Blitzkrieg 1914. Myths about the First World War
What do we remember about the First World War?
How do you imagine the First World War far from stories people? The most common sources of knowledge are vague memories from school lessons, some fragmentary information from publications and feature films, snippets of discussions, opinions that have been accidentally heard. All together forms certain stereotypes in the heads.
The mere presence of stereotypes cannot be called a bad phenomenon. This is nothing but a dry squeeze from historiography that dominates the domestic and foreign scientific community. And historiography can be diluted and flavored with replicas of rebels from historical science, of which there are few, and amateur historians who are not connected by corporate ethics, which are now much larger.
Another thing is that historiography is often one-sided. In Soviet times, one-sided for the sake of ideology, and in modern times - for the sake of it is not clear to anyone. However, you can search for beneficiaries.
Interpretation of history in the right way for interpreters is a lucrative affair. But it’s often difficult to call it just history. The stereotype is first turned into a myth, and then with the help of a cunning selection of facts - into direct disinformation.
It is clear why the PMV was cunningly interpreted during the Soviet era. It was necessary to show the rottenness and reactionaryness of the tsarist regime. But why are modern, no, not historians, but distributors of new, democratic myths doing the same thing?
One could refer to the irrelevance and insignificance of the topic, and, as a result, the lack of interest among historians. But no, there is interest, as evidenced by the wide discussion that began 15 years ago regarding the existence of the Schlieffen plan.
So, if you wish, you can find those who are interested in continuing the Bolshevik myths and creating new myths is beneficial. But it is beneficial to those whom neither the Bolsheviks nor the autocracy are satisfied with. And there are such. They are the ideological heirs of the Provisional Government of 1917 of the year. Moreover, it is they who are in charge of ideology in our de-ideologized country. Therefore, they not only did not reject the historical heritage of the Bolsheviks on this issue, but they also developed to the best of their ability. And to our homegrown mythmakers, you can add American. Where without them?
In relation to the First World, the following myths are most often found and replicated in Russian historiography and popular literature.
Myth No. 1. The goals of the Russian Empire in the First World War.
Back in Soviet times, it was claimed that Russia entered the war to capture the Black Sea straits. The reason for the statement is simple: it was necessary to bite the recently overthrown tsarism, exposing its anti-popular aggressive nature. Sometimes the desire to seize the Polish lands of Germany and Austria is added to this.
It has long and often been argued that Russia got involved in a clash of the Western powers that was unnecessary for her, as it sat tightly on the French financial hook. Categorically should not have entered the war, despite the pushing of the French. It would be right to stay away. And the Europeans let them bleed themselves as much as they like.
Finally, a new survey, which appeared in the zero years of our century: the assertion that the "Schlieffen Plan" never existed. Germany was not at all preparing for war. The throw to Paris through Belgium was completely random.
Myth No. 2. The country's unpreparedness for war.
Russia, unlike civilized countries, was not ready for war. Evidence of this is the lack of heavy artillery and the small number of stockpiled shells, which led to well-known problems when the war entered the positional phase. Plus the lack of ammunition, machine guns, rifles and in general everything.
Myth No. 3. Suicide attack.
Russia, for the sake of creditors, having not completed the mobilization, rushed into a suicidal unprepared attack in East Prussia, where it was naturally defeated because - see paragraph 2.
Let's analyze the points.
Myth No. 1. The goals of the Russian Empire in the First World War
All allegations of goals in the war are killed by the chronology of events in the first week of August.
The empire enters the war to capture the straits. What is she doing? Turning to the facts, we see that nothing.
Here is the chronology of 1914 of the year:
It turns out that first Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, then Germany to Russia. Two days later, Germany attacks Belgium and France. A day later, England stands up for the allies, and another day later, Austria-Hungary attacks Russia. Some kind of strange aggression of Russia. How does the declaration of war by Germany and Austria-Hungary help Russia to capture the Black Sea straits, which (what a surprise) belong to Turkey, which does not participate in the war?
Only after 2 months, namely 29 and 30 of October 1914 of the year, the Turkish fleet under the command of the German admiral fired on Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia and Novorossiysk.
In response to this, on November 2 of November 1914, Russia declared war on Turkey. Is this the very evidence of Russia's aggression against Turkey in order to capture the straits? And if the Turks remained smarter and did not attack? What then to do with the straits?
Thus, the assertion of entering the war for the sake of the Turkish straits is not just wrong, but false. Why is it repeated if the Bolsheviks who invented it have long rested in the Bose? I think the answer is obvious. This is the simplest way, having chatted the facts, to declare Germany and Russia as co-instigators and warlords of WWII and forget about the British, who did the maximum possible so that the Kaiser would not change his mind and turn on the back.
Sound familiar?
As for plans to seize Polish lands, this is a clear remake. There were then no Polish lands. There was German Silesia with Pomerania and Austrian Cracovia with Galicia. And not everywhere Poles made up the majority of the population. I suspect that the Poles launched this discourse, actively persuading themselves that they, the Poles, are urgently needed by Russia, and with these shamanistic spells they are invoking American troops to their land.
Why did Russia enter the world war?
The most interesting thing is that no one started any world war and did not intend to start even in the conditions of confrontation between the two military blocs.
Austria attacked Serbia, having a completely local task. Russia announced a partial mobilization against Austria in order to prevent the destruction of the ally, but did not intend to fight Germany, because there was no need.
On July 28 of 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia by direct telegram and on the same day began shelling Belgrade. Nicholas II sent a message to Berlin that a partial mobilization would be announced on July 29. In a new telegram on the same day, the emperor suggested that William send the Austro-Serbian conflict to the Hague Conference to prevent bloodshed. Kaiser Wilhelm II did not consider it necessary to answer.
On the morning of the 30 of July, the emperor in a telegram again urged William II to influence Austria. In the afternoon, Nicholas II sent to Berlin with General Tatishchev V.S. Another letter to the Kaiser asking for assistance in peace. Only in the evening, under the pressure of military officials, did the emperor give permission to begin general mobilization.
On the morning of August 1, Nicholas II tried to convince the German ambassador that Russian mobilization did not mean a threat to Germany. There would be a negotiating table. Moreover, on July 26, the British Foreign Minister proposed that England and Germany, with the participation of France and Italy (without Russia. - Approx. Aut.), Act as mediators to reconcile Serbia and Austria, but Germany rejects this option. But in the afternoon, the German ambassador Lichnovsky reports from London to Berlin: “In the event that we do not attack France, England will remain neutral and guarantee the neutrality of France.” Having received numerous reports of high probability, almost a guarantee of British neutrality, the Kaiser declares war on Russia 1 August 17.00.
And where is the French credit hook? Where is the Entente pushing Russia to enter an unnecessary world massacre? It was England that pushed Germany to war with Russia, and only with Russia.
But France could well stand aside and not come to the aid of an ally who would definitely not stand against the Triple Alliance. But the French announced a mobilization on 2 on August, after which the Kaiser decided to act in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan. And there already the British had to fit in to prevent the defeat of allied France. The defeat of allied Russia was completely allowed by them.
Many say that the death of Samsonov’s army in East Prussia saved Paris. This is true. But after announcing mobilization after a day's hesitation, France thwarted the English plan to leave Russia alone with the German-Austrian alliance and almost defeated itself. Why is no one talking about this? Yes, we all understand that if Russia were defeated, France would be next. But here, as they say, options are already possible. However, this direction is not interesting for researchers. The cultivated myth is interesting and its purpose is interesting.
The assertion that Russia, which Germany attacked, did not have to participate in the world war, could be attributed to ignorance. Well, how can you not participate in the war if you were declared this war? But not so simple. When they say that Russia did not have to get stuck in the war of England and France against Germany and Austria-Hungary, it means something completely different. The idea that even it was not necessary to try to protect the Serbs from the Austrian attack and generally participate in European affairs is being pushed implicitly. And in this I suspect a conscious and deliberately masked call for historical surrender to the West from the series “We would now drink the Bavarian.”
An implicit but logical chain is being built: it was necessary to capitulate in 1812, and the good Napoleon would abolish serfdom to us. In 1914, it was necessary to capitulate, and instead of revolution, industrialization, flights to Kosomos, they would crunch with a French bun. In 1941, it was necessary to capitulate, and would have drunk on beer. It is necessary to capitulate now to taste cheeses and jamon.
In 2002, the book "Inventing Schlieffen's Plan" was published. Its author is Terence Zuber, a retired US Army military and, judging by the surname, ethnic German. A retelling of the book and, all the more, criticism are beyond the scope of the article. It is easy to find materials for the discussion that was widely unfolding in narrow historical circles. I will limit myself to setting out the essence.
Zuber's key statement is that Schlieffen’s plan did not exist. So, nothing special, non-binding notes of a retiree. In support of the reader presented an extensive evidence base. That is, according to Zuber, the campaign in the West in the summer of 1914 is nothing more than a hasty improvisation of Moltke Jr. in the face of a threat from the east. Hurry, because Germany did not have offensive plans, and for some reason refused to defensively, if any, existed. As a result, Germany was a victim. If she declared the first war, it was solely as a response to Russian mobilization in order to deliver a preemptive strike. The first of the famous historians, the idea of a German victim was put forward by Delbrück, in 1941, Hitler developed it, and now Zuber worked on this field.
It would seem, so what? Did anyone say or write something? But in the 21 century, nothing is done just like that.
What do we get in the end?
The first, early assertion that Nicholas II did not intercede for Serbia at all, but sought to take away the straits from Turkey, makes Germany and Russia the instigators of the war equally.
The second, about French money, directly misinforms people, claiming that the country has entered a foreign war that has already begun. This discourse, by its very existence, denies us the right to participate in European affairs as an independent political force, but only as an executor of someone else's will.
The third statement, about the lack of offensive plans in Germany, completely removes that from the list of organizers of the massacre. She is now a victim, like Austria-Hungary, which, by the way, is generally tried not to be remembered again.
The result for the mass consciousness: Russia, and only Russia, is to blame for starting a world war. Germany and Austria are victims of unprovoked aggression. England and France, because of a falsely understood knightly nobility for Russia, entered into a fratricidal war with kindred peoples. Russia is to blame for everything. And in the subtleties, few will go into.
That's all there is to know about historical myths in order to understand who is planting them and why, and not pay attention to verbal husks.
Myth No. 2. The country's unpreparedness for war
Is unpreparedness for war an objective reality or also a myth, only a military-historical myth? And why are we used to talking about the unpreparedness of Russia alone? And were other countries ready? Who, for example? Strategists of all sides sat in a puddle. And this is an indisputable fact.
The Germans failed with their Schlieffen plan, despite the fact that at first they were successful. They could not defeat the French and free up forces to strike east.
Similarly, Russian strategists were mistaken in the calculations to defeat Austria-Hungary with one blow and free up forces to storm Berlin.
The Austrians did not manage to defeat the Serbs with the Montenegrins and, having thrown troops to the east, deter the Russian army at the border, while the Germans crushed the French.
The French also expected to link the Germans in Alsace in the oncoming battle and wait for the Russian advance.
And many more countries completely overestimated their strengths, deciding that it was their entry into the war on one side or another that would be decisive, that they would receive all the glory, and the allies would owe them their coffin. These are England, Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania.
In the 1914 year, only the Serbs achieved the planned result. They fulfilled their task, completely holding the front. And it is not their fault that Russia was not able to defeat Austria-Hungary by the New Year.
Oh yes, there are still Japanese who picked up the German colonies in China.
That is, no one was ready for the war that occurred in reality, and not in the minds of the generals. And this is taking into account the lesson of the Russo-Japanese War, where all the technical, tactical, and strategic elements appeared, with the exception of the role aviation. If Russia is reproached, it means a lack of industrial potential, which drawback in 1913 was not at all as obvious as in 1915.
From the very first day, all key states have used an attacking strategy. Everyone was going to succeed in the oncoming battle and end the war before the autumn slaughter. Accordingly, from these considerations the very same stockpiles of shells were created. Do not forget, the reserves of shells for weapons in our army were approximately equal to the French, surpassed the Austrian and inferior to the German. However, the Germans were preparing for two wars. First with France, then with Russia. And for each of the wars individually, they stockpiled less shells than we did. It turns out that, in the framework of the chosen strategy, our artillery was provided very well (by 1915, no more than 40% of the ammunition resource was shot). That is, shell hunger was actually organized.
So, the pre-war strategy did not justify itself.
Does this mean that the First World War was doomed to be transformed from maneuverable to trench, in which the one with more powerful industry and more resources wins? Or did someone from the warring parties and countries with a better combination of circumstances or with better governance have a chance of a quick victory?
Germany? Unlikely.
Schlieffen’s plan stalled immediately - on Belgian fortresses. On the move, they couldn’t be taken. True, the obstacle to the blitzkrieg was partially stopped by Ludendorff. He managed to secure the capture of Liège. But there were many similar obstacles, and there weren’t enough Ludendorfs. As it turned out, with all the gloomy beauty, Schlieffen's plan did not have a margin of safety in case of unforeseen circumstances.
Yes, plus creative reworking of the plan by Moltke, Jr., more than once criticized by historians. In addition, the Belgians opposed Schliffen's mathematics to intransigence, and the French - quick maneuver by reserves. And you should not forget that the Schlieffen plan allowed the loss of East Prussia. As long as the Russians were busy in front of the forts of Koenigsberg, Graudin, Thorn, and the Carpathians were stormed, France would have been defeated. In fact, Moltke exchanged a strategic victory near Paris for a tactical victory near Königsberg, preserving the cunk estates, but losing the war.
After the massacre, various recipes for victory were put forward for the Germans. Including our general Svechin. But as far as the Svechinsky alternative was logical and accurate in terms of military strategy, it was just as impracticable in terms of politics. In general, using after-knowledge, it can be argued: for the Axis powers there was no winning strategy.
The strategy of the Entente was that England and France restrain Germany, and Russia smashes Austria-Hungary. Then they press Germany together. And if in Galicia events developed as a whole according to plan, then the North-Western Front was defeated, and the eastern blitzkrieg did not take place. That is, in fact, the Entente war plan turned out to be as unrealizable as the Schlieffen plan. It would seem that all. What to talk about next?
However, for the purity of the experiment, it is worth looking at, and what would happen if the East Prussian operation (without taking into account the alternative option of the outbreak of war) were successful? But first, one must determine whether the North-Western Front really had no chance, or whether the plan of the General Staff was quite viable.
To be continued ...
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