Percussion "Bayraktara" in the sky over the Donbas. What other “gratitude” for C-400 will bring Moscow to life?
Later, after the “cheers” in our foreign ministry and mass media about the normalization of Russian-Turkish relations and the joint development of a “road map” to resolve the situation in the northern regions of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as after the erroneous submission of the Kurdish canton of Afrin to the torn apart Turkish army and to FSA militants in January 2018 of the year (in return for the illusory transfer of the “idlib gadyushnik” to the government forces of Syria), Erdogan taught Moscow a couple more cruel ur shackles from the "big Middle East game" section. First of all, it was intercepted by the operator of Igla MANPADS from detachments of the Idlib militants Tahrir ash-Sham of our Su-25CM 3 February 2018, whose ejection pilot (major Roman Filipov) died heroically in an unequal battle with the pro-Turkish An-Nusters. No “American trace” in this tragic incident was out of the question, since all groups in Idlib, without exception, are supervised exclusively by the security forces of the Turkish Republic. It is logical that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey could have prevented the tragic event, but did not do this in order to once again show the Russian side who is the boss in the region. Alas, such an action by our “Turkish friends” was not enough for the Kremlin to reach a new level of awareness of the entire deplorable situation.
Therefore, the “awarding” of the defense department of Turkey with a contract for the purchase of four divisions of the newest C-400 Triumph air defense missile system from Rosoboronexport can be interpreted as one of the most ridiculous military-political mistakes in recent years, considering that the issue of returning “idlib gadyushnik "Damascus is not even on the agenda of the Turkish leadership. But this is only half the problem.
Just a few days ago, quite resonant news on the preparation by the defense departments of "Nezalezhnaya" and Turkey of a contract for the purchase by the Ukrainian side of 2 unmanned aviation complexes (UAC) consisting of 6 Bayraktar TB2 shock reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (3 for each complex) and 2 ground combat control points equipped with appropriate antenna equipment and radio-electronic transmitting and receiving equipment to control the UAV and receive telemetric information from the onboard turret optical-electronic sighting complex type MX-10/15. The deal also provides for the delivery of a set of two hundred high-precision guided missiles MAM-L, which is a non-motorized version of the L-UMTAS multipurpose tactical / anti-tank missiles, also developed by Roketsun.
This news was leaked to numerous military-analytical blogs from the Ukrainian media space, while its author is the famous Ukrainian journalist from the nationalist camp Yury Butusov, citing sources surrounded by Defense Minister S. Poltorak and mil.in.ua portal. And despite the fact that even November’s Poltorak 13 itself suddenly “switched on the reverse gear” in the matter of acquiring Bayraktarov, declaring the absence of a signed document, there’s absolutely no reason to trust Butusov. After all, firstly, in the tenth of November, numerous Ukrainian sources have already announced the finished contract, signed during Poroshenko’s visit to Turkey, his visit to the Bayrakarov developer’s workshops, Baykar Makina, and photos on the background of Bayraktar TB2 Secondly, on the well-known resource korrespondent.net specific names and positions of the officials who participated in the signing of the contract were indicated; these are Defense Minister Stepan Poltorak, First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleg Gladkovsky, as well as Pavel Bukin, Director General of the State Concern Ukroboronprom.
Apparently, now the Ukrainian side is simply trying to hide the fact of this transaction in order to achieve operational surprise at the start of using the data. drones in the Donbass theater of operations. But all the details have long been known to us, and therefore it is necessary to start assessing the new threat to the 1st and 2nd army corps of the LDNR people's militia. The first thing to note is the practical ceiling of the Bayraktar TB2 UAV: with 80% full fuel tanks and rocket-bomb “equipment” on hangers, the ceiling can be from 6500 to 7000 m, which will not allow air defense units of the republics to destroy drones using MANPADS Igla, as well as the Strela-10M3 and Osa-AK air defense systems, which are in service with the NM LDNR, because their altitude ranges are 3500 and 5000 m, respectively. Secondly, small-sized guided projectiles MAM-L ("Smart Micro Munition"), represented by a composite body with a diameter of 0,16 m and a length of 1 m, have an effective scattering surface of about 0,005 square meters. m, and therefore can neither be detected by the obsolete coherent-pulse detection radar "Osa-AK", nor "captured" by the guidance radar, despite even the centimeter X-band of their work. Meanwhile, the LDNR armies still have a chance for a full-fledged fight against MAM-L shells. We are talking about the use of ZRSK "Strela-10M3".
In this self-propelled air defense missile system, the 9М333 short-range anti-aircraft missile with a unique three-band optical-electronic seeker is used. In addition to the infrared and jamming logical channels, a photocontrast channel is also used, capable of detecting and “capturing” small-sized air attacks (including MAM-L) according to their silhouette at the time of approaching the air defense missile system at a distance of about 1 km. Consequently, even with the visual detection of a sufficiently large Bayraktar TB2 UAV, the calculation of the Arrow-10М3 can prepare an 9ШХNNXМ optical sight (or more advanced version) for targeting the MAM-L projectile dropped from the Bayraktar suspension device. But there are also negative moments. In particular, the 127М9 anti-aircraft missile’s GOS photocontrast channel will have extremely low efficiency in difficult meteorological conditions, as well as at night, while the IR channel will not be able to see MAM-L due to the absence of an engine for this projectile, which means and thermal radiation.
The only way out of the situation could be the transfer of more modern and long-range Russian anti-aircraft missiles to the LDNR Armed Forces, capable of destroying the Bayraktar TB2 even before reaching the MAM-L projectiles. Moreover, the provocative and aggressive actions of Kyiv against Russia are increasingly pushing our defense structures to develop new countermeasures. As for Erdogan, his approval of the contract for the sale of strike and reconnaissance equipment to the Ukrainian regime drones will automatically add the Turkish leadership to the list of parties to the conflict in Donbas, as well as the establishments of states such as the United States and Great Britain.
Information sources:
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3419802.html
https://zn.ua/WORLD/ukraina-zakupit-u-turcii-partiyu-udarnyh-bpla-smi-299429_.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/strela10m/strela10m.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/osa_ak/osa_ak.shtml
Information