Secrets of Russian mobilization of 1914 of the year
As you know, the main mobilization issues of the Russian Empire at the time when the First World War erupted were in the hands of the head of the General Staff (a little later - the chief of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief) infantry general N. N. Yanushkevich.
The context of the events in question was as follows.
An insight into the essence of the problem
15 (28) July 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and 16 (29) July N. N. Yanushkevich presented the Emperor with two alternative decrees for signing: 1) on the private mobilization of the 4 military districts, whose troops were intended for combat actions against Austria-Hungary (Moscow, Odessa, Kiev and Kazan) (2) on general mobilization.
Obviously, the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army (both against Serbia and against Russia) forced Russia to take appropriate precautions. It is interesting that Germany, which denied Russia the right to take these measures, itself vigorously implemented pre-mobilization measures - and on a more serious scale. For example, the Germans on 8 (21) of July already announced a pre-mobilization state for troops concentrated in Alsace (in Russia, for comparison, this situation was announced only on 13 (26) of July). And already from the 11 (24) of July, military rail transport began in Germany. The German newspaper Lokal Antseiger 17 (30) July announced the announcement of a general mobilization. This message was then refuted by the German government, but has already been transmitted by Russian agents to Russia.
Based on the foregoing, the tension of St. Petersburg, which was supposed to take measures capable of protecting the Russian borders, is obvious. Moreover, these measures should not have allowed Germany to doubt Russian peace.
The drama of the problem that confronted the head of the Russian state was that, having made private mobilization, Russia could no longer make a general mobilization: the 4 of the southeastern districts were mobilized at the cost of upsetting the 3's (and the most strategically most important) of the northwestern districts. Indeed, the mobilization schedule of the system of European military districts of Russia did not provide for their private mobilization - that is, selective mobilization of individual districts.
But the hope of the Russian emperor to keep the peace, as well as the hope for the peace of William II, were so great that, in spite of everything, Nicholas II on that day 16 (29) July signed a decree on private mobilization.
Nicholas II and his Foreign Minister S. D. Sazonov, sincerely striving to maintain peace, did not want the measures taken by Russia to be interpreted as aggressive and anti-German. That is why the Tsar’s decision is made to privately mobilize only the 4 military districts: Odessa, Kiev, Kazan and Moscow — and this peaceful and half-hearted decision largely went against the interests of state defense. Obviously, since the emperor and the minister did not see another way out as mobilization, the chief of the General Staff, General N. N. Yanushkevich, was simply obliged to insist on mobilization, moreover, general, and not private.
The problem was that the latter had to mix all the calculations for the call for spare and the implementation of strategic rail transport. Russia risked joining the war in a strategically unbalanced and “crumbling” state. So, when N. N. Yanushkevich requested documents providing for private mobilization against Austria, the head of the mobilization department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff Major General S. K. Dobrololsky reported that there was no question of private mobilization, if only because her plan was not developed in the General Directorate of the General Staff. The order was repeated - which made S.K. Dobrorolsky urgently develop a plan for private mobilization. But, of course, for 24 - 48 hours it was impossible to successfully complete the work that required weeks and months in peacetime. It was, therefore, a dangerous improvisation.
On the other hand, having mixed the prepared calculations, private mobilization inevitably destroyed, from the point of view of mobile equipment, the possibility of successful implementation of the general mobilization - in the event that the changing foreign policy situation requires the announcement of the latter.
Strategically mobilizing against Austria (i.e., only 4 military districts, despite the fact that the Warsaw military district remained unmobilized) was senseless - after all, after concentration, the armies of the Two-Empire Empire went on the offensive, directing the main efforts to the Warsaw Military District. The interfluve between the Vistula and the Bug was strategically important - it was here that the operational routes of the advancing Austrian armies passed. By the way, after the outbreak of the war, this was fully confirmed: the Austrian 1 Army operated precisely in the area which the proposed private mobilization had bypassed in order to assure Germany of Russian peace.
Obviously, if the duty of the chief of the Russian General Staff was to submit to the head of state his ideas that private mobilization does not meet the goals of the state’s defense, his duty to the Fatherland was to do everything possible to ensure that, despite the most laudable humanitarian considerations, Russia did not enter into a war bound hand and foot by ill-conceived decisions.
Nevertheless, the decision on private mobilization was made, and the day of its implementation was appointed 17 (30) July.
On the same day, July 17, as we noted above, the publication of the German semi-official newspaper Lokal Antseiger announced the mobilization of the German army. This fundamentally changed the situation - and in the 19 hours the Highest decree on universal mobilization followed. The first day of the last was appointed 18 (31) July.
At the same time, the German government refutes the message “Lokal Antseiger” and detains the telegram of the Russian ambassador in the mail, reporting this refutation. St. Petersburg did not know about this fact, and a decree on mobilization was already sent to the headquarters of the military districts. On the 18 of July, Germany in an ultimatum form demands from Russia the abolition of mobilization - threatening if the ultimatum is rejected by war.
Nicholas II invites William II to refer the Austro-Serbian conflict to the arbitration court in The Hague. The answer was the declaration by Germany of the war of Russia - at 19 hours of the 19 of July (1 of August).
After this brief digression into the question, we finally turn to the subject of the article.
Yanushkevich Jr about father, the July crisis and mobilization
We want to shed light on some of the nuances of these events by citing the testimonies of the son of N. N. Yanushkevich - having historical meaning and directly related to the life of his father. Nikolai Yanushkevich Jr. received this information at the age of 17 first-hand - from his father.
The first interesting fact, cited by the son of the general, suggests that in the spring of 1914 the then Chief of the General Staff N. N. Yanushkevich received from Switzerland a letter addressed directly to him, written in French and signed with the pseudonym: “Caesar le Vainqueur”. The mysterious author of this letter predicted a war between Russia and Germany in the near future, the consequence of which would be a revolution and the fall of the existing regime in Russia - and the general was advised not to oppose these events. This letter the recipient immediately brought to the attention of the detective police - to conduct a proper investigation. But subsequently, he heard nothing more about this strange prediction.
As we noted above, N.N. Yanushkevich was responsible for enforcing general mobilization. As you know, the Russian Emperor Nicholas II and the German Emperor William II conducted personal negotiations before the war, and the Russian Tsar was convinced that war could be prevented by these negotiations. Wilhelm, in turn, tried to convince Nicholas that until universal mobilization in Russia had begun, there would be no war.
On the other hand, N. N. Yanushkevich knew (thanks to the work of Russian intelligence) that the German war plan was based on a surprise attack - without declaring war. Nicholas II did not believe this information, and categorically forbade Yanushkevich to begin mobilization without his personal permission. The latter was aware of the danger of the emerging international political situation, as well as his enormous responsibility for the success of the mobilization and, consequently, for the successful start of the war. He spent these critical days almost exclusively in his office, surrounded by telephones, one of which was connected by direct wire to the Tsar’s office in Tsarskoye Selo. Over the past few days, the future Chief of Staff of the Stavka has literally turned gray (although before that, as his son notes, he had not a single gray hair).
In the evening, on the eve of mobilization, N.N. Yanushkevich was informed that, according to intelligence, the German fleet left Kiel and was heading for the Russian Baltic coast at full speed in order to land troops, realizing a plan for a surprise attack. The only solution to save Russia was an immediate order for general mobilization, the first step of which involved mining the Gulf of Riga and Finland, as well as the coast.
The next few hours were, according to the general, the most critical of his life. He knew that it was impossible to convince the Emperor of the correctness of the information. On the other hand, if the German fleet landed troops before mobilization was announced, its plan would be so frustrated that it would have to be improvised. In addition, after the order on mobilization, it can no longer be stopped and, if intelligence reports are incorrect, the mobilization order will serve as an official occasion for the Germans to start the war - and, therefore, having given the order for mobilization, Yanushkevich will become the instigator of the war.
The general assumed responsibility and, without reporting to the Tsar, ordered the general mobilization. He later told his son that from that moment he was sitting at his desk, having a revolver at hand - with the intention of committing suicide if his decision turned out to be wrong. At about 2 at night, he was informed that one German warship had exploded on the mines just set up - and the German fleet turned.
In the morning, N. N. Yanushkevich went to the Tsar and reported on the incidents of the night and that the mobilization was in full swing. The emperor approved the decision of the general, kissed him, said that he had saved Russia, and signed a decree on universal mobilization. This incident, as noted by N. Yanushkevich Jr., remained the personal secret of the Tsar and his father.
In his memoirs about the war, Wilhelm, although he mentions an incident related to the actions of the German fleet, considers N. N. Yanushkevich the instigator of the war - referring to his personal order to start mobilization.
Neither Germany nor Russia, as the memoirist noted, had at that time the intention to disclose this incident, because the German step, thanks to the decision of N.N. Yanushkevich, failed, but on the Russian side it should have been kept secret, because a general who exceeded his authority was subject to trial. And the latter took the word from his family members in the strictest manner to keep this secret. Only later, after the revolution, he wrote about this in his memoirs, but, as his son notes, they were buried in an estate in the Chernigov province and they must be considered lost.
It is worth mentioning the last days of the life of the person who played such a significant role in the crisis events of July 1914. After the revolution, as noted by the eldest son of the general, N. N. Yanushkevich lived first in an estate in the Chernigov province, and then, after the seizure of the estate by peasants, Chernihiv itself - with the whole family. In early February of the 1918 of the year, two commissars came for him on a special train (in one carriage), arrested and brought to the headquarters of the then commander-in-chief of the Active Army N.V. Krylenko. The latter suggested that N. N. Yanushkevich become his chief of staff - and the general categorically refused. Then, by the same train, he was sent to Petrograd in the Peter and Paul Fortress, but an order was given along the way - not to bring alive.
The general was killed sleeping - shot at point blank range, to the head. His body was given to relatives for burial at the Mikhailovsky cemetery. The corpse was in a dressing gown, with one mustache burned (from a shot) and a cut off finger on his hand (on which he wore a diamond ring).
Later, the wife of the victim received a personal telegram from L.D. Trotsky, in which the sender said that he considered the murder of the general an irreparable mistake and a great loss for Russia.
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