The hunt for Syrian C-300 gave unexpected results. The true face of Greece and the losing plan of the USA
As the aggregate of information from several news and monitoring sources, including central Russian TV channels, Twitter pages of eyewitnesses, as well as the online air traffic monitoring resource Flightradar 24, a video report released by the Russian Defense Ministry on the delivery of the main firing elements of the S-300PMU-2 air defense system to the Khmeimim airbase (radar illumination 30N6E2, 5P85SE launcher, as well as ammunition in the form of 48N6E2 / DM missiles in individual TPKs) turned the operational-strategic situation in the Middle East upside down. The alignment has changed far not in favor of the Joint Armed Forces of the Western Coalition and the Israeli Air Force, forcing all participants in the Syrian military campaign, without exception, to reckon with the new position of Moscow, which radically tightened the tone of communication with pseudo-partners on the very first day after the brutal provocation of the Israeli Air Force, which exposed the Syrian The S-200V air defense missile system is our RTR / RER Il-20M aircraft.
Despite the blatant bluff from such high-ranking officials of the Israeli military-diplomatic departments as Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and a member of the military-political cabinet Tzhahi Khanegbi, unanimously claiming that the Syrian anti-missile shield C-300PMU-2 is unhindered by F-35I "Adir" and the continuation of the bloody shock operations against Shiite fighters with a pseudo-caliph, the parameters of the "Favorites" speak of a completely opposite scenario. Complexes capable of processing enemy air objects with an effective reflective surface in 0,02 sq. m, forced to cuddle up to the earth's surface (forced to fly in low-altitude mode) not only Israeli F-35I, about the imminent commencement of which in the Syrian theater of operations was declared by Israel’s Army Radio, but also by the Raptor X-guns of the X-NUMX-F-5A , which the US Air Force command can re-engage to carry out reconnaissance operations and escort F-22I Wild Weasel air defense breakthrough fighters.
Radar signature "Raptor", a component of the order of 0,07 square. m, will allow 30H6Х2 radars to detect the last at a distance of 80 — 85 km, and therefore they will certainly not risk coming closer to the three hundred-hundred divisions. The only value from using the F-22A will be to implement electronic reconnaissance positions of the Syrian C-300PMU-2 through the advanced onboard complex РТР / СПО AN / ALR-94 with a distributed aperture of 30 passive X-ray radar sensors, data from which will be transmitted to the board F -16CJ "Wild Weasel" for further targeting of AGM-88E AARGM anti-radar missiles. But earlier we have already said that HARMs and their improved modifications of AARGM have a rather mediocre speed, a large ESR and a radio-correction channel module that is vulnerable to radio-electronic interference. Consequently, during their use, the US Air Force, at best, will observe a partial interception of these PRLRs with the help of Favorites and Pantsyry, as well as “going to milk” after exposure to EW Krasuha-4 and Diabazol stations, and at worst - F-16CJ themselves will also lose, in order to achieve the required range of AGM-88E, they will have to climb 9 — 12 km altitude, approaching C-300PMU-2 division to a critical range of 170 km.
It is also necessary to remember that the armed forces of the United States, Israel and the headquarters of the Western coalition will definitely continue to search for “tools” for “hacking” of the updated “antimissile stronghold” of the Syrian Arab Army. About the possibility of bypassing the high-altitude frontiers of the “Favorites” by means of ATACMS and LORA operational tactical ballistic missiles with a further entry into the “blind funnels” above the divisions, we talked about before last; in the same place also ways of stopping this threat were indicated. An attempt to disable these complexes using special forces of the IDF, US Special Operations Forces or SAS is quite likely scenario, but the chance of its realization is zero, because at the moment most of the special forces and elite brigades of Syrian government forces previously involved in the stripping operation Idlib Gadyushnik ", can now be sent to protect several anti-aircraft missile divisions of the C-300PMU-2" Favorite ". Conclusion: the plans for conducting a special operation in the SAR, exaggerated by the Israeli media, are unlikely to succeed for Lieberman and his pack; losses will be unimaginable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Israeli Defense Ministry, the General Staff of the IDF and the US Air Force will continue to rely on the aerospace methods of countering the C-300PMU-2.
In view of these circumstances, I would like to draw attention to the sudden involvement of the Greek side in the game. So, right after the announcement (October 3) of a video report on the delivery of the first S-300PMU-2 ZRDN to the ATS, the RTR / RER RC-135V / W “Rivet Joint” aircraft once again set off, which carried out a longer (4 -hour) reconnaissance operation of radio-emitting objects in Latakia. This only strengthened us in the opinion that the Russian electronic warfare equipment deployed in this province did not give the possibility of a state intelligence aviation track the process of unloading the elements of the S-300 before the publication of the video material on the network. But the Rivet Joint was far from alone. In neutral airspace, 80-100 km south-west of Cyprus, a long-range radar detection and control aircraft Embraer EMB-145H AEW & C of the Greek Air Force was patrolling, which became known thanks to the online map syria.liveuamap.com with reference to Flightradar24. The vehicle, developed in Brazil with the support of the state-owned company Raytheon, received a Swedish dorsal radar with an Ericsson PS-890 Erieye double-sided active phased array, which is capable of detecting targets with an RCS of more than 20 sq. m at a distance of 480-520 km, and also carry out radio-technical reconnaissance in passive mode at similar distances.
Against the background of the July scandal with expulsion from Greece (not without pressure from Washington) of two Russian diplomats, as well as the desire of Evangelos Apostolakis, Chief of the General Staff of Greece’s National Defense, to give the Pentagon enhanced access to the Greek military bases, the participation of the Greek Air Force in monitoring the arrival of the "300" Syria is not surprising; After all, Athens was practically bought by the White House back in 2016, during the quite famous November visit to the country of Barack Obama with his “democratic fables” on the Acropolis.
From a technical point of view, the US defense department could have turned to the Greek Air Force command with a request to evaluate the frequency parameters of the Syrian S-300 to clarify the modification of the complex, because Greece already has a less long-range version of the S-300PMU-1 air defense system, which has been studied along and across as in terms of the element base, and in terms of the radio-technical "portrait", very familiar to the EMB-145H AEW & C aircraft. It is easy to guess that immediately after the distribution of the first "Favorite" air defense missile systems between the Syrian provinces, our instructors would hardly have activated the RPN unnecessarily, allowing the enemy to receive comprehensive information about the complexes. Therefore, the Greek-American plan most likely failed. Nevertheless, this is where everything comes together into a single picture, which Moscow should remember once and for all when building "friendly" relations with the Mediterranean states that are directly related to the release of the underwater and surface components of the Black Sea fleet Russian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Information sources:
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
http://airwar.ru/enc/spy/emb145.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/f16cj.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
http://mignews.com/news/041018_65631_92551.html
Despite the blatant bluff from such high-ranking officials of the Israeli military-diplomatic departments as Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman and a member of the military-political cabinet Tzhahi Khanegbi, unanimously claiming that the Syrian anti-missile shield C-300PMU-2 is unhindered by F-35I "Adir" and the continuation of the bloody shock operations against Shiite fighters with a pseudo-caliph, the parameters of the "Favorites" speak of a completely opposite scenario. Complexes capable of processing enemy air objects with an effective reflective surface in 0,02 sq. m, forced to cuddle up to the earth's surface (forced to fly in low-altitude mode) not only Israeli F-35I, about the imminent commencement of which in the Syrian theater of operations was declared by Israel’s Army Radio, but also by the Raptor X-guns of the X-NUMX-F-5A , which the US Air Force command can re-engage to carry out reconnaissance operations and escort F-22I Wild Weasel air defense breakthrough fighters.
Radar signature "Raptor", a component of the order of 0,07 square. m, will allow 30H6Х2 radars to detect the last at a distance of 80 — 85 km, and therefore they will certainly not risk coming closer to the three hundred-hundred divisions. The only value from using the F-22A will be to implement electronic reconnaissance positions of the Syrian C-300PMU-2 through the advanced onboard complex РТР / СПО AN / ALR-94 with a distributed aperture of 30 passive X-ray radar sensors, data from which will be transmitted to the board F -16CJ "Wild Weasel" for further targeting of AGM-88E AARGM anti-radar missiles. But earlier we have already said that HARMs and their improved modifications of AARGM have a rather mediocre speed, a large ESR and a radio-correction channel module that is vulnerable to radio-electronic interference. Consequently, during their use, the US Air Force, at best, will observe a partial interception of these PRLRs with the help of Favorites and Pantsyry, as well as “going to milk” after exposure to EW Krasuha-4 and Diabazol stations, and at worst - F-16CJ themselves will also lose, in order to achieve the required range of AGM-88E, they will have to climb 9 — 12 km altitude, approaching C-300PMU-2 division to a critical range of 170 km.
It is also necessary to remember that the armed forces of the United States, Israel and the headquarters of the Western coalition will definitely continue to search for “tools” for “hacking” of the updated “antimissile stronghold” of the Syrian Arab Army. About the possibility of bypassing the high-altitude frontiers of the “Favorites” by means of ATACMS and LORA operational tactical ballistic missiles with a further entry into the “blind funnels” above the divisions, we talked about before last; in the same place also ways of stopping this threat were indicated. An attempt to disable these complexes using special forces of the IDF, US Special Operations Forces or SAS is quite likely scenario, but the chance of its realization is zero, because at the moment most of the special forces and elite brigades of Syrian government forces previously involved in the stripping operation Idlib Gadyushnik ", can now be sent to protect several anti-aircraft missile divisions of the C-300PMU-2" Favorite ". Conclusion: the plans for conducting a special operation in the SAR, exaggerated by the Israeli media, are unlikely to succeed for Lieberman and his pack; losses will be unimaginable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Israeli Defense Ministry, the General Staff of the IDF and the US Air Force will continue to rely on the aerospace methods of countering the C-300PMU-2.
In view of these circumstances, I would like to draw attention to the sudden involvement of the Greek side in the game. So, right after the announcement (October 3) of a video report on the delivery of the first S-300PMU-2 ZRDN to the ATS, the RTR / RER RC-135V / W “Rivet Joint” aircraft once again set off, which carried out a longer (4 -hour) reconnaissance operation of radio-emitting objects in Latakia. This only strengthened us in the opinion that the Russian electronic warfare equipment deployed in this province did not give the possibility of a state intelligence aviation track the process of unloading the elements of the S-300 before the publication of the video material on the network. But the Rivet Joint was far from alone. In neutral airspace, 80-100 km south-west of Cyprus, a long-range radar detection and control aircraft Embraer EMB-145H AEW & C of the Greek Air Force was patrolling, which became known thanks to the online map syria.liveuamap.com with reference to Flightradar24. The vehicle, developed in Brazil with the support of the state-owned company Raytheon, received a Swedish dorsal radar with an Ericsson PS-890 Erieye double-sided active phased array, which is capable of detecting targets with an RCS of more than 20 sq. m at a distance of 480-520 km, and also carry out radio-technical reconnaissance in passive mode at similar distances.
Against the background of the July scandal with expulsion from Greece (not without pressure from Washington) of two Russian diplomats, as well as the desire of Evangelos Apostolakis, Chief of the General Staff of Greece’s National Defense, to give the Pentagon enhanced access to the Greek military bases, the participation of the Greek Air Force in monitoring the arrival of the "300" Syria is not surprising; After all, Athens was practically bought by the White House back in 2016, during the quite famous November visit to the country of Barack Obama with his “democratic fables” on the Acropolis.
From a technical point of view, the US defense department could have turned to the Greek Air Force command with a request to evaluate the frequency parameters of the Syrian S-300 to clarify the modification of the complex, because Greece already has a less long-range version of the S-300PMU-1 air defense system, which has been studied along and across as in terms of the element base, and in terms of the radio-technical "portrait", very familiar to the EMB-145H AEW & C aircraft. It is easy to guess that immediately after the distribution of the first "Favorite" air defense missile systems between the Syrian provinces, our instructors would hardly have activated the RPN unnecessarily, allowing the enemy to receive comprehensive information about the complexes. Therefore, the Greek-American plan most likely failed. Nevertheless, this is where everything comes together into a single picture, which Moscow should remember once and for all when building "friendly" relations with the Mediterranean states that are directly related to the release of the underwater and surface components of the Black Sea fleet Russian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Information sources:
https://syria.liveuamap.com/
http://airwar.ru/enc/spy/emb145.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/f16cj.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
http://mignews.com/news/041018_65631_92551.html
Information