The essence of the American proposals is simple and unpretentious - Russia must recognize its violations of the Treaty and eliminate them, in particular, land-based CD (CRNB) 9М729 should be eliminated, or its range should be reduced to contractual. And this should be verifiable, although no inspection mechanisms formally falling under the DRDM systems cannot exist. In general, “pay and repent,” and Russia, as always, “must”. Or maybe even the sanctions in the appendage will give the next. And it’s not a fact that 9М729 and those capable of launching SPU in the Iskander-M brigades are very few, but all other SPUs are capable of using the XRNB 9М728 - exactly the external signs of a rocket, but in short its range is less, but suspect it that it is capable of flying much further. At the same time, the Americans did not intend to answer the same at the Russian accusations of violating the Treaty. The meaning of their course is clear - to transfer the blame for the breakdown of the INF Treaty on Russia, they say, we would have remained, and the Russians would not have left us with any opportunities. And not only before the world community, but also before the cowardly European allies, whom they "convinced" of Russia's fault, forcing them to sign a statement in support of their position, despite the fact that the actions of the United States beat precisely on them in the first place.
It is absolutely clear that such a proposal by Russia will be ignored, if not to say otherwise - the Americans will simply be sent far away, and so far where even Sergey Shnurov did not send. Moreover, the Americans have not provided any evidence, in particular, on the issue of the 9М729 range. However, they can not be - as already mentioned, the identity of the appearance and dimensions with the SLCM 3М14 is not proof from a contractual point of view. A launch at a distance of more than 500km on land with a standard launcher was not recorded by the Americans. And our Foreign Ministry in a recent lengthy commentary (which did not contain any particularly breakthrough information) emphasized that 9М729 is a rocket with a range of 480 km, and if this is not true, then only the launch of this particular missile can be proven legally drier The Americans recorded launches at a great distance from the stationary test site PU, but even here they have nothing to cover - it could have been a different rocket (like the 9МXNNXX “Petrel”, or one of its prototypes) or the Caliber XRML of the “Caliber” complex additional tests passed, say, a new modification. In general, Washington has no methods against Kostya Saprykin, if Russia violates the Treaty, it is impossible to prove, but it is much easier to prove American violations. If charges of target rockets are generally propagandistic in nature (these very primitive stationary systems are much farther from the level of the nuclear missile superpower’s combat system than, say, Indian or Pakistani missiles), then charges of using SLCMs like Tomahawk “from the launch complex of the land Ajig Eshor missile defense system” are much more significant. Although it is also clear that neither hot nor cold from Russia a priori non-nuclear number of a dozen pieces of Russia can not be, and the threat is also of a propaganda nature. But the impact UAV, capable, in theory, of course, carry and tactical nuclear bomb B-730, is already a direct violation of the Treaty. But the Americans keep silent about this.
The Americans have obviously realized that their hysteria and pressure attempts are not passing, in Russia they are well aware of the real state of affairs with potential medium-range systems and with charges. Even started work on the "castration" (you would not call it otherwise) 100-kiloton BB W76-1 with SLBM "Trident-2" D5 into a toy that was cut down to 5 kiloton, which was written more than once - this is not a solution, but the product is intended for the same SLBM. Only the index of the “new old” product was previously voiced as W76-4, and now it is announced as W76-2. Talking about the creation of the same "castrated" to the same 5ct by ruthless vivisection of the SBSh CW version of the air-based W80-1 is also not a solution. Of course, all this is known in the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation. Similarly, they know in the United States that their fears are not unfounded, and Russia will indeed very quickly deploy a grouping of medium-range ground-based vehicles and the United States will find itself in the tail of the race in the role of far behind. After all, there are many such systems in China and they, though not a masterpiece of rocket production, are actually deployed in significant quantities, and the Americans have so far everything, as in a well-known joke about potential capital and real estate and really empty pockets and women with reduced social responsibility own house But the word has already been said, and the Americans will surely abandon the Treaty, accusing Russia and China will not forget, although he did not sign this agreement. The behavior of Europeans is amazing, and they are desperately afraid of the consequences - after all, medium-range missiles Russia will impose on them, and still jump under Washington’s whistle, like rats from the Pied Piper of Gammeln. Some kind of political masochism, otherwise you can not say.
At the same time, the Americans clearly our military and diplomats through closed channels not only brought unenviable prospects in the competition in the INF Treaty, but also undertook a different method of influence. Often, in order to communicate their position, various jabs in the media from "former", that is, different in the past high-ranking military or diplomats and politicians are used. Or editorial in high government media. The last way is usually used by our Chinese friends.
So, an interview was recently published by the former Chief of Staff of the Chief (then, when the Strategic Missile Forces were a type of Armed Forces, and not a separate branch of the armed forces) of the Strategic Missile Forces headquarters under Colonel-General Viktor Esin, which, in essence, describes the main message for which everything was given:
"If the Americans nevertheless start deploying their missiles in Europe, we will have no choice but to abandon the doctrine of the retaliatory counter strike and move on to the doctrine of the preemptive strike."
The interview was not perfect, Comrade Yosin used to like to identify people, for example, with the “strange” parameters of the future Sarmat ICBM, having once sent to the press information that it would weigh 100 tons and throw weight to 10 tons . Of course, such parameters are simply impossible if the range of the rocket is really intercontinental. Real “Sarmat” has more than 200 tons of mass with a weight of about 10 tons, but for more than a year “hundred-ton” “Sarmat” traveled from article to article. In this interview, the colonel-general, too, perhaps because of his age, made a number of inaccuracies, for example, this one:
“Now, if the START-3 Treaty orders to live long, then the United States, for example, can have three instead of one combat unit on each Minuteman-3 ICBM. We have all deployed ICBMs and SLBMs loaded with combat blocks and returnable virtually no capacity. "
No three blocks will appear on the Minutemen, they are simply not in the right quantity - they are now equipped with the W87 BB, previously used on the ICBM MX, 525 were released all in all to place 3 on a rocket, even if you forget about the need to have an exchange and repair funds of warheads. In fact, the return potential of the Americans is exhausted by the pre-installation of the BB on the Trident-2 SLBM. The statement about the allegedly full load of our ICBMs and SLBMs and the absence of return potential is also incorrect. Thus, the IDB "yars" duty to 3 or 4 (information varies) WB on the rocket instead of standard 6, RSM-29RKU-02 and P-29RMU-2 (2.1) on duty, too, with 3 BB, not to 10 BB on the rocket , as on the P-29RMU-2.1 "Liner" variant. So we have a return potential, and quite a lot. The question is whether the parties will have time to reinstall it, in which case, because the massive opening of the mines and working with the products with the removal of the head parts can be detected by various means of control and in themselves is a reason for the strike.
But most importantly, what is in the title, Colonel-General Yesin expressed - about the transition to the doctrine of preemptive strike instead of the counter or reciprocal-counter strikes as the main variant of the SNF (and retaliatory and worst). It is necessary to clarify in a nutshell the differences. What is the first, preemptive, preemptive strike, or, as is customary in our rocket men, to call it “a strike at the appointed time” is understandable. We received information about the possibility of delivering a massive nuclear missile strike against us by the forces of the SNF (SNFM), and struck first, setting the time of the strike in advance. Or they were guided by some other reasons for this crucial step. Counter blow - we learned about the preparation of this strike by the enemy (undercover, having opened the preparatory measures with technical means or somehow else) and struck ours simultaneously with the start of his strike. Or he discovered the start and immediately struck, and so far there was not a single explosion even in space (however, you should not fear creating so-called zones of high-rise nuclear blocking now - the charges of the SNF are too small for such waste, but still need to be taken into account as an option) - This is a retaliatory strike. Although the line between the counter and the retaliatory counter is not clearly defined and is discussed even by rocket men, in general, they have different opinions on this matter. Everything else is a blow back, and the minuses are clear to everyone.
It cannot be said that before our missile troops did not prepare for striking and strikes at the appointed time - not at all. At any regimental command post of the Strategic Missile Forces, you can easily find the board on the console, which will, if anything, count the time until that very start with the appointed time. More precisely, launches - after all in a regiment not one rocket, and 6 or 10 (in a regiment of mobile complexes - 9). The politicians are indifferent to the quirks of politicians, they must be ready for everything - both to the oncoming strike, and to the return-to-counter, and to the worst - to the return, and to ensure the fulfillment of the goals set in all cases. And, of course, to the preemptive strike too. And in the USSR, which formally proclaimed non-use of nuclear weapons first, preparing for the first strike, if necessary. Russia did not take on such obligations, so Yosin’s statement cannot, in general, be a sensation for specialists. We can talk about the change of the priority strategy, and not about the admission of the first strike - it was allowed before, if we are not talking about politicians who are voicing what should be voiced.
But it is not designed for them, but for politicians and the public. And it means, in general, that Russia is ready to dilute even more the ideas of a potential adversary about what the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and especially the SNF, which scenarios can be used and when and for what reason. This, of course, contributes to its deterrent effect, especially for Americans, who were more focused on the first blow, although they also proclaimed and proclaim the opposite. And suddenly for a gunfighter to hear that they are ready to shoot him even before he reaches for the Colt - this is not the most pleasant, agree. But together with the restraining effect, such a strategy increases the risks of escalation, because a party who fears a first strike may risk to strike first. Moreover, the Americans are able to fold 2 and 2, and understand that both the Avangard complex and the Sarmat complex, if equipped with the same planning and maneuvering apparatus, and other missiles with similar equipment, as well as the “Status- 6 "with its nuclear engine thermonuclear torpedo, and much more, besides the functions of, say, bypassing or early destroying the missile defense system (which so far makes no sense to bypass and destroy in advance), can also solve other tasks, including to ensure effective strike at the appointed time. And it certainly worries them. As well as the fact that they do not yet have anything at least somewhat similar, or the same antidote. And very soon appear. But when it does, the situation will become very dangerous. But even in China, success in hypersonic systems is now better than that of the United States. And this also annoys the Americans. And from our side, the hint at the change of the priority strategy was sounded not just like that, but as a warning and a proposal to return to an adequate discussion of nuclear issues. Moreover, another “bell” was sounded to Americans from the Federation Council, where, together with representatives of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the Security Council, they made recommendations to change the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, in particular, on using them first if they use strategic non-nuclear weapons against Russia including hypersonic.
China also added fuel to the fire, giving the third “bell”, a little later, Colonel-General Yixing, mentioning in the article in the South China Morning Post about new developments in China’s military strategy, where, among other things, the mention of “proactive planning, which will allow suddenly deliver an unexpected blow to the enemy (read - USA). " There was not a word about nuclear weapons, but it can be regarded as a hint that American words addressed to China and its medium-range potential were heard and deliberated by our Chinese friends. Moreover, unlike in Russia, the actions of the United States may carry a much more serious threat to China, and the Celestial capabilities in response are simply incommensurable in the missile-nuclear field with the capabilities of the two superpowers (well, the Chinese have to fear only one of them, the star-striped ). That, together with the continuing (despite significant progress) inability of the Chinese nuclear missile forces to effectively act in counter and counter-backlash attacks (there are many reasons for this, but there is simply no place to present them in this article) is a topic for another conversation retaliatory strike and the lack of survival of this potential, pushes the Chinese to the same preventive strike in a crisis with the US situation.
It is unlikely that such actions at almost the same time as Russian “thick hints” can be regarded as an accident. The question is - in the United States, are they able to understand what they are told before they even make cones with their heads? After all, we are not playing with trippers - the safety of all mankind is at stake.