Unfiled network capabilities of Su-30СМ and Su-35С. Is there a chance to catch up with a bunch of F-35A and IBCS?

50
The reason for the next high-profile and pathos PR campaign of Lockheed Martin Corporation in the West European and American media spaces was the uninteresting details of the US Air Force’s Orange Flag Evaluation 19-2 exercises held in June at 2019 training grounds near Palmdale (California) and El- Paso (Texas, at Fort Bliss Military Base). According to defensenews.com and competent sources at Lockheed Martin headquarters, the highlight and key element of these exercises is the multi-functional X-NUMX F-5A Lightning II fighter, which demonstrated the ability to transmit tactical airborne information the situation at the ground command post of the IBCS (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System) integrated control system for anti-aircraft missile systems.





The concept of using tactical fighters as a "mini AWACS" will provide greater flexibility and survivability of air defense systems in modern theater of operations


In this case, we are talking about using F-35A as an inconspicuous aerial platform for radar and optoelectronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation, which scans missile-hazardous low-altitude airspace areas (inaccessible for "monitoring" by AN / TPS-75 and AN / MPQ- radars 53 / 65) for the appearance of tactical missiles, small UAVs and other means of air attack, using its own anti-interference radar AN / APG-81 and the optical-electronic sighting system EOTS. Information packets with the coordinates of the detected targets are immediately transmitted via the secure Link-16 or MADL radio channels to the operator terminals of the IBCS CP system, where further target distribution between the Patriot PAC-3 anti-aircraft missile batteries takes place.

Undoubtedly, this concept of using the F-35A fighter as the “mini AWACS”, which provides for the early interception of low-altitude cruise missiles of the enemy beyond the radio horizon, can significantly increase the combat stability of the Patriot PAC-3 air defense system during massive missile attacks by the enemy, as well as minimize damage caused to concealed strategic targets. At the same time, the Patriot’s battery participating in the cover will not need to use the E-3C / G “Sentry”, which is less operational and more vulnerable to enemy air defense systems, which in a certain tactical situation will save the lives of pilots and operators of heavy and clumsy AWACS.

Despite the fact that Scott Arnold, deputy president of Lockheed for integrated air defense and missile defense, and Dan Verville, general manager of Northrop Grumman, described this concept as “a new word in the functioning of the network-centric defensive systems of the US Armed Forces”, significant developments in this area were tested by specialists from the military-industrial corporations Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, as well as representatives of the US Navy back in September 2016. We are talking about the successful training interception of a Beechcraft MQM-107 aerial target located outside the radio horizon using an ultra-long-range anti-aircraft guided missile RIM-174 ERAM (SM-6) launched from the LLS-1 USS Desert Ship specialized ground-based launch system (stationary ground version) launcher Mk 41). Target designation for this missile was not issued by the ground-based illumination radar, but by the airborne radar AN / APG-81 of the F-35A fighter.


Launch of the SM-6 anti-aircraft missile from the LLS-1 USS Desert Ship specialized ground-based launch system


The following question arises: do tactical aviation and the Russian Aerospace Forces anti-aircraft missile troops using hardware and software that ensure the use of the Su-30SM / 1, Su-35S and Su-57 multi-functional fighters as full-fledged AWACS and airborne platforms, capable of providing comprehensive air defense calculations to air defense systems without involving A- 50U?

The final answer to this question can not be given by any expert community, not to mention the ordinary military-analytical publications of Runet. Nevertheless, one thing is certain - there is a reserve, and it is very significant.

The potential is hidden in the on-board communication terminals K-DlAE and airfield complexes NKVS-27


So, for example, the Su-27СМ / СМ3, Su-30М2, Su-30СМ and Su-35С multipurpose fighters, representing the most numerous “backbone” of the VKS tactical fleet, have K-DLAE, K- terminals for coded voice communications and exchange of tactical information DLUE and K-DLI operating in the frequency range from 0,96 to 1,215 GHz. At the same time, radio channels are used, protected by both the Reed-Solomon code and frequency tuning, which puts these communications equipment almost on a par with the terminals of the American Link-16 network. And most importantly, in all this stories the fact that NKVS-27 aerodrome complexes developed by the Polet scientific-production enterprise and which are simplified domestic analogues of the American IBCS system are used as ground communication stations with these terminals. This is where the whole snag lies.



The modernization of the element base of the NKVS-27 airdrome systems, consisting in the introduction of specialized data exchange buses, is fully capable of ensuring synchronization of Su family fighters with the automated control systems of the Baikal-1M and Polyana anti-aircraft missile brigades already in service -X4M1. " They will relay the target designation from the Su-30СМ and Su-35С airborne sensors to the workplaces of the S-300В4 and S-350 Vityaz and S-400 Triumph air defense systems. It remains only to find out whether work is underway to interface the NKVS-27 airfield stations with Baikals and Polyany.
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

50 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. -3
    August 8 2019
    It remains only to find out whether work is underway to pair the airfield stations NKVS-27 with Baikals and Polyany.

    It is not necessary, who needs it knows, and so:
    - Chatterbox - a find for the spy!)
    1. +9
      August 8 2019
      How tired of such comrades, in every sentence about "secrecy", "who needs it, he knows" !!
      With such success, we will soon degenerate into news like:
      "In part A located in city B, Private C completed elements of combat training with honors on the new secret weapon E"
      Do not know what to say - be silent. And all the secret things will never fall into the open debate.
      1. 0
        August 8 2019
        So let's hope that all the secret things will never get publicly available to the readers of "Murzilka" for adults but ... boys!
      2. -2
        August 11 2019
        The author is well done, the article is gorgeous, that's just too much optimism, he wants to believe ... But there is nothing ....
    2. -4
      August 10 2019
      You don’t even understand what is at stake ... The author of the article gives out the wish for the possible real ... We do not have such opportunities, and are not expected ... You can portray something, but for a separate task ... We do not have system possibilities, we don’t even have the concept of network-centric systems at all ... We won’t pull them, they are vulnerable to electronic warfare systems and therefore we don’t need them ... Here is our advanced concept ...
      1. +2
        August 13 2019
        Read about the Mig-31 and its radar - this is the first aircraft in the world that was connected by a special channel to air defense systems, and also had communication with other aircraft in the field of view of the system. I think this topic continues ...
    3. -3
      August 10 2019
      There is no chance and do not dream ....
      1. +1
        August 13 2019
        Well, yes, there was no Barrier on the Mig-31, the command center was not issued ...
        But isn’t this the task discussed in the article?
        And what's the difference, on the ground or in the air is a receiver of information.
        Again, does the A-50 exist?
        Or from it the secondary does not get to Baikal?
        Unlike the American concept of network-centrism, where everyone passes information to everyone, we have the concept of centralized management.
        And far from the fact that it is worse.
        In any case, more realizable and reliable.
        1. -2
          August 13 2019
          Well, you are clearly fantasizing ...
          Unlike the American concept of network-centrism, where everyone passes information to everyone, we have the concept of centralized management.

          They have one and the other together, it’s obvious ... But we do not have anything similar except in air defense ... And sort out the network-centric approach, at least read the Wiki .... And you’re talking about such nonsense!
  2. +3
    August 8 2019
    the article is actually about what we don’t have, but it could be, in general, a dream
    1. 0
      August 9 2019
      Quote: _Ugene_
      the article is actually about what we don’t have, but it could be, in general, a dream

      That's just about anything, not a great strategist, but I can hardly imagine that some kind of fu-35 will impressively be in our air layers and pass the info right and left, the detection station will work for 300 km and its diapers are already full, I think 3 seconds he will think.
      1. -5
        August 10 2019
        Yes, imagine, and we are in the full task, looking for an asymmetric answer ...
    2. -5
      August 10 2019
      We do not have this, and cannot be, we cannot do this and therefore we do not need it ...
  3. +4
    August 8 2019
    It remains only to find out whether work is underway to pair the airfield stations NKVS-27 with Baikals and Polyany.
    ... Do you sell "Slavic wardrobe?"
    1. +1
      August 9 2019
      Alas, an ordinary wardrobe with "skeletons" is on sale! wassat
  4. +3
    August 8 2019
    Unfortunately, Eugene once again undertakes to write about what he absolutely does not understand. negative In general, another "Damantsevschina" wassat
  5. +1
    August 8 2019
    In my opinion, this is a simple show of Lockheed, to beat the price of the plane and yourself. Like: "These are the geniuses we are, what a wonderful plane we made ... Praise us and carry us on your hands."
    On the MiG-31 there is such a function as a mini AWACS. I suppose that on Su the same was provided for such a function as target attack with the help of ground defense. Apparently we have such a mandatory function as radio communication with the earth, everyone knows about it, but no one talks about it.
    1. -5
      August 10 2019
      Show off in your head, 5th generation airplanes do only for such opportunities ... That's why they don’t consider our Su-57 a 5th generation airplane - it is not used as part of network-centric systems, we simply don’t have them .. .There are developments with air defense but it is a narrowly focused system ...
      1. +1
        August 11 2019
        Stop twirling
        What do you know about network systems? It seems less than nothing
        1. -3
          August 11 2019
          More than you, that's for sure! And I know that we do not have them, and there is not even a concept for their creation ...
          Stop twirling

          Don’t stink!
      2. 0
        August 13 2019
        American network centrism completely nullifies the "advantages" of stealth technology. You will not argue that the noise-like link16 is not tracked by radio intelligence stations.
        Since there is radiation, and it is both from the source and from the receiver (protocols, with the exchange of information, there's nothing to be done) - what a stealth ...
        Well, a complex "network-centric" network is good when no one interferes with it.
        They already do not know how to work with cards, let's see what happens when the connected channels are cut off to them.
        In Syria, they have already raised a howl, and there it is all - they tested some electronic warfare equipment.
        Believe further in the infallible Amer network centrism
        1. 0
          August 13 2019
          I don’t believe in him, in this American network centrism. Moreover, I think that they have chosen not quite the right direction, there are others .... And what does the STELS technology have to do with it? And all your speculations are like empty slogans in the style of "Hurray" and no more ...
  6. 0
    August 8 2019
    C400 seems to be unable to receive info from fighter jets yet.
    1. -5
      August 10 2019
      Better be silent ... This is not yours and not for you ...
    2. +1
      August 14 2019
      On modern aircraft, starting with MIG-31, there is a special digital secure communication channel for transmitting / receiving target designation data. This concept was not developed now, but at the end of the 70s. And they will not remove it from planes - that's for sure. The type of channel / bandwidth / method of data encryption, etc. is changing. Standard exchange protocol. These data are transmitted / received from control centers of aviation connections / airdromes or air defense systems, they can also be received / sent by automated reconnaissance systems or drones. What more do you need. There’s just a bunch of iron there, here and here. It overshoots and sees each other. It is possible to tie it all in one knot. This is the work of people who are engaged in tactics, strategy and programming. Everything will be fine, otherwise why would the new RSL be done with high-speed data exchange between aircraft and ground and terrain mapping? It's just that Americans always do advertising loudly and to the whole world - they are in force. It’s stupid for us to shout about it. we are, anyway, on the defensive .. And disclosing all the data and capabilities of our systems is silly and childish.
      1. 0
        August 14 2019
        Americans and connect successfully.
  7. +3
    August 8 2019
    "Invisible aerial platform for radar reconnaissance" - fried ice? laughing

    The Reed-Solomon code allows you to only catch errors in data transmission, it will not protect against EW interference from the word at all. The only way to protect it is with a pointed communication channel using radar AFARs.
    1. 0
      August 14 2019
      A directional channel through a satellite or a signal reflected from the ionosphere. Moreover, the transmission can be carried out by short but capacious data packets with interruptions and at different frequencies.
  8. +3
    August 8 2019
    protected by Reed-Solomon code,

    A curtain.
    1. +4
      August 8 2019
      If someone is not in the know - the Reed-Solomon code does not protect anything, it allows you to correct errors in binary code. And in general, encoding is not equal to encryption.
      Here are the bourgeoisie https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/DataLinkProcessingAndManagement/Documents/Understanding_Voice+Data_Link_Networking.pdf - please, read how everything works, no one smacks nonsense about "secrecy" and "who needs to know"
      1. -1
        August 8 2019
        Secrecy, it is only necessary when the information did not manage to one way or another poke open access. It is customary for us to sometimes secret from our own.
        1. +2
          August 8 2019
          There is such a concept as Security Through Obscurity - this is how NOT to be done.
          Ideally, for security, all algorithms should be known, and only the password should be secret - then this will be a safe solution
          1. 0
            August 8 2019
            Quote: meGrail
            Ideally

            Denied encryption. wink
      2. +1
        August 8 2019
        Quote: meGrail
        Reed-Solomon code does not protect anything, it allows you to correct errors in binary code. And in general, encoding is not equal to encryption.

        Uh-huh. Yes And that is precisely why it is still widely used in error-correcting coding. On the microwave links (FEC) and satellite communications as well. In fiber too. In short, there is redundant information everywhere for error correction.
  9. Compare, for example, a piece of meat and a piece of watermelon ....
    1) "In this case, we are talking about the use of the F-35A as an unobtrusive air platform for radar and optical-electronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation, which scans missile-hazardous low-altitude airspace (inaccessible for" monitoring "by AN / TPS-75 and AN / MPQ-53/65) for the appearance of tactical missiles, small-sized UAVs and other means of air attack, using our own AN / APG-81 anti-jamming radar and an EOTS optical-electronic sighting system. "
    2) Onboard communications complex "K-DlAE / UE" and ground air communications complex NKVS-27, this is an onboard communications complex for exported (!) Front-line aviation aircraft and a ground communications complex. Nothing more!. Designed for short-range and long-range telephone and telecode radio communication of aircraft between themselves and with military aviation control points.
    No purpose of "radar and optical-electronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation," which scans missile-hazardous low-altitude airspace (inaccessible for "monitoring" air defense radars) for the appearance of tactical missiles, small UAVs and other air attack weapons, using its own anti-jamming radar and the optical-electronic sighting system "" of the multipurpose fighters Su-27SM / SM3, Su-30M2, Su-30SM and Su-35S ", could not and was not put into" K-DlAE / UE "and NKVS-27, because it simply radio communication equipment with the purpose of forming speech and other information channels (radio channeling equipment).
    According to these channels, one can speak, sing songs, and transmit other information, the source of which can be various on-board and off-board (when relaying radio signals) sources.
    That is, in 1) we are talking about the intelligence capabilities of aircraft equipment in the interests of reconnaissance, air defense and other interested services outside the aircraft, and in 2) radio equipment.
    3) ACS of the "Universal-1E", "Polyana-D4M1", "Baikal-1ME" types will be able to interface with the on-board systems of aircraft through the indicated channels formed by K-DlAE / UE "and NKVS-27 in case of them (Su-27SM / SM3, Su-30M2, Su-30SM and Su-35S ") equipment as platforms for" radar and optoelectronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation, "but for this you need to know whether all these aircraft are equipped and (or) which of them appropriate (general or private) equipment for radar and optical-electronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation.
    It is likely that now production aircraft have limited capabilities in this direction.
    These ACSs have communication channels with different launchers and airborne objects, and the issue of software interface and interfaces between channels, channel and terminal equipment is not so complicated.
    In particular, automatic control systems of the type Universal-1E, Polyana-D4M1, Baikal-1ME can be interfaced with on-board systems A-50 and many other ACS and PD systems.
    4) It remains to find out:
    - Are all of these aircraft and (or) which of them are equipped with the appropriate (general or private) equipment for radar and optoelectronic reconnaissance, as well as target designation? because the
    - work on interfacing airfield stations NKVS-27 and other means of communication with Baikals and Polyans is not complicated and secondary.
    1. +2
      August 9 2019
      I will add that the unification of exchange protocols is part of the TOR for all air defense systems and aircraft since the adoption of the S-300.
      1. 0
        August 14 2019
        In-in and I about the same ... It seems then we were ahead of the rest ...
    2. -2
      August 9 2019
      Compare a piece of meat and a watermelon or guess what will happen, try to spread "Baikal" at the bottom of Baikal.
    3. -5
      August 10 2019
      Bravo, very professional ... But it's all primitive and narrow and does not have a hundredth of the capabilities of network-centric systems ... These are narrow, inconsistent, disconnected, inconsistent systems, each of which is individual and not universal ... In short, yesterday. ...
  10. 0
    August 8 2019
    It is obvious that the aircraft created for the conditions of network interaction will remain a lame penguin without creating this same network infrastructure!
    1. 0
      August 10 2019
      Pi_dos has long had it ... And they are increasing opportunities ... And the software is not bad, but just new, and they want more and more, but not everything turns out right away and the costs are huge ... And the fact that the penguin flies badly they are not the main thing, it’s only the seniors who we rave about with close air combat ..
      1. +1
        August 11 2019
        Quote: VO3A
        Pi_ ndosov have it for a long time

        They create it!
        No one has a full-fledged network structure that can really provide what is needed. Work is underway and they will be ahead of everyone, most likely.
        "Lame penguin" is a general expression, not specifically for the Yankees. They are just the first, they create, experiment, they have at least something !!! There is nothing to talk about the rest, especially about the statements of our representatives. This still needs to be created and done in real life!
        1. 0
          August 14 2019
          The most interesting thing is that this aircraft has a limited target detection radius and such a platform is suitable for tactical decisions in a small theater of war or against the Papuans.
          1. 0
            August 14 2019
            Quote: Gogia
            The most interesting thing is that this aircraft has a limited target detection radius and is suitable

            for this, the NETWORK is created !!! comprehensive, with elements of reconnaissance, guidance, and everything else! The effective area of ​​the aircraft is how far the NET gets!
  11. +1
    August 8 2019
    From a technical point of view, this is not a problem. Air defense systems, AWACS aircraft integrate with each other, transmit targeting to each other and distribute targets. If there is a special tire, there is no problem receiving data from the fighter’s radar. In the same way, on the contrary: a fighter pilot can receive target designation from the same radars of S-400 systems and others.
    1. -2
      August 10 2019
      And where to get this "special bus", if there is no single concept, which means nothing fits ... Even our UAVs cannot give direct target designation to combat systems ... Dream on ... We got stuck in yesterday, in Syria, bare, we have nothing, we can do nothing ...
      1. 0
        August 11 2019
        I’m not a military man, but my duty is related to the integration of various departmental information systems among themselves (and this is really a problem because each department makes an order for itself from different manufacturers). I think computer systems based on military equipment are built on similar principles, so I think that the problem is completely solvable, if there was a will and an appropriate technical task. The ability to integrate into new samples should be incorporated initially, in existing samples during modernization. Moreover, all manufacturers of military equipment are in one holding, which greatly simplifies organizational issues.
        1. -2
          August 11 2019
          There is no will, there is not even understanding, we have such a stupid military leadership ... We cannot do anything in Syria, but they are introducing experience ... "To seize a foothold behind enemy lines to disrupt the deployment of his troops" - these stupid-headed people cannot be cured. .. All our teachings are moronic in design and do not correspond to modern war ...
  12. 0
    August 9 2019
    Could the AWACS aircraft be inconspicuous, does it radiate very powerfully?
    1. 0
      August 13 2019
      Here. Right. From being invisible, mini AWACS becomes "brightly visible" and there is no need to use stealth.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"