Turkey will receive a tool that is not available from C-400. Bosporus concession to please the USA
There is not the slightest doubt that for the sake of their own economic and military-technical benefits, the current Turkish leadership, headed by the unpredictable leader Recep Erdogan, is ready to crumple and “throw into the furnace” practically any configuration of good-neighborly relations with its Persian and Eurasian partners. It is this vector of Ankara’s actions that can be traced today in a difficult operational and tactical situation on the line of contact with the “idlib bridgehead” seized by the fighting, where Russian soldiers continue to die (thanks to this “bridgehead” the Turks received an excellent “shadow” arms market and a testing ground for testing new concepts weapons and electronic equipment in combat conditions).
Similarly, the situation with the sale to the Ukrainian militants of the shock-reconnaissance UAV "Bayraktar TB2" on the eve of the escalation in the Donbas and against the background of the insane statement of the NSDC secretary Alexander Turchinov "about the ability of the rocket forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to destroy the Crimean Bridge." This deal, which is another “stone in the garden” of the LDNR armies and Russian army units in the Southern Military District, could only be approved by the Turkish side in exchange for obtaining critical technologies in the rocket production industry, which are available to the Yuzhnoye design bureau "Thunder-2"), as well as in exchange for the technology provided for the production of active protection systems "Duplet" and "AKKOR Pulat" (a licensed copy of the Ukrainian KAZ "Zaslon-L" modified conceptual analog of the Soviet KAZ "Rain").
And, of course, we are talking about providing the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces with unimpeded access to separate NK and NATO naval strike groups in the waters of the Black Sea, even in the light of the unseen preparation by Kiev and the North Atlantic alliance of large-scale escalation in two seas and Donbas TVD. Already now, with a high degree of probability, it can be argued that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in the region, Ankara will completely ignore the provision of the Montreux Convention, which provides for blocking the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits during the period of involvement in the escalation of the Black Sea countries. It is not difficult to guess that a kind of "prepayment" for the removal of Ankara from what is happening was the very resumption of the contract for the supply of the low-profile F-35A fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force.
These points were discussed in more detail in our previous review. Information about the immediate start of the evacuation by the Pentagon of virtually all US military and civilian structures - from the KMP and SSO to diplomatic representatives and US special representatives for contacts with the SDF - from the Syrian Arab Republic (Rozhava abandoned to the mercy of the Turkish offensive) only strengthens us in the opinion that the Kurds also became an excellent bargaining chip in the US-Turkish negotiations for obtaining comprehensive privileges in the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, 19 December TASS, referring to sources in the Pentagon and the US foreign affairs agency, reported additional important details of the "encouragement" of the Turkish side for acting in the key favorable to Washington. The next bonus was the approval by the US State Department of the decision of the Agency for Defense Cooperation and Security (structure under the Pentagon) to supply the Turkish side at least four upgraded Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense missile systems as part of the 4 advanced AN-MPN-65 centimeter G- wavebands, 10 mast antennas OE-349 AMG ("Antenna Mast Group"), designed to combine remote ZRK batteries into network-centric zenith rocket brigades using a secure radio channel to exchange UHF- Range (470-862 MHz), 20 launchers M903, and surface-to-air missile 80 distal radius MIM-104E (GEM-T) and 60 MIM-104F PAC-3MSE.
The main technological parameters of the radar AN / APG-65 (speed of the escorted target in 7800 km / h, throughput in 125 targets, target detection distance with 0,1 EPR square meter - about 80 km, target canal - 8 simultaneously intercepted targets) we have long known and are not very different from the early modification version of the AN / MPQ-53 radar for illumination (with the exception of the noise immunity and performance of the microprocessor element base). But interceptor missiles should be considered in more detail.
The MIM-104E anti-aircraft missiles are an upgraded version of the MIM-104C with updated software for an active, semi-active radar missile and high-explosive fragmentation warhead with optimization of the fragmentation fragmentation sector (a similar technique is embodied in the Russian XURNXXXXX486X / QDGM software that is implemented in Russian Zur systems of the 2HXNXXX300 / IMT family of AI software. "Triumph" to increase the effectiveness of interception of operational-tactical ballistic missiles). Given the fact that the MIM-2E GEM-T SAMs have a range of 400 — 104 km, their use in the Patriot’s purchased Turkish government will not provide any advantages over the Triumph C-160 purchased from Rosoboronexport, because The 200H400DM SAM has an interception range of the order of 48 km at a higher flight speed (6 km / h against 250 km / h in GEM-T) and the speed of the intercepted target (9000 m / s against 6000 m / s).
Another thing - MIM-104F PAC-3MSE. Despite the similar intrinsic flight speed and speed of the target being hit, it is capable of destroying ballistic and aerodynamic objects by the method of kinetic destruction (direct hit), called “hit-to-kill” by western specialists. For this purpose, surgical accuracy is required on the undercut section of the trajectory, which is achieved by the presence of an active radar homing millimeter Ka-band, as well as a “belt” block of gas-dynamic rudders in the front of the MIM-104F. Also, ARGSN and the gas-dynamic unit allow the interceptor missile to more successfully withstand highly maneuverable cruise missiles hiding from the AN / MPQ-65 MRLS behind elevated terrain or radio horizon. Our MKB "Torch" to this day has not brought to mind similar SAME 9М96Е2 / DM, and therefore the "four hundred" (and in the export version, and in the version for the VKS of Russia) are unable to destroy over-horizon targets or objects, maneuvering with overloads more than 20 — 25G .
It was precisely due to the lack of “kinetic” 400М9Е96 SAM in the C-2 ammunition, the Turkish General Staff had long ago laid eyes on the “Patriot PAC-3MSE” and finally achieved its goal, skillfully manipulating the extremely favorable geographical position in the region and the unique possibility of controlling sea traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. But the Turkish side is not in a hurry to refuse C-400, because the greater range of 48H6DM missiles, 2,5 times higher energy parameters of the 92H6E guidance radar and the possibility of destroying targets at speeds up to 17280 km / h offer the Turkish army much broader opportunities to build not only zone-object, but also regional missile defense. All the sadness of this action lies in the fact that we are again in the role of the side drawn around the finger.
Information sources:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-01-11/ch5.htm
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/patriot/patriot.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/erint/erint.shtml
http://deita.ru/ru/news/krymskij-most-grozyat-unichtozhit-raketami/
https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3096820
Similarly, the situation with the sale to the Ukrainian militants of the shock-reconnaissance UAV "Bayraktar TB2" on the eve of the escalation in the Donbas and against the background of the insane statement of the NSDC secretary Alexander Turchinov "about the ability of the rocket forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to destroy the Crimean Bridge." This deal, which is another “stone in the garden” of the LDNR armies and Russian army units in the Southern Military District, could only be approved by the Turkish side in exchange for obtaining critical technologies in the rocket production industry, which are available to the Yuzhnoye design bureau "Thunder-2"), as well as in exchange for the technology provided for the production of active protection systems "Duplet" and "AKKOR Pulat" (a licensed copy of the Ukrainian KAZ "Zaslon-L" modified conceptual analog of the Soviet KAZ "Rain").
And, of course, we are talking about providing the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces with unimpeded access to separate NK and NATO naval strike groups in the waters of the Black Sea, even in the light of the unseen preparation by Kiev and the North Atlantic alliance of large-scale escalation in two seas and Donbas TVD. Already now, with a high degree of probability, it can be argued that in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in the region, Ankara will completely ignore the provision of the Montreux Convention, which provides for blocking the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits during the period of involvement in the escalation of the Black Sea countries. It is not difficult to guess that a kind of "prepayment" for the removal of Ankara from what is happening was the very resumption of the contract for the supply of the low-profile F-35A fighter jets to the Turkish Air Force.
These points were discussed in more detail in our previous review. Information about the immediate start of the evacuation by the Pentagon of virtually all US military and civilian structures - from the KMP and SSO to diplomatic representatives and US special representatives for contacts with the SDF - from the Syrian Arab Republic (Rozhava abandoned to the mercy of the Turkish offensive) only strengthens us in the opinion that the Kurds also became an excellent bargaining chip in the US-Turkish negotiations for obtaining comprehensive privileges in the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, 19 December TASS, referring to sources in the Pentagon and the US foreign affairs agency, reported additional important details of the "encouragement" of the Turkish side for acting in the key favorable to Washington. The next bonus was the approval by the US State Department of the decision of the Agency for Defense Cooperation and Security (structure under the Pentagon) to supply the Turkish side at least four upgraded Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense missile systems as part of the 4 advanced AN-MPN-65 centimeter G- wavebands, 10 mast antennas OE-349 AMG ("Antenna Mast Group"), designed to combine remote ZRK batteries into network-centric zenith rocket brigades using a secure radio channel to exchange UHF- Range (470-862 MHz), 20 launchers M903, and surface-to-air missile 80 distal radius MIM-104E (GEM-T) and 60 MIM-104F PAC-3MSE.
The main technological parameters of the radar AN / APG-65 (speed of the escorted target in 7800 km / h, throughput in 125 targets, target detection distance with 0,1 EPR square meter - about 80 km, target canal - 8 simultaneously intercepted targets) we have long known and are not very different from the early modification version of the AN / MPQ-53 radar for illumination (with the exception of the noise immunity and performance of the microprocessor element base). But interceptor missiles should be considered in more detail.
The MIM-104E anti-aircraft missiles are an upgraded version of the MIM-104C with updated software for an active, semi-active radar missile and high-explosive fragmentation warhead with optimization of the fragmentation fragmentation sector (a similar technique is embodied in the Russian XURNXXXXX486X / QDGM software that is implemented in Russian Zur systems of the 2HXNXXX300 / IMT family of AI software. "Triumph" to increase the effectiveness of interception of operational-tactical ballistic missiles). Given the fact that the MIM-2E GEM-T SAMs have a range of 400 — 104 km, their use in the Patriot’s purchased Turkish government will not provide any advantages over the Triumph C-160 purchased from Rosoboronexport, because The 200H400DM SAM has an interception range of the order of 48 km at a higher flight speed (6 km / h against 250 km / h in GEM-T) and the speed of the intercepted target (9000 m / s against 6000 m / s).
Another thing - MIM-104F PAC-3MSE. Despite the similar intrinsic flight speed and speed of the target being hit, it is capable of destroying ballistic and aerodynamic objects by the method of kinetic destruction (direct hit), called “hit-to-kill” by western specialists. For this purpose, surgical accuracy is required on the undercut section of the trajectory, which is achieved by the presence of an active radar homing millimeter Ka-band, as well as a “belt” block of gas-dynamic rudders in the front of the MIM-104F. Also, ARGSN and the gas-dynamic unit allow the interceptor missile to more successfully withstand highly maneuverable cruise missiles hiding from the AN / MPQ-65 MRLS behind elevated terrain or radio horizon. Our MKB "Torch" to this day has not brought to mind similar SAME 9М96Е2 / DM, and therefore the "four hundred" (and in the export version, and in the version for the VKS of Russia) are unable to destroy over-horizon targets or objects, maneuvering with overloads more than 20 — 25G .
It was precisely due to the lack of “kinetic” 400М9Е96 SAM in the C-2 ammunition, the Turkish General Staff had long ago laid eyes on the “Patriot PAC-3MSE” and finally achieved its goal, skillfully manipulating the extremely favorable geographical position in the region and the unique possibility of controlling sea traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. But the Turkish side is not in a hurry to refuse C-400, because the greater range of 48H6DM missiles, 2,5 times higher energy parameters of the 92H6E guidance radar and the possibility of destroying targets at speeds up to 17280 km / h offer the Turkish army much broader opportunities to build not only zone-object, but also regional missile defense. All the sadness of this action lies in the fact that we are again in the role of the side drawn around the finger.
Information sources:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-01-11/ch5.htm
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/patriot/patriot.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/erint/erint.shtml
http://deita.ru/ru/news/krymskij-most-grozyat-unichtozhit-raketami/
https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3096820
Information