21 June 1941 of the year. Creation of the Southern Front

Interest in the creation of the Southern Front

21 June 1941 of the year in 18: 27 the first visitor entered the office of Stalin - V.М. Molotov.

In 19: 05, the first meeting began, at which a draft of the Decree on the creation of the Southern Front, on the appointment of the persons who were entrusted with the general leadership of the South-Western (SWF) and Southern (SF) fronts, the Northern Front, on the appointment of L.Z. Mehlis, head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GU PP KA).

In some articles, this event is directly associated with the expectation of the beginning of the war with Germany 22.6.41 by the leadership of our country and the spacecraft, as well as with the preparation of the USSR armed forces to repel an attack just at dawn 22 June. The proximity of the dates of preparation of the draft and the beginning of the war would seem to be evidence of this.

In the book “Stalin. The secret "scenario" of the beginning of the war "the appointment of Mehlis is also clearly connected with the expectation of war: “Tomorrow is war! And today, on June 21 ..., early in the morning, the drug doctor from the Kremlin brought a new appointment to Lev Mehlis. In the run-up to the “surprise” attack, Stalin returns his assistant to the post of the head of the PG PP KA ... ”.

It is difficult to argue with this, since the draft of the Resolution prepares 21 of June from 19: 05 to 20: 15, and after 35 minutes in the same office a meeting is being held, on which the draft of well-known Directive No. 1 is written. A point of view emerged that this Directive should be called a “directive without a number”. This is somewhat strange, since the following Directive has a well-defined 2 number! Consequently, the previous Directive should be No. 1. That is how it was called in the Soviet stories. After all, it does not occur to anyone to call the first sheet in a document or in a book a sheet without a number.

At the beginning of the year, an interest in the creation of a law firm, which was related to the posting of documents on the operational department of the 1080 military unit, was again expressed on the Internet. The 1080 military unit is the headquarters of the LF, which was allocated from the headquarters of the Moscow Military District (MVO). Below is one of these documents. Interest caused the date of the resolution "21.6.41g.».

It may seem that the presented document emphasizes the connection between the following events: waiting for the start of the 22 war of June, the organization of the headquarters of the Law Faculty and the invasion of German troops. Such reasoning casts doubt on the memories of participants in the war. For example, the commander of the Moscow Military District troops, General Tyulenev, who indicates that he learned about the creation of the LF headquarters only in the morning of June 22. It turns out that General Tyulenev deliberately conceals or distorts events on the eve of the war, and where such “distortions” are revealed, one can begin to look for a “second bottom” in the events. Versions appear that can distort real events. It is only strange that General Tyulenev is not believed in this statement, but they believe in another statement about the deployment of air defense units on June 21. Although it is the second statement refuted by other memories and documents. It turns out that to create versions, it is enough to select the necessary memories, and simply not to write about others. At the same time, it is not even necessary to recheck the memoirs: if the veteran messed up, then let the critics refute ...

The article will present the memoirs of war veterans, documents and arguments of the author, who claim that the draft Resolution prepared before June 20-15 21 is not associated with the expectation of war by the leadership of the country and the spacecraft at dawn 22 June. If this is so, then at the first meeting with Stalin 21 June an irrelevant issue is considered on the eve of the war. This question has nothing to do with preparations for the troops of the western border districts to repel an attack in 8,5 hours. It is not connected with the operational notification of the troops of the western districts of the beginning of the war. It is clear to everyone that the headquarters of the law firm cannot be 23 June already at the border.

But if at the first meeting an urgent issue is not considered on the eve of the outbreak of war, then maybe the war is not expected? Those readers who will agree with my version will once again be convinced of the correctness of the considerations expressed by the author Victoria in the cycle “The Unexpected War of Hitler's Germany and the USSR” (hereinafter referred to as the cycle). It is better to get acquainted with the cycle starting with the 11 part (Part 11) and 12 part. At the end of the 26 part there are links to all subsequent parts ( link). For the convenience of familiarization with the material, I will try to use the style of presentation adopted by the author of the cycle.

The first visitor entered Stalin only in 18: 27. Until that time, the top leadership of the spacecraft had not come to Stalin. There is no information about their calls to Stalin. Is it possible that on the eve of the war Stalin didn’t deal with anything up to the evening of June 21? Engaged. Intensive attempts to negotiate with the German government took place in Moscow. There is almost no information about this period. V.M. Molotov said that before meeting with the German ambassador he had to consult Stalin by telephone about this.

View from the embassy in Berlin

I suggest you look at the events taking place in Moscow from the embassy in Berlin. In his memoirs, the translator V.M. Berezhkov writes: “21 of June ... the embassy received an order to make the German government another statement, in which it was proposed to discuss the state of Soviet-German relations.

The Soviet government made it clear to the German government that he is aware of the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and that military adventure may have dangerous consequences. But the content of this dispatch spoke of something else: in Moscow still hoping on the opportunity to prevent conflict and were ready to negotiate about the situation ... I was instructed ... to arrange a meeting of representatives of the embassy with Ribbentrop ... ".

V.M. Berezhkov failed to contact either Ribbentrop or his deputy. The duty officer at the Foreign Ministry could not help him. They call from Moscow several times and rush to the meeting. Probably, the caller reports the situation to Molotov, and that in turn to Stalin.

By seven in the evening [20: 00 Moscow time], the embassy staff went home, as they did not expect the war to start at dawn the next day. Berezhkov continues to call every 30 minutes in the German Foreign Ministry.

V.M. Berezhkov: “In Moscow at half past nine in the evening ... Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, invited the German ambassador ... and informed him of the contents of the Soviet note on numerous violations of the border by German aircraft. After this, the People's Commissar tried in vain to induce the ambassador to discuss with him the state of Soviet-German relations and to clarify Germany’s claims to the Soviet Union. In particular, Schulenburg was asked: what is Germany’s dissatisfaction with the USSR, if any?

Molotov also asked what explains the heightened spread of rumors about a close war between Germany and the USSR, which explains the mass departure from Moscow in the last days of the staff of the German embassy and their wives. In conclusion, Schulenburg was asked what explains the “absence of any reaction of the German government to the sedative and peaceful TASS message from June June 14”. Schulenburg did not give any intelligible answer to these questions ... ”.

At about one in the morning, a cipher entered the embassy from Moscow, which reported the contents of the conversation between the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Schulenburg and listed the questions raised by the Soviet side during this conversation. The Soviet ambassador is again invited to immediately meet Ribbentrop and pose the same questions to him. However, it is also not possible to arrange a meeting. Only in 3 the nights (in Berlin time) the Soviet ambassador was invited to the Foreign Ministry.

We see that Stalin, Molotov and, probably, other senior officials tried in vain to somehow clarify the situation and begin negotiations with the German government. At least find out about the claims or get an ultimatum. They still do not know that in Berlin a wrong decision has already been made for Germany: to start a war with the USSR.

It should be noted that the German ambassador could not answer anything VM. Molotov, for the reason that the brief content of the memorandum in which claims were made to the USSR, he learned a little later.

Roland Gottlieb (Head of the Telegraph Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany): “On the night of 21 on 22 June, I was on a shift from 21: 00 to 7: 00. That night I received a telegram from the bureau of the Secretary of State in a steel case marked “State secret. Super urgent night! Personally in the hands of the ambassador. " According to her, the ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, was to immediately go to Foreign Minister Molotov and give him the information contained in the telegram ... I cannot remember whether the words "declaration of war" were used in the text, but this is what is forever imprinted in my memory: our In conclusion, the ambassador had to inform Molotov that our troops had entered the territory of the Soviet Union in the early morning hours ... ”.

The atmosphere of the pre-war events

I suggest that you, readers, plunge into the atmosphere of pre-war events. The cycle provides a detailed analysis of intelligence information (RI), which came in from the fall of 1940 to June 1941. I recall a few interesting points from this material.

In early September, 1940, our intelligence noted up to 90 German divisions, which could take part in the war with the USSR. These divisions were deployed on the territory of East Prussia, Poland, Slovakia and on the territory of Germany at its eastern border. In Romania, the German troops at that time was not yet. RI does not mention the presence of German troops in Hungary. During the processing of the Republic of Ingushetia, some divisions were composed of brigades, regiments and battalions scattered all over the place. In other words - these were calculated divisions.

By 21.6.41, our intelligence services on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea counted to 129 calculated German divisions that can take part in the attack on the USSR. Compared to September 1940, the number of divisions increased by 43%. This increase takes into account the appearance of German divisions in the border areas in Hungary and Romania.

If we consider only the territory that was considered for September 1940 of the year, then the number of divisions increased by only 20%. Pay attention to this number. For 10,5 months, the number of divisions against the troops of PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO units increased by only 20% !

According to intelligence data, a significant part of the said troops was located at a distance from 20-30 to 100-280 km from the border. Some of the divisions that were intended to attack the USSR were deployed even at a distance from 280 to 424 km in Germany, as well as in September of 1940. This is covered in detail in the 13-16 parts of the loop. It also provides information that the reconnaissance of the NKVD border guards further overestimated the number of German troops in the spring of 1941, compared with the data of the KA General Staff Intelligence Directorate.

There is a version that the Soviet command believed that during the war with Germany it would be deployed before the 130 German divisions. However, there is not a single Soviet document that says this. All available documents say something completely different!

Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army (18.09.40): "Of the above 243 divisions to 173 divisions ... will be directed against our borders... ».

Later (before 8.11.40), a note prepared by KOVO’s chief of staff, General Purkaev, indicates the number of German troops deployed. By the simplest calculation, this amount turns into 152-166 divisions. This number does not include German troops in Romania, the number of which in the Note is estimated at 25-27 divisions.

In January, command and staff games are held on 1941. According to the scenario of the first game ( link) The Northeast and East fronts of the “Western” (before 60 infantry divisions), operating north of Demblin to the Baltic Sea, launched an offensive "in the interests of the main operation" carried out south of Brest, where the main forces of the "Western" were deployed - to 120 infantry divisions, and together with their allies - to 160 infantry divisions. For the first time, the 180 of the German divisions is mentioned.

In the plan of the General Staff of the spacecraft for the strategic deployment of the armed forces (11.3.41), the number of German divisions is even greater: 200 divisions, of which up to 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions will be directed against our borders ... "

The draft document, drawn up not earlier than 15.5.41, reiterates 180 German divisions. Initially, this number was estimated in 189 divisions.

Intelligence Service No. 1 The Spacecraft General Staff Intelligence Directorate (22.6.41): “The adversary for 22.6 brought significant forces into battle ... the entire 50-52 division. However, this is only approximately 30% enemy forces are concentrated to the front ... " 100% of the specified number of divisions will be from 167 to 173. Attention should be paid to the phrase “focused to the front"Because, according to intelligence data, part of the forces intended to attack the USSR was very far from the front. Probably, given their number, the total number of German divisions intended to attack the USSR may also reach 180 and more. For eight months, the documents refer to the number of German divisions, in the war with Germany, significantly more 129 divisions concentrated by June 22! Up to 180 divisions 21 Jun still lacks 28% troops.

At a meeting of the senior commanders of the spacecraft in December 1940, various reports stated that during hostilities in Poland and in the West German troops used from 3 to 5 tank groups. The Note prepared by General Purkayev in November 1940 of the year states that the German armed forces 8-10 Mechanical Corps (the term mechanized corpus is used in Note). Thus, the Soviet command knewthat the Germans would use tank and mechanized troops as part of tank groups uniting several mechanized corps (motorized corps).

German assault groups designed to attack the USSR were formed long before the outbreak of the war:

- The 1 Tank Group (TGr) was created by 16.11.40. The 1 TGr included: 3-th micron (formed by 21.3.41), 14-th micron (26.8.39) and 48-th micron (15.12.40);

- 2-I TGr was created as a group of Guderian 1.6.40 g. (16.11.40 was reformed into 2-th TGr). The 2 th TGy consisted of: 24 th MK (16.11.40), 46 th MK (25.10.40) and 47 th MK (14.12.40);

- The 3-I TGr was created in November 1940 of the year. The 3 th TGy consisted of: 39-th micron (beginning of 1940 of the year) and 57-th micron (15.2.41);

- The 4-I TGr was created in February 1941 of the year. The 4 th TGy consisted of: 41 th MK (24.2.40) and 56 th MK (15.2.41).

Before the outbreak of war, and even somewhat later, our intelligence failed to open a single German tank group (from 4), no motorized body (from 10) from the specified strike groups. On the eve of the war against our troops, only separate isolated German tank units were found by intelligence:

- against the troops of PribOVO - one full-fledged tank division. The remaining tank divisions are conditionally derived from the discovered 5 tank regiments and the 9 tank battalions;

- against troops Zapovo - one tank division. 4 Tank Divisions are converted from 7-8 Tank Regiments. There was RI about the possible finding of two more tank divisions on the Suwalki ledge. However, for the period from 1 to 21, June intelligence failed to confirm or deny their existence.

From the memoirs of the commander of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5 Army General A.V. Vladimirsky it also follows that the German tank units were not fully opened by our intelligence: "Composition, numbering and location of enemy compounds by our intelligence were opened accurately and not completely. So, before the 5 Army, only 15 divisions the enemy, including only two td. In fact, it was 21 Division, including five td. Concentration of the 1 TGr before the 5 Army... not noted at all... ».

Some authors do not carry out an analysis of published in open sources of RI and operate with phrases from memoirs of war veterans, which have rather vague wording. A typical example is the memories of the commander of the 2 th cavalry corps of General P.A. Belova: "... On Saturday, 21 June, I went to the district headquarters intelligence department ... The intelligence department had such details that were very close to reality ..."

Let us consider in more detail what kind of information General Belov could have known in the intelligence department of the district headquarters.

Intelligence information

The Note on the "plan cover", which was prepared at the headquarters OdVO May 1941 years, said that in Romania there: 40-45 Infantry and Motorized, 4 Cavalry Division, 4 mountain rifle brigades and 2 armored divisions, one German 17 infantry and moto divisions and 2 tank divisions.

This information is close to the RI given in the summary at the beginning of 1941 of the year: “As a result of the deployments, the German troops in the Balkans are located approximately as follows ... in Romania - against the USSR, in Moldova and Dobrudzha there are: 10 military units, 4 md, one militia and two militia units. In the central part of Romania are located: 6 pd, 2 md, 2 td and one aviation [parachute] division…" It turns out that according to intelligence data in Romania, there were up to 28 German divisions, of which 17 was in the border zone with the USSR. The presented data fit well with each other.

According to the information of the intelligence department of the OdVO headquarters on 17.6.41 against the district troops in the Lipcani-Reni sector, it is concentrated from 31 to 34 divisions, including up to German 16, including up to two tank and six motorized divisions. Information on the number of German divisions is close to the information provided for the end of May - the beginning of June 1941. Consequently, no other RI as of June 17 just can be. In fact, there were only 9 German infantry divisions in the border zone, two of them in the 1 echelon.

The first summary of the General Staff Intelligence (on 20-00 22.6.41) regarding the German forces in Romania states: "... The end of the transfer of German divisions from Bulgaria to Romanian territory ... Total German divisions in Romania should be considered 33-35 divisions ... of which 4 tank, 11 md and one mountain-rifle ...". A significant number of German troops appear, which move through the territory of Romania to our border. Among them there are new (with respect to the RI on 17.6.41) German shock formations: two tank and five motorized divisions.

On 30 June in accordance with the Scheme of the balance of forces against the forces of the LF 29 listed Romanian and German divisions. Probably, this number is given without troops 2-th echelon. 4 divisions are listed on 35 July (with RGCs taken as 4-md, but 4's Infantry Divisions of RGCs are not counted). On 10 July, taking into account the reserves - 30-34 divisions. In all cases, the Schemes do not include divisions of the 3 echelon. In the opposing forces in the Republic of Ingushetia is up to 900-960 tanks as part of two tank divisions. In fact, only one Romanian mechanized brigade (up to 22 tanks) was concentrated against the LF troops from 10 June to 60 July.

It can be seen that the maximum number of German-Romanian divisions of the 1 and 2 lines varies in the range of 30-34 and practically does not differ from the pre-war ROI (in 17.6.41). At the same time, all Romanian divisions (throughout the whole territory of Romania), which have about 5.6.41-ti from RN from 30, are not taken into account. Their number includes only one motorized infantry division and one mechanized brigade. The rest of the motorized and tank divisions in Romania, according to our intelligence, are German troops.

Thus, the RI from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the OdVO (later 9-th Army) and LF misinformed the leadership of the front and the General Staff until the beginning of July. In fact, against the troops of the OdMO (later the troops of the 9 and 18 Army) there were:

- on June 22 - 18,5 divisions in 1 and 2 levels (including German 7). Taking into account the troops of the 3 tier, the total number of divisions reached 24;

- By 10 July, the total number of divisions in three echelons was about 30.

Taking into account the tendency to build up the enemy grouping against the LF troops, the once overestimated intelligence data and their real numbers should have come closer to each other ... The German special services and the 11 Army completed their task for the initial period of the war: to prevent the Soviet troops from splitting into Rumanian territory , to tie down the opposing enemy troops, giving them the appearance of having large forces.

Therefore, the words of General Belov that "The intelligence department had such details that were very close to reality."Are erroneous. Perhaps these words are based on the concept adopted at that time that intelligence supplied only truthful information in full, and only Stalin was guilty of all the failures of the initial period of the war. In this case, the quotation in the memoirs deliberately distorts the real picture on the eve of the war.

Thus, by 22.6.41, the number of German divisions near our border, according to RI data, was close to their actual number. This coincidence was a random event, since the distribution of German divisions along the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea actually turned out to be different from what was indicated in the reports. This is evidenced by three facts (besides those listed in the cycle) that I submit for your consideration.

Not given due importance

As a first fact, consider the recollection of the head of the operations department of KOVO, General THEIR. Bagramyan: “We have not given due importance to another important operational area, the Lublin-Lutsk. Although here the bordering territory of Nazi-occupied Poland pretty deeply went to the east, hanging from the north over Lvov, but there were no good approaches to this from the west. And it was difficult to imagine that it was this region that the Fascist command uses to concentrate its large offensive grouping ... "

The interest is the following words of Ivan Khristoforovich: «Every hour it became clear that we are not dealing with a border incident, but with the beginning of a carefully prepared war.... given to the covering troops ... order to destroy the invading enemy ... turned out to be unreal. And not only because we had less power in the border area than the aggressor, but also because the attack, despite the serious measures taken on the eve of the war ... still turned out to be a sudden... »

The head of the operative department of the headquarters of the South-West Front writes that the war began unexpectedly. The concentration of two motorized corps near the border and their entry into battle was also unexpected for the front headquarters. Our divisions were not concentrated at the border. The Germans then beat them apart ...

Consider a message from scout NKGB Sedov from 20.6.41, which was supposed to go to the leadership of 21 June (selected localities referred to in the Republic of Ingushetia are shown in the figure above):

In the message there is not a single mention of motorized or tank units that were already partially in the area under consideration. These units, not to mention the unions of the shock groups, were not found by other scouts either. This once again confirms the memories of the generals I.Kh. Bagramyan and A.V. Vladimirsky.

In addition, the report notes that on one airfield on 23-05 20 June there are 7 airplanes (6 light single-engine - perhaps coherent Story, and one three-engine is clearly Yu-52), and on the second aerodrome there are no airfield buildings and aircraft. We know that a significant part of the aircraft flew to the airfields near the border only in the evening of June 21 and this information could not manage to reach the leadership of the country and the spacecraft even if it had been opened ...

Intelligence

Consider the RI Intelligence General Staff on 23-00 28.6.41 g. What is interesting in it?

Intelligence: “... The documents captured in the battle, while defeating the 39 headquarters of the tank corps, reveal the enemy’s operational intentions on actions on our western front. Installedthat on the Vilnius direction acts 3 Army the enemy, on the Brest direction - 2 Army. Shock group 3 of the Army as part of 39 tk, 5 AK [army corps] led the offensive to the junction of the northwestern and western fronts, and in the morning 25.6 of the 3 part of the Army from the Vilna region turned to Minsk for action on the rear of the Western Front ... "

Only a week after the start of the war, our intelligence was able to get a reliable RI of the 2 and 3 TGr, which are called armies in the report. According to the 3 th TGr, even 28 June, our intelligence does not know about the presence of 57-th uk in its composition (12 and 19 td, 18 md).

“23.6 Army Headquarters 3 was located in the forest 15 km northeast of Suwalki; 5 AK Headquarters - Lozdzeya; 39 headquarters tk - Simno headquarters 20 td in the forest near Alytus; headquarters 7 td - 2 km west of Alytus; 20 headquarters md - Radzyuny.

The 2 Army Shock Group consisting of 24 and 47 TK and 12 AK, operating in the direction of Brest-Baranavichy-Slutsk, had the task of connecting with the 3 Shock Group of the Army east of Minsk. During 27-28.6, the opponent persistently continued to carry out these intentions in the indicated directions ...

South-Western Front - it is documented that the 6 Army of the enemy is acting as part of the forces against the South-West Front (the data we had previously confirmed) ...

The following enemy units were identified in the battles: 175 md operates in the direction of Lyuboml - Kovel; 75 and 299 PD and 14 td operates from the direction of Vladimir-Volyn. 9 front came from the direction of Belz. Opponent during 27, 28.6 continued to develop a breakthrough in the direction of Dubno - Rovno, Dubno - Ostrog in the general direction to Shepetivka, up to 3-x tank divisions and 3-x motorized regiments ... ".

In the Republic of Ingushetia, in relation to the 6 Army, that "previously available data is confirmed". Then it turns out that the previously available data about the rest of the German troops is still (or not at all) confirmed ...

It can be seen from the figure that, in addition to the 9, 75 and 299 infantry divisions, there are 11, 57 and 297 infantry divisions that are not identified by our reconnaissance, operating in the specified area. In addition, 175-md in the Wehrmacht is missing. It should be about 25-th MD 3-th micron. Of the four tank divisions, only 14-I is mentioned. The remaining three are impersonal: “... up to 3-x tank divisions and 3-x motorized regiments". From the message is not clear: whether it is three impersonal tank divisions, or the scattering of individual parts ...

It should be noted that according to radio intelligence interception data, only the presence of 26 th TGy as part of 1 th, 16 th and 63 md was determined by 79 June (there was no information about other connections and motorized cases). Agree that only from the documents submitted it is clear that the entire pre-war RI on the deployment of German tank forces on our border was incorrect ...

In the 13 and 14 parts of the cycle, quite a different ROI was considered in detail. I will cite only one drawing of these materials. Note the highlighted period in purple.

And if the war?

After the second decade of April, the number of German divisions near the border increases by almost half by the RI. Let's look at a fragment of the memoirs of General D.D. Lyulushenko about this period: “In the spring of 1941, I was busy forming the 21 th mechanized corps [MBO] ... About a month before the outbreak of war, being in the GABTU KA, I asked the boss:“ When will the tanks arrive to us? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing ... "

“Do not worry,” said Lt. Gen. Ya.N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your body should be completed in full in 1942 year.

- And if the war?

— The spacecraft is strong enough without your body... »

In the 20-s of May, the mechanized corps of the second stage (42 and 46 td, 185 md) is not planned to participate in hostilities with Germany, despite a significant increase in German troops near the border for the month. At the end of April, units of the 21-mk were withdrawn to summer camps: the 42-I and 46-I divisions in the Idritsa and Opochka regions, respectively. The 185-i md was initially formed in the city of Idritsa on the basis of the 185-y sd.

Plans for the mechanized corps in the month of June are changing. D.D. Lyulushenko: “15 June according to the plan developed by the corps headquarters, the commanders of divisions and regiments started reconnaissance in the direction of the Daugavpils. The map of Colonel Voeikov was all riddled with marks: areas of concentration, future lines of deployment, estimated positions of batteries, paths of movement ...

21 June I was called to report to the General Staff. Late at night, I arrived in Moscow and called the General Staff on duty by telephone. He said: “Tomorrow you should report to Lieutenant-General Vatutin, Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff ...”

June 21 is summoned to Moscow by a corps of an incomplete corps, parts of which are located in camps in the Kalinin region and in the territory of the LVO. In the connections of the body reigns peaceful mood. For example, on June 22, the grand opening of the 46 summer camps was planned. A gala concert began, during which a message was received about the beginning of the war.

A call to Moscow to the Soviet Union cannot help our troops on the border during the invasion of German troops at dawn on June 22. This is a tertiary event in importance if NGOs and the General Staff expect war on the morning of June 22. And if you do not expect, then this is the usual military affairs. The transfer of the mechanized corps to the territory of PribOVO, if necessary, is already under consideration. Let me remind you that General Vatutin 20 June until the evening is also engaged in minor matters - working with General MI Kazakov (chief of staff of the Central Asian Military District).

The situation changes dramatically after the start of the war. D.D. Lyulushenko: "In the Operational Directorate, I was greeted with an alarming message: German troops crossed the border ... Directional officers quickly reported to Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin ... For a minute Vatutin turned to me: "Rather return to the corps. All instructions will be sent to you by the directive "..."

Fact of surprise attack

Do you think the head of the Operational Directorate was so much agitated by the situation on the border, and not the fact of the start of hostilities ?! Of course, he was disturbed by the fact of an unexpected attack! Why do I think so? Let's take a look at the first General Staff update on 10-00 22.6.41: «Northwest Front. ... The ground forces of the enemy went on the offensive and hit in two directions - the main ... forces 3-4 front and 500 tanks in the direction of Olita and providing ... blow ... forces to 3-4 front with an unknown group of tanks...

The Western Front... With ground forces, the enemy is developing a strike from the Suwalki region in the direction of Golynka, Dombrov and from the Sokolow region along the Volkovysk railway ...

Southwest front... In the 4-35 after the artillery fire in the area Vladimir Volynsk and Lyuboml ground troops of the enemy crossed the border developing a strike in the direction of Vladimir Volynsk, Lyuboml and Kristinopol. In 5-20 in the Chernovtsy region near Karpeshti, the enemy also launched an offensive ... As a result ... the enemy occupied, according to unverified data, Parhach and Vysotsko in the Radymno region. To the enemy cavalry regiment with tanks operating in the direction of Rawa-Russka penetrated to Ur ...

On the Romanian site... The ground forces of the enemy in the area of ​​Lipkany-Reni tried to force the river rod, but were repulsed. According to unverified data, the enemy in the area of ​​Kartal landed troops on the Danube ...

The enemy, having preempted our troops in deployment, forced parts of the spacecraft to take the fight in the process of occupying a starting position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy succeeded on separate directions achieve private success ... "

What is dangerous to the spacecraft in the summary? In the Baltic States, German troops are attacking with two reinforced army groups of 3-4 infantry divisions. These groups are reinforced with tanks - up to 500 units. 500 tanks - in RI there are two separate tank regiments (550 tanks) or a separate tank regiment and battalion (408 tanks). Do not forget that there are only one full-fledged tank division and five MD, which are not yet in combat, against the RI against the troops of PribOVO. The pace of advancement of infantry units is several times less than the pace of advancement of tank-mechanized troops ...

Against Zapovo troops, there is only one strike force in the direction in which the German troops are expected to strike. About the tank grouping in the area of ​​the city of Brest in the summary is not a word. And what could one site, which is under attack for a large enough district, mean? Only - the provocation of the German troops or reconnaissance in force ...

Something unimportant happens against the most powerful military district - KOVO. THEIR. Bagramyan: “In the area of ​​Lyuboml, one infantry division is advancing, in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky - one infantry and one tank, and the southern, to the very border with the 6 army, - two more German infantry divisions. Considering that we had four rifle divisions not far from the border, the situation naturally seemed not so threatening ... ”

Somehow, all frivolously perceived in the General Staff. If they expect war there at dawn on 22 June, then why does the General Staff believe such reports coming from the districts ?! And not only by the arrival in the morning, but also the daily summaries too! If provocation was expected, then everything becomes clear at once - do not let the German adventurers start a war...

Counterstrike Decision

Based on the operational reports submitted by the senior management of the spacecraft, the government makes a decision on the counter attack by the troops of the LCP. The Chief of the General Staff refuses to make this decision. This is all Stalin, and he was on his way to the headquarters of the South-West Front in order to deal with the situation ... But what with the situation to deal with, if anything terrible in reports from the districts has not yet arrived? Stalin could not decide on a counter attack without taking into account the views of the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff! But the military just could convince Stalin of the correctness of such a step.

In part, this is confirmed by the journal of the visit of Stalin. Tymoshenko and Zhukov are present for the second time at a meeting in Stalin's office with 14: 00 to 16: 00. Together with them is Vatutin. The People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were to report to Stalin the situation at the border, after the receipt of daily reports. In the same place, they probably came up with a proposal to strike counterattacks by the spacecraft and the subsequent entry into the territory of the former Poland. In any case, the Chief of the General Staff once again distorts real events: his signature is under the Directive, which arrived at the headquarters of the South-West Phase.

The lack of reliable RI (pre-war and the first day of the war, including the absence of large mechanized and tank formations near the border) led to an incorrect assessment of information in the General Staff and the disastrous decision about a counterattack by the South-West Federal Forces in Lublin. Perhaps the leadership of the spacecraft decided to use its pre-war procurement.

When discussing the received impracticable directive, the opinions of the members of the Military Council of the South-Western Front were divided. At this time, the chief of the General Staff arrives, who, having understood the situation on the ground, did not report to Stalin about the true state of affairs on the northern flank of the front. Only on the spot did the Chief of the General Staff understand the seriousness of the situation, but in Moscow he did not realize this ...

How could he rush the command of the border districts with the withdrawal of troops, if he does not understand the seriousness of the events at the border before he arrives at the headquarters of the South-Caucasian Front? This is another confirmation of the correctness of the events in the diary of Marshal S.M. Budyonny: "Stalin told us that the Germans, without declaring war, could attack us tomorrow ... Tymoshenko said that" if the Germans attack, we will break them on the border, and then on their territory ... "

In the afternoon and evening of 22 June, he was either sure of the correctness of his actions or did not dare to admit his mistake to Stalin, convincing him of the need for a counterstrike on Lublin. And if you did not dare to admit to an error, then perhaps there were many other erroneous explanations of it to Comrade Stalin before the war ... Maybe this is why there is nothing truthful in his memoirs about the events of June 19 — 22? ..

To be continued ...

Comments

[bistrov.]

My father met the war in Vilnius (as it was then called in Vilno) as a mechanic-driver of the BT-7 tank, according to his stories, there was complete calm among the "lower classes" before the war, an order was received to remove the engines from the tanks and send them for scheduled repairs, therefore After the start of the war, he had to retreat on foot in the direction of Velikiye Luki, where he entered his first battle, although before that he already had combat experience, having fought the winter in the war with the White Finns as part of the Black Sea Fleet Marine Regiment.

[210ox]

My parents, who were living near Smolensk at the time, were telling the opposite: numerous military echelons were coming to Belarus. At the beginning of 1941, however, they were teenagers and could take the goods for more serious ones.

[bistrov.]

Quote: 210ox

told the opposite - in Belarus were numerous military echelons. In early 1941.

Correctly they told you. The formation of tank corps and other forward-based formations began. The troops for this were transferred from internal districts.

[vladimirZ]

Based on the operational reports submitted by the top management of the spacecraft, the government decides on a counterattack by the troops of the South Federal Front. The Chief of the General Staff refuses to make this decision. This is all Stalin, and he was on his way to the headquarters of the SWF to deal with the situation ...
- from article

It was not the government that made the decision "to counterstrike the SWF troops," but the top military leadership of the Red Army - People's Commissar of Defense Timoshenko and early. General Staff - Zhukov.
It was they who remade B.M. Shaposhnikov's Plan. "Considerations on the strategic deployment of troops", signed by I.V. Stalin, providing for an active defense against the Timoshenko-Meretskov-Zhukov plan of the counter-offensive of the Red Army troops against the advancing German troops without appropriate training of the Red Army troops from Lvov (the main counter-attack on Lublin and further Krakow) and Bialystok (auxiliary counter-attack on Warsaw and V. "to prevent the concentration and deployment of German troops."
To this end, they concentrated in advance the main group of spacecraft in the Lviv ledge and a significant part of the troops for counterattack in the Bialystok ledge.
This Zhukovsky plan was developed in "Considerations" from no later than May 15, 1941 (the developer was then Major General Vasilevsky), not signed by anyone, but with the names of Timoshenko and Zhukov. The plan provided for a preventive attack by the spacecraft on the Germans.
According to the memoirs of Zhukov, when they proposed this option to Stalin, he categorically rejected it. Then Tymoshenko and Zhukov processed it into an immediate counterattack plan — an offensive against the advancing German troops with goals for the South-Western Front — Lublin-Krakow, without any training of troops and reconnaissance, which eventually spilled into Directive No. 3 of June 22, 1941, which it set off to fulfill Zhukov June 22.
The idea was previously a failure and doomed to defeat the troops of the Red Army, which was confirmed by subsequent events.
The result was a complete defeat of the spacecraft in the border battle and the defeat of the entire summer military campaign of the USSR.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladimirZ

To this end, they concentrated in advance the main group of spacecraft in the Lviv ledge and a significant part of the troops for counterattack in the Bialystok ledge.
This Zhukovsky plan was developed in "Considerations" from no later than May 15, 1941 (the developer was then Major General Vasilevsky), not signed by anyone, but with the names of Timoshenko and Zhukov.

Everything was not at all the way it was presented by some former commanders who decided to take revenge on Zhukov after his removal from the post of defense minister, which does not do them credit. I will not describe in detail all the details of the situation at that time, but I will just remind you that the density of troops in KOVO was lower than in ZAPOVO, so only those who do not know well what actually happened can speak seriously about the "Zhukovsky plan". was given on the forum "For the truth":

.... Firstly, on June 22, the density of troops in KOVO was lower than in ZAPOVO.
KOVO - 1,11 thousand people per 1 km of the front
ZAPOVO - 1,42 thousand people per 1 km of the front.
Secondly, already in 1945, two more new districts were created on the basis of KOVO - Lviv and Transcarpathian, which in 1946 were merged into one ZakVO, i.e. it was recognized that the borders of the CWO were too huge, which is why they needed to be transformed on the eve of the war, but there was simply no time for that. Although this issue could already be considered back in 1940, but then it was not before that.
Thirdly, you don’t have any idea why KOVO was paid attention on the eve of the war because you don’t know our enemy well.
Already in August 1939, even before the attack on Poland, cards were introduced for the first time in Germany, and the quantity of the assortment of marketable products on them sharply increased already in 1940.
I will not conduct an educational program here, but the USSR supplied grains in quantitative terms even more than oil, which is why a correctly made analysis showed that on the eve of the war Germany could wage a war of three months on its stocks, and no more.
In general, it’s shitty Oleg that you took up the topic, without even really studying the whole aspect of the pre-war situation, and therefore in your book there are more unproven accusations than reliable facts ..

http://zapravdu.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=4317&p=144908#p144908

[vladimirZ]

I will not describe in detail all the details of the situation at that time, but I will just remind you that the density of troops in KOVO was lower than in ZAPOVO, so only those who know little about what really happened can speak seriously about the "Zhukovsky plan". - ccsr (ccsr)

The density of troops on minor sections of the border did not greatly concern the leadership of the Red Army Timoshenko-Zhukov, where they did not count on offensive actions.
They originally planned by reworking "Considerations" of Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, to organize a shock grouping of troops from the Lvov salient (main and auxiliary from Bialystok) for a preemptive strike "against the concentration of German troops" in order to cut it off from the Balkan countries and encircle German troops in Poland - "Considerations" dated May 15, 1941
When this "plan" of theirs did not find support from I.V. Stalin, then Zhukov-Timoshenko converted it into a plan for an immediate counteroffensive on the fact of Germany's attack on the USSR without the preparation and reconnaissance of enemy troops, which resulted in Directive No. 3 of June 22, 1941, which Zhukov went to carry out on the evening of June 22.
It’s not enough to say that Zhukov’s plan was adventurous and illiterate, taking into account the surrender of the Western Front’s troops by the leadership led by Commander Pavlov, the opening of the front in the Military District in the area of ​​the rifle corps of the national formations of the former Baltic states, as a result of which our troops were defeated and captured in Belarus - the elements of betrayal and sabotage of the highest generals of the Red Army are visible.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladimirZ

The density of troops on minor sections of the border did not greatly concern the leadership of the Red Army Timoshenko-Zhukov, where they did not count on offensive actions.

Do you want to say that ZAPOVO and KOVO had minor sections of the border in June 1941?
There were sections in these districts where it was difficult for the German troops to attack, but you can’t cancel the density of troops in any way - this is the real figure for June 22, and from which they proceeded to the General Staff when they planned to strengthen the districts on the eve of the war.

Quote: vladimirZ

They originally planned by reworking "Considerations" of Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, to organize a shock grouping of troops from the Lvov salient (main and auxiliary from Bialystok) for a preemptive strike "against the concentration of German troops" in order to cut it off from the Balkan countries and encircle German troops in Poland - "Considerations" dated May 15, 1941

Well, there is no need to fantasize, because Vasilevsky’s draft clearly spells out the FIRST strategic goal, after which the following is set for 30 days:

II. The first strategic goal of the Red Army’s Glossar’s actions is to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Deblin, and exit to the 30th day of operation to the front of Ostroleka, p. Narew, Lovich, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. The next strategic goal is to have: by attacking from the Katowice region in the north or north-west direction, defeat the large forces of the Center and the North wing of the German front and take possession of the territory of the former Poland and East Prussia. The immediate task is to defeat the German army east of the river. Wisla and on the Krakow direction, go to the river Narov, Wisla and take possession of the Katowice region [21], for which:

Any military professional reading this fully understands that it is impossible to plan the FOLLOW-UP tasks if the FIRST and main task is completed, the purpose of which is to defeat the MAIN FORCE OF THE OPPONENT.

Quote: vladimirZ

It’s not enough to say that Zhukov’s plan was adventurous and illiterate, taking into account the surrender of the Western Front’s troops by the leadership led by Commander Pavlov, the opening of the front in the Military District in the area of ​​the rifle corps of the national formations of the former Baltic states, as a result of which our troops were defeated and captured in Belarus - the elements of betrayal and sabotage of the highest generals of the Red Army are visible.

There was no Zhukov's plan, these are all inventions of various dreamers on military topics, but there were real plans for cover in the districts, where the question of offensive operations was at the last level, and even then with reservations, "under favorable conditions."
In the most operational plan of 1941, about which the researchers write, there is no point where the development of a plan for a strategic offensive of the Red Army was listed - it does not exist in nature, which means that everything else is an invention of idle "historians".

Quote: vladimirZ

and sabotage of the highest generals of the Red Army.

Well, how could it be without a plot, sabotage, Mukhin, Martirosyan and other authors pedaling this topic, and thinking that one of the military professionals will seriously believe this.

[vladimirZ]

And "Considerations on the strategic deployment of troops" of May 15, 1941, published in the collection of documents by A. Yakovlev, was not there either? And the recognition of Zhukov recorded on the film, how did they get a refusal for this Zhukov-Timoshenko plan?
There was nothing, there was "according to Zhukov" the absolute surprise of the attack of the Germans and Stalin, "which did not allow clever generals to show their" talent "for bringing the army into full combat effectiveness", set forth in "Memories and Reflections." Enough tired of Zhukov's "fairy tales" to justify his adventurous, illiterate activities of the beginning of the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladimirZ

And "Considerations on the strategic deployment of troops" of May 15, 1941, published in the collection of documents by A. Yakovlev, was not there either?

"Considerations .." - this is only a part of the OPERATIONAL plan, which consisted of several documents.

Quote: vladimirZ

And the recognition recorded on Zhukov’s film,

Zhukov wanted to relieve his personal responsibility for the defeat of our troops in 1941, so I would beware of believing in everything that he says even on film.

Quote: vladimirZ

Enough tired of Zhukov's "fairy tales" to justify his adventurous, illiterate activities of the beginning of the war.

His guilt is not at all what some of his envious and haters attribute to him. And in general, as you imagine, Zhukov, without a year a week in the post of the NSS, which puts Tymoshenko at attention and orders him what he should do. Do you even understand that all Zhukov’s actions must have taken place with the permission of Tymoshenko, who set him the task, and therefore, even from the point of view of decency, it is ugly to put Zhukov to shame, as if he were a people's commissar.

[Looking for]

Vilno became Vilnius back in 1939 !!!

[aglet]

Quote: bistrov.

having won the winter in the war with the White Finns, the composition of the regiment of the Marine Corps of the Black Sea Fleet.

In the Black Sea Fleet, the Marine Corps units began to be organized only in July 1941. The Finnish War was a little earlier. a tank is not a lorry in a collective farm garage, if the engine was removed from it, then the replacement engine is already nearby, especially if the scheduled repair is necessary. and repairs of such complexity should be carried out at tank repair plants, where the tank is delivered in its entirety.
"you have to be more careful, more careful"

[bistrov.]

Quote: aglet

Marine units began to be organized only in July 1941

What do you think I am composing? I pass on what I was told. The father, who first served as a diver, after decompression sickness, was written off to torpedo boats, where he underwent an internship as a minder, with the outbreak of the Finnish war, they collected people like him from different divisions and ships, armed with three-rulers, issued 30 rounds each, and sent to the so-called ... "warm-ups" in a navy uniform, in boots, in black overcoats, from Sevastopol to Karelia, however, upon arrival, they changed into felt boots, wadded trousers, hats were given instead of caps. What would you like to call these troops?

Quote: aglet

repairs of such complexity should be carried out at tank repair plants,

Even now, the engine is often replaced in parts in the conditions of a tank repair workshop, and the BT-7 tank cannot be compared in terms of design complexity, for example, with the T-55 tank.

[aglet]

Quote: bistrov.

Even now, the engine is often replaced in parts, in the conditions of a tank repair workshop

and then WHAT and WHERE did they send from the tank your father’s mechanical drive was? And How
then from divers (conscripts, no?) to "trainees" minder at the TC, then "Marine" to the Finnish, then a tanker to the German, what a versatile talented person, one can envy. I did not find anywhere data on the participation of the Black Sea Fleet in any form in the Finnish war. The KBF fought, including the marines, but the Black Sea Fleet did not. can you have data?

[bistrov.]

Quote: aglet

then the tankman in German-

After completing his military service in the Black Sea Fleet, in 1940, his father remained on extra duty, completed courses in tank mechanics, received the rank of Sergeant St. service.

Subsequently, after the first wound, the military fate again threw him into Sevastopol and he participated in his defense, commanding a platoon, and then a company of marines (the personnel were sailors), was wounded there again, a bullet hit a lung, was evacuated to a large the ground, after being cured, he got to Stalingrad, participated in the encirclement of fascist troops, near Kalach, at the final moment of the encirclement, a heavy shell hit his tank, blew off the tower, was wounded a third time, his arm was seriously injured, he was treated for a long time (six months) , after being cured he was not fit for combat service, continued to serve in a repair battalion, ended the war in Poland, with the rank of captain, had three orders (two "Stars" and "Patriotic") and six medals, two of them "For Courage" and one "For Military Merit". Died in 1991.

[bubalik]

,,, if you read the operational reports of the border guards on the eve of the war, they get more aware of the concentration of German forces on the border than the army team.

365 From the memorandum of the Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs on the concentration of German troops in the border zone of Germany and Romania

15 May 1941 city

In the Klaipeda region in April from the city of Pilau (East Prussia) from the city of Kiel arrived 15-th regiment of coastal anti-aircraft artillery.

On May 10, in Pilau, the following were stationed: up to two infantry regiments, six to seven marine divisions of up to 11 thousand people, a heavy artillery regiment of 245 and 305 mm caliber, a tank regiment of 250 tanks, an air formation of up to 100 Heinkel seaplanes -145 "and up to 50 Junkers-87 bombers.

In the area of ​​Aidkunen (near the border), there were up to 10 heavy artillery regiments and a motor-mechanic unit numbering about four thousand people. The tank units of this unit were located in the area of ​​Deden and Nikimeshki.

In the 26 Hill area on April 1941 in the town of Dorohusk (near the border) an infantry battalion arrived. There is also a field radio station. 9 May in the town of Hill arrived the headquarters of the infantry

/ 382 /

divisions, infantry and artillery regiments. In the m. Staw (8 km north-west of the Hill) is a cavalry regiment,

In the area of ​​Hrubieszow 10, infantry regiments arrived in Hrubieszowa County ...

On the Soviet-Romanian border on May 9 In the areas of Solka (18 km south-west of Redeutsy and the station of Itskane), up to three German infantry divisions were concentrated. 13 May with. The German infantry division was located in the Dorokhoi area.

The construction of military structures continues along the entire border line, especially in the Kirli Baba area and along the valley of the Bistrita River. A number of cases of observation and photographing of our territory by German officers and Romanian military personnel were noted ...

Lieutenant-General Maslennikov

Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Institute of History of the USSR
General Directorate of Border Troops
Political Administration of Border Troops

Edition: Border Troops of the USSR. 1939 - June 1941. Collection of documents and materials. - M .: "Science", 1970. - 816 p.

[AsmyppoL]

You cited one document from the intelligence of the border units.
How does it compare with the data of the General Staff KA Intelligence Department? How many German units really were in these areas? Where is the analysis? Why you should believe the data of the border guards and not believe the data army? I understand that you did not read the cycle ...

And you did not try to compare the document N359 from 21.4.41 from the cited book with the data of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Spacecraft and the actual number of arrived German units?

This comparison was carried out in the 15 part of the cycle, in which it was shown that the reconnaissance of the NKVD border guards overestimated the number of arriving German troops even more than intelligence control. But in reality, the German units were arriving less ...

[bubalik]

good afternoon

Why you should believe the data of the border guards and not believe the data army?

,,, it turns out that the top leadership of the country did not believe anyone?

[AsmyppoL]

Good afternoon!
The country's top leadership believed in comrades Tymoshenko and Zhukov, who periodically expressed their authoritative opinion. As they were believed, they seldom visited St. Stalin (this will be the case in the 2 part). They also substantiated the call for assignments for fees, the transfer of parts from internal districts. They also demanded from the country funds for the construction of facilities in URs, equipment for them. All that was requested. Even 29 Mechanized Corps ...
The top management read all the intelligence reports and from all the intelligence services of the USSR and tried to figure it out ... Someone gave Stalin advice on a military case ...
How the intelligence agencies of all departments interacted with each other (including border guards and corps-army-district commanders), how fast messages went - all this was written in the 14-th part of the cycle by Victoria (somewhere from the middle of the part). I have not seen such an analysis anywhere.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Someone gave Stalin consultations on a military matter ...

Of all the highest military marshal B. Shaposhnikov was a particularly respected Stalin - he listened to his opinion most of all.

Quote: AsmyppoL

the speed with which the messages passed — all of this was written in the 14th part of the cycle by Victoria (somewhere around the middle of the part). Somewhere I have not seen such an analysis.

In fact, the comments indicated that the author, to put it mildly, vaguely represents how things really were, and the texts used by other authors were not always trustworthy.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The country's top leadership believed in comrades Tymoshenko and Zhukov, who periodically expressed their authoritative opinion.

But Kuznetsov and Beria seem to have nothing to do with it - so what is there to understand?

Quote: AsmyppoL

The top leadership read all intelligence reports from all intelligence services of the USSR and tried to figure it out ...

And when did they manage to do this, if only 800 messages were received from Sorge during his work, and only 360 of them were reported (and not studied!) To the country's leadership? Do you even have the idea that at least five structures were conducting reconnaissance then, starting from the NKID and ending with civil aviation, whose pilots also contributed during flights abroad.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Someone gave Stalin consultations on a military matter ...

In fact, in July 1940, Stalin even left the Main Military Council of the Red Army, where he was not even the chairman - this fact shatters all your fantasies.

Quote: AsmyppoL

all of this is written in the 14th part of the cycle by Victoria

You and her spread a lie about the initial period of the war?

[vladimirZ]

R. Sorge, as an agent "for Germany," supplied, along with reliable information, misinformation disseminated specifically by the German leadership, including through diplomatic structures, from which, in Tokyo, Sorge mainly obtained information. In addition, Sorge worked on a proactive basis, seemingly with the permission of the leadership of Soviet intelligence, for German intelligence, which introduced a certain element of doubt in Sorge's data - "a double agent, for whom does he really work?"
And also, on an initiative basis, Sorge began to specifically merge the diplomatic services of the United States and V. Britania with information about Japan’s preparations for an attack on the United States and the Asian colonies of B. Britania, which came into conflict with the activities of the Soviet leadership and Soviet intelligence to withdraw Japan from attacking USSR and its reorientation in the direction of the attack on the United States and the colonies of B. Britain in Southeast Asia. Data on this in the USSR came from Soviet intelligence in the United States.
All this together caused distrust of the leadership of the owls. intelligence to information supplied by R. Sorge.
Information from the books of the colonel of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, historian, writer Arsen Martirosyan.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladimirZ

R. Sorge, as an agent "for Germany," supplied, along with reliable information, misinformation disseminated specifically by the German leadership, including through diplomatic structures, from which in Tokyo,

These are already details, because it was about the entire array of intelligence information that came from various structures, and which, according to the author of the article, was allegedly "studied" by the government. How the author understands this, I still cannot imagine.

Quote: vladimirZ

In addition, Sorge worked on the initiative, seemingly with the permission of the leadership of the Soviet intelligence on German intelligence,

And where is this written? Do you seriously believe that Sorge was forcibly recruited by the Germans and he worked for them out of fear to the detriment of the Soviet Union? Aren't you accidentally ill with Martirosyan?

Quote: vladimirZ

And also, on an initiative basis, Sorge began to specifically merge

And where did you find it all - share the information ...

Quote: vladimirZ

Information from the books of the colonel of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, historian, writer Arsen Martirosyan.

I cannot take his statements seriously, especially after he issued the pearl, that it was the purge in the General Staff of the General Staff on the eve of the war that brought new personnel to the apparatus that improved the activity of this structure. By the way, it’s not entirely clear to me why Martirosyan so famously describes the work of the GRU without serving a day in the Soviet Army, and for some reason it is bashfully silent about how the NKVD on the eve of the war slammed German agents in all the border districts, and was powerless against the actions of spies and saboteurs in the most difficult days of the war. This is a very interesting question in order to understand and evaluate how this influenced the rout of our troops in the summer of 1941.

[vladimirZ]

Who likes watermelon, and who likes pig cartilage. I do not like Martirosyan, read Rezun-Suvorov, Solonin and others, or traitors or not a devil of people who do not understand intelligence and the army. In my opinion, Martirosyan, as a professional intelligence officer, fully owns the analytical apparatus for studying the history of the Second World War and, in particular, the history of intelligence, knows its subtleties, the essence and most important history from inside intelligence, even if not the GRU, but the SVR. The principles and work of intelligence in all its forms are identical, only its objectives in the GRU, SVR or elsewhere differ.
Remain with your opinion, and I with my own, tested by books and works of many historians such as A. Martirosyan, Yu. Mukhin, Yu. Zhukov, O. Kozinkin, E. Prudnikova and many, many others.

[ccsr]

Quote: vladimirZ

I do not like Martirosyan, read Rezun-Suvorov, Solonin and others, or traitors or not a devil of people who do not understand intelligence and the army.

I do not like either one or the other - they too too primitively expound what happened on the eve of the war, and they often lie godlessly.

Quote: vladimirZ

Remain with your opinion, and I with my own, tested by books and works of many historians such as A. Martirosyan, Yu. Mukhin, Yu. Zhukov, O. Kozinkin, E. Prudnikova and many, many others.

This is your business. But I can notice that if you want to have better information about the pre-war events based on the memoirs of Soviet military intelligence, then it’s better to read M. Boltunov - he is not a dreamer, and his books are much more useful than the ones you brought.

[Operator]

The article incorrectly describes the situation for January - June 1941 year, the reality was as follows:
- the military-political leadership of the USSR was sufficiently informed by strategic intelligence of the number and pace of building up German divisions and allied divisions in the front line along the German-Soviet border, in Norway, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania;
- the number of enemy divisions testified to its ability to start a war against the USSR almost from April 1941.

The lack of intelligence information from strategic intelligence on the specific date of the attack and tactical intelligence on the deployment of each enemy division did not change anything in the general situation, except for making it advisable to withdraw parts of the Red Army from the border deep into Soviet territory in order to reveal the first strike direction and deployment parts of the enemy after he goes on the offensive.

Therefore, the assertion of Soviet propaganda about the "surprise strike" is just an attempt to hide the strategic miscalculation of the military-political leadership of the USSR in terms of preparing and organizing available troops for military operations on the western front at the beginning of the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Lack of intelligence from strategic intelligence about the specific date of the attack

If this were so, then there would not have appeared a b / n Directive at the end of June 21, which clearly indicates that an attack of the Germans is expected on June 22-23.

Quote: Operator

- the number of enemy divisions testified to its ability to start a war against the USSR almost from April 1941.

I completely agree, with a little clarification - the Germans knew about our theater of operations, and therefore it would hardly have started a war in April due to spring thaw.

Quote: Operator

Therefore, the assertion of Soviet propaganda about the "surprise strike" is just an attempt to hide the strategic miscalculation of the military-political leadership of the USSR in terms of preparing and organizing available troops for military operations on the western front at the beginning of the war.

I think that it was more of a propaganda stamp to brand the fascists, but in fact, all competent military men knew that there would be a war, but not everyone could predict with an accuracy of a week or a month when it would begin.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The article incorrectly describes the situation in January - June 1941,

I agree with your opinion - the article is biased, and given the rigging of some facts, it looks like a paid lie. Or in the extreme case, we can say that the author’s ambitions in the absence of knowledge played a cruel joke with him.

[Unknown]

Well, as always to blame, Comrade STALIN. he must personally verify the combat readiness of the border districts. and generals, so-so, for furniture. What did the district commanders report? for example, what the aviation marshal Golovanov writes. ..... And now we will call Comrade Stalin. - He picked up the phone and ordered Moscow.

A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. He didn’t have time to say that he was calling about the submission of Golovanov, who is now with him, as from his answers I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.

- No, comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops at the border, and my intelligence works well. I’ll check it again, but I think it's just a provocation. All right, Comrade Stalin ... What about Golovanov? Clear. [51] He hung up.

- Not in the spirit of the owner. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border.

I was expectantly silent.

“The master does not want to subordinate you to me.” You have a lot of yours, he says. But in vain .......... Well, how is this passage? THIS SAME betrayal! Now I understand why they didn’t publish Marshal for a long time. and in general, who is interested in the history of relations, TOV STALIN, I advise you to read with the generals - “distant-bomber” marshal. Well, tell me, to whom does Stalin trust Pavel, the commander of the district, or intelligence? after decades, after the outbreak of war, we can say - it was necessary to do so, or in another way, but what was, it was. for 1941 the Germans were stronger, and that’s it. the party and the government supplied the army with everything they could, at that time. this is food until the 30s on the cards, and lack of consumer goods, lack of housing, etc. all funds went to the army, and the fleet, the country could not repeat the year 1914-16. there was no place to wait for help. and do not need about the help of the Allies, who then in the prewar years could have thought that the British and the United States would help us? Well, let's ask ourselves the question, how did our generals dispose of these weapons? here everyone is clear. and we are all tanks, planes, guns, etc., we consider. and we must not forget about our eternal, I suppose, maybe, somehow, and we will immediately receive both surprise and surprise. so far to go, at the beginning of the 83rd year m.vo. pos Mulino, training urgent service. a new regiment arrived in a week's alarm, about which everyone knew what it would be, and where to run, and what to start, etc. So what? all through ....... one place. the guards do not let the screamers shout, everyone crowds, they don’t have any equipment, there are no batteries, and the batterymen themselves do not know where, and so on. and we are comparing the 41-year-old, then in general the pipe, the majority of soldiers with 3-4 years of education, what can I talk about. The Germans were stronger, and it took two years, long and hard, to compare with them, and started to beat.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Unknown

. ..... And now we call Comrade Stalin. - He picked up the phone and ordered Moscow.

A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. He didn’t have time to say that he was calling about the submission of Golovanov, who is now with him, as from his answers I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.

- No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my intelligence is working

I also like to read about Golovanov. At one time, he also resented the words of General Pavlov ... But he did not lie ...
The words of Marshal Golovanov you specified and the analysis of intelligence information are considered in the 16 part of the cycle. If interested, look

[Looking for]

until on this. in fact. anti-Russian resource. all "eugenias" will find fault with the USSR. Whiteguards. Hitlerites. foreign weapons, glorify. the Bolsheviks. Soviet people. Victory weapons, hayat. Yes. what are you such renegades !!!

[aglet]

Quote: Seeker

until on this. in fact. anti-Russian resource. all "Eugenias" will find fault with the USSR.

here it is necessary to put a question mark, or three, and so, pathos is not enough ... what is this anti-Russian resource? Are there any facts? the author writes correctly, the shtirlitsa screwed up, and the General Staff even more, gave out his wish for the reality. and there is no need to reproach Stalin or Molotov, they say they could not. they are civilian leaders, to supply their army business with everything necessary, and they have fulfilled their task. and that the leadership of this army, starting from the people's commissar and the chief of the general staff, was lying and misrepresenting reports in their own interests, it was noticed later that Comrade Stalin had too many concerns to monitor every action of beetles and paul’s.
"At this time, the Chief of the General Staff arrives, who, having understood the situation on the spot, did not report to Stalin about the true state of affairs on the northern flank of the front ... And if he did not dare to admit his mistake, then there may have been many of his other erroneous explanations to Comrade Stalin before the war ... Maybe that is why there is nothing truthful in his memoirs about the events of June 19-22? "
this, if someone didn’t understand, was about Zhukov, and his heroic counterattack on the South-Western Front, which destroyed all remaining tanks in that direction. and where is the glory of the weapon of victory, which, by the way, was not there then?

[Unknown]

But he did not lie ... did not understand, you want to say that Pavlov, really did not observe the concentration of the Germans on the border? Interestingly it turns out, the frontiers, they see the air force, they make fly-overs, they see, but they don't see Pavlov. interesting. and how is this ............. "Directive of the headquarters of a special military district

18th of June 1941

In order to quickly bring the theater of military operations of the district to combat readiness, I ORDER:

... 4. The commander of the 8 and 11 armies:

a) determine on the site of each army the points of organization of field depots, PT mines, explosives and anti-personnel barriers for the design of certain barriers. The specified property is concentrated in organized warehouses for 21.6.41 g .;

b) for setting minefields, determine the composition of the teams, where they should be allocated from and their plan of work. All this through the fillings of the border divisions;

c) proceed to the procurement of scrap materials (rafts, barges, etc.) for arranging ferries across the Vilia, Nevyazh and Dubiss rivers. Crossing points set in conjunction with the operational department of the district headquarters.

The 30 and 4 pontoon regiments are to be subordinated to the military council of the 11 army. The shelves should be in full readiness for laying bridges across the r. Neman. Next to the exercises, check the conditions of bridge laying by these regiments, achieving the minimum deadlines;

d) the commander of the 8th and 11th armies - with the aim of destroying the most important bridges in the lane: the state border and the rear line of Šiauliai, Kaunas, p. The Neman will reconcile these bridges, determine for each of them the number of explosives, demolition teams and concentrate all means for demolition at the nearest points from them. The plan for the destruction of bridges to approve the military council of the army. it turns out that on 18.06.41/3/10 the leadership of the country directly indicated to the heads of districts, armies, and even corps that the troops should be prepared for all sorts of surprises. have they prepared? Looks like collective sabotage of rate directives. party and comrade STALIN. They understood that they would have to retreat, so they prepared production facilities ahead of time in the east of the country. but it did not suggest that the generals would so quickly destroy the first line of defense in the western districts. for this they were put on trial by the pauls, and his subordinates. and, in general, the complete inaction of the generals of the XNUMXrd and XNUMXth armies led to a general retreat, and even the flight of our troops from the Bialystok ledge. worth a look, photos, and newsreels of the Germans, so horrified by the scale of the disaster. after all, all weapons were thrown during the flight, and the equipment that the country created with such difficulty. because the environment is not a defeat. much can be done, at least forged German infantry divisions. to say nothing, the Germans sat until the very end in cauldrons, and only then went on a breakthrough. and here .......... .that is the first, generals disappeared somewhere, but this is a separate issue.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Unknown

"Directive of the headquarters of the special military district ...

Dear Unknown, I did not quite understand: is it a directive from Moscow to the headquarters of the Special Western District, or is it a directive of Pavlov to the armies subordinate to him. Tell me where you can read the full text of the directive.

[M. Michelson]

It turns out that General Tyulenev deliberately keeps silent or distorts the events on the eve of the war.

But can a Soviet general lie in his memoirs or be silent about something ?!

Perhaps that is why there is nothing true in his [Budyonny] memoirs about the events of June 19-22? ..

It turns out maybe.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Unknown

But he did not lie ... did not understand, you want to say that Pavlov, really did not observe the concentration of the Germans on the border? Interestingly it turns out, the frontiers, they see the air force, they make fly-overs, they see, but they don't see Pavlov. interesting. and how is this ............. "Directive of the headquarters of a special military district

Dear Unknown! In the phrase you submitted you can see the full confusion. All piled up in one pile.
I recommend reading the 14 part of the cycle. At 2018, the year of the best analysis about the exchange of intelligence information between the intelligence services of the NKO and the NKVD (including the border guards) is not in the books. Intelligence reports from all intelligence services still go to the Government. The information of subcontractors is rechecked either by their sources or they are asked to double-check subcontractors. Those recheck as quickly as possible with the help of another source. Within a few days, information from the NKVD intelligence services turns out to be an NPO intelligence service, is collected for intelligence purposes and is sent on the list (including Stalin and Beria). Later in this interchange of information is connected intelligence NKGB, isolated from the NKVD. In this part, all this is written and many conclusions are drawn on the basis of documents. Intelligence reports from the Space Agency Intelligence Directorate are sent to the districts (regarding them). This is one line of intelligence.

In the districts, there were parallel flows of information: from the border district to the district, from the border detachment to the army headquarters, from the commandant's office to the corps headquarters. The memoirs also contain memories of the transfer of information from the commandant's office even to the division. The reconnaissance observers from the artillery units took an active part in reconnaissance from the army. The intelligence departments of the districts also received information from illegal agents who were in touch in the districts. For example, it is known that the deputy chief of the PribOVO intelligence department, Colonel Derevyanko, was in an illegal position before the war on the territory of Army Group Sever in order to confront illegal agents and present his observations for subsequent analysis of the situation. That is, the intelligence service was trying very seriously to understand what was going on abroad. Intelligence reports from the districts went to the intelligence department of the spacecraft and to the neighboring districts. New information was rechecked and if confirmed, then it entered the new reports, which were daily!

So that everyone knew everything, but the data were not complete or of a misinformation nature - they were thrown by German intelligence services and counterintelligence. In the next post I will continue

[AsmyppoL]

Intelligence from border guards. When it is said about it, no one even tries to analyze what is given in the intelligence report. If it is written in detail about something, then the type of border guards everyone knows. In the 14 part, it is analyzed in detail over a short period of what the guards have seen and how it disagrees with other data. I understand that you do not want to read, it's easier to write what you have read in other books. It is not difficult for me, I will repeat.

In the book "Border Troops of the USSR 1939-1941." there is a message (from 21.4.41) from Beria to Stalin about the transfer of German units to our border. The message specifies in detail what has arrived from April 1 to April 19. Part 14 provides a detailed unique analysis of this message (there was no such analysis for 2018 in any book).

The author of the cycle counted 17,5 German conditional divisions (in my opinion, before 18, the author did not count a couple of regiments and tank battalions). 18 divisions for 19 days beginning of April. It did not take into account the arrival of the German units to the border in the area from the city of Yaroslav to the border with Slovakia (the length of the section 92,5 km).

The army team counted 25 days (from 1.4 to 25.4.41) from 12 to 15 divisions. And the data of the army team were too high. It turns out that the intelligence of the border guards even more overstated the data on the German parts! In other words, misinformed the leadership of the NKVD, NGOs and the Government. Cross-rechecking cut off such a misinformation.

The most interesting thing is that for the period from April 4 to May 15 (for 42 of the day!) The entire 24 division actually arrived. And who should believe more ??

[AsmyppoL]

This is another unique data from the 16 part of the cycle, which is also not shown anywhere in the books.
The figure shows a fragment of the German map on 22 June 1941 of the year. German divisions are applied in sufficient detail. The paradox is that the famous maps in the books with the placement of the German divisions at our border were not obtained from our intelligence services, but from captured German maps! This is after the knowledge.

The fragment above shows the dislocation of the German units from the battalion (artillery division) and higher as of June 17. What is visible at the border? There are practically no parts near the border - there are few battalions and there may be a mouth and batteries that are not shown on the map. What is there to watch with binoculars ??
The June 21 summary for the same site is not much different. Only there part of the parts is missing ... I do not know the intelligence where they are ...

That is why full intelligence reports are not published in the open press (even if not daily, but at least once a week). There was a thesis of the head of the GRU, General Ivashov, intelligence gave everything and all books of that period were adjusted to this thesis ... This is a given and it can be seen on the basis of documents, and not someone's words.

As for the intelligence of the Air Force, there are no documents. What to refer to? The book describes a sensational episode about the flight of the general on the instructions of Stalin ... Do you like to read the yellow press? It is just from there. What a shame that it was included in the encyclopedia ...

The general flew along the route that the NKVD border guard reconnaissance aircraft flew daily. In the Baltic States and back. Twice a day to have independent information (cross). And from there along the KOVO border. Again - twice a day. And the plane landed on the grounds where the planes of the border guards were landing. Therefore, the data transmission system was worked out. Only information was sent to the frontier. From there it was imposed on other intelligence services and sent to Moscow Maslennikov. In part PribOVO and KOVO - in the relevant border associations. The pilots did not see anything special. Yes, there were some troops. Only tanks went in the evening and at night. Therefore, problems with them and in intelligence. The number of tanks turned out to be relatively close for one reason: the intelligence officers used the calculated data. The Germans were not in the tank shelves for 275 tanks. And according to calculations were ...
There will be time to read the cycle - there are a lot of interesting things there and everything with documents and memories ... There are several hundreds of such sources of information ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The figure shows a fragment of the German map on 22 June 1941 of the year. German divisions are applied in sufficient detail. The paradox is that the famous maps in the books with the placement of the German divisions at our border were not obtained from our intelligence services, but from captured German maps! This is after the knowledge.

Doesn’t it bother you that the map is not military, but administrative? Why on earth did the German military use it to inflict operational conditions? Did they also experience a shortage of cards before the war?

[Unknown]

here is the link to the directive dated 18.06.41/31/11.07.40. Source: http: //vpk-news.ru/articles/4 .... campaign, this directive went through all districts. as for intelligence, and the order of transfer to the authorities - thanks a little enlightened. our general staff, or gru, did not know how to do analysis on the basis of intelligence, it seems, writes about this, the shipboard. I understand that this is the case, I reported on the instance, let the authorities continue to rack their brains. And I’m taking bribes from me. in this situation, always Comrade STALIN. will be guilty, they reported to him, all with the rank, at all instances. like this. But Pavlov himself did not feel the approach of war? it’s not a matter of whether there is a plan for covering the border, or, something else. troops must be on alert, always, for that she and the army. from XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, the whole year he commanded the district, and commanded. some kind of training camps in early June, according to a plan approved in advance, etc. in the end it turned out what happened, the defense of the border area - failed. because the commander of the Baltic vo. blacksmiths, was not shot, and so too. here’s the verdict to Pavlov, everything is said there, for what, and why .......... By the decision of the State Defense Committee, they were arrested and put on trial by a military tribunal for cowardice, unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without permission of the high command, collapse of command and control , power inaction, former commander of the Western Front, Army General Pavlov D. G., former chief of staff of the same front, Major General V. Klimovskikh, former chief of communications of the same front, Major General A. Grigoriev, former commander of the XNUMXth army general -Major Korobkov A.

The Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941 examined the case on charges of Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoriev A.T. and Korobkov A.A.

The judicial investigation found that:

a) the former commander of the Western Front Pavlov D. G. and the former chief of staff of the same front V. Klimovsky from the outbreak of hostilities of the Nazi forces against the USSR showed cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of disposition, allowed the collapse of command and control, surrender of arms and depots to the enemy, unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the Western Front and this gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front;

b) the former chief of communications of the Western Front A.T. Grigoryev, having the opportunity to establish uninterrupted communication of the front headquarters with active units and formations, showed alarmism and criminal inaction, did not use radio communications, as a result of which the command and control of the troops was disrupted from the first days of hostilities;

c) the former commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front A. A. Korobkov showed cowardice, cowardice and criminal inaction, shamefully abandoned the units entrusted to him, as a result of which the army was disorganized and suffered heavy losses.

Thus, Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoryev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. violated the military oath, dishonored the high rank of a Red Army warrior, forgot their duty to the Motherland, their cowardice and alarmism, criminal inaction , the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons and depots to the enemy, the assumption of unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units caused serious damage to the troops of the Western Front.

The Supreme Court of the USSR, Pavlov D.G., Klimovskikh V.E., Grigoryev A.T. and Korobkov A.A. are deprived of military ranks and sentenced to death.

The sentence is carried out.

I warn you that from now on all those who violate the military oath, forget the duty to the Motherland, defame the high rank of the Red Army warrior, all cowards and alarmists who willfully leave fighting positions and hand over weapons to the enemy without a fight, will be mercilessly punished according to all the strictness of the laws of wartime, regardless on faces.

An order to announce to the entire command staff from the regiment commander and above.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. Stalin

- Order No. 0250 of July 28, 1941.
TSA MO RF. F. 4, op. 11, d.65, l. 192-193. everything is clear and clear. and shedding tears, for these generals I will not, and also to justify. through their fault, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed in June 41.
.

[vladimirZ]

Add to your comment, Unknown (Unknown).

At the trial, between Pavlov, the commander of Zap.VO and Korobkov, the commander of the 4th Army, a dispute broke out: which of them did not give the order to withdraw the three divisions of the 4th Army from Brest, without fulfilling the order of the General Staff of the Red Army of June 18, 1941 to bring troops in combat readiness and their withdrawal from the garrisons. This is reflected in the records of the court hearing of the military tribunal over the command of the military missile defense.
As a result, three Brest divisions, one of which was armored, were completely defeated, and German artillery shot the sleeping soldiers in the barracks literally from the first minutes of the war. At the same time, German troops, including the 2nd Guderian Panzer Group, bypassing Brest and the disorganized troops of the 4th KA Army, found themselves on the almost undisguised KA troops operational direction Brest - Minsk (the lower flank of the Bialystok ledge). On the Brest direction there was another 13 army of air defense missile defense, but in addition to the command of the army and the command of the rifle corps, there were no troops in this army.

The upper flank of the Bialystok ledge - the line of demarcation of the OzapVO and PribVO troops, was covered by the troops of the 11th army of the PribVO, specifically 29 rifle corps formed on the basis of the former Lithuanian army. The soldiers and commanders of the 29th corps wore the uniform of the Lithuanian army with red buttonholes of the Red Army, retained their full-time structure and most of the command.
With the outbreak of war, the 29th corps, consisting of Lithuanians, went over to the Germans for the most part or scattered home, opening the front to the Germans in the direction of Alytus UR - Vilnius. There were no other spacecraft troops in this direction.
From Vilnius, German troops, including the 3rd Gotha tank group, turned to Minsk, where together with the Guderian group, on the 5-6th day of the war, they closed the encirclement of the space forces located west of Minsk in the Bialystok ledge.
Which of the highest generals of the Red Army, the General Staff, the People’s Commissariat of Defense planned such a deployment of the space forces in ZapVO and PribVO, which led to defeat, and is responsible for this, remains open? But the fact that it was not only the ZapVO command for sure. The General Staff was engaged in the deployment of troops, represented by the leaders of the Meretskov-Zhukov and the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko.

[Unknown]

everything is correct. the reasons for the defeat at the beginning of the war were hushed up for a long time. Our military did not want the truth, you can understand them. almost all the marshals were still alive, and some issues they tried to avoid. the same mertskov who was arrested and then released. the matter is him, interrogation protocols, confrontations, etc. just disappeared. there is none, that's all. You can now learn a lot from the Internet, Pavlov’s interrogation protocols, for example, but there is nothing on Meritskov, they write only what was destroyed, either in the year 55, or maybe later. so our generals had something to hide. and notice when, comrade STALIN died, they immediately began to write their memoirs. There is NO SUPREME, and all blunders can be blamed on him. and it turned out that they had few tanks, and the planes were not the same, our soldier was bad, etc. but they don’t even remember their mistakes and flaws. in special literature on military affairs, there errors are identified and analyzed, but who reads such books from the wide mass. and the rest here’s for you, “recollection and reflection,” notes of the front commander, etc., and everything is decorous and noble. and that the German was stronger, in all respects at the beginning, and had to learn from mistakes, not a word about it with great blood. such a lack of understanding has done more harm than good. as the well-known person used to say, they wanted the best, but it turned out as always ,,.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene writes

There was a point of view that this Directive should be called the "directive without a number". This is somewhat strange, since the next Directive has a very specific number 2! Therefore, the previous Directive should have No. 1. That is what she was called in Soviet history. After all, it does not occur to anyone to name the first sheet in a document or in a book as a sheet without a number.

There is nothing strange in this, because Directive No. 1 appeared in January 1941, and assigning the same number to another directive in June contradicted the accounting of these documents. The appearance of a new numbering from June 22 is associated with the outbreak of war, which is why the numbers of directives No. 2, 3, etc., went
The directive b / n was handed over to the cipher agency on June 21 at 23.45, and there it was transferred to the okrugs with a strictly defined account number for each okrug. But when it was being drafted, the war had not yet begun, which is why it was left without a number, not knowing how events would unfold. After the start of the war, they decided to attribute it to wartime documents, which is why it was counted as the first number in the Great Patriotic War, although after its signing it was without a number - this is how it should remain in history, and not as directive No. 1.

[Operator]

Quote: ccsr

at the end of June 21, which clearly states that June is expected to attack 22-23

This is not a prediction, but practically a statement of fact, but this is not the point: from the point of view of strategy (and this is how the top military-political leadership should think) the specific date of the attack is not important - preventive measures to repel aggression should be taken in advance.

The surprise of the attack must be taken for granted - a different position borders on the naive belief that you keep abreast of the enemy, which happened in 1941 year.

The Soviet leadership did not fulfill its responsibilities in:
- withdrawing the covering army from the border to the Stalin line in order to prevent surprise attacks and reveal the direction of the main attacks of the enemy;
- the deployment of work to create behind the Stalin line the main defensive position of the Red Army with the location in its rear logistics and fuel depots, field airfields and areas of dislocation of mechanized corps;
- resuscitation of reconnaissance and sabotage bases that existed before 1937 in the strip between the state border and the main defensive position of the Red Army.

[Seal]

The head of the operative department of the headquarters of the South-West Front writes that the war began unexpectedly. The concentration of two motorized corps near the border and their entry into battle was also unexpected for the front headquarters. Our divisions were not concentrated at the border. The Germans then beat them apart ...

Still would. For him, it is certainly unexpected. After all, he met the war you ways. Halfway between Kiev and Tarnopol (Ternopol). He rode rode (together with his operational department, and even with the encrypted encryption department, which apparently had remained in Kiev until the very end) and suddenly he saw through the car window - priests, explosions !!! All this cavalcade saw German planes bombing the city of Brody in the morning of June 22 !!!
And what do we have? And we have that since the evening of June 21, 1941, the KOVO Headquarters in Kiev no longer has the operational and encryption departments, and by the time the war begins, they also do not exist in the Headquarters of the Southwestern Front Tarnopol (Ternopol).
And what is the chief of staff of the front without any operational department? Oh nothing.
And what is Front Headquarters without an encryption department?

[genisis]

Well, you have to fantasize about completeness:
“On the same morning (19/06/1941), a telegram from G.K. Zhukov arrived from Moscow that the People's Commissar of Defense had ordered the creation of a front-line administration and by June 22 to transfer it to Tarnopol. It was ordered to keep this "in the strictest secrecy, about which to warn the personnel of the district headquarters." We already had everything thought out in advance. According to our calculations, it was not only difficult, but also too noticeable to transport the entire front-line command by road. Therefore, it was decided to use the railway as well. The commander of the district ordered a train train to be sent from Kiev on the evening of June 20, and the main headquarters convoy - in the morning of the next day.
“What about the troops?” I asked the chief of staff.
- So far, an order has been received only regarding the district administrative apparatus. And you need to, without wasting time, prepare all the documentation on the district’s operational plan, including the state border cover plan, and send it by train to the General Staff no later than June XNUMX by train. After that, together with your department, you will follow us in motor vehicles so that you can be at the place in Tarnopol no later than seven in the morning of June twenty-second.
Naturally, I expressed surprise that the command leaves for the command post without an operations department: after all, if something happens, it will not be able to command troops without at hand either officer operators or secret communication specialists. But the proposal to leave two or three commanders with me, and the others, headed by my deputy, to be sent simultaneously with the Military Council, was not approved by Purkaev. This is not necessary, he explained: by the morning of June 22 the operations department will already be in Tarnopol, and before that it is unlikely to be needed.
“So everything is going according to plan,” the general impatiently waved his hand, making it clear that there was nothing to waste time talking. ”
The operations department arrived in Tarnopol even earlier than the appointed time at 7:00 a.m. on 22/06/1941.

[Seal]

Thanks for confirming that

For him, it is certainly unexpected. After all, he met the war you ways. Halfway between Kiev and Tarnopol (Ternopol). He rode rode (together with his operational department, and even with the encrypted encryption department, which apparently had remained in Kiev until the very end) and suddenly he saw through the car window - priests, explosions !!! All this cavalcade saw German planes bombing the city of Brody in the morning of June 22 !!!
And what do we have? And we have that since the evening of June 21, 1941, the KOVO Headquarters in Kiev no longer has the operational and encryption departments, and by the time the war begins, they also do not exist in the Headquarters of the Southwestern Front Tarnopol (Ternopol).

[genisis]

And what, someone did not know? Actually, the memoirs of I. Kh. Baghramyan were published back in 1971.

[Seal]

I knew. Perhaps you knew. But judging by the mass of entries under various rather ordinary (not this one, this article is more likely not ordinary) articles like "thank you, did not know" under such materials, about which you would not think that you might not know them - not the fact that everyone knew.
But I remain in my opinion that in fact Baghramyan and the company arrived in Tarnopol at 07:00, and much later. Roughly hours from 11:30 - 12:30.
Since the front cipher in the army the front headquarters gave (now as a keepsake) only around 14:00.

[genisis]

No. The operations department arrived exactly at the time indicated above.
“The situation cleared up slowly. Information about the position of the 5th and 6th armies had to be collected bit by bit. At about 9 a.m., we learned that the Nazis in the cover bands of these armies had captured a number of other settlements, crushing the resistance of the border guards, garrisons of fortified areas and advanced detachments of cover forces that managed to approach the border.
The commander of the 5th Army at 10 a.m. sent the first report on the radio: "Sokal and Tartakuv are on fire. The 30th Infantry Division could not break through to the border and took up defenses north of the Strumilovsky fortified area."

[genisis]

And further
“When the chief of staff of the front reported the situation at 10 o’clock in the morning, General Kirponos immediately summoned the commander of the air forces, General Ptukhin, and demanded that he concentrate the main efforts of the air force on covering the air from the troops advancing to the borders, delivering concentrated attacks on tank and enemy motorized groups and its nearest airfields.
Ptukhin left, and General Purkaev put on the desk of the front commander the just received directive of the People’s Commissar of Defense. Turning to Vashugin, Kirponos read it slowly and distinctly:
"On June 22, 1941, at 4:XNUMX am, German aviation, without any reason, raided and bombed our airfields and cities along the border. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.
In connection with an unprecedented insolence attack from Germany on the Soviet Union, I order:
1. Troops with all their strength and means to destroy the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border. Until further notice to the ground forces, the border shall not be crossed.
2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping [94] of his ground forces. Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields with powerful blows from bomber aviation and bomb the main groupings of its ground forces. Air strikes to deliver to a depth of German territory up to 100-150 km. Bomb Königsberg and Memel. Do not air raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions. "
Since the requirements of the directive were clear enough, without any comment, it was immediately transferred to the troops. ”
Thus, there were no delays in transmitting orders from the Operations Division.
The main difficulty was in the broken lines of communication with the 5th and 6th Armies.

[Seal]

Quote: ccsr

The directive b / n was handed over to the cipher agency on June 21 at 23.45, and there it was transferred to the okrugs with a strictly defined account number for each okrug.

It is logical to assume that the transfer had to start from the Western District. Moreover, KOVO, as well as the newly created SWF, could not accept the encryption with all desire.
But the encryption arrived at the Call Center Headquarters only at 01:45 22.06.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX

[genisis]

I don’t know what, in your reality, they couldn’t accept in the SWF, but in reality everything was as follows:
“At 0 hours 25 minutes on June 22, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving a telegram from Moscow. It was addressed to the commanders of all the western districts. The People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff warned that "during 22-23.6.41, a sudden attack by the Germans is possible," and demanded, without succumbing to any provocative actions, to bring the troops "into full combat readiness to meet the sudden attack of the Germans and their allies." ... Further, the telegram indicated specific measures that should have been taken:
"a) during the night on 22.6.41, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
b) before dawn on 22.6.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
c) bring all units into combat readiness; keep troops dispersed and disguised;
d) to bring the air defense into combat readiness without additional lifting of the assigned personnel; prepare all activities to darken cities and objects;
e) do not carry out any other measures without a special order. "[92]
Only at half past three in the night did the reception of this very important, but, unfortunately, rather lengthy directive, end. Less than an hour and a half was left before the fascist attack. ”

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene writes

Before the start of the war and even somewhat later, our reconnaissance was not able to open a single German tank group (out of 4), not a single motorized corps (out of 10) from the composition of the indicated attack groups. On the eve of the war against our troops, reconnaissance discovered only individual scattered German tank units:

This half-truth is easy to refute even with intelligence reports:

Special communication of the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army on the grouping of German troops on June 1, 1941
31.05.1941
№ 660569

and intelligence No. 5 of June 15

which indicate the composition of the German group on the theater.
As for the opening of the groups, I don’t know which amateur decided that this was the whole tragedy of the first days of the war, but any military professional knows that the defending formations are absolutely indifferent to where the orders of the advancing tank divisions of the Wehrmacht come from, the main thing is to know at least what is in service with such divisions and what are its capabilities. Moreover, the tank groups themselves were not of the same composition, and did not have the support units that appeared in the tank armies. So it is unclear what knowledge about the location of the headquarters of such a group provided if, with the outbreak of hostilities, the headquarters immediately began moving, and never participated in hostilities on the front line. I'm not talking about the fact that in peacetime, with the radio silence mode and the lack of air reconnaissance data, it’s incredibly difficult to discover the location of such a headquarters, because it’s difficult for agents to enter deployment areas, and sending scouts is problematic.

[AsmyppoL]

Unfortunately, you have not learned to carefully read and assimilate the text, as you rush with fierce criticism.
1) in the submitted scan there is no mention of either the German tank groups or the motorized corps. You can write anything, but there is no mention of these associations in intelligence reports. If you have other information, please provide DOCUMENTS.
2) The above scan proves the correctness of the author Vik. Regarding the grouping in East Prussia, there is a clearly readable text about the presence of five tank regiments, which turn into two tank divisions.
Regarding ZOVOV, the same situation: six tank regiments are transformed into FOUR tank divisions.
About this and written in the article and in the cycle, if you carefully read the texts.
The military man understands that the 1,5-2 tank regiment is not a tank division! Many times it has been written about this ... A person who understands this on paper, but has not encountered it in his life, does not understand it .... And profusely chio says ....
The Wehrmacht’s tank regiments do not have the necessary amount of transport to equip the needs of the tank division for fuel, ammunition, repair services !!! Also for the implementation of the mechanization of infantry regiments attached to the division or division, the mechanization of the artillery regiment of the infantry divisions! Simply no! Another organization is the communication of the division with regiments and corps, reconnaissance and motorized mechanized battalions and much more. The command of the spacecraft understood this, but the experts from the couch is not clear ....
For the sofa expert, I repeat: the discovery of the headquarters of the tank group is an understanding that the border has a large mobile grouping that can be introduced into a breakthrough or the defense itself can break through. So the Germans fought in Poland and in France. Large tank groups. About this there is in the meeting materials in December 1940 of the year and in the cycle.
Secondly, this concept against which district the main blows are expected (by the number of groups). The location of the headquarters can give a link plus or minus 50-70 km to the direction of impact of the group.
The tank group is the pace of advancement to 30-50 km per day. This is ensuring the maneuverability of infantry, artillery, ammunition supply. Bypasses, girths and deep breaks.
When there is a separate tank regiment, then by itself it is not capable of breaking far without infantry, and if infantry are given, then tanks will move at the speed of movement of infantry units or formations ....
Elementary things worth explaining ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Secondly, this concept against which district the main blows are expected (by the number of groups). The location of the headquarters can give a link plus or minus 50-70 km to the direction of impact of the group.

Complete nonsense - in a day the headquarters of the group can change position a couple of times, so put all your calculations in one place, especially since 50-70 km to the direction of impact means that on the front it can really mean up to 100 km. and then what will the knowledge of the location of the group headquarters give you?
On the contrary, knowing the exact location of tank formations and tracking their radio networks will provide much more information about the intentions of the enemy.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Elementary things worth explaining ....

Well then, explain what is more important to the commander of the border army - an accurate knowledge of the formations that oppose his army, or the location of the headquarters of a tank group, which may not fall into the responsibility of his army.

[AsmyppoL]

Again fantasy about radio finding radio networks of tank units. We discussed this point: there is no data confirming the finding of networks of tank divisions, corps and groups! From the word at all. No need to give your fantasies for the facts. There are no facts, therefore your words are fiction. Incomplete information about the German mobile connections, associations confirms the lack of knowledge of the real situation of intelligence and, including radio intelligence.

[AsmyppoL]

You led scan intelligence and did not explain a word about it. Like this summary confirms that our intelligence knew everything ...
The scan you cited is a direct confirmation of the opposite: intelligence misinformed the leadership of the country and the army.
Try to find the answer yourself))) the answer lies on the surface - do not even need to analyze

[AsmyppoL]

I will answer your question: what is more important to the commander of the border army where the headquarters of the tank group is located or knowledge of tank units.
I replaced the word "join" with "part". Why? Because against the three districts there were only THREE COMPLETE TANK DIVISIONS! According to your scan. One against ZAPOVO and two against KOVO. Other intelligence reports should be watched against KOVO. Only three full-fledged tank divisions against the troops of three districts! The border armies are more than three reconnoitered German divisions. Therefore, I chose the commander of the army, against which the TD did not hit

[AsmyppoL]

The remaining tank divisions were obtained by adding tank regiments.
If I know about the presence of the headquarters of a tank group or a motorized corps - this is very serious and dangerous! Somewhere there are other parts and connections that are not discovered by intelligence! If the headquarters of a tank group is found, then where there are at least two motorized corps nearby - up to six mobile divisions, at a minimum. This is planning operations to a depth of 400 km (according to the experience of companies in Poland and in the West).

If a Germans 2-3 tank regiment is found in front of the army, it is much less dangerous! Why?
In the tank shelves there is no motorized infantry from the word at all! There is no motorized artillery, there is no motorized engineering and reconnaissance battalions, there are few vehicles to provide for rear traffic. How far can regiment tanks go without motorized infantry and other parts? Tanks without infantry are iron boxes with limited visibility and without air defense. Not a dangerous target ...
Add tank regiments to the army corps? After all, there are no other motorized units (listed above)! How fast can infantry stomp their feet behind tanks? Kilometers 12-15 per day and tanks will go with the same speed!
At the same time, it would not occur to the commander of the border army that the bridges would not be blown up, but could be captured. Consequently, the engineer battalions of infantry divisions will go legs. And artillery in a number of infantry divisions is still on horseback. I mean, the speed drops significantly!
In PribOVO, the 9 tank battalions were also noted, in which there are also no reinforcement units ... Everything is even worse there ...
I did not find the depth of the advance of the German tank regiment. But td (of which only three) can strike at a depth of up to 30-35 km and get up. While infantry formations still provide the flanks ...
The absence of large mobile groups

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If a Germans 2-3 tank regiment is found in front of the army, it is much less dangerous! Why?

Ask this question to some "military historians", but I'm not particularly interested in this - I'm not used to guessing on coffee grounds, and I'm more interested in the documents of those years in order to draw my own conclusions, which may not be liked by someone. And this is connected not with my conceit, but with the experience that I had during my service in the army.

[AsmyppoL]

So nothing but communications equipment did not interest you! In matters of tactics - a complete profan .... Together with my historian Kozinkin ... Why do I have to explain the proprietary truth three times, like a schoolboy after playing on a computer, that the SIX TANK Regiments are not equal to FOUR TANK DIVISIONS !! Even if they have a close number of tanks

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

So nothing but communications equipment did not interest you! In matters of tactics-a complete profane ....

Take it easy, kettle - during the service I had nothing to do with the communications troops, and, moreover, being an operational duty officer at one of the directorates of the GSVG headquarters, I resolved issues that allowed me to understand everything that happened on June 22 in the districts.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Six tank regiments are not equal to four tank divisions !! Even if they have close tanks

I don’t know why you are carrying all this nonsense if the minimum number of tank regiments in a tank division is two at least.

[AsmyppoL]

Yes ... I wondered last year too: why do you bring scans or huge excerpts from the Internet if they do not confirm anything ...
Again the same thing .... On your first scan, which was cited as confirmation that the intelligence was reporting everything correctly, it is written: "against the ZAPOVO six tank regiments (a total of four tank divisions) ...".
I replied that the six tank regiments did not equal four tank divisions and explained why. In response, you brought a new scan, which does not approve anything new. There is the same nonsense for the transformation of tank regiments into divisions. In addition, in the most detailed summary of many disinformation about the deployment of the German parts.
But I understand that you are talking only with yourself ...
Why do you write that in a tank division there is at least two tank regiments ?? We are not discussing the Soviet division before the war or after the war! We are talking about the Wehrmacht tank division. There was one tank regiment in it on the eve of the attack on the USSR! One! You don't know that either ...
And according to the intelligence given by you, the 1,5 tank regiment is equal to a tank division. This is linden! There are no two regiments of motorized infantry, an artillery regiment on a motorcycle, a motorized engineering and reconnaissance battalion and other things. But the intelligence services did not find these units either ...
You read more slowly what you bring and what you answer.
I can explain all my comments using documents or memories, and you write the text is very far from the truth .... Das ist is fantastic ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

On your first scan, which was cited as confirmation that the intelligence was reporting everything correctly, it was written: "there are six tank regiments against the ZAPOVO (a total of four tank divisions) ...".
I replied that six tank regiments did not equal four tank divisions and explained why.

You really are an ignoramus in military affairs - the summary is about ONE TANK DIVISION (!) And SIX TANK REGIVES, which in total give you four tank divisions when calculating two tank regiments per division. 1 + 3 = 4 do you even understand this? And 3 estimated tank divisions are obtained from 6: 2 = 3.
Well, literate, at least not a shame ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

In addition, in that detailed summary there is a lot of misinformation regarding the deployment of German units.

You cannot confirm your lies with anything - this is a fact.

Quote: AsmyppoL

And according to the intelligence report you cited, 1,5 tank regiments are equal to a tank division.

You generally don’t know how to understand reports, and because of your ignorance you didn’t take into account one tank division, indicated in front of six regiments. And you are still trying to portray something from yourself, chickens to laugh.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There are no two motorized infantry regiments, a motorized artillery regiment, motorized engineering and reconnaissance battalions and other things. But intelligence did not find these parts and the headquarters too ...

Your stupidity just rolls over - they still might not have arrived in the range of action of tank regiments by June 1, which is why reconnaissance may not have been found. And in general, how can you find the support parts if, on arrival, they may not go to the connection’s radio network at all, but simply arrive with a report to the connection commander. In general, you are fantastically stupid to evaluate such documents and speculate what and how intelligence units should have done.

[cavl]

If you didn’t find, as you say, 2/3 of the division’s fighting forces, how did the intelligence decide that these units were fully concentrated?
I always thought that intelligence operates with facts, not speculation. There were analytical departments in the intelligence departments of the districts, but the forecasts had a text from which it was clear that this was not verified information. Assumptions scouts in intelligence without additional reservations do not give.
And if the summary contains such information, then an instruction is given to check and report.
Army men are checking, intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army, requests are being written to the NKGB, NKVD and their intelligence urgently trying to double-check the information.

[cavl]

So how many tanks and regiments were in the tank division of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941 ?!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

I always thought that intelligence operates with facts, not speculation.

They do not make speculations there - they only do forecasting based on AVAILABLE facts, and they do not always describe the whole situation.

Quote: cavl

If you don’t find, as you say, 2/3 of the division’s fighting forces,

The main power of tank divisions is tank regiments, and knowing the organizational structure of the divisions, you can determine where the missing support units or other combat regiments appear. What could be the mistake of intelligence, which revealed the location of the tank regiments, if the Germans carefully concealed any movements of their troops?

Quote: cavl

There were analytical departments in the intelligence departments of the districts, but the forecasts had a text from which it was clear that this was not verified information.

But doesn’t it bother you that besides radio intelligence and undercover intelligence, other types of intelligence have not been conducted? Where to get then information for analytics?

Quote: cavl

And if the summary contains such information, then an instruction is given to check and report.

In addition to orders, you must still have strength and means, but they were just not enough. So there is no need to build illusions about 1941 - we even did not conduct aerial reconnaissance over German territory.

Quote: cavl

Army men are checking, intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army, requests are being written to the NKGB, NKVD and their intelligence urgently trying to double-check the information.

They all directly dispersed to double-check - especially undercover intelligence, which needs time to transfer the task, then find out something there, and then it takes time to report it to the district intelligence department or through its own line to the NKVD. Dream ...

[Romv]

The Germans had one tank regiment in the tank division. Intelligence crap

[ccsr]

Quote: RomV

The Germans had one tank regiment in the tank division. Intelligence crap

In this case, you managed, because you do not know how the structure of the tank divisions in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army differed:

The structure of the tank divisions (the first three were formed in 1935: the first in Weimar; the second in Würzburg, later relocated to Vienna; the third in Berlin. Two more were formed in 1938: the fourth in Würzburg, the fifth in Oppeln) approximately the same: the Panzerbrigade (tank brigade) included two regiments consisting of two battalions, each with three Panzerkompanie (companies): two — leichte (light tanks); one is gemischte (mixed); Schutzenbrigade (mot) (motorized rifle brigade), which is part of the motorized rifle regiment of two Kradschutzenbataillon (motorcycle rifle) and motorized rifle battalions. The division included: Aufklarungbataillon (reconnaissance battalion); Panzerabwehrabteilung (anti-tank division); Artillerieregiment (mot) (motorized artillery regiment), included a pair of light divisions; Pionierbataillon (combat engineer battalion), as well as rear units. There were 11792 military personnel in the state division, of which 394 officers, 324 tanks, forty-eight 37-mm anti-tank guns, thirty-six field art. guns with mechanical traction, ten armored vehicles.
.... The mechanized corps of the army of the USSR in the state of 1940 included 2 tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, a motorcycle regiment pa and other parts. The tank division had two tank regiments (four battalions each), an artillery and a motorized rifle regiment. The state had 10940 people, 375 tanks (four types, including KB and T-34), 95 BA, 20 field artillery systems.

https://topwar.ru/16703-evolyuciya-organizacionnyh-form-sostava-pancervaffe-vermahta-i-voysk-ss.html
If you have enough abilities, then you will understand that the number of tanks in divisions did not differ much, but there was a difference in battalions. And what then is the "mistake" of reconnaissance, if the size of the tank division was revealed in advance?

[Romv]

The mistake was that the structure of the TD could change and this is clearly seen in the materials in March 1941 about the appearance of heavy tanks as part of divisions and more powerful artillery to fight heavily armored tanks.
There are constant requests before the war about the strands.
Few people thought that the Germans after France would not introduce weights in the division.
But we didn’t know why the Germans tuned in to the Erzaztanki

[ccsr]

Quote: RomV

The mistake was that the structure of the TD could change and this is clearly seen in the materials in March 1941 about the appearance of heavy tanks as part of divisions and more powerful artillery to fight heavily armored tanks.

The division, being a unit, it is really possible to change structures, but not by someone’s whim in the district (tank group in the Wehrmacht) but during organizational events. They do not write about this in the press, which is why it is impossible to immediately track all organizational changes, and information on them comes belatedly, even if there is an agent in the upper headquarters of the enemy.

Quote: RomV

There are constant requests before the war about the strands.

Well, intelligence cannot jump out of its pants, especially in peacetime, when there are restrictions on conducting intelligence against those with whom a non-aggression treaty has been concluded. That is why intelligence could not answer all the questions.

Quote: RomV

Few people thought that the Germans after France would not introduce weights in the division.

This is not a question for scouts, but for strategists from operational departments - they should see ahead and set the task of intelligence to find out how much the enemy has advanced in this direction. Or maybe these ideas will be successfully buried, or they may not be feasible at the present stage, and then everything will go down the drain. But this is not even the point, but the fact that the forces and means of intelligence will be diverted to a dummy, and they will not be enough for other intelligence tasks.

Quote: RomV

But we didn’t know why the Germans tuned in to the Erzaztanki

This is a very difficult question for intelligence, which requires a lot of time and specialists in this field, or a recruited agent in the ordering structures of the Wehrmacht. By the way, already in February 1939, in a report to the Narcotics Defense, a test of heavy tanks in Germany was mentioned.

[ccsr]

Quote: RomV

The mistake was that the structure of the TD could change and this is clearly seen in the materials in March 1941 about the appearance of heavy tanks as part of divisions and more powerful artillery to fight heavily armored tanks.

This is not at all how you imagine:

Intelligence report
headquarters of the Western Special Military District
about the grouping of German troops
June 21, 1941
Owls secretly.
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red
Army Lieutenant Comrade Golikov
Army reconnaissance chiefs: 3, 10, 13, 4
.... 5. The bulk of the troops is located in a thirty-kilometer strip from the border. District Suwalki, Aris continues pulling up troops and rear to the border. Artillery is on firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki) heavy and anti-aircraft artillery were installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there..

http://bdsa.ru/documents/html/donesiune41/41061822.html

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I replaced the word "join" with "part". Why?

Do not fool me - I served at the GSVG headquarters for too long to know what interests commanders and chiefs at various levels in the first place.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Therefore, I chose the commander of the army, against which the TD did not hit

You can choose anything, but you alone do not understand that the operational situation in a strip of any border region can change within a few days, and no one can predict how it will change, without taking into account the intelligence information that the district receives not only from its intelligence structures, but also through the GRU GSH and neighboring districts (fleets).
I simply can’t take all your other fantasies seriously, because I understand that you most likely didn’t even serve a day at the army headquarters, but you’re already embarking on discussing what they were supposed to do there.

[AsmyppoL]

I served it maybe so, but there is absolutely no elementary knowledge from the troops on tactics. One aplomb that type I know.
Poser but you ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It served maybe it was, but there is absolutely no elementary knowledge of the troops on tactics.

I gained elementary knowledge during my studies, but after it I had to deal with issues in the strategic link of the armed forces, where people like you look like clowns who decided that they are smarter than everyone if they read something from declassified official documents.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I served it maybe so, but there is absolutely no elementary knowledge from the troops on tactics. One aplomb that type I know.
Poser but you ...

You see, you are our illiterate, your mess in my head has not surprised me for a long time, but when you give out pearls, you need to know the tactics when evaluating a tank group, I can only say that you are a complete layman in military affairs. All that concerns the actions of tank groups, this applies to operational planning, and you have no idea how tactical training differs from operational. Yes, you still need to look for such clowns ...

[AsmyppoL]

Why write with a clever type of truism? Author Victoria described in great detail the passage of information and its exchange between the intelligence agencies of various departments. And more competently and for pre-war time! You can not distribute post-war information to pre-war! You can do this if you confirm your words with the help of documents. Otherwise, this is the opinion of the sofa expert, who doesn’t know how it was before the war and with something foaming at the mouth. This is not even an expert, but a diagnosis !!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The author Victoria described in detail the passage of information and its exchange between intelligence agencies of various departments.

Some madame tried to distribute texts from other books, but the fact that she didn’t cut it in this case, it became clear to me when discussing her comments. You are not far from her, judging by how you understand intelligence.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You led scan intelligence and did not explain a word about it. Like this summary confirms that our intelligence knew everything ...

You’d better study it yourself to begin with, to at least have the right to say what is reflected in it. The whole summary is large in text, and starts at 399 pages and ends at 411. Do you want me to scan it all for you? Maybe look for yourself ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

The scan you cited is a direct confirmation of the opposite: intelligence misinformed the leadership of the country and the army.

She may misinform people like you, but any military professional will even now be surprised at the accuracy of her data, especially since reconnaissance in peacetime is difficult.

[AsmyppoL]

Something with your memory has become. I saw your scans of this report. You made them laugh a year ago on the Militeri website.
So what is this summary of misinformation about? Can't figure it out? Nap convolutions))) the answer is simple. It is necessary to take a pencil, a piece of paper and answer the question ... I feel, you can not ... This is because you need to think, not quotes and your fantasies .........

[AsmyppoL]

I not only read and studied it))) I analyzed it and went the way of building a map of the deployment of troops in the wake of Victoria. And the crap bulletins are immediately visible.

[AsmyppoL]

Okay, nebudu torment you. After all, nothing clever you can think of.
The trouble with the June 15 bulletins that you cited is that she repeats intelligence reports from 31 May. Fully ...
The misinformation of this report is that it seems that the enemy’s forces did not izminilis for one division in 15 days And did not move to the border not by a meter. In fact, during this period, an intensive concentration of German troops began, which reconnaissance was NOT TRACKED! Everything that I wrote is easy to check: all the detailed documents are available in the public domain and on the website Memory of the People))))
Fill with stupidity further

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Okay, nebudu torment you. After all, nothing clever you can think of.
The trouble with the June 15 bulletins that you cited is that she repeats intelligence reports from 31 May. Fully ...

You are even more stupid than I thought - in the first paragraph of the summary it says that the DATA is presented as of June 1, 1941, but you even couldn't understand this text correctly, that's why put your "discovery" down your back. First, learn to at least understand the essence of the text of the summary, so as not to make fun of your "discoveries".

Quote: AsmyppoL

The misinformation of this report is that it creates the appearance that the enemy’s troops in 15 days did not go down one division

You really are a complete ignoramus in evaluating intelligence reports, because in order to check all the data of the intelligence, it takes time, which is why it is delayed. But it is done for a certain category of officials, and the latest operational information, which has not yet been confirmed by other sources, is given only to officials of intelligence agencies with a mandatory notification that the data still needs to be clarified. And they bring it around the clock, and the bosses themselves decide what to communicate to them, and what not to inform about until they get the exact data so that they will not get to the tribunal later.
Enlighten the verbiage, as it was during the war:

Quote: AsmyppoL

In fact, during this period, an intensive concentration of German troops began, which the intelligence did not track!

This lie is easily refuted by intelligence reports from June 18 to 22:

OWL. SECRET
Series "G"
Copies:
To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
Head of Intelligence Directorate
General Staff of the Red Army,
To the chiefs of staffs of the 8th, 11th and 27th armies,
Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District
EXPLORATION № 02 K 20.00 21.6.41 HQ PANEVEZHIS
22.6.41 0.25
Cards 100 and 000
According to reliable data, the concentration of German troops in East Prussia continues. On 20.6.41, on the section of the Konigsberg-Tilsit railway, there was an increased movement of military echelons. The advancement of units to the state border continues.
The construction of pontoon bridges over the r. Neman in the areas: Rus, Tattamishken (2426), Kloken (1834), Tilsit, Winkel; continues in the Wishville area and intensely in the [ dv.] Winge (1048).
Border protection and monitoring of our territory are assigned to field units.
In the Klaipeda region, the civilian population (the main image of old age) is invited to evacuate inland from the border for 20 km
In Suvalka district, residents were evicted inland from the border for 5 km.
On 12.6.41, horses were counted in the Suwalki area, which should be taken to the army on 20.6.41.
There is talk among military personnel and civilians in East Prussia that troops stationed in East Prussia have been ordered to take their starting position for the offensive .....

http://bdsa.ru/documents/html/donesiune41/41061822.html

[AsmyppoL]

Again truths that the author Victoria examined in detail with a mark on the points of deployment of the German troops. If the memory looks bad, it seems the 16 part. All German units are located quite far from the border. Even in the latest report from 21, the concentration of troops near the border was not revealed by intelligence services. No need to put scans of documents from which you clearly can not explain anything!
The concentration of German troops took place, but intelligence could not tie the passing troops to the divisions. The dummies that the Germans organized back in the 1940 year began to be filled with real parts, but our intelligence services could not understand this. Therefore, since the end of May, they have failed to increase the number of divisions. The troops are coming, but the intelligence services cannot understand that this is happening! This is clearly seen on the schedule of concentration of German troops according to all intelligence and final design of the General Staff. This is the problem of the miss of our top commanders! At the same time, in PribOVO, 5 tank regiments and 9 individual tank battalions are consolidated into tank divisions. The higher command is aware that these are not full-fledged divisions that cannot be used for deep breakthroughs and operations. In ZOVOVO, the 6 regiments turned into defective divisions into 4, into KOVO (I don’t remember exactly, but I don’t want to look for you) 7 regiments were turned into conditional divisions.
On the Suvplkinsky bulge, 1 or 2 tank divisions seemed to have noticed, but until June 22, none of the intelligence services confirmed their presence or absence! There were problems in this !!
And according to reports from May 31 and from June 15 (as of June 1), the number of divisions is the same! And not corresponding to the real distribution of the German troops. And what's the intelligence reconsidered is not important. The important thing is that after rechecking, the distorted data was confirmed! Confirmed German disinformation! And the reports received by the district intelligence departments, corps, divisions passed through the district reconnaissance departments misinformed the understanding of the situation in the formations and unions, since they did not represent the rapidly changing situation near the border ... I am trying to explain it. And the fact that this is a summary of 15 June as of June 1 and repeating the main points of the summary of 31 in May is clear to the moron! Why explain elementary things? Or is it your level of communication - say only obvious things and not be able to explain something or analyze ....
Then you on your new forum and troll on users ....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Again, common truths, which the author Victoria examined in detail with a mark on the locations of German troops. If you look badly with memory, it seems the 16th part.

Verbiage, not supported by documents.

Quote: AsmyppoL

No need to put scans of documents from which you clearly cannot explain anything!

You are not able to understand them - this is the point.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The top command understands that these are not full-fledged divisions that cannot be used for deep breakthroughs and operations. In the ZAPOVO, 6 regiments were turned into 4 inferior divisions, in the KOVO (I do not remember exactly, but I do not want to search for you) 7 regiments were turned into conditional divisions.

Complete nonsense - your fantasies about six tank regiments and four tank divisions appeared due to the fact that you could not even correctly understand the summary. And you still grind some nonsense about the highest command staff.

Quote: AsmyppoL

And the received reports to the intelligence departments of the Arimy, corps, and divisions passing through the intelligence departments of the districts introduced misinformation into the understanding of the situation in the formations and unions, since they did not imagine the rapidly changing situation at the border ...

Stop lying - only a limited number of officials allow information coming from the General Staff of the General Staff. And even more so, what is the point of bringing the army summary to the army commanders, which contains information for several districts - are you even out of your mind when you write all this?

Quote: AsmyppoL

I’m trying to explain this.

You are just an amateur in military affairs, and all your attempts to explain something were best shown in your calculation of the four calculated tank divisions of the Germans - you sat in a puddle without even understanding how all military people understood this.

[cavl]

I agree with you. There is some text and there is no analysis.

[cavl]

Where is the intense concentration of troops? How much, what exactly? How many echelons did the increase occur? What previously did not pass the military echelons?
A summary of something and nothing. It cannot be concluded on the basis of the concentration of tank groups, the expectation of the redeployment of aircraft to advanced airfields, and the expectation of war at dawn on June 22.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Where is the intense concentration of troops?

Here:

According to reliable data, the concentration of German troops in East Prussia continues. 20.6.41, on the section of the railway Konigsberg - Tilsit - increased movement of military echelons.

The word "enhanced" just means above the usual schedule.

Quote: cavl

A summary of something and nothing.

For you - yes, for the senior staff of the General Staff and military professionals, she talks about everything.

Quote: cavl

It cannot be concluded

On what basis then did the "Directive w / n" appear, which indicates the date of the attack on June 22-23?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I not only read and studied it))) I analyzed it and went the way of building a map of the deployment of troops in the wake of Victoria.

Your analysis is not interesting to me, like any nonsense of amateurs who have never worked with these documents, and do not know how to evaluate them.

Quote: AsmyppoL

. And the nonsense of the bulletin is immediately visible

I have not yet seen a single documentary fact that refutes intelligence from you, so burn on, the paper will endure everything.

[AsmyppoL]

Look in the mirror. Here there is a complete amateur with the aplomb of the brilliant military leader ...))) do the wings not interfere with the passage in the doorway?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

wings do not interfere in the doorway to pass?

They are enough to pat your face slightly ...

[cavl]

You are like two chicken, stop the bazaar!
And then I will complain.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Something with your memory has become. I saw your scans of this report. You made them laugh a year ago on the Militeri website.
So what is this summary of misinformation about? Can't figure it out? Nap convolutions))) the answer is simple. It is necessary to take a pencil, a piece of paper and answer the question ... I feel, you can not ... This is because you need to think, not quotes and your fantasies .........

So on a miller, fools like you are trying to portray something of yourself, that's why you do not have to enter into discussions with people like you, but simply post scans that you are not even able to correctly evaluate.

Quote: AsmyppoL

We need to take a pencil, a piece of paper and answer the question ... I feel, you can not ...

I feel that you simply won’t be able to understand that this was not the last GRU General Staff report — this one was simply opened to the media, and it is widely known.

Quote: AsmyppoL

It is necessary to think, and not to quote your own fantasies .........

Who fantasizes and how, I understood a long time ago - you are trying to cover up your ignorance in military matters with ordinary demagogy, that supposedly since the coordinates of the headquarters of the tank groups were not established, then the military intelligence messed up everything, and therefore we were defeated in the first hours of the war. And any military professional immediately understands who he is dealing with. If you really want to show your "cleverness", then you can go to the forum "For the truth", and there to develop your ideas, then let's see what they really are.

[AsmyppoL]

Where is the quote with the confirmation of the disclosure of networks of motocases and tank groups? Or for his words, except a wild fantasy, there is nothing to answer ????

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Where is the quote for disclosing the networks of motorized corps and tank groups?

Now, I’ll run to the archives to look for the necessary report for you - for the sake of such a pretzel, this must be done. Wait for an answer .....

[AsmyppoL]

You can not find in the archives that exists only in your brain)))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You can not find in the archives that exists only in your brain)))

Well, why not - now they reveal a lot of things, but you won’t become smarter from this, you think too primitively.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

We discussed this point: there is no data confirming direction finding of networks of tank divisions, corps and groups!

You do not have it. And in the collections of memoirs of veterans of radio intelligence, it is repeatedly described how on the eve of the war, radio interception and direction finding of the networks of German troops took place.

Quote: AsmyppoL

therefore your words are fiction.

Therefore, you are just an amateur in this matter.

[AsmyppoL]

As usual, there are many letters, a new scan and nothing new .... Zabaltyvanie comment: about anything, but I know the type ...
Yes, you do not know anything .... Just chatting your fantasies!

Give specific text, which refers to the intersection of networks of tank associations!

Such a text and the serif could not be due to the fact that the headquarters of the motocases and groups were located geographically before the start of the war on the territory of other headquarters and used their networks.

And your earlier judgments that the notes of the negotiations are kept in certain secret matters - this is your fiction again. OSNAZ radio divisions were subordinate to the district intelligence departments and therefore their data should be taken into account in the district intelligence information. There is not a word about motocases and tank groups. Dream and gush further .. Das ist fictionishshsh)))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Give specific text, which refers to the intersection of networks of tank associations!

Are you out of your mind, or just out of inability to argue, decided to show your "cleverness" by asking questions that can only be answered by those who have access to the archives of the GRU General Staff?
It looks like you are still that fruit, once you have become in a pose and started demanding data from the forum user that is hardly known to a wide circle of people.
Scan than you personally did not like, especially since the author of the text is a famous person in the circle of military radio intelligence, and who would not lie about the fact that they worked on German networks. By the way, do you even have any idea about the forces and means of the district intelligence kit in order to have an idea who and how worked against the Germans?

Quote: AsmyppoL

And your earlier judgments that the serifs of the negotiations are kept in some secret affairs - this is again your invention.

You’re definitely an ignoramus in reconnaissance - reports to the Main Intelligence Directorate from the districts came in several directions, including, in addition to the generalized daily report, the data were constantly transmitted along the radio intelligence line, where a deeper assessment of the radio environment was given.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Das ist fantastic)))

Will give east gross stupid ...

[AsmyppoL]

But I'm not a liar, like you, who give out their fantasies for facts

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

But I'm not a liar, like you, who give out their fantasies for facts

You are simply an amateur in military matters, but you so want to show yourself as an "expert" that you have already started jumping out of your pants. Be educated, this is what another respected radio intelligence officer writes about the work on the radio networks of German divisions. :

[AsmyppoL]

Alla garage, it was already on the site of the Military in the month of May! And we discussed your fabrications in a cycle in the fall ... There is no what you claim there .. Or is it a sclerosis ??? Then you should go to your website.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Alle garage, it was already on the Militeri site in the month of May!

And you cannot discuss what you do not understand. Yes, and on the milter there are the same teapots like you.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There is not what you say ..

This means that Colonel I.Z. Zakharov, a well-known radio intelligence officer in the GRU of the General Staff, invented that in 1941 they worked on opening German radio networks and finding direction of divisions, on the basis of which it was concluded that they were concentrated near the southwestern border. You are simply ridiculous in your ignorance, however this is not even surprising.

[cavl]

Write a text that refers to serifs of tank divisions, tank corps, and tank groups.
Everything written can refer to infantry divisions, army corps, and field armies.
Regarding the tank forces, it seems you are thinking out.
I will also write how you: we are waiting, with more substantiated evidence.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Write a text that refers to serifs of tank divisions, tank corps, and tank groups.

Well, if you don’t believe Colonel GRU GSH, a war veteran, a professional radio intelligence officer, then why on earth would you believe me, even if I write the text?

Quote: cavl

Regarding the tank forces, it seems you are thinking out.

By the way, tank divisions have much more radio networks than infantry networks, so I don’t need to think up anything - you’re just not in the subject.

Quote: cavl

I will also write how you: we are waiting, with more substantiated evidence.

And why are they for you - enjoy the author’s article and enjoy it, especially since you trust him in everything.

[Seal]

Quote: genisis

At 0 hours 25 minutes on June 22, the district communications center in Tarnopol began receiving telegrams from Moscow. It was addressed to the commander of the troops of all western districts.

This is normal and not in doubt. Signalers accept everything that comes to them. But about this

Quote: genisis

The People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff warned that "during 22-23.6.41, a sudden attack by the Germans is possible," and demanded, without succumbing to any provocative actions, to bring the troops "into full combat readiness to meet the sudden attack of the Germans and their allies." ... Further, the telegram indicated specific measures that should have been taken:

could only become known later with the arrival of the encryption department.
That is, the signalmen have adopted a set of conventional signs. On this, the work of the signalmen ended.
However, before the arrival of the encryption calving, the Commander of the SWF and his Chief of Staff could receive the contents of the encryption program on the HF, as they repeatedly contacted the General Staff.

From the memoirs of G.K.Zhukov:

At this time, I and the Commissar of Defense were in continuous negotiations with the district commanders and chiefs of staff, who reported to us about the increasing noise on the other side of the border. They received this information from border guards and front-line cover units.
Approximately at 24 hours on June 21, the commander of the Kiev district, MP P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopil, reported on HF, that, in addition to the defector, reported by General M. A Purkayev, another German soldier appeared in our units - the 222nd Infantry Regiment of the 74th Infantry Division. He swam across the river, came to the border guards and said that at 4 o’clock the German troops would go on the offensive. M.P. Kirponos was ordered to quickly transfer the directive to the troops on putting them on alert

Further from the memoirs of Purkayev it follows that he personally began phoning the armies and individual corps of the South-Western Front in order to convey to their commanders the information received on the HF from Moscow.
At the same time, Purkayev notes that many commanders asked why this information was not transmitted to them in the prescribed manner, through a cryptogram.

[genisis]

Do not tell me where you found Purkayev’s memoirs. I did not come across, would love to meet.

[Seal]

Quote: genisis

memoirs

The term "memoirs" means "memories". Any memories. From the word "Memoria" - that is, "Memory". Hence the Memorial.
Not necessarily in hardcover with the words "Memoirs of So-and-so."

“In the period from 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock on June 22, the commander of the district troops received an order from the General Staff, which required to bring the troops to full combat readiness, in the event of the Germans crossing the state border, to reflect by all means and means, not to cross the border and not to fly, until special order. <…>
I ... in TERNOPIL ... arrived at about 3 o’clock in the morning on 22.6.41.
By my arrival, the commander of the district’s troops, General KIRPANOS, had already received orders from the General Staff to put the troops on alert, but he didn’t give any orders to anyone.
Having received the instructions of General KIRPANOS on the orders of the General Staff in connection with the expected German attack, I immediately called all the army commanders personally to the BODO apparatus. And in the period from 3 to 4 hours he personally transmitted an order to everyone to bring troops into full combat readiness, to take up defense according to plan. When crossing the Germans, the state borders should be reflected by all means and means, and the borders themselves should not be crossed. Our planes do not fly over to special instructions.

All army commanders accepted these instructions for execution. ” (Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Documents. On the eve of the war ")

[genisis]

It’s strange that you didn’t read there, on page 8
"Cipher telegram comrade "Kamkov was sent at about 6 a.m. 22.6 (after the cipher department arrived with documents)."
You previously wrote about your confidence that the Operations Department arrived no earlier than 11:30 - 12:30

[Seal]

Yes, there is such a thing.

All army commanders accepted these instructions for execution. To verify that the orders came from me personally, I demanded that each Commander ask me a security question, the essence of which would be known to the two of us. All commanders except Commander 4 [9] com. KOSTENKO asked me such questions. For example, Commander of the 6th Army Comrade MUZYCHENKO asked me the following question: - What is the middle name of the wife of Army General Comrade Zhukov. - The commander 4 [10] replied: "I believe, I am starting to execute." General KAMKOVY personally spoke with the commander of the cavalry corps (the corps was in the SHEPETOVKA area) personally by simple telephone. He handed it to him, as well as to the Commando.
General KAMKOV answered me that he would not do anything until he received the telegram of the Military Council of the district. Cipher telegram comrade Kamkov was sent around 6 a.m. 22.6 (after the cipher department arrived with the documents).
Army commanders raised the alarm troops by personal orders by telephone and telegraph.

But just this very thing seems .... well, not true.
For we look here:

Cryptographers everywhere work approximately the same.
It can be seen from the document that it took 45 minutes to decrypt and encrypt again. And these cryptographers were at their regular places in stationary conditions. And here are the people with the wheels. They need to turn around, get their cryptographic notebooks in the prescribed manner, place them in safes under the guard and defense of the sentry, equip their secret workplaces. That is the same amount of time. Well, or at least 30 minutes.
I’ve already counted the time somewhere from Broad to Ternopol. Now the distance is 78 kilometers. But it should be borne in mind that in the post-war period the road was straightened twice or even thrice. So, in 1941, the distance was not less than 100 km. And the road was not paved. The speed of the column, God forbid, 40 km / h. And even less. For any minimum 2,5 hours of travel.
True, Baghramyan himself writes that

While we were crossing the 60 kilometers remaining to Tarnopol, small groups of fascist aircraft bombed our convoy twice more. Fortunately, no serious harm was done.

Well, apparently something happened with Baghramyan’s memory. So even now on a straightened asphalt road and taking into account the expanded borders of the cities of Ternopil and Brody, 78 kilometers between us.
But Baghramyan writes that the Germans bombed their convoy twice. He does not run the risk of writing that they say they flew to their destination despite bombs exploding from the right, from the left, from the front, and from the back. But for good, it should be assumed that the head convoy (a very tasty target for pilots) still waited somewhere in the roadside forests for both bombings.
So, if we take into account that the Germans flew our border at 04:00, then over Brody (where Bagramyan first saw them), and this is 130 km. (in a straight line) from the border, the heavily loaded Junkers were no earlier than 04:30.
So, if we assume that the headquarters column was not bombed, then in two and a half hours the column would have reached Ternopol. And it was like times 07:00.
But they were bombed twice... How long did the bombings eat? How long did it take to eliminate the "minor damage" caused by the bombing? How about changing a wheel? How many wheels did you need to change? Unknown. But I believe that we will not be mistaken if we add another 2 or even three hours. That is, the convoy could theoretically reach the Front Headquarters no earlier than 09:00.
But I believe that in order to have time to hide from the bombing, the convoy was traveling not along the road, but somewhere huddled against the forest. Well, or not on the highway, but on country roads. That is, then it would be necessary to add another 2-2,5 hours.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

For example, the commander of the MVO troops, General Tyulenev, who indicates that he learned about the creation of the headquarters of the Law Firm only in the morning of June 22. It turns out that General Tyulenev deliberately keeps silent or distorts the events on the eve of the war, and where such “distortions” are revealed, one can begin to search for a “second bottom” in the events.

Complete nonsense, which can only be believed by a civilian who has not served in the army for a day. Tyulenev wrote the truth, because he doesn’t know by rumors about the creation of the front, but by the document that he was handed to him for familiarization and on which he signed - this is customary in the army. From this moment on, he takes office.

Before the start of the war and even somewhat later, our reconnaissance was not able to open a single German tank group (out of 4), not a single motorized corps (out of 10) from the composition of the indicated attack groups. On the eve of the war against our troops, reconnaissance discovered only individual scattered German tank units:

Another amateurish nonsense - in intelligence reports, the main unit of account is the division, and not their association, especially since the tank groups did not have a regular structure. For any commander, it is more important to know how many formations the enemy can set up, and not their integration into corps or groups.
A classic example for the ignorant:

And how many divisions at the pope? - Stalin suddenly interrupted Churchill's reasoning.

Even politicians, civilians, understand that accounting must be done in divisions, but our false researchers still do not know this.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

Therefore, the words of General Belov that “the intelligence department had such detailed information that were very close to reality” are erroneous.

They are erroneous because they refute your lie about the fact that intelligence incorrectly opened the group in Romania. And the statement of Vladimirsky, who was not even the chief of staff of the 5th army, testifies only to the fact that he may not have known what they knew in the intelligence department of the district:

From the memoirs of the commander of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th Army, General A.V. Vladimirsky’s also follows that the German tank formations were not completely opened by our intelligence:

Why on earth should the head of the district’s intelligence department bring all the information to the head of the army’s operations department if this matter is decided personally by the district’s chief of staff. Can you even say anything clever about army orders?

Thus, by 22.6.41, the number of German divisions near our border according to the Republic of Ingushetia It turned out to be close to their actual number.

Yes, for such work it was possible to immediately present for the rewarding of many participants in intelligence structures. However, this was done later, in the spring of 1942, when we retreated in many directions.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

This once again confirms the memoirs of Generals I.Kh. Baghramyan and A.V. Vladimirsky.

In all memoirs, no one ever writes about their personal mistakes. For example, this statement just says that our memoirists could not correctly assess the grouping and configuration of the future theater, and this is their direct responsibility:

THEIR. Baghramyan: “Another important operational area - Lublin-Lutsk - we did not attach due importance. Although here the territory of Poland occupied by the Nazis bordered on us rather deeply east, hanging from the north over Lviv, but there were no good approaches to this ledge from the west. And it was hard to imagine what exactly this region the fascist command uses to concentrate its large offensive group ...»

And here is intelligence information, if our generals did not initially believe that the Germans would advance there?

The lack of reliable RI (pre-war and the first day of the war, including the absence of large mechanized and tank associations near the border) led to an incorrect assessment of the information in the General Staff and the adoption of a fatal decision on a counterattack by troops of the South-Western Front to Lublin. Perhaps the SC leadership decided to use its pre-war stock.

Another lie of the amateur, because Directive No. 3 sets TASKS for June 22-24, and does not give the ORDER to strike at Lublin. The text itself indicates that the LUBLIN AREA must be mastered by June 26.06, but not a word is said about what forces and means to do it, i.e. there is no specific order. The essence of Directive No. 3 is that it GIVES THE RIGHT to the front commander to cross the state border, and this can only be decided by the government of the country. That is why they urgently gave this directive, and not the ORDER for the capture of Lublin. By the way, the author’s lie is easily refuted by the cover plan - there are no words about the need to PLAN AN OPERATION to capture Lublin.

[Seal]

The following Ivan Khristoforovich’s words arouse interest: “With every hour it became more obvious that we were dealing not with a border incident, but with the beginning of a carefully prepared war ... The order given to the covering forces ... the order to destroy the invading enemy ... turned out to be unrealistic. And not only because in the border zone we had less power than the aggressor, but also because the attack, despite the serious measures taken on the eve of the war ... still turned out to be sudden for us ... "

I wonder what time Ivan Khristoforovich deigns to talk about? When did he arrive at the war himself?

[icant007]

A typical example is the recollections of the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps, General P.A. Belova: "... On Saturday, June 21, I went to the intelligence department of the district headquarters ... The intelligence department had such detailed information that was very close to reality ..."

Something I did not find in Belov’s memoirs such words. But he found something else - General Belov, according to his memoirs, was on vacation on June 21.

[AsmyppoL]

If you didn’t find something, it only shows that you have read little literature on pre-war events. With this level of horizons, how can anything be checked ???
Advise where you can increase it, I will not ...
You just need to read everything carefully ...

[icant007]

I have been reading memoirs since I was 10. My first book was Vasilevsky's "The Work of a Lifetime", then Bagramyan "This is how the war began."

True, in adulthood there was a big break, but I’m catching up.

In the meantime, I will consider the link to Belov’s memoirs your mistake or typo. It seems to be a fairly balanced approach.

Well, unless of course you poke my nose you are ready to admit that you are wrong.