Kimskander. Where did the North Koreans get a new OTRK very similar to the Iskander?
Recently, regular rocket tests took place in the DPRK. They took place after a considerable break in order not to interfere with the negotiation process with the United States, which was brought into a dead end by the efforts of "luminaries of diplomacy" such as a couple from a casket, the same person: Bolton and Pompeo. And took place almost immediately after the historic visit of an armored train with Kim Jong-un to Vladivostok and a summit with the president of Russia. That’s how it was filed in the Western media, and probably not in vain: Kim Jong-un could well have informed Putin about his plans, and could have not done so. Being a nuclear power, but the DPRK is completely independent in its actions.
Recently, footage from these tests was published. Most of them are of no interest, they were the 300-mm long-range MLRS (a very advanced system with satellite-guided GLONASS and Beidou missiles, 200 km) and other MLRS. But not only. For the first time, footage of the launch of a new operational-tactical complex, very reminiscent of our Iskander, was shown, albeit not in its most modern version. Western analysts have already dubbed it various nicknames (this index is still unknown and may remain unknown for a long time) such as Kimskander or Iskander-Eun.
A shot from the test OTRK DPRK
This complex did not come from nowhere, for the first time something like it was shown on the parade more than a year ago. But those cars, obviously, were either stuck together with running models, or some early models of the chassis, perhaps, rejected: the difference between them and the prototype of the complex that had been shot the other day was too great. But, obviously, the main elements of the complex already existed in the current configuration, they simply did not show them to the public. And just the current configuration of the complex immediately leads to recall of the family of the RK type "Iskander".
Early prototypes or mockups of this complex
And so much so that many researchers immediately assumed that this is the Iskander in some export iteration, perhaps further aggravated even in comparison with the Iskander-E, but transferred to the Koreans or built on the basis of the documentation transferred to the DPRK. Of course, this would be a violation of the prohibitions established by the UN, if it were true.
And yet, the resemblance is truly striking. Starting from the launcher. In the current version, it looks very similar to the Iskander self-propelled launcher, though not the current 9P78-1 and not the new rocket designed for 4 and created for that very “scandalous” 9X729 CR (and, already clear, for a number of others) means "for growth", which was mentioned not so long ago at the highest level), but one of the earliest options. The distance between the first and second pair of axes leads to this idea, although the launcher itself looks more like the modern version in terms of design features.
Above - SPU 9P78-1 OTRK "Iskander-M", below - the North Korean complex
The base itself for the launcher of the North Koreans is obviously of Chinese origin. Meanwhile, Chinese friends have their own weapon, created with an eye on Iskander, and, possibly, with elements of cooperation with Russia in the creation (both sides usually keep quiet about such topics). It is about the DF-12 system (М20 for export). But, unlike many Chinese samples, it does not look like a full copy, but it is more similar in philosophy and area of application. There, the rocket itself is different in appearance, and the launcher carries 2 missiles in transport-launch containers, which is not on the Iskander, and there is no possibility of using cruise missiles. And the system does not have unique capabilities, such as a quasi-ballistic trajectory and active maneuvering, this system does not have, so the statements about "approximate compliance" on the performance characteristics of the Russian system should be attributed to the field of advertising. In general, it is abundantly clear that the Chinese system was not the "source of inspiration" for the Koreans, or the Chinese were not a "source of secret knowledge" for the Northerners. The northerners have a classic scheme of our complex, with the placement of 2 BR without TPK, the car body with a retractable roof acts as the protective shell of the missiles. However, our OTRK (for the time being it is precisely the operational-tactical and has not yet moved into another category) uses the KR, and they are in the TPK. What the North Koreans will be there, nobody knows yet.
On the left - the launch of our rocket, on the right - the North Korean
If we look at the photo of the test launch, we will see that the similarity between the BRs of the Iskander family complexes and the North Korean is striking. Rockets look like twin sisters, that is, some differences can be found, of course, but you have to look. Even the number of bandages flying off at the start is the same, as well as the places of their installation. Of course, there is no reason to believe that the missiles correspond to the capabilities of non-export versions of the BR 9М723-1, but it may well turn out that, minus maneuvering and other exclusive features, the Korean system may not be very far from the export version of the Russian BR on a number of characteristics. In the meantime, it remains to be seen where all of a sudden a breakthrough comes from the North Koreans.
Option with the transfer of technology from Russia, we celebrate. Although in the West some researchers already suggest something like this - the similarity of systems according to external features is too strong. As one Markus Schiller noted (whose author’s article took advantage of several collages), “if something quacks, walks, swims, flies and looks like a duck, it is a duck”. However, this gentleman generally considers the entire DPRK missile program as someone else’s external (either Chinese or Russian or Chinese-Russian) project, denying Koreans the ability to develop their own missile program on their own - and this is completely wrong. But we will not blame our country for violating the UN Security Council embargo. If something somewhere could have taken place secretly, no one will ever admit it, and it will be almost impossible to prove it. But, on the other hand, there is a risk of leakage of information on technology transfer, and on both sides (no matter how effective the DPRK’s counterintelligence is, the FSB doesn’t eat soup either). Too risky, and therefore - doubtful. The author also does not believe in the success of the DPRK intelligence service, which has stolen detailed documentation in Russia on such a delicate subject (do not forget: Iskander-M is a carrier of nuclear weapons, and the export system has enviable capabilities, and some people even refused to buy it in my time). Such thefts in our time are possible except in the form of "I turn away, squint, and I will count to 1000". At one time, the Americans clearly acted in a similar way with Israel and its nuclear program, which neither they nor the Israelis like to remember very much. In present-day Russia, the counterintelligence regime is quite strict, and the secrets in the DPRK would hardly have "floated away" in such quantity that it would be enough to recreate the advanced system so closely. Of course, they could have learned something when the “nuts” had not been “tightened” so much in our country, but all the same — it wouldn’t be possible to measure this problem either by measuring or photographing or by secret documents.
There is a possibility with the purchase of technologies in Ukraine, which was actively selling the secrets of a “highly developed alien civilization” to the DPRK, traces of which can still be found on the territory of the upcoming “agrarian superpower” and alien to it. But, as it seems to the author, in this case it is hardly possible to talk about it seriously. Ukrainian crafts on the topic "Thunder-2", commissioned by Saudi Arabia, in general, if you brush off the traditional tales of Kiev bonuses about "Peremogs", have not yet come from the level of rare fire tests of engines, creating a constructively poor prototype of a launcher and prototypes of missiles similar also on the Iskander, but quite remotely. There is nothing to pass to the Ukrainians on this issue, they would be glad to find out something somewhere, no one shares it. And time goes on, and Saudi princes, who have allocated money, can get bored with tales that the donkey has already learned the letters "I" and "A". Although it is impossible to completely exclude the fact that North Koreans in Ukraine acquired some remnants of knowledge and developments on this issue both on the topic “Thunder-2” and on the stillborn “Sapsan”. But the fact that the DPRK turns out not similar to these projects.
The variant with China cannot be ruled out, but, as we see, the system is not similar to the Chinese analogues. The Chinese, of course, could quietly prompt something to the northerners, despite the sanctions regime, which they are believed to observe in a very peculiar way. But knowing something about Iskander is clearly not enough to create such a complex. Creating a system with only external resemblance will not give it even a hundredth of the capabilities of the original, and in the DPRK this must be understood, they are generally much less susceptible to the copying virus than the Chinese or Japanese. Moreover, the capabilities of the Russian and North Korean rocket industry are incommensurable, and the fact that we will have the same size, some capabilities and one appearance, when copied, it will be completely different in size, mass and capabilities. Other fuel, less powerful, other materials, other technologies.
Where to look for a solution to the North Korean rebus? You can, of course, decide that the Koreans have blinded a fool, something very similar to Iskander, only for the sake of PR, and they mislead the world with this non-working system. But, as reported, the rocket really flew some decent distance, and it was not a throw-in launch of the layout. In addition, the North Koreans 2 a year ago, specially developed and tested a solid-fuel engine of the desired size, and now it is clear for which particular system. And this is a very expensive thing - to create a new rocket engine to do this for PR.
South Korean OTRK "Hyonmo-2" (version 2), and its rocket
Meanwhile, there is something interesting in the South Koreans, the eternal opponents of the DPRK. With which, if there were no American actions, Pyongyang could possibly establish much warmer relations for a long time. This is in spite of various overruns with regard to the North at Seoul. Like the non-recognition of the existence of the DPRK and, in general, the level of denial of reality with the Southerners can only be argued that Ukrainians with their fantasies about the Crimea and the Donbass. We are talking about OTRK "Hyonmo-2" (Hyunmoo-2). It was created in South Korea at the beginning of the 2000s, and no one there concealed that it was created with an eye on Iskander-E. Moreover, the performance characteristics of this complex largely correspond to the characteristics of the export version of our complex. For example, the range of the first version of the complex is slightly less than 300 km, the payload mass is less than a ton. And the rocket itself also looks like a copy of the Iskander, like the North Korean novelty. But the launcher is different, the system uses TPK and is generally clearly developed by Koreans on its own. But the rocket, most likely, they helped develop. In those years, cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in the missile area was very broad. Thus, the South Korean KM-SAM air defense system was created on the basis of developments in the then-non-existent Vityaz C-350 air defense missile system, more precisely, according to its export variation, and the SAM system of the complex is practically a copy of the export 9М96Е. Known story and with the South Korean space carrier KSLV, where, in fact, the first steps into space were made by the URM-1 universal rocket module for Angara missiles, which were also not flying into space. That is, the South Koreans in those years received technology from Russia, which at that time still had no opportunity to finance their work in full on a number of projects, and they were delayed. Thus, we tried the solutions, replenished the budget, and brought our projects to practical implementation.
And the deal with the "Hyonmo-2" range of about 300 km in the version of 2A was not limited. By the end of 2000-x, a new version of the Hönmo-2B was created, with an increased range to 500 km, and more recently, the 800-km version of the Hönmo-2С. True, the mass of the warhead as a result of these innovations has been almost halved, and the accuracy of the Korean woman is seriously inferior to the Russian counterpart. There is no talk about maneuvering and other capabilities of our complex (although on the 2C version there were steering wheels in the head area, which probably indicates the possibility of making a corrective maneuver in the target area). And just in the South, North Korean intelligence feels most confident of all, which is quite natural: there is one people, one language, a bunch of relatives. Similarly, the Stasi was even more effective than Soviet intelligence in work against the Federal Republic of Germany. Perhaps the technology of the North Korean rocket is simply stolen or overbought to a large extent in South Korea? Or did the North Koreans thoughtfully collected all possible information about the Russian system from all sources, but did they get the basic information from the South?
On the left - the South Korean BR "Hyonmo-2A", in the center - our BR "Iskander", on the right - the North Korean BR. Of course, the difference in size and mass in the picture cannot be established exactly, but the similarity of all three missiles is evident.
Of course, a complete analog will not work, and you don’t need it. But with bringing (when this happens) this OTKK Kimskander-EH, if you can call it that, the smiling leader of the DPRK will receive another serious argument for communicating with the Americans, whose bases in the radius of action of this system will be the first to be hit, and with the southerners and with the Japanese. After all, the reserves of range growth in the dimension of Iskander's BR are very large, the only question is whether the northerners will allow their technologies to be realized at least half as much as they can from where Kim Jong-un armored train recently returned. Of course, the North Koreans are very far from Russia in military technologies, including rocket technologies, but also the views of most Russians raised on the stories of various liberal travelers and other bloggers about a backward country without the Internet, with soldiers in ancient form with ancient weapons, where everything walk, staggering from hunger, because they feed on quinoa, extremely far from reality. Especially in the context of military technology, and especially in the missile part of them. What they once again proved.
Mysterious Iskander Clone
Recently, footage from these tests was published. Most of them are of no interest, they were the 300-mm long-range MLRS (a very advanced system with satellite-guided GLONASS and Beidou missiles, 200 km) and other MLRS. But not only. For the first time, footage of the launch of a new operational-tactical complex, very reminiscent of our Iskander, was shown, albeit not in its most modern version. Western analysts have already dubbed it various nicknames (this index is still unknown and may remain unknown for a long time) such as Kimskander or Iskander-Eun.
A shot from the test OTRK DPRK
This complex did not come from nowhere, for the first time something like it was shown on the parade more than a year ago. But those cars, obviously, were either stuck together with running models, or some early models of the chassis, perhaps, rejected: the difference between them and the prototype of the complex that had been shot the other day was too great. But, obviously, the main elements of the complex already existed in the current configuration, they simply did not show them to the public. And just the current configuration of the complex immediately leads to recall of the family of the RK type "Iskander".
Early prototypes or mockups of this complex
And so much so that many researchers immediately assumed that this is the Iskander in some export iteration, perhaps further aggravated even in comparison with the Iskander-E, but transferred to the Koreans or built on the basis of the documentation transferred to the DPRK. Of course, this would be a violation of the prohibitions established by the UN, if it were true.
Launch Brothers and Twin Rocket
And yet, the resemblance is truly striking. Starting from the launcher. In the current version, it looks very similar to the Iskander self-propelled launcher, though not the current 9P78-1 and not the new rocket designed for 4 and created for that very “scandalous” 9X729 CR (and, already clear, for a number of others) means "for growth", which was mentioned not so long ago at the highest level), but one of the earliest options. The distance between the first and second pair of axes leads to this idea, although the launcher itself looks more like the modern version in terms of design features.
Above - SPU 9P78-1 OTRK "Iskander-M", below - the North Korean complex
The base itself for the launcher of the North Koreans is obviously of Chinese origin. Meanwhile, Chinese friends have their own weapon, created with an eye on Iskander, and, possibly, with elements of cooperation with Russia in the creation (both sides usually keep quiet about such topics). It is about the DF-12 system (М20 for export). But, unlike many Chinese samples, it does not look like a full copy, but it is more similar in philosophy and area of application. There, the rocket itself is different in appearance, and the launcher carries 2 missiles in transport-launch containers, which is not on the Iskander, and there is no possibility of using cruise missiles. And the system does not have unique capabilities, such as a quasi-ballistic trajectory and active maneuvering, this system does not have, so the statements about "approximate compliance" on the performance characteristics of the Russian system should be attributed to the field of advertising. In general, it is abundantly clear that the Chinese system was not the "source of inspiration" for the Koreans, or the Chinese were not a "source of secret knowledge" for the Northerners. The northerners have a classic scheme of our complex, with the placement of 2 BR without TPK, the car body with a retractable roof acts as the protective shell of the missiles. However, our OTRK (for the time being it is precisely the operational-tactical and has not yet moved into another category) uses the KR, and they are in the TPK. What the North Koreans will be there, nobody knows yet.
On the left - the launch of our rocket, on the right - the North Korean
If we look at the photo of the test launch, we will see that the similarity between the BRs of the Iskander family complexes and the North Korean is striking. Rockets look like twin sisters, that is, some differences can be found, of course, but you have to look. Even the number of bandages flying off at the start is the same, as well as the places of their installation. Of course, there is no reason to believe that the missiles correspond to the capabilities of non-export versions of the BR 9М723-1, but it may well turn out that, minus maneuvering and other exclusive features, the Korean system may not be very far from the export version of the Russian BR on a number of characteristics. In the meantime, it remains to be seen where all of a sudden a breakthrough comes from the North Koreans.
Where does the wind blow?
Option with the transfer of technology from Russia, we celebrate. Although in the West some researchers already suggest something like this - the similarity of systems according to external features is too strong. As one Markus Schiller noted (whose author’s article took advantage of several collages), “if something quacks, walks, swims, flies and looks like a duck, it is a duck”. However, this gentleman generally considers the entire DPRK missile program as someone else’s external (either Chinese or Russian or Chinese-Russian) project, denying Koreans the ability to develop their own missile program on their own - and this is completely wrong. But we will not blame our country for violating the UN Security Council embargo. If something somewhere could have taken place secretly, no one will ever admit it, and it will be almost impossible to prove it. But, on the other hand, there is a risk of leakage of information on technology transfer, and on both sides (no matter how effective the DPRK’s counterintelligence is, the FSB doesn’t eat soup either). Too risky, and therefore - doubtful. The author also does not believe in the success of the DPRK intelligence service, which has stolen detailed documentation in Russia on such a delicate subject (do not forget: Iskander-M is a carrier of nuclear weapons, and the export system has enviable capabilities, and some people even refused to buy it in my time). Such thefts in our time are possible except in the form of "I turn away, squint, and I will count to 1000". At one time, the Americans clearly acted in a similar way with Israel and its nuclear program, which neither they nor the Israelis like to remember very much. In present-day Russia, the counterintelligence regime is quite strict, and the secrets in the DPRK would hardly have "floated away" in such quantity that it would be enough to recreate the advanced system so closely. Of course, they could have learned something when the “nuts” had not been “tightened” so much in our country, but all the same — it wouldn’t be possible to measure this problem either by measuring or photographing or by secret documents.
There is a possibility with the purchase of technologies in Ukraine, which was actively selling the secrets of a “highly developed alien civilization” to the DPRK, traces of which can still be found on the territory of the upcoming “agrarian superpower” and alien to it. But, as it seems to the author, in this case it is hardly possible to talk about it seriously. Ukrainian crafts on the topic "Thunder-2", commissioned by Saudi Arabia, in general, if you brush off the traditional tales of Kiev bonuses about "Peremogs", have not yet come from the level of rare fire tests of engines, creating a constructively poor prototype of a launcher and prototypes of missiles similar also on the Iskander, but quite remotely. There is nothing to pass to the Ukrainians on this issue, they would be glad to find out something somewhere, no one shares it. And time goes on, and Saudi princes, who have allocated money, can get bored with tales that the donkey has already learned the letters "I" and "A". Although it is impossible to completely exclude the fact that North Koreans in Ukraine acquired some remnants of knowledge and developments on this issue both on the topic “Thunder-2” and on the stillborn “Sapsan”. But the fact that the DPRK turns out not similar to these projects.
The variant with China cannot be ruled out, but, as we see, the system is not similar to the Chinese analogues. The Chinese, of course, could quietly prompt something to the northerners, despite the sanctions regime, which they are believed to observe in a very peculiar way. But knowing something about Iskander is clearly not enough to create such a complex. Creating a system with only external resemblance will not give it even a hundredth of the capabilities of the original, and in the DPRK this must be understood, they are generally much less susceptible to the copying virus than the Chinese or Japanese. Moreover, the capabilities of the Russian and North Korean rocket industry are incommensurable, and the fact that we will have the same size, some capabilities and one appearance, when copied, it will be completely different in size, mass and capabilities. Other fuel, less powerful, other materials, other technologies.
Is there a clue to the south of the 38 parallel?
Where to look for a solution to the North Korean rebus? You can, of course, decide that the Koreans have blinded a fool, something very similar to Iskander, only for the sake of PR, and they mislead the world with this non-working system. But, as reported, the rocket really flew some decent distance, and it was not a throw-in launch of the layout. In addition, the North Koreans 2 a year ago, specially developed and tested a solid-fuel engine of the desired size, and now it is clear for which particular system. And this is a very expensive thing - to create a new rocket engine to do this for PR.
South Korean OTRK "Hyonmo-2" (version 2), and its rocket
Meanwhile, there is something interesting in the South Koreans, the eternal opponents of the DPRK. With which, if there were no American actions, Pyongyang could possibly establish much warmer relations for a long time. This is in spite of various overruns with regard to the North at Seoul. Like the non-recognition of the existence of the DPRK and, in general, the level of denial of reality with the Southerners can only be argued that Ukrainians with their fantasies about the Crimea and the Donbass. We are talking about OTRK "Hyonmo-2" (Hyunmoo-2). It was created in South Korea at the beginning of the 2000s, and no one there concealed that it was created with an eye on Iskander-E. Moreover, the performance characteristics of this complex largely correspond to the characteristics of the export version of our complex. For example, the range of the first version of the complex is slightly less than 300 km, the payload mass is less than a ton. And the rocket itself also looks like a copy of the Iskander, like the North Korean novelty. But the launcher is different, the system uses TPK and is generally clearly developed by Koreans on its own. But the rocket, most likely, they helped develop. In those years, cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in the missile area was very broad. Thus, the South Korean KM-SAM air defense system was created on the basis of developments in the then-non-existent Vityaz C-350 air defense missile system, more precisely, according to its export variation, and the SAM system of the complex is practically a copy of the export 9М96Е. Known story and with the South Korean space carrier KSLV, where, in fact, the first steps into space were made by the URM-1 universal rocket module for Angara missiles, which were also not flying into space. That is, the South Koreans in those years received technology from Russia, which at that time still had no opportunity to finance their work in full on a number of projects, and they were delayed. Thus, we tried the solutions, replenished the budget, and brought our projects to practical implementation.
And the deal with the "Hyonmo-2" range of about 300 km in the version of 2A was not limited. By the end of 2000-x, a new version of the Hönmo-2B was created, with an increased range to 500 km, and more recently, the 800-km version of the Hönmo-2С. True, the mass of the warhead as a result of these innovations has been almost halved, and the accuracy of the Korean woman is seriously inferior to the Russian counterpart. There is no talk about maneuvering and other capabilities of our complex (although on the 2C version there were steering wheels in the head area, which probably indicates the possibility of making a corrective maneuver in the target area). And just in the South, North Korean intelligence feels most confident of all, which is quite natural: there is one people, one language, a bunch of relatives. Similarly, the Stasi was even more effective than Soviet intelligence in work against the Federal Republic of Germany. Perhaps the technology of the North Korean rocket is simply stolen or overbought to a large extent in South Korea? Or did the North Koreans thoughtfully collected all possible information about the Russian system from all sources, but did they get the basic information from the South?
On the left - the South Korean BR "Hyonmo-2A", in the center - our BR "Iskander", on the right - the North Korean BR. Of course, the difference in size and mass in the picture cannot be established exactly, but the similarity of all three missiles is evident.
Of course, a complete analog will not work, and you don’t need it. But with bringing (when this happens) this OTKK Kimskander-EH, if you can call it that, the smiling leader of the DPRK will receive another serious argument for communicating with the Americans, whose bases in the radius of action of this system will be the first to be hit, and with the southerners and with the Japanese. After all, the reserves of range growth in the dimension of Iskander's BR are very large, the only question is whether the northerners will allow their technologies to be realized at least half as much as they can from where Kim Jong-un armored train recently returned. Of course, the North Koreans are very far from Russia in military technologies, including rocket technologies, but also the views of most Russians raised on the stories of various liberal travelers and other bloggers about a backward country without the Internet, with soldiers in ancient form with ancient weapons, where everything walk, staggering from hunger, because they feed on quinoa, extremely far from reality. Especially in the context of military technology, and especially in the missile part of them. What they once again proved.
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