VKS played on the lead. Serious targets for the deployment of 48Я6-K1 radar on Hmeimim
Extreme attention of expert circles, as well as numerous Russian and foreign military-analytical publications, was attracted by recent satellite photographs of the Hmeimim air base in Russia, made by the well-known Israeli optical-electronic reconnaissance satellite Eros-B, which is at the disposal of the operating company ImageSat , as well as attached online service «Observer IL».
This time, they did not capture the positions of the long-range anti-aircraft missile systems C-300PMU-2 “Favorit” near the large rocket production enterprise near Masyaf or the garrisons of the elite units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near the Baniyas-Latakia highway, and the newest Russian radar complex 48ЯNX -K6 “Flight-K1”, deployed in close proximity to the runway of the Hmeymim airbase. It is quite obvious that the radar was delivered to Syria as part of one of the urgent flights of heavy military transport aircraft Il-1MD or An-76-124 "Ruslan", and then immediately took up combat duty, providing for a continuous all-round view of the airspace within 100 radius —200 km from the Russian “air harbor” in the province of Latakia.
And here a quite logical question arises: what are the objectives of the transfer of the Podlet-K1 radar detector to the region, the airspace above which is permanently “viewed” by the 96Л6 centimeter range, which is part of the C-400 “Triumph” anti-aircraft system? Moreover, it is known that in the monitoring of the airspace over Latakia, Hama and Tartus are actively involved 9S18M1-3 "Dome" radar detection and 9S15M2 "Review-3", which are the "eyes" of the Syrian SAM "Buk-M2E" and Russian C- 300B4.
It may seem to a simple layman that this is only about the desire of the command of the Aerospace Forces of Russia, as well as the leadership of the development company (VKO Almaz-Antey concern) to test the new radar in close to combat conditions. Meanwhile, in this case, any commercial interests of Russia's largest defense enterprise in the field of air defense, as well as the military’s interest in secret tests of new equipment are relegated to the background, giving way to the implementation of preventive measures to ensure the safety of technical personnel of the Khmeimim air base, as well as the mixed flight personnel aviation operational brigades of the Russian Aerospace Forces (crews of Su-25M3 attack aircraft, Su-34 multipurpose fighter-bombers and Su-35S multi-functional fighters, etc.). And there is absolutely nothing to hide here.
The operational and strategic situation observed on the western and northern approaches to the airbase, has become extremely threatening. Due to the lack of a carte blanche from Moscow for the suppression of fortified areas and the positions of artillery units of the Turkish army, located at the commanding heights east of the Al-Gab valley (in the western part of the Idlib Gadyushnik) and covering Tahrir ash-Sham opornikas, in front of the field the commanders of the latter opened up new horizons for successful sabotage and reconnaissance actions against the garrisons of the CAA and the units of the OSS of Russia in the province of Lattakia.
Moreover, the pro-Turkish Islamist detachments "Dzhebhat Tahrir Suriya", stationed in the settlements of Karamanli and Kalaz Tahtani (near the Turkish-Syrian border near the Jebel Turkman mountain range), have the opportunity to conduct successful offensive "throws" in the direction of the settlement. Rabiya, Jakruran and Kabir. This is evidenced by the recent successful sortie of militants of this formation in the area of height 797 (near the village of Kabir), during which at least 2 MBTs and an armored car of the Syrian government forces were destroyed by anti-tank systems. In the future, this may lead to the advancement of the Tahrir Suriya militants in the direction of the Latakia-Yailadagi highway with the final exit to the Khmeimim fire control lines from the northern air direction (using dozens of cheap drones-kamikaze).
In this scenario, one can expect 1,5-2-multiple intensification of air raids on the infrastructure of Avb “Hamim” infrastructure simultaneously from the east and north directions. The number of drones used by militants will increase significantly. Therefore, in order to avoid breaking even a small part of the kamikaze UAV into the “dead zones” of the ZRSK “Tor-M2U” and the MIRROR “Armor-C1”, approaching in the low-altitude mode, outfits of several dozen drones should be detected at a distance of 30 — 50 km from the airbase , after which an immediate distribution of the escorted objects between the batteries of the above air defense systems should follow.
Meanwhile, the radar detectors assigned to the Tor-MXNUMU and Pantsir-S2 complexes are capable of detecting targets with 1 EPR — 0,05 square meters. m (corresponds to the radar signature of kamikaze drones) at a distance of the order of 0,1 — 8 km and 10 — 15 km, respectively, which leaves combat calculations and radar information processing tools not so much time for the distribution of enemy UAV between combat vehicles (especially during a massive strike ). The multispectral X-NUMXES20-E multispectral optical electronic scanners of the Pantsir-С10 complexes, whose effective range depends on meteorological conditions, dustiness of the atmosphere, etc., are not omnipotent.
The only adequate solution to the problem is the deployment of the above radar complex 48YA6-KHNUMX “Podlet-KHNUMX”, and the command of the Aerospace Forces made a bet on it. Unlike the less powerful integrated “Pantsirevsky” 1PC-1Е / SOTS detectors, this product is a high-potential high-resolution low-altitude radar detector with solid-state RPAR operating in the S-band of decimeter waves and capable of detecting medium-height targets with 1-1 ESR. m at a distance of 0,05 — 0,1 km, low-altitude with a similar image intensifier — at the time of exit because of the radio horizon 80 — 120 km, which is 1.5 to 2 times higher than the radars for detecting Thors and Pantsiri. Moreover, the placement of the antenna post on the 27-meter folding tower provides an increase in the radio horizon, as well as coverage of additional “unseen” low-altitude sectors of the rocket-hazardous air directions in the theater with complex terrain relief.
More importantly, the “Podleta-K1” software and hardware algorithm has introduced a special “ultra-low” scanning of airspace, which provides for viewing in a small elevation sector from -7 to + 12 degrees with increasing beam energy potential. In combat conditions, this quality allows the 48Я6-К1 radar to detect enemy air attack weapons approaching with a decline of several tens to hundreds of meters relative to the position of the antenna post. Even the all-altitude 96L6 C-400 detector, which works with only 3-degree humiliation, cannot boast of such abilities.
In the difficult terrain of the Jebel Ansariy massif, the above-listed advantages of the Plyot-KHNUMX RLO are an ideal aid in providing reliable information about the air situation to operators of any type of air defense missile system covering Avb “Hmimim”. The system linkage between the 1Я48-К6 radar and information consumers (anti-aircraft missile batteries or a mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade) will be carried out by regular network-centric units - the Poliana-D1М4 automated command and control system and the unified battery command posts "REN-NMNXXNXX-NXX" and the unified battery command posts "REN-NMN".
This time, they did not capture the positions of the long-range anti-aircraft missile systems C-300PMU-2 “Favorit” near the large rocket production enterprise near Masyaf or the garrisons of the elite units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps near the Baniyas-Latakia highway, and the newest Russian radar complex 48ЯNX -K6 “Flight-K1”, deployed in close proximity to the runway of the Hmeymim airbase. It is quite obvious that the radar was delivered to Syria as part of one of the urgent flights of heavy military transport aircraft Il-1MD or An-76-124 "Ruslan", and then immediately took up combat duty, providing for a continuous all-round view of the airspace within 100 radius —200 km from the Russian “air harbor” in the province of Latakia.
The Prylet-KHNUMX radar complex is an indispensable tool for the information illumination of an air defense force group covering the Russian Khmeimim airbase
And here a quite logical question arises: what are the objectives of the transfer of the Podlet-K1 radar detector to the region, the airspace above which is permanently “viewed” by the 96Л6 centimeter range, which is part of the C-400 “Triumph” anti-aircraft system? Moreover, it is known that in the monitoring of the airspace over Latakia, Hama and Tartus are actively involved 9S18M1-3 "Dome" radar detection and 9S15M2 "Review-3", which are the "eyes" of the Syrian SAM "Buk-M2E" and Russian C- 300B4.
It may seem to a simple layman that this is only about the desire of the command of the Aerospace Forces of Russia, as well as the leadership of the development company (VKO Almaz-Antey concern) to test the new radar in close to combat conditions. Meanwhile, in this case, any commercial interests of Russia's largest defense enterprise in the field of air defense, as well as the military’s interest in secret tests of new equipment are relegated to the background, giving way to the implementation of preventive measures to ensure the safety of technical personnel of the Khmeimim air base, as well as the mixed flight personnel aviation operational brigades of the Russian Aerospace Forces (crews of Su-25M3 attack aircraft, Su-34 multipurpose fighter-bombers and Su-35S multi-functional fighters, etc.). And there is absolutely nothing to hide here.
The operational and strategic situation observed on the western and northern approaches to the airbase, has become extremely threatening. Due to the lack of a carte blanche from Moscow for the suppression of fortified areas and the positions of artillery units of the Turkish army, located at the commanding heights east of the Al-Gab valley (in the western part of the Idlib Gadyushnik) and covering Tahrir ash-Sham opornikas, in front of the field the commanders of the latter opened up new horizons for successful sabotage and reconnaissance actions against the garrisons of the CAA and the units of the OSS of Russia in the province of Lattakia.
Moreover, the pro-Turkish Islamist detachments "Dzhebhat Tahrir Suriya", stationed in the settlements of Karamanli and Kalaz Tahtani (near the Turkish-Syrian border near the Jebel Turkman mountain range), have the opportunity to conduct successful offensive "throws" in the direction of the settlement. Rabiya, Jakruran and Kabir. This is evidenced by the recent successful sortie of militants of this formation in the area of height 797 (near the village of Kabir), during which at least 2 MBTs and an armored car of the Syrian government forces were destroyed by anti-tank systems. In the future, this may lead to the advancement of the Tahrir Suriya militants in the direction of the Latakia-Yailadagi highway with the final exit to the Khmeimim fire control lines from the northern air direction (using dozens of cheap drones-kamikaze).
In this scenario, one can expect 1,5-2-multiple intensification of air raids on the infrastructure of Avb “Hamim” infrastructure simultaneously from the east and north directions. The number of drones used by militants will increase significantly. Therefore, in order to avoid breaking even a small part of the kamikaze UAV into the “dead zones” of the ZRSK “Tor-M2U” and the MIRROR “Armor-C1”, approaching in the low-altitude mode, outfits of several dozen drones should be detected at a distance of 30 — 50 km from the airbase , after which an immediate distribution of the escorted objects between the batteries of the above air defense systems should follow.
Meanwhile, the radar detectors assigned to the Tor-MXNUMU and Pantsir-S2 complexes are capable of detecting targets with 1 EPR — 0,05 square meters. m (corresponds to the radar signature of kamikaze drones) at a distance of the order of 0,1 — 8 km and 10 — 15 km, respectively, which leaves combat calculations and radar information processing tools not so much time for the distribution of enemy UAV between combat vehicles (especially during a massive strike ). The multispectral X-NUMXES20-E multispectral optical electronic scanners of the Pantsir-С10 complexes, whose effective range depends on meteorological conditions, dustiness of the atmosphere, etc., are not omnipotent.
The only adequate solution to the problem is the deployment of the above radar complex 48YA6-KHNUMX “Podlet-KHNUMX”, and the command of the Aerospace Forces made a bet on it. Unlike the less powerful integrated “Pantsirevsky” 1PC-1Е / SOTS detectors, this product is a high-potential high-resolution low-altitude radar detector with solid-state RPAR operating in the S-band of decimeter waves and capable of detecting medium-height targets with 1-1 ESR. m at a distance of 0,05 — 0,1 km, low-altitude with a similar image intensifier — at the time of exit because of the radio horizon 80 — 120 km, which is 1.5 to 2 times higher than the radars for detecting Thors and Pantsiri. Moreover, the placement of the antenna post on the 27-meter folding tower provides an increase in the radio horizon, as well as coverage of additional “unseen” low-altitude sectors of the rocket-hazardous air directions in the theater with complex terrain relief.
The radar received a unique elevation mode of operation, which allows you to track targets with negative approach angles against the background of natural interference generated by the enemy’s EW tools.
More importantly, the “Podleta-K1” software and hardware algorithm has introduced a special “ultra-low” scanning of airspace, which provides for viewing in a small elevation sector from -7 to + 12 degrees with increasing beam energy potential. In combat conditions, this quality allows the 48Я6-К1 radar to detect enemy air attack weapons approaching with a decline of several tens to hundreds of meters relative to the position of the antenna post. Even the all-altitude 96L6 C-400 detector, which works with only 3-degree humiliation, cannot boast of such abilities.
In the difficult terrain of the Jebel Ansariy massif, the above-listed advantages of the Plyot-KHNUMX RLO are an ideal aid in providing reliable information about the air situation to operators of any type of air defense missile system covering Avb “Hmimim”. The system linkage between the 1Я48-К6 radar and information consumers (anti-aircraft missile batteries or a mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade) will be carried out by regular network-centric units - the Poliana-D1М4 automated command and control system and the unified battery command posts "REN-NMNXXNXX-NXX" and the unified battery command posts "REN-NMN".
Information