If the enemy’s assessment was correct this time too, the command could justifiably re-apply this tactic that had already proven itself twice, otherwise severe disappointments and complications were inevitable.


    and further
    If it is not possible to crush the military power of Russia before the onset of winter, then the war against it will be such a blunder, the consequences of which cannot be predicted. All plans, the implementation of which was planned "after the Barbarossa", will thereby be postponed indefinitely, the bulk of the German troops will remain constrained in the East for at least one more year, the threat of war will simultaneously arise on several theaters of operations - just what they thought to avoid by attacking the Soviet Union. Therefore, very good reasons forced to decide on the maximum efforts, however, beware of irresponsible to go all-in.


    That is, the German generals were aware of the potential of the USSR, so they were in a hurry to start a war and quickly end it.
  10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 10: 33 New
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    Quote: icant007
    So he himself writes:

    Well, Christmas trees :))))) Read TOGETHER what Tippelskirch writes

    Quote: icant007
    If the opponent’s score was correct this time too, the command could justifiably re-use this tactics that had already been twice proven, otherwise severe disappointments and complications were inevitable.

    Where is the confirmation that Tippelskirch is hiding the truth? He writes that the USSR’s potential could not be clearly determined, and writes that the plan could work if the assessment were correct. You accused Tippelskirch of lying, no question, so where is the rebuttal?
    Quote: icant007
    If it is not possible to crush the military power of Russia before winter, then the war against it will be such a blunder, the consequences of which cannot be predicted.

    So the Germans appreciated the power of the Red Army as they could, drew up a plan for its defeat (Barbarossa) and rightly noted that if they did not break it down, it would be bad for them. Where is Tippelskirch’s refutation?
  11. icant007 2 February 2020 11: 23 New
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    Eshkin cat)

    He would not have written about this if he had not been aware of the real potential of the USSR.
    The fact of the matter is that he contradicts himself.
    He says that they did not know anything about the USSR. And then he says, they were in a hurry because they knew that the delay in death was similar. )))
  12. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 17: 37 New
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    Quote: icant007
    He would not have written about this if he had not been aware of the real potential of the USSR.
    The fact of the matter is that he contradicts himself.
    He says that they did not know anything about the USSR. And then he says, they were in a hurry because they knew that the delay in death was similar. )))

    I'm amazed! So to customize the source to your own point of view - this is not given to everyone. But if you please read what is written by Tippelskirch, and not what you want to read from him.
    So, Tippelskirch indicated the main tasks of the German plan. First of all, this is the destruction of the USSR troops in the European part
    The main goal was to destroy the main forces of the Russian army, located in the western part of Russia, through bold operations with the deep advance of tank wedges and to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready units deep into the vast Russian territory.

    Destroying the Soviet army is the first task. And only after its implementation it was necessary to capture certain territories
    Then, as a result of a quick pursuit, German troops were supposed to reach the milestone from which Russian aviation could no longer make raids on German territory. The ultimate goal of the operations was to reach the Volga, Arkhangelsk line, so that the last remaining industrial area in Russia in the Urals could be paralyzed by German aviation if necessary.

    That is, the destruction of the Red Army forces was a prerequisite in order, on the one hand, to protect their own industrial potential from air raids, and on the other, to put the Soviet potential at risk of the Luftwaffe and thereby significantly reduce it.
    Take your quote from Tippelskirch
    Quote: icant007
    If it is not possible to crush the military power of Russia before the onset of winter, then the war against it will be such a blunder, the consequences of which cannot be predicted.

    That is, if before the winter of the Red Army in the western part of the USSR will not be destroyed, then the task of defeating the Red Army will not be solved, and the industrial potential of the USSR will not be multiplied by zero. Why was it important to multiply the USSR industrial potential by zero?
    The size of the Russian army was fairly accurately estimated by the Germans: 150 infantry divisions, 36 motorized brigades and 32 cavalry divisions, of which at the beginning of the war about 25 infantry divisions, 7 cavalry divisions and several motorized brigades were linked at other borders, primarily in East Asia {twenty}. The German command counted on the fact that at the beginning of the war it would be necessary to encounter approximately 20 infantry, 125 cavalry divisions and 25 motorized brigades, including 30 tank divisions. These compounds, of course, far from exhausted the human reserves of a huge country, which, with an annual draft contingent of approximately 5 million people, had [1,5] at least 239 million young people fit for military service. The question of to what extent the Russian military industry could arm this mass of people remained open. The destruction of the Russian military industry acquired in this connection crucial.

    That's all - and no need to breed conspiracy :))))
  13. icant007 2 February 2020 17: 52 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The question of to what extent the Russian military industry could arm this mass of people remained open. The destruction of the Russian military industry acquired in this connection crucial.

    That's all - and no need to breed conspiracy :))))


    Well, here is the contradiction)

    If industry is underestimated (that is, it is weak, or they think that it is weak), its destruction should not be decisive.

    Of crucial importance is when it is known that the industrial potential is powerful. ))).

    Do you think that the words of Tippelskirch should be interpreted according to yours.
    I think the opposite.

    I think either Kurt was too clever with words, or a translator.

    But in any case, if we know that the enemy has a strong defense complex, should we attach decisive importance to its defeat? Right? )
  14. ccsr 2 February 2020 12: 30 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    So the Germans appreciated the power of the Red Army as they could, drew up a plan for its defeat (Barbarossa) and rightly noted that if they did not break it down, it would be bad for them.

    What then is the "genius" of the German commanders, if they initially drew up a plan without taking into account the real power of the Red Army? So only arrogant fools do, since the plan did not take into account the actions of the enemy - this is the criterion for the viability of any planning.
  15. ccsr 2 February 2020 12: 27 New
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    Quote: icant007
    They again hoped that the lightning-fast war imposed on the enemy would circumvent Moltke’s position that “no operational plan can remain unchanged after the first meeting with the main enemy forces”.

    This LITERATURE definition should be guided by any LITTLE HQ officer when developing a plan regarding combat operations against any enemy. And the "ingenious" German generals threw a bolt on this fundamental definition, and decided that the USSR was the same enemy for them as Poland or Denmark, and our mitrofanushki still give them praise, and consider them talented commanders. Although it is obvious to any professional that the “Barabarossa" plan originally included strategic miscalculations that would not allow it to be fulfilled in the war against the USSR. But the Germans did not have a chance to win in a protracted war with the USSR, even if the allies did not help us. So what then is the "genius" of the German General Staff?
  16. ccsr 1 February 2020 18: 43 New
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    Quote: icant007
    Tippelskirch's memories are generally quite superficial. Although there are certainly many interesting things.
    And like any former German general in his memoirs, he is trying to hide the miscalculations of his command under the guise of not knowing the real situation in the USSR.

    The conclusion is absolutely correct, but amateurs will never believe this, and they will spread a lie about what kind of secrecy regime was in the USSR, and the Germans could not know anything about our military potential.
  17. strannik1985 1 February 2020 11: 40 New
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    More like competence

    The stallion was too lively. Surely Abver collected and analyzed information, but even if it was true and voluminous, the possibilities of the economy changed greatly from the five-year to the five-year period. If we compare the changes in the military-industrial complex and the Armed Forces of England, France, the USSR over a decade, then the possibilities of the latter in 1931 and 1941 are like heaven and earth.
    Plus, no matter how illogical it may sound, within the framework of the task, even if the analysis is carried out correctly, you still need to attack, because in 1942 and 1943 the Red Army will become even stronger, and how will the political curve lead ...
  18. ccsr 1 February 2020 12: 04 New
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    Quote: icant007
    There is such a thing - military statistics.
    - the branch of social statistics (See. Social statistics), which studies the quantitative side of military phenomena in preparation for war, during the war, and after its end, inextricably linked with their qualitative side.

    Thank you for not being too lazy to enlighten the next amateur. I am glad that you do not pass by the nonsense that some "military experts" declare here.
    Quote: icant007
    About this, by the way, your beloved Tippelskirch repeatedly writes, saying that any prolongation of the war is fatal for Germany.

    Your opponent apparently read this author diagonally, so he did not pay attention to the MAIN conclusion:
    any prolongation of the war is fatal for Germany.

    The question arises how the "talented" German general staff planned to quickly end the war in such a vast territory, where sometimes it floods in the summer so that sometimes it is not possible to pass through small rivers in the European part.
  • ccsr 1 February 2020 11: 57 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    But the Red Army during the winter war was formally significantly stronger than the Finnish army, and the Soviet economy also exceeded the Finnish one. So what?

    In fact, one district fought there, the war ended three months later by writing peace on our terms - this is the result of the fact that Finland could not compete with the USSR.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I understand that you have already forgotten that the conversation actually began with an assessment of the genius of the German General Staff.

    I don’t think that the German General Staff was brilliant - amateurs in military affairs hold opinions about its “genius”.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And I understand perfectly well that, for example, to give a comparative assessment of the Schliffen and Gelb plan is completely useless for you - you just don’t understand what it is all about.

    It was enough for me to carefully study the Barabarossa directive and it became clear to me that those who developed it had a primitive idea of ​​the USSR and the Red Army. By the way, for the Germans, the organization of the partisan movement as early as August 1941 was a complete surprise - here you have the "strategists".
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    That's just the reason for this - not the competence of the German General Staff :)))

    Full of their fault, it was not Hitler who developed Barbarossa. By the way, some of the highest military personnel in Germany did not serve Hitler at all, and resigned even before the attack on the USSR. And the reason is that they understood what kind of adventure Hitler had decided to conquer the USSR.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Do you even understand what the difference is? Or will you continue to talk about effective intelligence of the USSR, "miscalculated for a couple of divisions"?

    Do you even understand what such troop maneuvering is, and why did intelligence report on all German divisions? I think that you are just an amateur in this matter and therefore do not understand what the dynamics of the movement of troops are, and what problems exist in the assessment of troops located on a particular section of the border. By the way, both Shaposhnikov in the reporting documents, and Halder in their diaries operate on the total number of divisions - learn the materiel.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Instead of LEARNING a story, you THINK it. There is a perfect fact - the Germans were extremely mistaken in assessing the military potential of the USSR.

    The Germans not only made a mistake in this, but also because they did not take into account our resistance, our mob resources, our distances, or our climate, so you should not speculate on only one mistake - the German General Staff was completely deprived when developing Barbaross’s plan, and military professionals understand that, and you don’t belong to them.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    True, there is one caveat - first you need to find out where the Russian tank factories are.

    Do not be surprised - it was discovered at the stage of the creation of the tank industry of the USSR.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    the resident’s work is “slightly” different, and the romance “with walkie-talkies, daggers and yads” in it is quite a bit

    How do you know this? Tell us in more detail where you came across this.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 13: 50 New
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      Quote: ccsr
      In fact, one district fought there, the war ended three months later by writing peace on our terms - this is the result of the fact that Finland could not compete with the USSR.

      And with all this, both the Red Army general staff and lower-ranking "units" demonstrated simply disgusting work, as a result of which the prestige of the Red Army in the world greatly shook. on the contrary, the Finns demonstrated much better staff work and command and control.
      From all this, it obviously follows that “comparable armies and economies” (which in no way affect the assessment of the work of the General Staff) you have dragged here to corny the uncomfortable conclusions for you.
      Quote: ccsr
      I do not think that the German General Staff was brilliant

      I recommend learning to count
      Quote: ccsr
      It was enough for me to carefully study the "Barabarossa" directive

      You could not master one page of a cited source yourself - where can you study the whole directive?
      Quote: ccsr
      and it became clear to me that those who developed it had a primitive idea of ​​the USSR and the Red Army.

      For once, the right conclusion. Perhaps, in 20 years, REASONS will reach you, for which the Germans had such a primitive idea. I suggest that these reasons have no relation to the competence of the General Staff.
      Quote: ccsr
      By the way, for the Germans, the organization of the partisan movement as early as August 1941 was a complete surprise - here you have the "strategists".

      The Germans knew about the possibility of guerrilla warfare and prepared for it - a surprise for them was just too quick a start. And taking into account the fact that the partisans did not and did not have any strategic influence in 1941, and did not seriously influence the implementation of German plans, I can only repeat that you either do not know the subject at all or deliberately blabber the subject of discussion.
      Quote: ccsr
      By the way, some of the highest military personnel in Germany did not serve Hitler at all, and resigned even before the attack on the USSR.

      "Name, sister, name!"
      Quote: ccsr
      Do you even understand what such troop maneuvering is, and why did intelligence report on all German divisions?

      You are a person who is unable to see gross errors in your own argumentation. If Soviet intelligence revealed the real state of affairs, that almost all combat-ready divisions were concentrated against the USSR, this would clearly mean Germany’s readiness to attack the USSR. The picture, painted by Soviet intelligence, that less than half of combat-ready and only 40% of the German divisions are deployed against the USSR, indicates that in 1941 the Germans were not going to attack the USSR.
      Quote: ccsr
      I think you're just an amateur

      And I think that you need to learn to think.
      Quote: ccsr
      and what are the problems in assessing troops located on a particular section of the border

      I - I know, that's why I say - the intelligence of the USSR was about twice as wrong
      Quote: ccsr
      By the way, both Shaposhnikov in the reporting documents, and Halder in their diaries operate on the total number of divisions - learn the materiel.

      Learn to read before you poke a nose in my nose.
      Halder, in his report to the Führer on June 20, 41 on readiness for Barbarossa: General composition of forces:
      1. Infantry divisions - 103 (including 2 mining and 4 light divisions)
      2. Tank divisions - 19
      3. Motorized divisions - 14
      4. Cavalry divisions - 1
      5. Special forces - 5 (3 security and 2 infantry divisions)
      In total - 141 divisions
      That is - I congratulate you once again - Halder did not operate with the total number of divisions, but only with those that were at his fingertips. I recall that at that time the Germans had 208 divisions.
      Quote: ccsr
      The Germans not only made a mistake in this, but also in the fact that they did not take into account not our resistance, nor our mob resources, nor our distances, nor our climate

      Delirium of the amateur. Still study “Barbarossa” at your leisure, although I doubt that you will succeed. With such a low level of analytical abilities as yours, I have not come across for a long time.
      Quote: ccsr
      Do not be surprised - it was discovered at the stage of the creation of the tank industry of the USSR.

      Documents - to the studio :)
      Quote: ccsr
      How do you know this? Tell us in more detail where you came across this.

      On the pages of historical literature. That is, where you did not look
    2. icant007 1 February 2020 14: 39 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      In total - 141 divisions


      Well, in our RU report of June 22, there are something like 140 divisions for Germans against the USSR.


      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      I - I know, that's why I say - the intelligence of the USSR was about twice as wrong


      Intelligence roughly calculated everything correctly.
      According to the figure of 290 divisions, we cannot say for sure what Soviet intelligence took into account.
      If we analyze the chronology of reconnaissance reports, then there was a similar message earlier, while taking into account, including air fleets.

      But if we take the number of 210 divisions, which is given, for example, by Muller-Gillebrand, as the total number of ground forces, and add the satellite forces, then we will get approximately 290 divisions.
    3. ccsr 1 February 2020 18: 53 New
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      Quote: icant007
      According to the figure of 290 divisions, we cannot say for sure what Soviet intelligence took into account.

      It can be said unequivocally that this number included not only all German divisions staffed by the state of wartime, i.e. fully combat-ready, but also those that were incomplete in terms of personnel and equipment, but within a few days or weeks could be fully understaffed due to the call of the civilian population. This element of training the Wehrmacht is well described in the book “Soldier of the Three Armies”, when under the leadership of the sergeant major, a car battalion of draftees arrived with their cars was completely formed within two days in the countryside. These are exactly the nuances our intelligence took into account when evaluating the capabilities of the German army.
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 18: 58 New
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      Quote: icant007
      Well, in our RU report of June 22, there are something like 140 divisions for Germans against the USSR.

      I explained the difference above. I will try again
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      If Soviet intelligence revealed the real state of affairs, that almost all combat-ready divisions were concentrated against the USSR, this would clearly mean Germany’s readiness to attack the USSR. The picture, painted by Soviet intelligence, that less than half of combat-ready and only 40% of the German divisions are deployed against the USSR, indicates that in 1941 the Germans were not going to attack the USSR.

      Is the difference clear?
      The only thing that intelligence did more or less correctly was to determine the number of German troops on the Soviet-German border. But other intelligence errors created, however, a completely misconception about Germany’s intentions
      Quote: icant007
      Intelligence roughly calculated everything correctly.

      Well, if you say for a long time that black is white ... yes, maybe someone will believe
      Quote: icant007
      But if we take the number of 210 divisions, which leads, for example, Müller-Gillebrand, as the total number of ground forces, and add the satellite forces

      Divide by the area of ​​the planet Mars and raise to the power of the cosine of the angle by the polar star, introducing a correction for last year's average cost of firewood in the Novgorod region ...
    5. icant007 1 February 2020 21: 40 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Quote: icant007
      But if we take the number of 210 divisions, which leads, for example, Müller-Gillebrand, as the total number of ground forces, and add the satellite forces

      Divide by the area of ​​the planet Mars and raise to the power of the cosine of the angle by the polar star, introducing a correction for last year's average cost of firewood in the Novgorod region ...


      Well, since you think that Mars and the Novgorod region are close to our topic, then I will only have to shrug)

      It is only you who can conclude that if half of the German divisions are in the west, it means that it is not going to attack the USSR.
      Germany has already demonstrated its general adventurism by fighting on two fronts in World War I.
    6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 2 February 2020 10: 21 New
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      Quote: icant007
      It is only you who can conclude that if half of the German divisions are in the west, it means that it is not going to attack the USSR.

      No, not only me :))) The leadership of the country represented by Stalin, for example :)))
      Quote: icant007
      Germany has already demonstrated its general adventurism by fighting on two fronts in World War I.

      It is very sad that you do not see the difference. First, Germany in 1914 had a very powerful ally, Austria-Hungary, who fought against the Republic of Ingushetia. But the most important thing, of course, is not this, but that Germany fought precisely on two fronts, that is, she was forced to fight against the Russian Empire and against France. But in 2 France was crushed, England did not have any significant ground forces either on the continent or in the metropolis and could not attack Germany in Europe.
      At the same time, common sense dictates that if you fight, then you must beat in full force and concentrate all available forces - a situation where Germany attacks the USSR with less than half combat-ready divisions while the rest cool off somewhere else, connected by combat missions is completely absurd.
    7. icant007 2 February 2020 11: 03 New
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      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      No, not only me :))) The leadership of the country represented by Stalin, for example :)))


      Do not confuse words and actions.
      The Soviet leadership hoped that the war could be delayed until 1942, and tried to calm the population with a non-aggression pact.
      In fact, there was a pulling of our troops to the border.

      You yourself know that you are casting a shadow on the wattle fence.

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      At the same time, common sense dictates that if you fight, then you must beat in full force and concentrate all available forces - a situation where Germany attacks the USSR with less than half combat-ready divisions while the rest cool off somewhere else, connected by combat missions is completely absurd.


      Firstly, they do not cool, but carry out combat missions at the Mediterranean theater of operations, cover the Atlantic coast of the occupied territories.

      Secondly, Germany was not alone in the Second World War. You count all the allies of Germany, Romania, Finland, Hungary, Italy and you get a different picture.

      In the armed forces of Italy alone, there were more than 2 million people.
      This is the sum without the allocation of the Ground Forces.
      You say the Italians are still warriors. Well, they are still against us, but nevertheless they poorly fought poorly at the Mediterranean Theater.

      And thirdly, in war it is necessary to be guided not by common sense of the layman, but by military professional considerations. If there is a concentration of enemy troops on our border, then we must strengthen our defense here. And do not think how many divisions Germany has concentrated against England.
  • ccsr 1 February 2020 18: 39 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And with all this, the General Staff of the Red Army and subordinate "links" showed simply disgusting work,

    This does not cancel the outcome of the war, but merely serves as a subject for parsing errors. Anything more clever you can tell?
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    For once, the right conclusion.

    Most likely it first came to you what military professionals understand.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    "Name, sister, name!"

    Don’t be dishonored - you yourself can’t at least find something?
    He also called the participants in the core of the organization - these are large German military leaders. The German conspirators developed a political plan of their actions: they proposed, among other things, to lean on the Soviet Union and not fight with it.
    "Colonel-General Beck, in the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, said:" We have entrusted the fate of Germany to the adventurer. Now he is at war with the whole universe. " General Beck led the conspiracy against Hitler. Field Marshal Witzleben, one of the authoritative and visionary generals, referring to Hitler, loudly declared in 1941: "This is a completely crazy guy." Major General Krebs, a former assistant military attache in Moscow, said: "These people apparently have no idea about the state and strength of Russia. The war with Russia is the death of Germany." Professor Jessen, who was formerly close to Hitler, said: "Hitler is a criminal, he leads Germany to death. Hitler is an enemy of the people. The war with Russia is not like it," says German prisoner of war Krome in the NKVD report.

    https://tvzvezda.ru/news/qhistory/content/201705301350-a1u0.htm
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I - I know, that's why I say - the intelligence of the USSR was about twice as wrong

    What is doubled - enlighten with links to at least intelligence materials.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I recall that at that time the Germans had 208 divisions.

    Lies, because this number does not reflect all the German divisions that could take part in the war against the USSR in the event of an unfavorable start to the war. By the way, even this figure does not correspond to your lies that our intelligence doubled the number of German divisions.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Documents - to the studio :)

    Enlighten:
    The aspects of Soviet-German strategic cooperation during the Weimar Republic (1922-1933) should include the active participation of German companies in the industrialization of the USSR during the years of the first five-year plan (1928-1932). Perhaps, in its contribution to the industrialization of the USSR, Germany is second only to the United States from all countries. Germany supplied the USSR with the latest industrial equipment and specialists.

    Source: How Germany and the USSR collaborated before the war.
    © Russian Seven russian7.ru
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    On the pages of historical literature.

    Do not wag this way - or do you just have nothing to say?
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk 1 February 2020 19: 25 New
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    Quote: ccsr
    This does not cancel the outcome of the war, but merely serves as a subject for parsing errors. Anything more clever you can tell?

    I already said - the trouble is that such things are not available to your understanding. But I can repeat it again - on the example of the war of the USSR and Finland, we see that the quality of work of the headquarters does not depend on the comparative strength of the armies and industrial potentials of the warring countries, that is, your thesis
    Quote: ccsr
    Because it is necessary to compare at least proportional armies and approximately the same order of the economy of the warring countries.

    worthless.
    Quote: ccsr
    Most likely it first came to you what military professionals understand.

    No, exactly what I said :) Having piled a touching number of errors, you, apparently, purely statistically at least indicated something correctly :)
    Quote: ccsr
    Don’t be dishonored - you yourself can’t at least find something?

    No I can not. You wrote to us
    Quote: ccsr
    By the way, some of the highest military personnel in Germany did not serve Hitler at all, and resigned even before the attack on the USSR.

    And now - give a quote in which they are mentioned
    Quote: ccsr
    Colonel General Beck

    Which resigned long before the attack on the USSR. And even before the start of World War II. He wrote his report in 1938 because he was an opponent of Germany’s entry into the war AT ALL, and not specifically with the USSR.
    Quote: ccsr
    Field Marshal Witzleben

    He resigned in 1942.
    Quote: ccsr
    Major General Krebs, former Assistant Military Attache in Moscow

    served until the end of the war, shot himself in May 1945
    So which of us is dishonored here? :)))
    Quote: ccsr
    What is doubled - enlighten with links to at least intelligence materials.

    Already cited above. You are not able to master even a comment?
    Quote: ccsr
    It's a lie, because this number does not reflect all the German divisions that could take part in the war against the USSR in the event of an unfavorable start to the war

    Go learn the materiel. 208 divisions COULD NOT take part in the war against the USSR in the event of an unfavorable start to the war, because except for those that were concentrated against the USSR, the rest in the bulk were not combat ready. And yes, the Germans had exactly 208 divisions, Müller Gillebrand in your hands
    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Documents - to the studio :)
    Enlighten:
    The aspects of Soviet-German strategic cooperation during the Weimar Republic (1922-1933) should include the active participation of German companies in the industrialization of the USSR during the years of the first five-year plan (1928-1932). Perhaps, in its contribution to the industrialization of the USSR, Germany is second only to the United States from all countries. Germany supplied the USSR with the latest industrial equipment and specialists.

    Source: How Germany and the USSR collaborated before the war.
    © Russian Seven russian7.ru

    That is, documents that would confirm that in Germany you knew at least the place of manufacture of Soviet tanks you do not have, and again you tried to stupidly stupid, issuing informational garbage about "contribution to industrialization." The drain is counted.
    Quote: ccsr
    Do not wag so it went

    :)))) I told you the absolute truth - I studied the situation with the agents of the parties through the pages of historical literature and sources. What is unclear for your gyrus?
  • ccsr 2 February 2020 12: 06 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    that the quality of work of the headquarters does not depend on the comparative strength of the armies and industrial potentials of the warring countries, i.e.

    The utter nonsense - headquarters is only an organ of planning and control in the armed forces, and their work directly depends on what level the state and its army are at. Only a fool can compare the work of our headquarters, for example, in the First and Second World War, if only because the armed forces themselves have changed.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Which resigned long before the attack on the USSR.

    Unlike you, he studied Hitler’s program statements well, and I think the war in Spain helped him understand where Germany would go in the future. That's why he resigned because back in May 1938 he opposed the plan of attack on Czechoslovakia.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    served until the end of the war, shot himself in May 1945

    He presented exhaustive data on the Red Army, but did not want to listen to him, and here you are talking about his suicide, as if his assessment of our army would change.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    208 divisions COULD NOT take part in the war against the USSR in the event of an unfavorable start to the war, because except for those that were concentrated against the USSR, the rest in the bulk were not combat ready.

    It’s complete nonsense, because if there is an organizational structure for the compound and it is equipped with command personnel at least 70-80%, then such a division can be brought to a READY state for several days. About "combat readiness" they write those who do not understand a fig how these concepts differ.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And yes, the Germans had exactly 208 divisions, Müller Gillebrand in your hands

    Why should I believe this historian, the lie of which our researchers have repeatedly exposed, even on this resource:
    https://topwar.ru/140302-tayna-nemeckih-poter-vo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyne-chast-i-pro-myullera-gillebranda.html
    By the way, here is how the Wehrmacht was evaluated already in 1939:

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    That is, documents that would confirm that in Germany you knew at least the place of manufacture of Soviet tanks you don’t have,

    They are in the archwaves of German intelligence structures - go and look for them there. A large number of German specialists worked in our large cities, and I think they were able to determine which plant makes tanks - as a child I knew that warships are made at the Zaliv factory, and you think that all German specialists were naive.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The drain is counted.

    You can even hang yourself the Hero of the Forum Battles medal, but remember that you are only a journalist and your wild ideas about military affairs are visible to any military professional.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I told you the absolute truth - I studied the situation with the agents of the parties through the pages of historical literature and sources.

    What "source" have you ever seen in your eyes, enlighten?
  • icant007 31 January 2020 08: 14 New
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    In your chanting of the genius of the German command, there are notes of poorly concealed admiration for the enemy.
    So, close to the praise of fascism.

    They did not have any genius, the Germans throughout the war acted according to the pattern. This is their strength, and their own weakness.

    But Russia cannot be defeated by cold rationalism.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 31 January 2020 16: 25 New
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      Quote: icant007
      In your chanting of the genius of the German command, there are notes of poorly concealed admiration for the enemy.

      Why is it badly hidden? I admire the German General Staff quite openly, since he deserves it 100%
      Quote: icant007
      So, close to the praise of fascism.

      No, very far away. Because the admiration for the German General Staff does not prevent me from further admiring the General Staff of the Red Army, which has been completely equal since 1943, and in 1944 it clearly surpassed the German General Staff.
      But with reasoning
      Quote: icant007
      They did not have any genius, the Germans throughout the war acted according to the pattern

      very close to the repetition of the bloody defeats of 1941
      1. icant007 31 January 2020 18: 45 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        very close to the repetition of the bloody defeats of 1941


        And here the matter is not in the Germans, but in us.
        Chronic unpreparedness for war is our scourge.
        1. ccsr 5 February 2020 13: 49 New
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          Quote: icant007
          Chronic unpreparedness for war is our scourge.

          By the way, our actions on the first day of 08.08.08 unfortunately once again confirmed that we did not learn how to immediately respond to the situation, and this is already an alarming symptom for our armed forces.
          1. icant007 5 February 2020 14: 09 New
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            Incidentally, by the way, I also meant these events. From someone here in VO, I heard sayings like: "There was a lot of mess, but we won."

            It would be nice if someone raised this topic here by examining the question: "Are we ready for another war?"
            1. ccsr 5 February 2020 19: 15 New
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              Quote: icant007
              It would be nice if someone raised this topic here by examining the question: "Are we ready for another war?"

              It would hardly be a productive discussion, if only because those who know the situation, I think they will not write here. As for the rest, many authors generally vaguely imagine what kind of war scenario we will have in a strategic and local conflict, so they are unlikely to appreciate our readiness for a particular situation. I think that in the strategic plan we are much better prepared than for any critical situation near our borders with the former Soviet republics. Although, as I understand it, the events in Novorossia forced our commanders to take appropriate measures - at least the exercises began to be carried out on a grand scale.
  • pmkemcity 29 January 2020 08: 03 New
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    The blow from Kotelnikovo was inflicted on the fact that there it was faster and easier to concentrate the withdrawn tanks from the Caucasus. In addition, a bunch of transport and material resources were concentrated there. The blow itself was delivered along the railway in order to deliver it all faster to Stalingrad. If the Germans were concentrated in the Kalach region, it would take another week, and maybe more.
    An article from the category of "new Hohlak history" with reference to hohlokartinki.
  • icant007 29 January 2020 08: 05 New
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    Perhaps Manstein cherished hope for the environment of our group, but to me personally such an intention seems unlikely.
    The southwestern direction was covered by us the weakest, here Manstein also aimed.
    And the direction from Nizhne-Chirskaya to Kalach is complicated due to the features of the relief. The right bank of the Don abounds in a bend with hills with rather steep slopes, plus our group is quite powerful from the north, which can easily hit the attacking Germans on the flank.
    The bare snow-covered steppe in the southern direction is also not always easily passable by tanks, but here we did not wait for the Germans.
    It is enough to recall the heroic crossing of the 2nd Guards Army, which walked over 200 km on foot in order to reach the defensive lines on the river. Myshkova.

    By the way, this was written by Bondarev in "Hot Snow".
  • Amateur 29 January 2020 08: 10 New
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    Schaub, I was so smart before, like my Sarah after. (Jewish folk wisdom)
  • Glory1974 29 January 2020 08: 42 New
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    The main tactics of the German troops is a strike in the joint between units or formations, bypass and coverage. Further, if you get the environment. Therefore, it is logical to assume that in this case, Manstein also suggested such actions.
    But in this article I did not see any assumptions, facts, or at least the alleged patterns of action of the troops. The version has the right to life, but you need to dig more deeply.
  • Radikal 29 January 2020 11: 48 New
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    I looked at the bibliographic list of literature that the authors used - rather poorly. Moreover, it was published in the vile post-Soviet years, when the distortion of history took great strides across the country! You might think that before this period nothing on the history of the Second World War was published .... sad
  • Radikal 29 January 2020 11: 55 New
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    A map with the situation from the collage to the article was taken from a Bulgarian source in general - were there no domestic ones? sad
  • Trilobite Master 29 January 2020 11: 55 New
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    Oh ho ... I don’t know where to start. Perhaps I’ll start from the end. smile
    I read the article. By itself, in the part that directly relates to the title, it seemed to me rather superficial. Manstein wanted to completely defeat the Red Army near Stalingrad? I don’t think so. Manstein was a realist and knew what he could achieve with the available forces and what not. But he was a military man and had to carry out the order; he carried it out to the best of his abilities. It is unlikely that anyone could do more in that situation than he did.
    I’m not a great specialist in the Battle of Stalingrad, so I don’t want to go into an in-depth analysis of the strategic and operational situation near Stalingrad at the end of 1942, however, I note that the Russians, since the end of November, have been advancing all the time, and the Germans were retreating and this happened if my memory serves me right up to the end of February 1943. Then and only then the Germans had the opportunity to inflict a major defeat on the Russians, which Manstein immediately took advantage of. To think about it in December 1942, when ours were actively advancing, and the Germans were forced to patch holes on the front with separate companies and battalions ... Indeed, somehow, on the part of the authors, such an assumption seems too hypothetical to me.
    Now about, as it seemed to me, the main thing.
    the truth of historical science cannot be a simple correspondence of knowledge of reality. Such an understanding of truth is more in line with the sciences of nature. As for the sciences of the spirit, which influence the formation of a person’s worldview, some kind of conventional agreement on the interpretation of certain facts and events in a particular society becomes true.

    It is strange to hear this from people familiar with historical science firsthand. That is, the authors deliberately admit that this or that point of view on historical events can be true in one historical period and false in another. Roughly speaking, today the truth is one thing, tomorrow, depending on the political upheaval, it’s different, and this is normal, it should be so ... Here many adhere to the point of view according to which history is not a science. In this form, as its authors see, history is really not a science, but, excuse me, a lady of easy virtue or, worse, a rubber doll that reciprocates any scumbag or scum. Fortunately, this is not so, and if the authors of the article do not understand this, then studying history, they are wasting time.
    The past can be not only for an individual person, but also for nations. A successful person wants to have a positive self-esteem. Self-esteem consists of many components, one of which is belonging to a nation ... It is impossible to feel comfortable thinking that your fathers and grandfathers are murderers and rapists, thieves and bandits, people without conscience, honor and dignity, that a people to whom you yourself belong - vile and nasty.

    But this is already very bad. The authors actually say that there are good and noble peoples, and there are vile and nasty. And that it’s good and right to belong to a good people is good for self-esteem. We omit the fact that, as can be seen from the previous passage, they are mentally prepared to consciously change the interpretation of historical events in order to be representatives of a good people, but the fact that people can be divided into good and bad means that the people who make up these peoples , can be divided on a national basis into good and bad. “You are drilled, you are good, and you are Kalmyk nasty. And you are Russian, you are generally the best, the representative of the God-bearing people, bringing progress and prosperity, the eternal fighter against evil and destruction.”
    Was it worth reading the article itself after such an introduction? Can a researcher guided by such principles be objective and honest?
  • albert 29 January 2020 17: 37 New
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    I have the impression that the authors simply scuffed an article from Mukhin’s book “The Crusade to the East,” only by swapping their words. negative
  • smaug78 30 January 2020 13: 09 New
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    Yeah, draw conclusions on the basis of memoirs when there are military documents ... Regular liars and ignoramuses from propaganda ...
  • Oyo Sarkazmi 30 January 2020 20: 51 New
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    The Russians were dead, the Germans were just too lazy to beat them. So what?
    And the fact that the German soldiers were starving to death, froze, both in the boiler and on the outside, Hitler had no reserves, because of the constant bombing of the airfields, German planes could be above the front line for only 15 minutes, serviceable planes had to be taken out by train from the jump airfields - there was not enough gasoline to return. And for the entire battle of Stalingrad, the Germans did not succeed in transferring either division from other fronts - that is how they crushed them everywhere.
    Ours was also hard, the lack of reserves, the extended front, so Manstein managed to wedge himself with small forces, even to stop the attackers.
    It's like boxers after the sixtieth round - sometimes they wave their hands, but they can no longer move.
  • icant007 1 February 2020 10: 51 New
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    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: ccsr
    Despite the fact that without any communications, any agent is an empty phrase - the NKVD residency faced this after the outbreak of war

    I suggest - such information in peacetime is simply merged through diplomatic channels. Without the slightest difficulty. In general, see fewer spy movies, the resident’s work is “a bit different”, and there’s very little romance “with walkie-talkies, daggers and yads”


    So ccsr does not contradict you in anything. In peacetime, there were no problems in the war. He talks about it and you confirm it)

    And you're talking about some daggers.
  • Operator 1 February 2020 14: 04 New
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    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

    He is a journalist from Chelyabinsk, and they, apparently, are allowed to not know about the presence of tens of thousands of German technical specialists - they are agents recruiting agents in the pre-war USSR.

    One massive (by the standards of the time) German mountaineering in the Caucasus is worth it. And where did the Wehrmacht get topographic maps of the European part of the USSR, in detail exceeding the maps of the Red Army (i.e. not copied from them), I’m afraid to even imagine.
    1. ccsr 1 February 2020 18: 55 New
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      Quote: Operator
      He is a journalist from Chelyabinsk,

      And I’m still thinking where the legs grow from this ignorance - now I understand, thanks for the help.
      And where did the Wehrmacht get topographic maps of the European part of the USSR, in detail exceeding the maps of the Red Army (i.e. not copied from them), I’m afraid to even imagine.

      They put professional intelligence officers from the Luftwaffe into the crews of all civilian aircraft, and they shot on professional equipment of our territory. Moreover, due to the fact that we did not have a common radar system throughout the European territory, they deviated from flight routes for hundreds of kilometers and flew deep into the country.