Caspian map of the United States and NATO against Russia and Iran
US policy in the Caspian Sea basin is aimed at dominating the region, exacerbating contradictions and creating an anti-Iranian and anti-Russian military-strategic springboard.
It is also important that three of the five Caspian states - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan - are the most difficult northern border of the Greater Middle East (BWI), within the framework of the “grand” strategy of the Great BWI from the North Africa to Kazakhstan and India inclusive, coinciding with the Centcom - the Central Command of the US Armed Forces.
Although Russia and Iran are pursuing their own national interests and priorities in the Caspian zone, mutual coordination of actions would be beneficial to both countries. Control over a significant part of world energy resources and a favorable strategic position allow Iran to actively compete with Russia: Iran is the only one of the five states of the Caspian basin (the rest are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) that has direct access to the Indian Ocean, which gives it advantages over Turkey and Russia when transporting energy from the Caspian. Iran has the longest coastline in the Persian and Omani Gulfs, and the most practical route to the open seas and the only land road to the Arab world runs through its territory. Iran has easy access to China and the Far East through Central Asia, which allows to restore historical "Silk Road" with the connection of the South Caucasian and Central Asian states. Economic rivalry in the Caspian region is unfolding mainly due to control over its oil-bearing regions and transport corridors. Iran, like Russia, is interested in economic and political stability in the Caspian region of the post-Soviet space.
In general, Iran’s approaches to the security problem in the Caspian region are determined by the objectives of its long-term strategy in the region: a desire to counteract nationalist sentiments on both sides of the Iranian-Azerbaijani border in order to avoid the threat of separatism in the Iranian north-western provinces inhabited by Azerbaijanis; search for new markets for Iranian goods and the application of capital, bypassing the US policy of international isolation of Iran; using its advantageous geographical position to ensure that communications, oil and gas and transport flows pass through its territory.
The arrival of foreign companies in the Caspian Sea (English and American directly or indirectly own 27% of oil and 40% of gas reserves here) and non-regional players (the United States in the first place) only spurred the arms race that has begun long ago. While the availability of military equipment and flotilla Russia remains the leader in the Caspian. Its 15-strong Caspian naval flotilla includes a surface ship brigade, security ship brigade, support vessel brigade, search and rescue operations department, hydrographic vessel division, ekranoplanes air group and marines guard brigade. Russia plans to improve the air cover of the Caspian Naval Theater by equipping it, in addition to existing facilities, with new S-300 anti-aircraft systems. Iran also headed for a sharp increase in its military presence (1,5 times) in the Caspian, transferring its naval forces from the Persian Gulf there. In 2003, a new development program for the Iranian National Tanker Company was adopted: it provides for the construction of a series of tankers at local shipyards and the creation of an Iranian tanker fleet in the Caspian.
The position of Russia, like Iran, regarding the problem of militarization of the Caspian remains unchanged. Both states proceed from the premise: since the Caspian Sea is an inland sea of coastal countries, the protection of sea borders is the prerogative of these states themselves, which do not need the services of third countries.
In general, the process of militarization of the region adjacent to the Caspian Sea is developing against a very bad background. First, the Caspian littoral states are still unable to agree on the legal status of the sea, which makes it impossible to establish uniform rules for the game here. Secondly, between some of them, tensions in bilateral relations have not been relieved. Thirdly, the situation is aggravated by non-regional powers and TNCs: controlling the major oil projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, they claim a special role in this region.
Security is a fairly complex phenomenon, not limited only to the military sphere. It includes political, economic, informational and ideological components, it has a human dimension. Therefore, there are a number of possible areas of cooperation between Iran and Russia that can be aimed at achieving stability in the region: environmental protection, joint projects to clean the Caspian Sea from industrial pollution, etc. Moscow is convinced that excluding Iran from regional processes would be counterproductive - like from the point of view of the prospects of political stabilization, in which Russia is interested, and in view of the development of integration processes in this new strategic space. Russia and Iran, despite some similarity of approaches to safe development in the Caspian zone, pursue their own national interests and priorities, which will not necessarily coincide in all respects. That is why the coordination of Iran’s actions with Russia, which remains, despite the current weakening, an influential military-political force in the region, would benefit both parties.
The Islamic Republic of Iran remains a rebellious power in the emerging Greater Middle East. Accordingly, the actions of the United States in relation to Iran on the territory of the BWI are determined by the well-known “anaconda” principle: the total encirclement of Iran and its subsequent strangulation. The task of creating the Caspian buffer zone between Iran and Russia is to constantly divide them, drive, figuratively speaking, a wedge between them through the strategically important and extremely sensitive sea space of the Caspian Sea.
Obviously: the rupture of the Russia-Iran ligament itself is of fundamental importance for securing the non-regional powers a dominant position in the Caspian.
Two other American projects of artificial design of new macroregions are intended to break this bundle: Greater Central Asia and the Caspian-Black Sea region, which cut off Russia and Iran from each other in the transverse direction simultaneously to the right and left.
The US Department of State's published report to the Congress on budgetary financing of military operations abroad in 2012 caused a surge in interest in the problem of militarizing the Caspian Sea and became evidence of a systematic US action on organizing a naval outpost against Iran. According to the report, Washington, in view of the "growing importance of the security of the Caspian Sea in this oil-and-gas-rich region," intends to contain Iran and the Russian Federation, arming their neighbors (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) in the Caspian Sea. It is obvious that we are already talking not only about the flat militarization of the region, but also about putting together the Caspian military bloc led by the United States in the future.
Thus, with regard to Azerbaijan, the most advanced in naval affairs, it is noted that “the United States will continue to work with the Azerbaijani Navy to increase the security of the Caspian Sea, develop professional military education, expand opportunities to participate in joint peacekeeping operations and promote progress towards compatibility with NATO ... "In the future, Washington believes that Azerbaijan will be involved in the NATO bloc. Already, with the help of the United States, Azerbaijan has created a special-purpose naval unit. It is expected that the armament of this part will soon be replenished with special means of production of the NATO countries. In any case, instructors of the US Navy SEAL sabotage and intelligence units work in this center. The Coast Guard of Azerbaijan (which, perhaps, is a more developed structure than the fleet) includes the S-201 patrol boat (a former Coast Guard boat of the Point type), two small American patrol boats S-11 and S-12 of the Silver Ship type. Azerbaijan also has US-made RIB-36 boats for the transfer of special forces.
US intends to help Kazakhstan in modernization of maritime aviationin particular, US-made helicopters (Huey II) already in its arsenal, which should “increase the capabilities of the Kazakh military in protecting important energy infrastructure facilities and in responding to threats to Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea.” Earlier in 2010, the United States donated four landing boats to Kazakhstan free of charge under the five-year cooperation plan between the defense ministries of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States. Earlier, in 2005, in Aktau, the official transfer of three American 42-foot Defender type boats built by Safe Boat International was held. In addition, in 2006, South Korea handed over to the Naval Forces of Kazakhstan three patrol ships (patrol boats of the Sea Dolphin type) with a displacement of 150 tons. In fact, the history of modern naval forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan began in 2006.
It is possible that the United States also indirectly participates in the modernization of the Kazakh Navy through joint Kazakh-Azerbaijani programs. Thus, in 2008, the military leadership of Kazakhstan reached an agreement on the training of personnel of the marine special forces of Kazakhstan on the basis of the reconnaissance and sabotage center of the Azerbaijani Navy.
In Turkmenistan, just starting to turn into a state with the Navy, Washington plans to organize training for local sailors in English as part of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In addition, "US assistance will be aimed at helping to strengthen the nascent Turkmen naval capabilities that will contribute to security in the Caspian Sea." In general, at the expense of the Foreign Military Financing Program (Foreign Military Financing - FMF) and in-country training in English, the United States is counting on further expansion of cooperation.
Iran, like Russia, in its policy towards the states of the region takes into account the degree of their involvement in unfriendly blocs, partnerships and alliances. Russia and Iran are interested in creating a counterweight to Turkey, which claims to increase its regional role; Both states are also concerned about the US attempts to establish itself in the Caspian as the sole superpower. Iran sees a threat to its security as Washington’s involvement of the states of the region in a campaign to limit Iran’s ability to increase its defense capability, and Russia cannot but be disturbed by the threat of NATO penetration into the southern CIS states, which it considers to be its priority interests.
Materials used:
http://ruleaks.net/2430
http://bs-kavkaz.org/2012/07/kaspijskiy-vektor-irano-rossijskogo-vzaimodejstvia/
http://analitika.az/articles.php?item_id=20120704083522326&sec_id=9
http://bs-kavkaz.org/2012/07/kaspijskaja-karta-usa-i-nato-protiv-rossii-i-irana/
http://ruleaks.net/706
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