The creation of the Southern Front and the events in the Moscow Military District

55
In the previous parts (Part 1 и Part 2) documents and memoirs of war veterans were reviewed, which indicate that the leadership of the USSR and the SC were not concerned about the deployed number of German troops near the border and their concentration until the evening of 21.6.41. Therefore, on June 1, at the first meeting of Stalin, not very important issues were considered. : the creation of the Southern Front (LF), the appointment of the commander of the second-line armies and the leaders of the Northern Front, the South-Western Front (LPS) and the LF. Consideration of minor issues eight hours before the war testifies that until 20-00 21 June, the leadership of the country and the army they did not expect the beginning of a full-scale war with Germany at dawn on 22 June. In the new part, it is proposed to consider the events at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District (MVO) on the eve of the war and after it began, which are connected with the formation of the front management of the law firm.

The creation of the Southern Front and the events in the Moscow Military District




Deploy front-line management


19 June 1941 from the General Staff to the headquarters of the Arkhangelsk Military District (ArVD) is sent a cipher telegram (PC) on the beginning of the deployment of front-line control. The text of the telegram could not be found, but in another document there is a link to the specified PC.

PC №2706 / org from 24.6.41:
“The chief of staff of ArVO. On the formation instead of the front management of the army.

Copies to the deputy chiefs of the Main Political Department, the operational management of the General Staff, the head of the personnel department of the spacecraft.

During the change of directive of the General Staff No.org / 1 / 524033 from November 19.06.41, XNUMX The field control of the front provided for in the deployment scheme should not be formed. It is necessary to form an army field office with service agencies, guards, editors and printers of the army newspaper according to staff number 48 / 926.

The formation of the field control of the front, the editorial staff and the printing house of the newspaper of the front is completely removed. V.Sokolovsky
.

19 June in the General Staff, a decision is made to begin the mobilization deployment of the front control based on the ArVO. Where should the deployed control go from ArVO?

In the evening of June 21, a decision is made to create LF and second-line armies. June 22 from the MVO is allocated headquarters LF. The commander of the army of the second line Marshal S.M. Budyonny is forced to form his headquarters on his own. 21-22 June order to cancel the deployment of front-line control in the ArVO is not received. Therefore, the management of the ArVO was not intended either for the headquarters of the law firm or for the headquarters of the second-line armies.

The author has only one version of the purpose of the said administration, which has no documentary evidence: the administration was intended for the commander of the direction, which included the LUF and the LF. Late in the evening of June 22, the Chief of the General Staff arrives at the headquarters of the South-Western Federal Branch to monitor the implementation of measures about the counterstrike on Lublin. At headquarters, he learns about the real situation at the front, and 23 Jun sees an ever-worsening state of affairs. The situation is changing rapidly, and its headquarters is still in the formative stage and it is not known when it will be able to arrive. In this situation, the headquarters of the direction is no longer needed. Now, if two fronts attacked abroad and between the fronts and the headquarters of the South-West direction, a huge document flow would have appeared - then another thing ... Perhaps, on his instructions, Assistant Chief of the General Staff General Sokolovsky cancels the earlier decision, which is reflected in PC.

In cycle it was shown that not all military and civilian specialists in Moscow were expecting a June 22 war. To understand the atmosphere of that time, I will give an excerpt from the diary of Academician V.I. Vernadsky: "[19.6.41]
It is said that Germany was presented with an ultimatum - in 40 hours to withdraw its troops from Finland - in the north near our borders. The Germans agreed, but asked for a postponement - 70 hours, which was given ...


[June 22 Morning] Apparently, there was indeed an improvement - or rather, a temporary calm with Germany. Ultimatum was introduced. The Germans gave way. Finland was supposed to destroy the fortifications near our borders (in the north) built by the Germans. Apparently, in connection with this - the departure of the British Ambassador and Finland? Grabar told that he had seen one of the generals, who is now being informed in the party and in the bureaucratic environment of the political situation, who told him that for a few months the danger of collision with Germany had disappeared ...


Call commanding staff of the Moscow Military District


At the headquarters of the Moscow Military District 19 Jun, everything is ordinary, quiet and peaceful. The staff of the headquarters assigned to the field management and the assigned staff work quietly in their places: in the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and in civil organizations. They are not aware of the imminent field trip. The leadership of the Moscow Military District does not cancel the planned army field trip on June 23. Probably, during the study trip, they were supposed to prepare the assigned commanding staff for staff work. Generals Pokrovsky and Sparrows wrote in their memoirs about the unpreparedness of field administrations to their work.

A.P. Pokrovsky (subsequently the chief of staff of the second line armies):
The events of the beginning of the war showed that we were not prepared for the organization of field management. Regulations on the field management of the army in war was not developed before the war. There were notes, drafts, but there was no such Provision on army field management, Headquarters and, in general, on the transition of the army to martial law ...

That is, there were cadres, but even the presence of the best cadres, knowledgeable, experienced people - this does not in itself create an efficient headquarters. The headquarters is in the work: it must be prepared. And what did we get?

For example, in order to create the headquarters of the law firm, an MBO management was sent there. But the management of the MBO was not up to date. It knew neither this theater, nor these troops, nor all that is connected with the preparatory work that preceded the war in the headquarters of those formations that should be deployed in this particular theater of operations. The headquarters of the Moscow Military District, who arrived there, to the south, and became the headquarters of the law firm, for a long time understood the situation and mastered it. Of course, it was wrong ...

Anticipating hostilities, we could have, in the south, a pre-formed headquarters of the LF headquarters. And it would cost not so expensive in peacetime and could be created not openly, but closed, under a different name ...


V.F. Vorobiev:
From 1940, he served as chief of staff of the 61 Infantry Corps, preparing for a number of war games in the district and on maneuvers to work in the west direction ...

21.6.41 I was unexpectedly appointed for me unexpectedly by the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the law firm, which was formed from the staff of the Moscow Military District. I did not study the southern direction and did not know this theater.

The staff of the LF headquarters on 50% was staffed from reserve officers who were drafted into the army for two or three days on the eve of the war. In the operations department, of which I was the head, no one of the called-up officers of the reserve could independently keep a log of military operations, compile a combat report, an operational summary, systematically keep a work card. This is explained by the fact that at the gathering the officers assigned to the district headquarters were not engaged and not used according to the posts they were intended for during the war ...

On Friday, June 20, the headquarters of the 1080 military unit, including the subscription composition, is raised in alarm. This is evidenced by the text of the name "A list of commanding officers ... who did not appear on call.


Consequently, there was a call (gathering or alarm), which was not attended by one commander from the operational department (GS).



Why did the call take place 20 Jun? In mid-August, when it was already clear to all that the war would last long, a new document appeared. The document refers to the accrual of service from 20 June commanders who are called to the spacecraft. The names of the commanders are also in the list of arrivals on call.



Below is a list of the commanding staff of the OO X / NXX military unit, who appeared on call. On June 1080, both lists were sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District for logistics services to Major General I.М. Karavaeva for setting for contentment. This is evidenced by the date on the resolution.



The list includes 20 people, including the deputy chief of staff - the chief of the PA, General Vorobyov, and the deputy chief of the PA, Major Lyamin. If Captain Kolokoltsev had arrived, then the 21 man was on the list. You do not think that this number of commanders is too small for the OO headquarters of the army or the front?

At that time there were no computers, the text was typed or written in handwritten form. OO is a lot of reports, maps and other documents. Even the two documents presented above are typed on a typewriter. The situation on the cards for beauty applied draftsmen. They also put text on the cards both in the headings and in the tables. Of course, when it allowed time.

Before the transfer of both documents to General Karavaev, a draftsman (Red Army man Silaev) and one typist Ushakov were inscribed in the list of departing people with a red pencil. If a Red Army soldier's servant is where they are sent, they will go there, then it is another matter with a typist ... A typist is a freelance person, and an irregular working day is not supposed to be her as a military man. For civilian personnel normalized working day. By law, he should pay for processing, but somehow this issue is still decided. Note that they were included in the list by one specialist, bringing the total to 22 people.

At that time, the GS organization also included the division of the specialists of the cryptographic-staff service (SS), who were withdrawn from its composition only by the beginning of July 1941. The reason was the violations identified during the inspection of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. In particular, it was found that the outgoing and incoming PF on operational issues were shared with the management staff.

There is no cryptographer in the list above! Where was the field office going to go without the ShShS specialists? Right! To study! The ciphers are an expensive thing, and you can teach the personnel of the NGO and on unencrypted messages (without the lifting of the WSS specialists).

Field front or army control


How many people were listed in the OO headquarters of the army or the front? Information about the number of people in the NGO on the eve of the war could not be found. However, it is known how many full-time posts were in the OO headquarters of the army and the front in the state of 02 / 45, which was introduced from July 1. The table in the figure uses the following abbreviations: “military unit” - military personnel, “military unit” - civilian personnel.



Without a chief of the OO, who is simultaneously listed as deputy chief of staff, there are 02 posts for the front headquarters and 45 for the army headquarters in the 35 / 21 staff department. Remove from the list of soldiers on the naval part (senior assistant - 1 and assistant - 2). Positions related to maritime affairs may be occupied only by servicemen of the Navy Commissariat (Captain of rank 3 and Lieutenant Commander). There are no soldiers on the Navy side in the list of OOs from 20 June. Add to the number of employees of OO head of the department, which is listed in the list of June 20. Get the number of posts in the OO headquarters of the front and the army 33 and 19, respectively. It turns out that in the list from June 20 the number of people (21) is close to the number of OO army headquarters (19). The only difference is that the OO headquarters of the front and the army on the staff 02 / 45 is listed on the 3 or 2 draftsman and the typist, respectively. There is only one draftsman and one typist on the list for June 23.

By the way, in the dedicated cryptographic department by staff number 02 / 45, there were 29 and 22 specialists for the front and army headquarters, respectively. The ShShS front staff also included a school of cipher technicians with an 65 specialist.



It turns out that the field office of the army, not the front, was going to the 23 study trip on June. The number of departing specialists were not included. After the call, the subscription was dismissed home until Monday. The figure below shows that the commander who was summoned on June 20 from a reserve to participate in a field trip is called up for service only after the start of the war.



In the postwar period, the assigned composition was called for fees, and they received wages at the place of work in a civil organization or enterprise. It can be assumed that the same practice could have existed before the war. Therefore, the commanders who arrived on call warned about the study trip on the 23 number and were released to their homes. 22 June they were called to the spacecraft, as they had to go to the place of deployment of their military unit - the headquarters of the Law Faculty.

Memories of veterans from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District


The staff after the collection went to service on Saturday 21 June. On this day, there is no excitement at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District about the rise on the eve of the assigned composition of field management. After all, the trip was planned, training, short and for a short distance.

Gen. A.I. Shebunin (Chief Quartermaster MBO) was not planned to participate in the field trip. He wrote that June 21 was a typical Saturday day:
With the onset of the summer heat, the families of the administrative staff of the district usually moved from Moscow to their summer cottage in Serebryanny Bor, then considered a suburb. On Saturday, 21 June, many of my employees, as always, gathered at the dacha. The work at the district headquarters on Saturdays ended at five o'clock, then only the operational duty officers remained there. So it was on that Sabbath day.

The divisional commander Zakharkin was at the General Staff of the space station that day, from where he arrived at the dacha. According to him, I realized that the atmosphere in the General Staff seemed he is troubled. After exchanging opinions, Ivan Grigorievich and I agreed that there are very real reasons for alarm. I was anxious in my heart when he left the hospitable division of the divisional commander late at night. But still I was far from thinking that only a few hours separated us from the beginning of the terrible events that were destined to shake the world...


Chief of Engineers of the Moscow Military District A.F. Hrenov writes:
On Monday [23 June 1941 of the year] the headquarters planned a trip to work out the organization and interaction as part of the field front control ... Home returned long after midnight [June 22 has arrived]. I collected everything I needed in the field and quickly went to bed. Early in the morning I was going to go out of town, to Zhukovka, - there, in the country house with relatives, the family lived ...


Memories of the former cadet of the Moscow Red Banner School named. Supreme Council of the RSFSR V.P. Diveeva:
At this time I was just seconded to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, was sent to the post of clerk. We were left at work for the weekend, but no alarm we experiencedand here early in the morning they announce that Germany has attacked the Soviet Union. An alarm immediately appeared in the headquarters, you know, even some kind of agitation. It turned out that at the headquarters of the clerks and in other minor positions there were about 150 people from the school, we were quickly gathered and sent to the school ...


Light anxiety in the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. It could be related to the anticipated exercises of the field control, the 7 th mechanized corps, the 1 th air defense corps. It is possible that the exercises were also expected in other units of the district. Left cadets cadets on the night of June 22, but the alarming condition appeared only after the start of the war ...

Early morning 22 Jun


The commander of the Moscow Military District troops, General I.V. Tyulenev wrote:
It was already getting dark when I left the headquarters of the Moscow Military District ... I got out of the car in a quiet Rzhevsky Lane, where I lived with my family - my wife and two children. At 3 o'clock in the morning 22 June a phone call woke me up. Urgently summoned to the Kremlin ... Then Voroshilov announced that I was appointed commander of the law firm. It was proposed to leave for the destination today ...


It turns out that General I.V. Before dawn, 22 Jun did not know about the decision to create the law firm. One inaccuracy that is immediately visible: a call to the Kremlin in 3-00. At that time there was no one in the Kremlin in the Kremlin.

The information that they learned about the formation of the LF headquarters only in the morning of June 22 is confirmed by other generals from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. From their memoirs, one can find out a more accurate time when the commander of the Moscow Military District troops was invited to the Kremlin and when they began to call the command personnel to the Moscow Military District headquarters.

Gen. A.F. Hrenov:
He barely fell asleep, his phone rang.

“Comrade general,” came the excited voice of the operational duty staff of the district, “the commander calls you.” It is ordered not to linger. The car is leaving now ...

In the reception of the commander, I found the chief of staff, Major-General GD. Shishenin, head of the political department of divisional commissar F.N. Voronin, head of logistics Major General A.I. Shebunina and several other comrades ...

Soon the commander appeared and invited us to the meeting room of the Military Council ... Going into the hall and accepting the report of the chief of staff, he did not sit down as usual, but remained standing: "Comrades, at four o'clock with the minutes I was called to the Kremlin. K.E. Voroshilov and S.K. Tymoshenko told me that fascist Germany had treacherously attacked our homeland ...

Ivan Vladimirovich said that he was appointed commander of the LF troops, a member of the military council — Army Commissar 1, rank A.I. Zaporozhets, chief of staff - Major General GD Shishenin. The heads of the arms and services of the front are appointed by the appropriate heads of the district. Field control departs to the front in two echelons. Destination - Vinnitsa. The composition of the first echelon should be ready for shipment today, the composition of the second - tomorrow. Then he announced who was leaving for the first echelon, determined the time of gathering at the Kiev station to 15 watches and ordered me to take up the duties of the head of the first special train ... ”
... Arkady Fyodorovich specifies the time of the call of the commander of the Moscow Military District to the Kremlin: at 4 o'clock with minutes.

Gen. A.I. Shebunin: "...At six in the morning 22 June 1941, the command personnel of the Moscow Military District, who lived at the cottages in Serebryany Bor, were alerted to the district headquarters. Here we were officially informed about the beginning of the war with Germany. Chief of Staff Major General GD Sishenin announced the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, according to which the Moscow Military District had to urgently allocate a part of the higher commanding staff to form the LF administration in Vinnitsa ...


Only in the morning did General Shebunin find out that he, too, was a member of the command staff of the law department and should serve the first echelon to Vinnitsa. For the first time, the destination was announced on the morning of June 22. That is why no one knew where the front headquarters would be located and there were no maps. The call time was also clarified: at six in the morning. In the memoirs, too, there is an inaccuracy: the order of the People's Commissar of Defense was not yet at dawn on 22 June.

General V.F. Vorobyev wrote that in the evening of June 21 he unexpectedly found out about his appointment as the head of the law firm OO. In the list of arrivals on call 20 June, a tick is inscribed in front of his last name in red pencil. Of course, he did not have to come to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District on call, but on June 20 he had to learn about his participation in the field trip. The unexpected appointment in the evening of June 21 is in doubt, since neither the head of the engineering service, nor the chief quartermaster of the Moscow Military District on Saturday are yet aware of their appointments. General Sparrow or mistaking the number 21, confusing it with early morning 22 June. Or he could have been informed about a new appointment by a certain friend from the General Staff. But this is only the author's assumptions.

The first documents of the operative department of the headquarters of the Law Faculty


After notifying the commanders on the allocation of front-line control from the MVO, the registration of the subscription composition in full begins.



The case of an OO 1080 military unit begins with the document presented above (sheet 1). However, this does not mean that this document was prepared earlier than the subsequent documents in the file. Documents in affairs are hemmed in process of receipt in a secret department.

In the case, behind the list of the commanding staff, decreasing by echelon, there are lists of the commanding staff who appeared and did not appear on call (sheets 2 and 3). On the above lists there is a resolution: [i] "Ex. No. 1 has been handed over to Major General G. Karavaev. 21.6.41."
... Consequently, both documents were printed on the evening of June 20 or the morning of June 21, and the resolution was applied on Saturday. There is not a single correction in both documents - these are ordinary documents of peacetime. Nicely designed: no mistakes or fixes.

The new document (list of decreasing echelon) is already a wartime document, as it has numerous edits:

1) Captains Dax and Bozhenko removed from the list. Captain Bozhenko departed for Vinnitsa on June 22, and captain Dax departed for 23 on June with the main staff of the OO;

2) the list includes the WSS experts who were called only on 22 June;

3) in the list three experts of the WSS and 11 cadets, who were assigned to the NGO 22 June, were written in handwritten dough;

4) the list was supplemented by personnel two times. First time "signature st.pom.nach. 1 Division Petukhov"is peeped above the mention of cadets. The second signature we see at the bottom of the document.

Thus, we can conclude that the list of commanders was prepared no earlier than June 22. Consequently, the 2 and 3 sheets in the OO case appeared before the specified list.

Captain Kolokoltsev D.K. - this is Kolokoltsev Dmitrievich Konstantinovich. He was crossed out with a red pencil in the list of officers who did not appear on call. So he still appeared. Probably 22 or 23 Jun. Subsequently, he did not serve in the headquarters of the Law Faculty.

From the personnel of the PA, noted in the list of commanders (outgoing train), it was possible to establish:

1) Zyabkina MV, Smirnova A.I., Stremenkova B.P. and Sobolev A.P. - called up from stock 22.6.41 g .;

2) specialists of the WSSS Lyubimov N.S., Platonov M.I., Yumatov A.S., Kochko I.L., Belousov V.P. were called from the stock also 22 Jun.

In the column "call date"the rest of the FSS specialists noted"June 1941 g"Probably they were also called up from the June 22 reserve, and the lack of a date is negligence or haste in the paperwork. A similar situation exists in the documents of senior manager of the administrative service Rykunova BV, quartermaster Y. Rybalchenko and other OO commanders called up from the reserve;

3) the list mentions three typists. These are freelance staff: Savchuk, Berezhkovskaya and Ushakova (later the name of the typist Zakharova appears in the documents of the LF headquarters), who were not planned to take part in the field trip on June 23. In the documents Savchuk AP, Berezhkovskoy Z.A. and Zakharova A.N. marked the date of entry into service - 22 June 1941 year;

4) of the draftsmen who found themselves in the OO headquarters of the Law Faculty, it was possible to restore only Ryabinov MA (called to 22.6.41 G.) and Denisova S.B. (called to 23.6.41 the city of Kirov RVK Moscow);

The list refers to 11 cadets without specifying the military institutions in which they previously served. As of 20 July, 7 cadet trainees and 9 NKVD frontier cadets are on the staff of OO.

From 7 cadets-trainees managed to establish: Terekhin Ivan Vasilyevich, Krasavin Nikolai Alexandrovich, Korshunov Georgiy Gennadievich and Zhelannii Mikhail Vasilyevich. All of them are called to the spacecraft in 1940 year, sent to the army 22 June and served in cryptographic communications. It turns out that they are all from the cipher school of the Moscow Military District and are attached to the OO as cipher-trainees. At that time, only the QA commanders from the junior lieutenant and above could be the coders.

Of the 9 border guard cadets, only two cadets of the Higher Border School (Moscow) were established: Yu.E. Gazenklever. and Nagarnikova V.D. On the school website there is information that because of the start of the war, cadets who entered the school in 1940 (17-th recruitment of core students), starting from June 22, were sent to military units sent to the front or stationed in defensive positions. 21 June no one has sent cadets of the frontier schools to the troops.

From which cadets the number of 11 formed, which is given in the list, is difficult to say. It is possible that when sending later, a larger number of cadets were included than was noted in the list.

From the presented data it is clear that the OO staff of the LF began its deployment in full only on 22 June. The order of the Military Council of the Law Firm of 2.7.41 states:
Manning departments and departments with missing personnel is required, using primarily surplus departments and divisions ...


It turns out that as of July 1, the headquarters of the Law Faculty had over-the-staff personnel. This is confirmed by the document.



The ending should ...
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  1. +11
    20 June 2019 18: 36
    The Germans broke all the plans of the staff ... this is the case when virtual plans break down about the harsh reality of war.
    I read the memoirs of many veterans about the first days of the war ... there was complete mess in the leadership of the Red Army ... there was no connection ... there was no clarity of situation ... the orders of the higher authorities often contradicted each other ... it cost a lot to the Red Army.
    Against this background, only the Soviet Navy was on top ... in time to meet the enemy.
    1. +6
      20 June 2019 19: 20
      As for the fleet, this is a common misconception. In fact, the Germans did not plan to attack the Soviet Navy on June 22.06. Or even later. Planned mine production, which were carried out almost according to plan
      1. +6
        20 June 2019 19: 28
        I agree ... with your error. hi
        The Germans started the war on the Black Sea in the early morning of June 22, 1941, having made an air raid on the Main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, dropping several air mines.
        On 03.13 June 22, 1941 “Several planes appeared, marching at a low altitude from the west, from the side of the sea” (P.A. Morgunov “Heroic Sevastopol”, M.1979).
        (Major General Pyotr Alekseevich Morgunov. In 1941-1942, the commandant of the coastal defense of the Main Base, the deputy commander of the Sevastopol defensive area for land defense).

        https://flot.com/blog/piton56/8599.php
        1. +6
          20 June 2019 20: 35
          This was the mine setting of bottom contactless mines. It was carried out demonstratively precisely with the aim of forcing the fleet to remain at the base. Well, they didn’t shoot much. The documents of the German headquarters are now open, there is no talk of strikes. There were simply not enough planes for this. The Luftwaffe has announced that it will work on our airfields and on the support of land explorers. They also did not give ships, they wanted to use them against England. Although they could use Lutz and a couple of smaller cruisers to attack the Baltic, plus destroyers and torpedo boats. In general, if the Germans had a plan to hit the fleet, the losses would be no less than on land. It was assumed that the rapid advance of the army would leave the fleet without bases and it would cease to exist.
    2. +6
      21 June 2019 22: 49
      "The laying of mines began at 23:30 on June 21. A group of minelayers" Nord ", guarded by six boat minesweepers and four torpedo boats, put obstacles I-12, I-13, I-14, I-15 and I-16 in several stages between Bengtsher Island and Cape Tahkuna. " watched a Soviet battleship heading west, and after leaving, at about 17:57, noticed ships and at least three warships. During the laying of mines, Soviet coastal observation posts several times interrogated the German ships with Morse code light. They did not respond, but " Kaiser "lit the anchor lights."
      "This is called" Low level of training of command and enlisted personnel. "In a number of cases, minesaghs were found by observation posts and they were requested. Apparently, the lack of an answer satisfied everyone. Moreover, the minesagh Kaiser, in response to the request, generally turned on the stern of the mines, which also suited everyone. But this is not surprising: no one reported above about these cases. Well, someone is swimming there and it is normal. "
      “It was on the obstacle of the Nord group that the Baltic Fleet's minelayer protection detachment fell on June 23, 1941. As a result, the destroyer Gnevny was killed, the cruiser Maksim Gorky was heavily damaged, and the destroyers Proud and Guarding were lightly damaged. The Germans achieved a serious material result, and an equally important moral result, the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Vice-Admiral V.F. Tributs telegraphed the People's Commissar: “Within one day, the enemy almost paralyzed the activities of the fleet in the Gulf of Finland, today it is impossible to send a risk ".
  2. +10
    20 June 2019 18: 41
    Time coincidence plus or minus a few days
    The more I think about these events, the more interesting ...
  3. +5
    20 June 2019 18: 57
    This suggests (in my opinion) that the USSR had no intention of fighting with Germany, and that in relation to Romania (EXACTLY the Southern Front liberated Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina-Chernivtsi region in 1940), it was planning something. It was possible that they expected revenge attempts
    1. +6
      20 June 2019 21: 58
      An interesting article, more comments by historians, with comments by veterans.
    2. +5
      21 June 2019 22: 40
      Yes yes ..... Absolutely no intentions ..... From Romania terribly aggressive expected return.
      "Therefore, on June 21, at the first meeting with Stalin, not particularly important issues were considered: the creation of the Southern Front (SF), the appointment of the commander of the second line armies and the leaders of the Northern Front, Southwestern Front (SWF) and the SF."
      Only the author has 3 fronts in the text. Apparently, all 3 are against Romania, especially Northern.
      And the creation of the Southern Front in peacetime is a secondary issue .....
      1. +9
        22 June 2019 07: 31
        The 3 fronts are not listed by the author, but by the draft decision reviewed on the evening of June 21)))
        The creation of the LF is, of course, a secondary issue ... It was necessary to disperse aircraft, raise air defense troops and urgently return air defense units from the landfills, take long-term facilities for the UR battalions, load ammunition into them, start deploying communications troops, withdraw the support groups that should were to arrive in less than an hour, ordering the withdrawal of connections at least to the concentration points for the alarm, but not to leave them at the points of permanent dislocation. Much could have been done, but nothing was done ...
        1. +6
          24 June 2019 13: 02
          That is, all of the above should have been done? Of course, it’s hard to argue with this now, only decisions were made by the leadership of the USSR, unfortunately, without taking into account the knowledge of the history of 2019 ....
          Is it common practice to deploy fronts in peacetime ?? In addition to the Far East, with the Japanese at their side, there were usually no fronts in the USSR. Except for "liberation campaigns". It turns out that in 1941 the USSR decided to release someone again?
          1. +6
            24 June 2019 22: 02
            We have no documents that would confirm the memoirs of Zhukov, that the leadership of the USSR took decisions prohibiting the military to do something.
            It is no secret that the beginning of the war was expected in the middle of May 1941. From April began a sharp increase in the number of German divisions, which brought up to our border. This is according to our intelligence.
            The country's leadership agreed to prepare the troops for a possible repulse of aggression. In the bunkers loaded ammunition and food, organized the permanent presence of garrisons in the long-term facilities, rifle battalions, reinforced by an artillery battery and a platoon of tanks, arrived at the outposts. The remaining parts and connections were on high alert. The air defense units put into firing positions, but they were in readiness of the N3.
            20-21 Jun nothing was done. No need for Stalin’s sanctions to load ammunition into the bunkers. There is no need for Stalin’s resolution in order not to keep permanent garrisons at least in the bunks, to organize the duty of duty crews. Return artillery troops and air defense troops from the camps. These are the plans of the General Staff and Stalin do not care how the military learn ...
            The fact that Zhukov is to blame for the tragedy of June 22 can be seen from his memoirs, in which there is no word about his actions from 20 to June 21. The only evidence of that period is the fictitious pretext of meeting with Stalin on the evening of June 21 ...
            1. +9
              25 June 2019 11: 06
              The topic of the "chief commander's" guilt is separate and extensive. Therefore, I prefer to discuss such a global all the same separately, do not complain ...
              As for the preparation or, accordingly, the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war ..... Again, so much has been stated that it is typical, from opposite positions and with references to the same sources, which is not very ..... interesting to say. Everyone sees what he wants, he wanted to spit on what he does not like.
              I would just like to hear an explanation of the fierce concentration of forces and means in the border area. Not necessarily from you)))) That's just sane, IMHO, essno ..... And it turns out a little strange. In the area of ​​Brest - a breakthrough of artillery and ammunition for her. In Brest itself - so-so, which is why he was left on the morning of the 22nd, art went away ..... "in the trophies" ..... And such examples are innumerable. At the same time, in some areas, the troops happily went on the offensive and seized enemy territory. That is, they all had some plans and they tried to fulfill them in accordance with the charter. But they are not shown .... As well as plans to repel aggression. Eternal theme .....
              1. -2
                25 June 2019 13: 26
                Quote: frog
                I just would like to hear an explanation of the fierce concentration of forces and means in the border area. Not necessarily from you))))

                There was no fierce concentration of troops. You can see for yourself if you count the size of the district grouping and the length of the border of responsibility in different western districts. Believe me, the numbers are not in favor of the "concentration" of troops, even rather the troops were not enough to cover the state border.
            2. -5
              25 June 2019 13: 21
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              On June 20-21, nothing was done.

              Nonsense - the presence of a directive b / n, which indicates the date of the German attack on June 22-23, best indicates that the war was expected, and were given orders to the okrug and the NKVMF. Another thing is why the plans for covering the districts in full with a short order were not introduced - this remains a mystery to researchers, and until at least the protocol or the transcript of the evening meeting with Stalin appears, either amateurs or outright liars, pursuing their goals of discrediting the country's leadership, and the leader in the first place.
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              The fact that Zhukov is to blame for the tragedy of June 22 can be seen from his memoirs, in which there is no word about his actions from 20 to June 21. The only evidence of that period is the fictitious pretext of meeting with Stalin on the evening of June 21 ...

              This is a clear juggle.
              Zhukov, by definition, could not be to blame for the tragedy of June 21, because Tymoshenko was his boss, although his personal guilt, as chief of the general staff, is there, but you have no idea about her because you don’t know what he was responsible for. So there are fewer slogans - let’s facts what Zhukov was personally guilty of.
              Otherwise, you will be considered an ordinary liar, speculating on the topic of June 22.
  4. +7
    24 June 2019 22: 22
    Quote: frog
    Is it common practice to deploy fronts in peacetime ?? In addition to the Far East, with the Japanese at their side, there were usually no fronts in the USSR. Except for "liberation campaigns". It turns out that in 1941 the USSR decided to release someone again?

    About the inevitability of war with Germany, the leadership of the country and the army knew. I hope we will not argue about this?
    Creating a front in peacetime has virtually no effect on events in wartime, I think so. What is the difference without front and with the front? The field office is separated from the staff of the district and moves to the field office. In the district remains the headquarters for mobilization. And it's all! Troops, airplanes, credits are not affected. Increased controllability of troops (so thought) and all.
    But communications shelves are not deployed, communications funds are not released from warehouses ....
    In my opinion, this is a half-measure the same as the organization of the permanent duty of commanders in the headquarters ...

    Regarding the release of someone - again, I will express only my opinion - it is unlikely. Why? A special corps in the Crimea until the beginning of June was waiting for the landing of the enemy and even the passage of a powerful Italian fleet into the Black Sea.
    South front. According to intelligence data in Romania, only German divisions to 36, and even Romanian 40. And how many troops in the Southern Front?
    For the rest of the border, liberation is a war with Germany. In May, the British Ambassador wrote in his message that the Russian military are eager to postpone the war at least until December ...
    Sudoplatov wrote that the military and the leadership of the country tried to prevent the creation of a large superiority over parts of the spacecraft - this is what I believe more. Shine a larger number of 1's divisions, but not surpass the German troops in numbers ...
    In addition, intelligence reported on contacts of the English circles with a view to agreeing on the cessation of hostilities and the formation of a united front against the USSR. The main thing is that it was reported both from German circles and from English. In such a situation, it would be foolish to invade the west by the leadership of the country ....
    I expressed only my opinion, since there is no documentary evidence, and the memories often deliberately distort the events of this period.
    1. +10
      25 June 2019 11: 22
      Thanks for the detailed answer. However, IMHO, it does not quite correctly reflect the state of affairs. But this is my personal opinion ..... To discuss this very topic here is an artel naprsany work. Because there are much more questions than answers. And, as usual, criticism of the same Suvorov, as well as his supporters, will come and ....... "discussion" ... Emotional ..... about such things, if you really talk, then, sorry , "in private", "direct", so to speak ....
      But in short, the difference with the front and without is global. Because management is shared. As for the non-deployment of communications, I would like, if possible, links to sources. Not for criticism, for the sake of interest for ....))))
      The special corps in the Crimea did nothing to repulse the enemy’s landing, rather, on the contrary, he was going to take part in landing ...
      The 11th Wehrmacht army took part in the database, EMNIP, July 2 ..... Already after the Red Army knocked out the Romanians from its territory, with the exception of the EMNIP, one bridgehead, and carried out landings on Romanian territory ... And so on .... But, as I said, there is no desire to be the initiator of the next swara .....
    2. -9
      25 June 2019 13: 49
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The creation of a front in peacetime has practically no effect on events in wartime, it seems to me that way.

      A front can be created in peacetime, but as a rule they don’t do this, in light of the functioning of many district services that do not fall into the front line. But if we create a front in peacetime, then we can pre-equip combat units at the expense of other parts of the district, and then the combat capabilities of the front-line units will increase. In the event of a surprise attack, this reserve will be obtained much later. We must proceed from this when evaluating when it is better to create a front.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      What is the difference without front and front? The field administration stands out from the district headquarters and moves to the field CP. The district remains the headquarters for mobilization actions. And it's all!

      This is an oversimplified understanding, if only because when creating the front, the troops immediately begin to advance to their original positions, or turn around where it is provided for by a cover plan. In the district there remains a tiny group of officers under the command of one of the deputy commanders, which resolves all issues with the liquidation of the district, and then decreases in the front.
      Mobilization activities are only part of the work of this group, because the evacuation and transfer of property of the district also falls on the shoulders of those who remain in such a group.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Troops, aircraft, military personnel do not move. The controllability of troops is increasing (they thought so) and that’s all.

      This is not so at all - in the parts of the cover, the enlisted staff can already be dressed in uniform in two to four hours, and lose their position, or stay to guard the property left. And airplanes almost immediately begin to distill or disperse to alternate aerodromes - that was the way it should be done if a cover plan was introduced in the districts.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      In such a situation, invading the West would be stupid on the part of the country's leadership ....

      The point is not even in this situation, but in the fact that the economic potential of the USSR and the lack of combat experience among the units of the Red Army, with insufficient equipment of modern weapons, generally excluded the possibility of an attack on the most powerful army in the world. It was from this that our entire policy of containing the Germans was built, and therefore, every delayed day of the war was considered a great success for us at that time. It is precisely because of this that Stalin categorically forbade any active action against the Germans, even if they repeatedly violated our airspace.
  5. +10
    25 June 2019 19: 21
    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    В 03.13 June 22, 1941 “Several planes appeared, marching at a low altitude from the west, from the side of the sea” (P.A. Morgunov “Heroic Sevastopol”, M.1979).


    A report by Kopets (CALL) on approaching German aircraft was made in 30–40 minutes. after Admiral Oktyabrsky reported the discovery of "unknown" aircraft and received permission to open fire.
    1. +1
      27 June 2019 06: 51
      There was also information that the locator at Evpatoria spotted unknown planes as early as 1-30
  6. -7
    26 June 2019 19: 42
    Author:
    Eugene
    In the previous parts (part 1 and part 2), documents and memoirs of war veterans were examined, which indicate that the leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft was not concerned about the deployed number of German troops at the border and their concentration places until the evening of 21.6.41.

    What joy was the resident of the NKVMF Vorontsov, who arrived on June 21 and gave an urgent report to Kuznetsov, and according to some historians, reported to Stalin on the situation in Berlin at the evening meeting, was urgently summoned from Berlin then.
    19 June in the General Staff, a decision is made to begin the mobilization deployment of the front control based on the ArVO. Where should the deployed control go from ArVO?

    Enchanting stupidity - you even managed to misinterpret the text of the directive, because instead of managing the FRONT, the ARMY field management is deployed in it, i.e. structure rank below:
    Form is necessary army field control with organs service, security, editorial and printing of the army newspaper in state No. 48/926.

    We read further:
    The list includes 20 people, including the deputy chief of staff - the chief of the PA, General Vorobyov, and the deputy chief of the PA, Major Lyamin. If Captain Kolokoltsev had arrived, then the 21 man was on the list. You do not think that this number of commanders is too small for the OO headquarters of the army or the front?

    Why is it not enough for a small district with a small number, if 67 officers served in the operational management of the Red Army? For the army, such a number of officers of the OO is brute force in general, not only in peacetime, but also in the wartime.
    The typist is a civilian person, and she, as a military man, is not entitled to an irregular working day. Civilian employees have normalized working hours. According to the law, he should pay for processing, but somehow this issue was still decided.

    Complete nonsense - a typist for military service, and even in peacetime decreases for all exercises with headquarters, and even more so in the military. And she is alarmed just like all the staff officers. The author decided to tell one more fairy tale ...
    At that time, the GS organization also included the division of the specialists of the cryptographic-staff service (SS),

    Ostap suffered ...
    There was no "cipher-headquarters service (SHS)", but there was simply a "cipher-service (SHS)", without any "headquarters". This is how people who are illiterate in military affairs come up with fables, spread them through the networks, and then they are surprised that they are called liars. Where did you get the term "cipher-staff service (SHS)" - tell or give a link, just not to Victoria, which itself is illiterate in such matters.
    1. +7
      26 June 2019 20: 38
      Quote: ccsr
      What joy was the resident of the NKVMF Vorontsov, who arrived on June 21 and gave an urgent report to Kuznetsov, and according to some historians, reported to Stalin on the situation in Berlin at the evening meeting, was urgently summoned from Berlin then.


      The historians did not correctly read the last name: Voroshilov, not Vorontsov, attended the meeting.
      I am ashamed to not know such subtleties ...
      1. -6
        27 June 2019 14: 00
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        The historians did not correctly read the last name: Voroshilov, not Vorontsov, attended the meeting.
        I am ashamed to not know such subtleties ...

        It is a shame to you not to know that the names of the RESIDENT OF MILITARY EXPLORATION or the NKVD could not even indicate (or change it), so that no one who had access to the list of visits knew that this person was called to Stalin.
        In early April 1938, Rybkin was unexpectedly called to Moscow. And on April 7, to the great surprise of Boris Arkadevich, he was received by I.V. Stalin. In the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov, he talked with Rybkin for almost two hours, taking an interest in the details of the political and economic life of Finland, while showing good knowledge about this country. The essence of the call was that on behalf of the Soviet government, he was entrusted with conducting probe negotiations with the government of Finland. In the archival materials of foreign intelligence, these negotiations are referred to as negotiations on the April 7 case.
        In his memoirs Z.I. Voskresenskaya describes this scene in Rybkin’s conversation with the USSR Ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay in the year 1943:
        A.M. What questions did Molotov and Voroshilov ask you?
        Keen. While Stalin questioned me, they were silent. Finally, Joseph Vissarionovich, turning to them, asked: "Well, what is your opinion, will we entrust him?" Both nodded their heads in agreement. “So, dear comrade, comrade ...” Stalin hesitated. “Rybkin,” I prompted. Stalin laughed: “You scouts always have so many names and professions that you must have gotten into it yourself ... We decided to authorize you to conduct strictly secret negotiations with the Government of Finland. ”

        https://military.wikireading.ru/25815
    2. +4
      26 June 2019 20: 47
      Quote: ccsr
      Complete nonsense - a typist for military service, and even in peacetime decreases for all exercises with headquarters, and even more so in the military. And she is alarmed just like all the staff officers. The author decided to tell one more fairy tale ...


      Read the syllables: "the typist is not liable for military service, but a civilian"! civilian personnel have a strictly rationed working day. And after the outbreak of the war and joining the service in the column, they had a record "without rank." Why breed female screams, bring a document where it is indicated that I am wrong ...
      1. -3
        27 June 2019 14: 11
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Read the syllables: "the typist is not liable for military service, but a civilian"!

        Your illiteracy in military matters is simply off scale, because the term "civilian" is used for all categories of civilian personnel of NGOs - stokers, plumbers, chauffeurs, accountants, etc.
        But the term "liable for military service" refers to a strictly defined category of citizens - for example, doctors, secret clerical workers, who have permission, some civilian signalmen on the eve of the war, etc.
        As for the "standardized" working day, it exists in peacetime, but even when withdrawing to an exercise, this is not respected - and every person liable for military service who gives consent to work in an NCO is notified of this, otherwise they will simply not be hired.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Why are women screaming to breed, bring a document that states that I'm wrong ...

        I don’t divorce them - we had three women who went with us for all the exercises, some of them lasting up to 10 days, and their families could do without them ..
        1. +3
          27 June 2019 14: 21
          Documentary evidence that the typists of the Moscow Military District were in charge of military service !! Do not faktazy, let's confirm
          What kind of kindergarten !? If only if ....
          1. -2
            27 June 2019 16: 05
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Documentary evidence that the typists of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District were military liable !!

            He sang an old song, verbiage - now I’ll run away for the sake of educational program in the archives of the subscription that typists gave when hiring an NGO.
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            What a kindergarten !?

            This is not a fantasy - this is the real life of the army, in which you simply have wild ideas of a civilian.
  7. +5
    26 June 2019 20: 40
    Quote: ccsr
    19 June in the General Staff, a decision is made to begin the mobilization deployment of the front control based on the ArVO. Where should the deployed control go from ArVO?

    Enchanting stupidity - you even managed to misinterpret the text of the directive, because instead of managing the FRONT, the ARMY field management is deployed in it, i.e. structure rank below:
    It is necessary to form an army field office with service agencies, guards, editors and printers of the army newspaper according to staff number 48 / 926.


    Repeatedly wrote to you: read by syllables - maybe then it will come!

    In the encryption from 19 June we should have talked about the formation of front-line control in ArVO. The encryption from 24 June cancels the previous order and already speaks about the formation of the army command ...
    1. -3
      27 June 2019 14: 18
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Repeatedly wrote to you: read by syllables - maybe then it will come!

      In the encryption from 19 June we should have talked about the formation of front-line control in ArVO. The encryption from 24 June cancels the previous order and already speaks about the formation of the army command ...

      And what is so mysterious if it is a common practice, when a new directive cancels or changes the essence of an earlier order?
      But this is not the point, but in your words:
      On June 19, 1941, a cipher telegram (SHT) was sent from the General Staff to the headquarters of the Arkhangelsk Military District (ArVO) about the beginning of the deployment of front-line command. The telegram text could not be found, but in another document there is a link to the specified PC.

      This means that you have not seen the text of the directive of June 19, but you have the audacity to assert that there was what you think. You did not even give a link to "another document", and suggest believing you, although you already know what kind of dreamer you are. And after that they sucked out a whole "theory" from the finger, as if it were what decided in that situation.
      1. +3
        27 June 2019 14: 26
        The text is very unambiguous: "In the change of the directive of the General Staff No.org / 1/524033 of 19.06.41, the field control of the front provided for by the deployment scheme should not be formed."
        There was a directive of the General Staff on the formation of the front field control, which is being clarified on June 24.

        This is much more definite than the quirks of your friend about the call from the Kremlin to the General Staff. There is no confirmation at all, but you supported it! Then it was profitable, but now do nonsense
        1. +1
          27 June 2019 14: 29
          You still read by syllables, so it is better understood)))
          1. -5
            27 June 2019 18: 44
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            You still read by syllables, so it is better understood)))

            You generally don’t understand the essence of this directive, but with a smart look they brought it for some reason.
            Tell us in more detail what "strategic" significance was the directive of June 19, if it had to be changed with the outbreak of the war?
        2. -5
          27 June 2019 16: 11
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          The text is very unambiguous: "In the change of the directive of the General Staff No.org / 1/524033 of 19.06.41, the field control of the front provided for by the deployment scheme should not be formed."

          And what follows from this, especially since they could also cancel this order after some time? What are you trying to prove here?
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          it’s much more definite than your friend’s twists about a call from the Kremlin to the General Staff.

          I don’t know what you’re talking about, so bring the text to begin with.
  8. +6
    26 June 2019 20: 45
    Quote: ccsr
    We read further:
    The list includes 20 people, including the deputy chief of staff - the chief of the PA, General Vorobyov, and the deputy chief of the PA, Major Lyamin. If Captain Kolokoltsev had arrived, then the 21 man was on the list. You do not think that this number of commanders is too small for the OO headquarters of the army or the front?

    Why is it not enough for a small district with a small number, if 67 officers served in the operational management of the Red Army? For the army, such a number of officers of the OO is brute force in general, not only in peacetime, but also in the wartime.


    For such statements is required to bring documents to confirm. The article states that the state in the operational department of the front should be 58 people after the separation of the encryption department from its composition.
    Read by syllables - it will probably be clearer ...
    1. -4
      27 June 2019 15: 11
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      For such statements it is required to provide documents for confirmation.

      Please - Document No. 350
      Vacation plan for the commanding staff of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army for 1941, approved on March 31, 1941 by the head of the Directorate, Lieutenant General Malandin

      https://alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1011580
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The article states that there should be 58 people in the operational department of the front after separating the encryption department from its composition.

      For such statements it is required to provide documents for confirmation.
      We are waiting ...
      1. +2
        1 July 2019 09: 22
        So why wait? See the last document in the article.
        Counted 58 people in total.
        1. 0
          4 July 2019 16: 41
          Quote: cavl
          So why wait? See the last document in the article.
          Counted 58 people in total.

          You apparently did not understand that the author of the article fantasized that 20 officers of the operational department (without cryptographers) are too few, so you had to show him that even in the operational management of the General Staff the total number of officers is not so great that there was anything to compare with. The last document of the article indicated the TOTAL number for loading onto transport, and before that only the officers of the operational department of the front were counted, and in fact, according to the previous list drawn up in June, there were only 37 people, which just corresponds to the ratio:
          in the operational management of the General Staff - 58 officers, in the front department - 25 officers, plus typists and cadets, a total of 37 people. Those. in Moscow, the formation of the department took place according to the state, and talking about some kind of lack of staff is simply wrong.
  9. +7
    26 June 2019 20: 51
    Quote: ccsr
    At that time, the GS organization also included the division of the specialists of the cryptographic-staff service (SS),

    Ostap suffered ...
    There was no "cipher-headquarters service (SHS)", but there was simply a "cipher-service (SHS)", without any "headquarters". This is how people who are illiterate in military affairs come up with fables, spread them through the networks, and then they are surprised that they are called liars. Where did you get the term "cipher-staff service (SHS)" - tell or give a link, just not to Victoria, which itself is illiterate in such matters.


    The registration cards of military personnel indicate that they are specialists of the "cipher-staff service". After the separation of this service from the operational department (management), the position and indication of the "encryption service", "special communication" or "8th department" are written in the documents about these people. Different cards are different. Why yell, I say again. Show the document on the indicated military personnel, which indicates the text that you dispute.

    There were so many distortions in your words that only you can believe the documentary confirmation ...
    1. +6
      27 June 2019 06: 25
      Oh, I mistook a pseudo-expert of the sofa troops !!)) Well, without the grammar! But proudly expresses his opinion ... Opinion of the sofa expert))
      I remember discussing air defense problems with you on the eve of the war (comments on the 19 part of the cycle). And how did you, through WEEK after the discussion, proudly led the combat log that was quoted in the section you criticized. A week later, we discovered what was in the article)))
      I then asked: You do not read the material, which criticize?))

      Now again the same thing ... I have it written "specialists of the ShShS" - this is the position)) You should read the material more carefully!
      In the List of command personnel sent by the echelon, the position of ciphers is indicated and there are three cherished letters "ShShS" written there !!)))
      If you don’t even look for the commander’s account cards, you could at least look at it on the Internet! Eh, an expert of sofa troops ... Did Kozinkin really like that linden?))
      It is written on the Internet that the main document of the encryptors is the "Manual on the encryption-staff service of the spacecraft", which was periodically replaced. This is the official name of the service. Another replacement of the instruction on shshs occurred in 1943.
      In the archive in 1939, the corresponding files were also called: "... Cases and documents on ... the cipher-headquarters service, intelligence and technology of special secrecy - should have been kept ..."
      The schools in which junior lieutenants were trained for the service were officially called the "school of the cipher-staff service" ... Burdock, did you not guess?)))
      1. +6
        27 June 2019 06: 28
        And Victoria, who fiercely criticized you, dear Ekspert of sofa armies, long ago even sent me quotes from the instruction on the ShShS. Those. she is much better versed in this matter than me, and you are up to her, like half the moon)))
        1. -5
          27 June 2019 15: 44
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          And Victoria, who fiercely criticized you, dear Ekspert of sofa armies, long ago even sent me quotes from the instruction on the ShShS. Those. she is much better versed in this matter than me, and you are up to her, like half the moon)))

          Well, where are the links to these documents? And why in the document the first letter "w" is written with a capital letter, and the next two with a capital "SHS"?
      2. -4
        27 June 2019 15: 42
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        I have written "ShShS specialists" - this is the position))
        In the List of command personnel sent by the echelon, the position of ciphers is indicated and there are three cherished letters "ShShS" written there !!)))

        You can write whatever you want, but you do not even understand why the document says "ШШС" and not "ШШС" and why the first letter is capitalized and not capitalized - this is a Chinese letter for you.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        If you don’t even look for commander accounting cards,

        Already started to back up - where are these cards, dreamer?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        It is written on the Internet that the main document of the encryptors is the "Manual on the encryption-staff service of the spacecraft", which was periodically replaced.

        Stop wagging verbiage - where did you find the term "cipher-staff service" in the orders and documents of 1941?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        In the archive in 1939, the corresponding files were also called: "... Cases and documents on ... the cipher-headquarters service, intelligence and technology of special secrecy - should have been kept ..."

        Yes, they could write anything in the archive when combining the affairs of different structures, but this does not mean that there was an encryption-staff service, because there was only Encryption Department.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        The schools in which junior lieutenants were trained for the service were officially called the "school of the cipher-staff service" ... Burdock, did you not guess?)))

        Why then are you afraid to bring documents with this name? But you, as an ordinary mug, apparently do not know that in this school they could train not only cipher clerks, but also clerks for headquarters, specialists for plotting the situation on maps, which is why such a name for the school could have arisen, and not because the General Staff was "cipher- staff service ".
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        I remember discussing air defense problems with you on the eve of the war (comments on the 19 part of the cycle). And how did you, through WEEK after the discussion, proudly led the combat log that was quoted in the section you criticized. A week later, we discovered what was in the article)))

        It seems to you that I was discussing something with you - I ridiculed your ignorance, and used the text of other articles. And the fact that you are a layman in military affairs I discovered long before you began to object to me.
      3. -4
        28 June 2019 13: 01
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        It is written on the Internet that the main document of the encryptors is the "Manual on the encryption-staff service of the spacecraft", which was periodically replaced.

        It is written on the Internet that the "Manual" was introduced in 1943, and not in June 1941, which you are talking about here. So let's link to a real document, and not to the "specialist" Victoria, which you have on the Moon, since it is so far away ...
    2. -4
      27 June 2019 15: 25
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The registration cards of military personnel indicate that they are specialists of the "cipher-staff service".

      So where are these cards? But this is not the point - where in the documents of NGOs did you find such an interpretation of these higher educational institutions?
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      After the separation of this service from the operational department (management), the position and indication of the "encryption service", "special communication" or "8th department" are written in the documents about these people.

      And you generally know that on July 19, 1939, the 8th department of the General Staff of the Red Army was renamed Encryption Department and included as an independent structural unit in the Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. Where in the name of the Department you saw that he "cipher-staff service" not just "encryption service"? Have you come up with such a name for this department?

      Quote: AsmyppoL
      In different cards in different ways.

      What does the card have to do with it if the department name is "encryption service"?
      http://old.redstar.ru/2008/11/14_11/2_01.html
  10. +8
    27 June 2019 09: 48
    Quote: ccsr
    With what joy, then, was urgently summoned from Berlin by a resident of the NKVMF intelligence Vorontsov, who arrived on June 21 and made an urgent report to Kuznetsov
    It was more difficult for the Germans to hide preparations at sea. As Kuznetsov himself writes In May, not only airspace violations became more frequent. From various sources we learned about the movements of German troops on our borders. German warships pulled into the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. They suspiciously often called at Finnish ports and lingered there. The Baltic Theater bothered us the most: the fleet, which had only recently received new bases, was in its infancy. It was necessary to strengthen these bases from the sea, to strengthen their rear.
    Immediately a week before the outbreak of hostilities, the number of ship calls to our seaports under the German flag sharply decreased. And literally on the eve of the war, from June 19, German ships began to leave our seaports without even completing loading and unloading. In each commercial sea port, in addition to the captain of a trading or fishing port, there is also a commander of the naval base, into which the seaport turns after the declaration of a state of war or other directive. All this (reduction in the number of calls, the flight of vessels that did not complete the PRR) from could not go unnoticed by the sailors.
    Apparently from this joy.
    1. -6
      27 June 2019 15: 59
      Quote: Seal
      It was more difficult for the Germans to hide preparations at sea.

      Quote: Seal
      Apparently from this joy.

      You didn’t quite understand correctly - everything you write about was constantly reported by the resident Vorontsov himself through the residency of the General Staff of the General Staff in Berlin in the form of codes that were delivered to the headquarters of the Navy.
      But the fact that a scout of such magnitude was called on the eve of the attack tells experts everything - Vorontsov brought the exact data that the attack would take place on June 22, which is why he was urgently heard. And he informed not only his opinion, but also the opinion of a resident of the General Staff of the General Staff, who was not specifically withdrawn in order not to give the Germans an excuse to think that the date of the attack was known to our intelligence in Berlin.
  11. +3
    27 June 2019 14: 16
    Quote: ccsr
    It is a shame to you not to know that the names of the RESIDENT OF MILITARY EXPLORATION or the NKVD could not even indicate (or change it), so that no one who had access to the list of visits knew that this person was called to Stalin.
    In early April 1938, Rybkin was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow. And on April 7, to Boris Arkadyevich’s great surprise, he was received by JV Stalin. In the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov, he talked with Rybkin for almost two hours, taking an interest in the details of the political and economic life of Finland, while showing good knowledge about this country. The essence of the challenge was that he, on behalf of the Soviet government, was entrusted with conducting sound negotiations with the Government of Finland. In the archives of foreign intelligence, these negotiations are referred to as negotiations on the April 7 case.
    In his memoirs Z.I. Voskresenskaya describes this scene in Rybkin’s conversation with the USSR Ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay in the year 1943:
    A.M. What questions did Molotov and Voroshilov ask you?
    Kin While Stalin asked me, they were silent. Finally, Joseph Vissarionovich, turning to them, asked: “Well, what is your opinion, shall we entrust him?” Both nodded their heads in agreement. "So, dear comrade, comrade ..." - Stalin hesitated. “Rybkin,” I prompted. Stalin laughed: "You, intelligence officers, always have so many surnames, professions, that you probably got confused in them ... We decided to authorize you to conduct strictly secret negotiations with the Government of Finland."

    https://military.wikireading.ru/25815

    I understand you are holding me for school? Why write explicit nonsense? I have been working on this issue for a couple of years now and I know where the version about Vorontsov came from! This is a mistake when reprinting the magazine of Stalin's publication! There Vorontsov was printed over Beria. In the original - Voroshilov.
    Some hacks used this in their writings, but this incident on the forums is long gone ..
    I will not argue that there were people in Stalin’s office who were not listed in the diary: I know about such cases. But in this case - it is a linden for first-graders. As did Pronin and Scherbakov, 21 numbers in Stalin's office. Just like Kuznetsov with Stalin, and then it turned out that the deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission.
    No ideas needed, comrade .... Comrade Stalin did not have a window for Vorontsov’s reception on the evening of 21 June
    1. -6
      27 June 2019 19: 07
      Quote: AsmyppoL

      As I understand it, you hold me for a schoolboy?

      I keep, and obviously not a Soviet schoolchild, judging by the adequacy of the estimates of the Second World War.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      I’ve been dealing with this issue closely for a couple of years now and I know where the version about Vorontsov came from! This is a mistake in reprinting the journal of Stalin's death! There, over Beria, Vorontsov was imprinted. In the original - Voroshilov.

      Complete nonsense - the question is not whether Vorontsov was indicated or not in the journal, but that he was reporting to Kuznetsov, who was present at the meeting with Stalin. But this is not even the point, but the fact that the urgent call of an intelligence officer of such a level FROM BERLIN on the eve of the war best suggests that the top military leadership wanted to receive accurate information from the resident and, if necessary, submit it personally to Stalin for report. According to specialists of the GRU GSH, such a meeting took place. So your demagogy about the fact that Vorontsov was on the list of visitors or not, and there is no need to eat a damn - his last name could not be included in the list of visitors. Alternatively, he could be in Stalin’s reception room at that time and wait for a call after Kuznetsov’s report, to clarify details if the leader wanted to know them. This does not contradict the practice then and then - so you can not wave the magazine, it is not a fact that Stalin did not hear Vorontsov.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      that there were people not listed in the diary in Stalin’s office: I know about such cases.

      Oh, sailed - you know about this practice, but do not want to believe that an urgently called resident could report to Stalin personally. Then why was he called at all - didn’t you think about it?
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      No ideas needed, comrade .... Comrade Stalin did not have a window for Vorontsov’s reception on the evening of 21 June

      You are absolutely stunned - what the hell is a "window" if Vorontsov could be invited to a meeting from the reception, he made a short report, answered questions and then immediately left the meeting. Do you even know anything about the work of higher government agencies?
  12. +6
    27 June 2019 16: 56
    Quote: ccsr
    You didn’t quite understand correctly - everything you write about was constantly reported by the resident Vorontsov himself through the residency of the General Staff of the General Staff in Berlin in the form of codes that were delivered to the headquarters of the Navy.
    What does the residency of the General Staff in Berlin have to do with it? I am talking about our Soviet ports. Are the agents of our resident of the General Staff of the General Staff in Berlin sitting in our Soviet seaports ???
    1. -5
      27 June 2019 18: 52
      Quote: Seal
      What does the residency of the General Staff in Berlin have to do with it?

      The resident Vorontsov, as a naval attache, was in the embassy in Berlin, and did not have his own encryptors, which is why the communication system of the resident of the General Staff of the General Staff was used. He did not deal with Soviet ports, they did not care for him, but he constantly gave information about German ports and the Kriegsmarine - this was his direct duty. And his urgent call to Moscow on the eve of the war speaks for itself - this is obvious.
  13. +5
    1 July 2019 08: 38
    Quote: ccsr
    Do you even know anything about the work of higher government agencies?

    In each period, the features of the work of higher government agencies may vary significantly.
    Quote: ccsr
    You are absolutely crazy - what the hell is a "window" if Vorontsov could be invited to a meeting from the reception, he made a short report, answered questions and then immediately left the meeting.

    Yes, at least for 5 (five) minutes. In this case, comrade Poskrebyshev in the Journal of visits comrade Stalin would make a record (for example, conditional time):

    Vorontsov. Entered at 20:55. Went out at 21:00.

    Quote: ccsr
    And his urgent call to Moscow on the eve of the war speaks for itself - this is obvious.

    What am I talking about? The first sign that something was being conceived for N.G. Kuznetsov was messages from our native Soviet seaports. Because, according to the plans of the Germans, the tenth role was assigned to the kriegsmarine in the war with the USSR.
    And in the information that
    Quote: ccsr
    information about German ports and kriegsmarine he gave constantly
    there could be no change at all. Or all the changes were fully explained by the conduct of the war with England.
    1. +4
      1 July 2019 09: 28
      Correctly noted. At a meeting on June 3, the People's Commissar of Defense lingered a minute and the secretary immediately noted this.

      3 June 1941 year
      1. Potemkin 18.00-19.30
      2. Tarle 18.00-19.30
      3. Mikoyan 19.45-19.55
      4. Malenkov 20.05-20.25
      5. Khrushchev 20.25-21.00

      6. Tymoshenko 20.45—23.31
      7. Zhukov 20.45-23.30
      8. Vatutin 20.45-23.30

      9. Shakhurin 22.40-23.45
      Latest Released 23.45
      1. 0
        4 July 2019 16: 50
        Quote: cavl
        Correctly noted. At a meeting on June 3, the People's Commissar of Defense lingered a minute and the secretary immediately noted this.

        Before the Finnish War, a resident of the NKVD in Finland was personally received by Stalin, and nowhere was his name registered.
    2. 0
      4 July 2019 16: 47
      Quote: Seal
      Yes, at least for 5 (five) minutes. In this case, comrade Poskrebyshev in the Journal of visits comrade Stalin would make a record (for example, conditional time):

      You inattentively read the author of the article - even he admits that not all persons were listed by Poskrebyshev. This is not surprising when the question concerned residents or illegal immigrants.
      Quote: Seal
      Vorontsov. Entered at 20:55. Went out at 21:00.

      The fact is that a controversy erupted around this family name, and not without reason. But this does not mean that even if Vorontsov was in the reception, his name would certainly have been included in the list of visitors if Comrade Stalin had called him.
      Quote: Seal
      In each period, the features of the work of higher government agencies may vary significantly.

      Nifiga does not change - even under Putin and Yeltsin, all officials dance to the same tune, the motive only changes, and bureaucratic dances never.
      Quote: Seal
      What am I talking about? The first sign that something was being conceived for N.G. Kuznetsov was messages from our native Soviet seaports.

      To urgently call a resident, Kuznetsov’s desire alone is not enough - there are procedures related to the NKID, and the issue must be resolved along this line.
  14. 0
    8 July 2019 08: 52
    Quote: ccsr
    This is not surprising when the question concerned residents or illegal immigrants.
    Let me remind you that Vorontsov was neither illegal nor a resident. He was the official naval attache of the USSR in Germany.