Better than Vityaz. What is the S-300 air defense system capable of with the unique 9M96E anti-ballistic missiles?

52
The object of extremely close attention of the regulars of the national military analytical portals and blogs was a non-interesting photograph taken by photo correspondents of the Red Star publication at the time of the visit of a delegation of the Serbian Air Defense Forces to the Ashuluk training range as part of the joint exercises of the Air Defense Forces of Russia and the Air Defense Forces of Serbia "Slavic shield 2019."





The integration of the 9M96Е / E2 family of interceptor missiles into the arsenals of the S-300ПМ1 anti-aircraft missile systems is the main help in maintaining the combat stability of the Russian Air Force anti-aircraft missile regiments at any theater of operations


In particular, the photo depicted the upgraded self-propelled launcher 5P85CE of the S-300ПМ1 anti-aircraft missile system, equipped not only with standard transport and launch containers for deploying full-time long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles 48Н6Е (about 150 well-built transport and) a module designed to transport and launch the latest medium-range 9M96E interceptor missiles (about 45 km). The photo shows that this 3-cell transport and launch module is located on the attachment points of the standard fourth transport and launch container for the 48Н6E missile system.

This fact indicates that the ammunition load of each self-propelled launcher 5П85CE (or towed 5П85TE) has been increased exactly 1,5 times (three anti-aircraft missiles 48Н6Е and three SAMs 9М96Е respectively), while fourXXX were previously only represented by fourX48. Consequently, the total arsenal of one modernized anti-aircraft missile battalion C-6ПМ300 will be increased from 1 to 48 anti-aircraft missiles, due to which its combat stability will increase markedly, and the process of "depletion" of ammunition will decrease.

Considering the "related" element base (hardware component) of the electronic "stuffing" of the 30Н6Е and 92Н6Е and radar combat control points 54К6Е and 55К6Е, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that the new XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -tak will be integrated into the ammunition as an S-9PM96 air defense system, and in the S-9 Triumph air defense system. Recall that the architecture of the Diamond-Antey “four hundred” from the first days of R&D implementation provided for equipping the complex with super-maneuverable rockets of the 96М2Е / E300 family, but later on, due to “childhood diseases” of an active radar seeker (unstable “capture” of targets on the terminal portion of the trajectory) , the entry into service of these products was characterized by more than 1-year “slip”. In turn, this automatically entailed the postponement of the adoption of the latest multi-channel air defense systems of medium and long-range S-400 Vityaz, as well as ship-based air defense systems Redut, unified with the first 9M96Е / E2 air defense systems.

The corresponding question arises: what spectrum of unique operational-tactical and technological advantages can the updated S-300ПМ1 and С-400 Triumph air defense systems boast in comparison with the early modifications of the systems if the advanced 2019XN launcher announced at the 5 training exercises comes out phases of the concept demonstrator and will begin to replenish regimental sets of “three hundred” and “four hundred”?

While some news journalists, due to their low awareness of the architecture of the S-350 Vityaz airborne guidance system, continue to point to equipping the 9M96Е / E2 family of interceptor missiles with infrared seekers, in reality we are talking about a modern centimeter high-resolution active radar seeker (Ku ) or millimeter (Ka) ranges based on a slot antenna array. Unlike semi-active radar seekers of the 48Н6Е and 48Н6DM anti-aircraft guided missiles, which require continuous illumination from the multifunctional radars 30Н6Е and 92Н6 until the “meeting” with the target, active missile launch systems of the 9X family are capable of scattering near the 96M family with an effective target. m (fighter "Typhoon" with weapons on suspensions) at a distance of about 1,5 — 55 km, after which the need for illumination disappears. Targets of the type “AGM-60 JASSM-ER” (EPR near 158 — 0,08 sq. M) can be “captured” at a distance of 0,1 — 25 km. Consequently, the S-27ПМ300 and С-1 air defense systems equipped with this missile will be able to work on targets "hiding" outside the radio horizon.

It is also known that only JSC Agat Moscow Research Institute has experience in the development, serial production and modernization of these types of active radar seekers. And this means that the 9M96Е / E2 anti-aircraft missile homing head is one of the modifications of the ARGSN Slate, partially unified with the 9M317M anti-aircraft missiles that are part of the Buk-M3 air defense systems. According to official data published in the online directory rbase.new-factoria.ru with reference to the Agat Research Institute, this homing head is able to receive target designation from a wide range of third-party sources of radar, radio-technical and optoelectronic reconnaissance (including Bumblebee radar systems) Aircraft AWACS A-50U, H011M Bars-R airborne radars of Su-30СM fighters, Sych family of airborne systems, as well as shipborne and ground-based surveillance radars).

Conclusion: equipped with 9M96E / E2 interceptor missiles, the S-300 and S-400 complexes will be able to strike even those enemy air attack weapons that have a low-altitude trajectory throughout the entire flight and do not "emerge" because of the radio horizon, revealing their location for divisional guidance radars 30N6E or 92N6E. This quality will be a key bonus of the updated "three hundred" in the case of massive missileaviation attacks from the enemy.

Another indisputable advantage of the new missiles in comparison with the standard 48Н6Е and 48Н6DM is the presence of a two-tier "gas dynamic belt" of transverse control engines (DPU) located in the center of mass of the rocket, the advantages of which we have repeatedly listed in our previous reviews. In contrast to the standard developed aerodynamic rudders and the gas-assisted air-breathing system, which provide a longer (“viscous”) reversal of the SAM in pitch and yaw planes, the “belt” of the anti-aircraft missile, creating an impressive transverse moment of force, provides instant throws of the missile interceptor on the trajectory with overloads from 60 to 70G, which allows you to intercept aerodynamic and ballistic objects maneuvering with 30-35G overloads and destroy them using the hit-to-kill direct hit method. Thus, the missile defense potential of the upgraded S-300ПМ1 air defense systems can reach the level of the latest C-350 "Vityaz", "Patriot PAC-3 MSE" and SAMP-T missile systems.

But there is also such a parameter, according to which the basic ammunition of the S-300PM1 complex can give odds even to promising Vityaz. It's about the speed characteristics of the long-range anti-aircraft missile 48Н6Е. Its flight speed on the marching and initial sections of the trajectory reaches 5 — 6,6M, respectively, while the speed of the 9M96Е / E2 interceptor missiles barely approaches the figure in 3,2 — 4М. It is logical to assume that the preservation of full-fledged heavy anti-aircraft missiles with the 48Н6Е index in the ammunition kits will make it possible to intercept enemy strikes that remove high-speed targets after 30-100 distances of km or more.

The presence of this quality can become critical if the enemy carried out a massive missile attack on the defended object using several dozen 5-swing air ballistic missiles “Deep Strike” or high-speed supersonic missiles such as ASN4G, and the C-300 covering division did not manage to intercept all attacking counter course missiles using the slower 9M96E missiles. Good old 48Н6Е safely compensate for this drawback.
52 comments
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  1. +5
    17 September 2019 15: 14
    Well written. Clear, accessible and without lyrics.
    1. +2
      17 September 2019 21: 47
      Quote: Aron Zaavi
      Well written. Clear, accessible and without lyrics.

      It's like this without lyrics, Damantsev doesn’t do that !! belay
      if the enemy carried out a massive missile attack on the defended object using several tens of 5-stroke Deep Strike aero-ballistic missiles or ASN4G high-speed supersonic missiles, and the S-300 covering division did not manage to intercept all attacking missiles in the opposite direction

      Is this your white verse ?? laughing
      1. 0
        18 September 2019 12: 01
        I liked the article. Eugene softened his style a little laughing and reading became easier. The very essence expressed in the title may be controversial but interesting. It turns out that the potential for modernization at pm1 has not yet been exhausted, and after all, dofiga, given the modernization of pm
  2. +8
    17 September 2019 15: 21
    Conclusion - modernization is a great way to give the old complex new qualities.
  3. +11
    17 September 2019 15: 55
    In particular, the photo depicted the upgraded self-propelled launcher 5P85CE of the S-300ПМ1 anti-aircraft missile system, equipped not only with standard transport and launch containers for deploying full-time long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles 48Н6Е (about 150 well-built transport and) a module designed to transport and launch the latest medium-range 9M96E interceptor missiles (about 45 km). The photo shows that this 3-cell transport and launch module is located on the attachment points of the standard fourth transport and launch container for the 48Н6E missile system.

    Of course, I wildly apologize, but in the photo the PUs are clearly visible four TPK.
    1. +3
      17 September 2019 17: 23
      Quote: Alexey RA
      Of course, I wildly apologize, but four TPKs are clearly visible in the photo of the PU.

      In fact, when the messages began to "connect" the S-300/400 and the zur 9M96E / E2, the "speech" was from the very beginning about quadruple installing 9M96 in place of the TPK 48Н6 ...
  4. -5
    17 September 2019 16: 07
    After 50 years, the air defense finally realized that it makes no sense to shoot anti-aircraft missiles outside the radar horizon laughing
    1. +12
      17 September 2019 16: 29
      Quote: Operator
      After 50 years, the air defense finally realized that it makes no sense to shoot anti-aircraft missiles outside the radar horizon laughing

      On the contrary, after 50 years, the air defense officers finally got the opportunity not only to shoot at targets behind the radio horizon of the division radar, but also to hit at these targets. smile

      PMSM, the whole ambush was in the ARLGSN, which should capture the target and lead it against the background of the earth. The very concept of a missile with an ARLGSN and radio correction of the trajectory when the missile was brought into the target capture zone was worked out already in the early 90s - however, not for air defense, but for the Air Force, on an air-to-air missile RVV-AE.
      1. 0
        17 September 2019 16: 32
        How can I shoot at a target that doesn’t - that is, it does not see the radar?
        1. 0
          17 September 2019 17: 02
          But the information may come from another source.
          1. -2
            17 September 2019 17: 10
            And who said that the radar should be ground?

            It’s another matter that the C-300 / 400 radars have ground-based radars, so they do not need long-range anti-aircraft missiles in FIGs — they will completely cost short-range missiles until the UAVs are riveted.
        2. +12
          17 September 2019 17: 39
          Quote: Operator
          How can I shoot at a target that doesn’t - that is, it does not see the radar?

          The target does not see only the radar of the firing division. Other radars (RTB, AWACS) are observing the target.
          In the presence of SAM with ARLGSN + radio correction of the trajectory and external data from other radars that see the target, it is quite possible to shoot at the target. The main thing is to bring the missile launchers into the area by radio commands, in which its GOS, when turned on, will capture the target. In this case, the divisional radar itself may not see the target itself - the position of the target is determined according to data from external sources. The main thing is for a divisional radar to see a missile: to generate correction signals, you need to know the position of the SAM and be able to transmit these signals to it. And since the GOS in the missiles is active, then the divisional radar does not need to see the target for illumination.
          Moreover, the accuracy of the radio command correction of the missile defense path with ARLGS when outputting to the GOS turn-on area can be much less than the accuracy required for missiles with PARLGS when operating on target. Just because in the first case, the errors of the RCTUs will be compensated by the active guidance of the missiles to the target in the last section.
          1. 0
            18 September 2019 09: 43
            Add.
            You need to understand the principles of building air defense facilities (even without taking into account the terrain)
            The best option is to repeatedly overlap the zone with MULTIPLE air defense systems.
            But even if we take S-300/400 air defense systems, then the sectors ALWAYS go with overlapping so that the retirement of one division does not open a gap in defense. Ideally, each sector of an air defense zone should be fired by 3 divisions.

            Accordingly, it is logical that one of the two neighboring divisions can see the target, and the other does not. But since The division that sees the target is busy shooting at other targets, then it can transmit data to direct the missile to a neighbor.

            And this is only the simplest situation.
            1. -4
              18 September 2019 10: 46
              Where did you see the overlapping of the zone by several S-300 / 400 air defense systems (except in textbooks)? laughing

              And yes - how will overlapping help detect air targets outside the radio horizon?
              1. +2
                18 September 2019 11: 11
                LenVO. Moscow.
                Shooting at the knoll is also useful.
                1. -3
                  18 September 2019 15: 30
                  Mathias Rust disagrees with you.
                  1. +1
                    18 September 2019 15: 42
                    Firstly, Rust was not shot down for a simple reason - there was no order. And so he was led from the border itself. It should be noted that the responsible comrades sat down for this (two, if I remember correctly).
                    It should be noted that the division commander cannot open fire without a command in peacetime without an order.

                    Secondly, it was a long time ago and then the S-300 missile range was only 75 km maximum.
                    It should be noted that it was conducted not only by air defense systems, but also by air defense aircraft.
                    1. -3
                      18 September 2019 16: 09
                      The trick is that they drove Rust only when approaching the USSR’s territodes in the area of ​​Tallinn Naval Forces. Immediately after crossing the state border, his plane was identified as an alien fighter of the air defense forces, but the fighter jumped past Rust at high speed and lost contact with him.

                      Further, the Rust plane on the route was fixed several times as an unidentified air target using surveillance radars, but the overwhelming part of Rust's flight passed outside radar and visual control by the air defense forces of the Leningrad and Moscow districts.

                      In fact, Rust could be shot down only once - after the report of the fighter pilot on the recognition of the aircraft as a stranger. The decision of the command of the Tallinn Air Defense Zone was a few minutes, it was decided to transfer the aircraft to escort the allies - the air defense zone of the Leningrad District. But at this point, Rust sank below the radio horizon and they stopped seeing him. But other means of surveillance radar other than ground at the USSR air defense was not.

                      So the command of the air defense forces was guilty of only one thing - that for many years it brazenly lied to the political leadership of the USSR about the supposedly continuous radar field on the outskirts of Moscow.
                      1. +1
                        18 September 2019 16: 39
                        This is not entirely true.
                        Here is a flight statement.
                        https://www.drive2.ru/b/2019498/
                        It says that both the 6th Air Defense Army (including covering Leningrad) and the Moscow Air Defense aircraft conducted.

                        But on the one hand, the absence of an order, and on the other, the uncoordinated actions of individual air defense commanders led to the fact that Rust was missed.

                        And this does not negate the fact that the actual radar field was.
                      2. -2
                        18 September 2019 16: 47
                        Quote: alstr
                        the radar field was

                        Solid or at 3%?
                      3. 0
                        18 September 2019 22: 47
                        Around Peter and Moscow was continuous.
                      4. 0
                        22 September 2019 00: 26
                        Quote: alstr
                        Around Peter and Moscow was continuous.

                        At what height?
                  2. +1
                    18 September 2019 15: 49
                    And about the double overlap. In 97, the air defense of St. Petersburg consisted of 4 brigades of 6 divisions (a brigade of 2 regiments with 3 divisions).
                    This is only the S-300. Still there were forces of the Fleet, aircraft, S-200 (there were still some places) and smaller air defense systems. Plus aviation.
              2. +3
                18 September 2019 11: 18
                Quote: Operator
                Where did you see the overlapping of the zone by several S-300 / 400 air defense systems (except in textbooks)?

                Quote: alstr
                LenVO. Moscow.


                Moscow is certainly the most striking example, but in our country there are other areas covered by S-300 / 400 air defense systems, where individual divisions overlap each other's zones of destruction.
    2. -3
      17 September 2019 17: 15
      What is the meaning of this comment, how do you generally understand what you wrote?
      1. -3
        17 September 2019 17: 24
        Long-range anti-aircraft missiles should come with a radar for detecting low-flying long-range targets.
        1. +5
          17 September 2019 17: 32
          Low-flying targets can be hit using the backlight with AWACS or even fighters (there are no technical limitations). Ideally, a UAV with a radar is best suited.

          If the complex has restrictions on the radio horizon, this does not mean that it does not need long-range missiles. For example, long-range missiles can shoot down AWACS, reconnaissance UAVs, which are assigned the task of high-altitude reconnaissance, and all aviation of a potential enemy will automatically be forced to fly under the radio horizon, which "turns off" the possibility of using almost all "gliding" bombs, which forces the enemy put turbojet engines on them, and this multiplies the cost of such missiles.
          1. -2
            17 September 2019 17: 39
            One long-range anti-aircraft missile per air defense division is enough to prevent AWACS from boring.

            But the main objective of the air defense division will be low-flying targets (strike UAVs, KR and tactical aircraft), so it needs short-range anti-aircraft missiles like air within the radio horizon of ground-based radars.

            When UAV-DRLOs appear, the situation will change, but not earlier.
            1. +2
              18 September 2019 09: 44
              The rate of fire on AWACS aircraft / jammers - 3 missiles.
          2. +2
            17 September 2019 18: 07
            Quote: Nikolai Semirechensky
            Low-flying targets can be hit using the backlight with AWACS or even fighters (there are no technical limitations).

            In the presence of SAML ARLGSN backlight is not needed. All that is needed is data on the current coordinates and speed of the target, transmitted to the firing division. And there let the car think:
            - where is the area at the exit in which the missile launcher will capture the target when the ARLGSN is turned on;
            - what commands should be given to the missile launcher so that it reaches this area, taking into account the fact that the position of this area changes with every change in the parameters of the target’s movement.
            In short, the air defense missile system needs to hit the missile's "thread" into the running "eye of the needle" of the target capture area. And the better the characteristics of ARLGSN, the larger the size of this "ear". smile
            1. 0
              18 September 2019 12: 43
              SAM with ARGSN will cost like gold. There are stories in the network that the cost of one 9m96 rocket is approximately 2 million Amer preziks, which is more expensive than any American cruise missile (at purchasing power parity, of course). We need a cheap and massive air-to-ground missile, and we need radar on an UAV. ARGSN is not useless, for example, on long-range missiles it is the most, but not at short range - it is a palliative.
        2. +3
          17 September 2019 17: 58
          Quote: Operator
          Long-range anti-aircraft missiles should come with a radar for detecting low-flying long-range targets.

          Native radar 76N6 complete with a 39-meter tower 40V6M.
          If we want to see NLC further, then only AWACS. Or you have to put forward the radar close to the line of contact, which is fraught (either the PRPs will crash, or harmful flights will arrive).
          1. -2
            17 September 2019 19: 36
            39 meters (radar altitude) + 39 meters (altitude of the target) = 160 km of the radio horizon. Then why increase the range of anti-aircraft missiles?

            The anti-radar missile will disable the tower, and the air defense missile division has no spare - again, "I'm sitting, kuru" (C).

            Therefore, until the UAV-AWACS is included in the ZRK-400/500, the most demanded anti-aircraft missiles will be "nails" from the Pantsir-SM air defense missile system.
            1. +2
              17 September 2019 19: 39
              Quote: Operator
              39 meters (radar altitude) + 39 meters (altitude of the target) = 160 km of the radio horizon. Then why increase the range of anti-aircraft missiles?

              To bring down the reasons - carriers of URO. And do not deal with the consequences in the form of UAB, RV-Z and other unpleasant things with small ESR and large quantities.
              1. -3
                17 September 2019 19: 42
                I don’t mind - only the priority in the development of air defense systems should be done on the UAV-DRLO.
            2. 0
              18 September 2019 09: 48
              Then, that there are a couple of nuances:
              1. standard deployment / collapse standard towers (this is 25 m) - two hours.
              2. To raise the cabin to a 40 m tower, you need a crane. And upon the fact of the experiment, the people suffered all day.
            3. PPD
              -1
              18 September 2019 11: 23
              Tell me, how do you imagine these
              UAV-DRLO
              can you imagine?
              In the radar stations there are also people "included". And it is not at all casual.
              With all the "automations". Maybe this is the future, but definitely not close.
              This miracle should: find a target, identify, process the data, transmit it to the air defense system, fly on its own, deal with interference, sit down on its own - with horror we guess the price of the "issue". etc.
              1. -1
                18 September 2019 12: 51
                You won’t believe it, but on radar fighters they themselves discover the targets, determine their type themselves, and a person takes part in this only by making a decision about the attack. Install the radar from AFAR to some Altair, and put it in a circle on a certain route. Yes, perhaps the radar power on such a device will not be as large as, for example, on the Su-57. But he does not need to see targets at a distance of +350 kilometers. It is necessary to cover the dead sectors of air defense, at a distance of 150-200 km. It is within his power.
                Yes, operators will be needed for such UAVs, but this is also not a problem.
                1. PPD
                  -1
                  18 September 2019 13: 20
                  They say in such cases it is better not to smile.
                  Yes Yes.
              2. 0
                18 September 2019 15: 29
                This miracle is called Su-57 radar.
  5. 0
    17 September 2019 16: 42
    Good article.

    Impressed by an integrated approach and extensive modernization. Instead of one missile, a pair of missiles of different ranges, plus interaction with aviation in terms of aiming at a target. Let them slow down for 7 years, but the trend makes me happy. It is very pleasant to read such articles - not everything in our country is bad.
  6. +1
    17 September 2019 17: 25
    I wrote about this earlier and I will write again: the work of air defense on missiles fired using missiles based on ARGSN is a deliberate dead end. ARGSN is nothing more than a full-fledged radar, with its own illumination and signal processing equipment, in the form of "giblets" (processor, etc.). The only reason this missile will be justified is in order to prevent the "overflow" of the air defense missile system due to the insufficient guidance channels of the air defense missile system. To do this for complexes of the S-400 type is daunting; for more obsolete air defense systems, in theory, it is possible. In practice, a missile with ARGSN and a range of 45 km is meaningless - you need to shoot down the carriers!

    For air defense systems, there are two problems: the first is the channel / number of missiles on the battery / division, the second is the radio horizon. The first problem is solved by improving the interaction of the Air Force and Air Defense, by integrating their control and information exchange systems (network-centricity) and building up a fleet of fighter aircraft, the second problem is solved by using UAVs that can stay on duty over the complex for days, eliminating the problem of air defense dead zones. 9M96E missile does not solve either one.
    1. PPD
      0
      18 September 2019 11: 33
      There is no dead end here, the active head unfolds in the last section - 4 seconds before the target is hit. That is what Damantsev calls the "bourgeois" term "terminal section". So the active head is just a plus. But besides, we need a STS.
      Well, shooting down carriers is for aviation.
      Wundervaflu has not yet been invented. The Commonwealth of Forces is the path to victory.
  7. +1
    17 September 2019 17: 42
    While some news journalists, due to their low awareness of the architecture of the S-350 Vityaz airborne guidance system, continue to point to equipping the 9X96E / E2 family of interceptors infrared seeker, Never did "some news reporters" mention IK.GSN in 9M96 missiles! IK.GSN was "attributed" to the 9M100 missile! By the way, the "shape" of the bow of the 9M100 raises doubts about the presence of an infrared seeker! But there is also no information about the availability of AR.GSN for 9M100! There are even statements about the absence of a seeker in the 9M100 rocket ... the presence of a radio command guidance system of the "Torah" type is assumed ... Personally, I am not so categorical about the lack of a 9M100 seeker "vobche" ... I do not exclude that in this the missile will be used by the GOS, for example, based on the AR.GSN RVV R-77 ...
  8. +2
    17 September 2019 21: 08
    Quote: Alexey RA
    In particular, the photo depicted the upgraded self-propelled launcher 5P85CE of the S-300ПМ1 anti-aircraft missile system, equipped not only with standard transport and launch containers for deploying full-time long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles 48Н6Е (about 150 well-built transport and) a module designed to transport and launch the latest medium-range 9M96E interceptor missiles (about 45 km). The photo shows that this 3-cell transport and launch module is located on the attachment points of the standard fourth transport and launch container for the 48Н6E missile system.

    Of course, I wildly apologize, but in the photo the PUs are clearly visible four TPK.

    Sorry, Alex, but you see 4 TPKs. And Evgeny Damantsev sees only THREE. And he already has 9M96 medium-range anti-aircraft missiles that have already become interceptor missiles, which implies that they have become anti-missiles ...
    1. +5
      17 September 2019 21: 36
      I apologize! Indeed, a quad transport launch module. Allowed a flaw ...
  9. 0
    18 September 2019 08: 52
    Here is an important clarification https://naked-science.ru/article/tech/eksperty-obratili-vnimanie-na
  10. 0
    18 September 2019 12: 22
    He told everything cool, but where is "Vityaz" himself?
    Here they give the material !!!!




    So at least you can evaluate!
  11. 0
    18 September 2019 12: 23
    In fact, this picture is not surprising to me.
    Back in 97, at the military department, we announced such missiles.
    Anyway, the S-300/400 line initially included missile upgrade capabilities.
    If the radar pulls, then you can flash any rocket in the software. The only point is the advisability of this.

    Therefore, theoretically, if the software allows (possibly with some restrictions), then the missiles are compatible with the entire line of complexes of type C.
  12. The comment was deleted.
  13. 0
    19 September 2019 13: 24
    It’s good that our missile defense, including from low-flying missiles, is now fully echeloned.
  14. 0
    20 September 2019 10: 48
    There are so many posts calling for the use of UAVs for reconnaissance of air targets in combination with air defense systems, which is hardly feasible in the next decade. Why only no one offers to radar antenna posts on airships. He hung such a thing on a kapron cable at a height of several hundred meters and significantly increased the detection range.
  15. 0
    22 September 2019 23: 45
    Damantsev is concrete and concise as never before! Thank!