Far from coincidence! What did the British RC-135W catch under the guise of the “Ukrainian throw” into the Sea of Azov?
Fortunately, this time common sense prevailed, and the "horses" of the barely showing signs of life of the Navy had the intelligence not to raise the degree of tension. However, this argument is not entirely appropriate in this situation, since the command of the Navy clearly fulfills the orders received through the "Ukrainian top" from the US defense department and NATO headquarters in Brussels. And this time, obviously, the command of the Navy “independent” was given the go-ahead for the usual demonstration passage by the sea, excluding provocative actions. Of course, the naval auxiliary vessels, drawn off the coast of the Republic of Crimea, sufficiently amused even those observers who were not strong in matters of naval equipment parameters. Meanwhile, when at the very last moment it became known that Ukrainian vessels leaving the Western Navy in Odessa were slowly but surely heading towards the Kerch-Yenikalsky Canal with further passage to the waters of the Sea of Azov, numerous resources exploded with angry comments from readers condemning the Black Sea admission fleet and the Coast Guard of the Border Service of the FSB of Russia of the Ukrainian surface component to the "backyard" of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces.
This is not surprising, since the memory of the most patriotic cell of our population preserved the creation of the Operational Group by the Azov-Black Sea Territorial Administration (APPT) of the Russian Fishery to prevent piracy from Ukraine, as well as an asymmetric response to the seizure of “Nord”, expressed in many hours inspection of ships bound for the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. This time the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy (medium reconnaissance ship SSV-201 “Priazovye”, tugboat SB-739, etc.) and ships of the Bokhr SS of the FSB of Russia (patrol ship / small corvette, etc. 22640 “Amethyst” and high-speed PCs Ave 03160 "Raptor") limited to only escort "ancient" representatives of the so-called Ukrainian fleet.
For alarmistly-minded observers and administrators of some VKontakte communities, for example, “The Raccoons of Novorossiya”, this was a good reason for catching Moscow allegedly “unwilling to confront the Navy of Ukraine against the background of a possible tightening of sanctions from Washington”. Again, the defensive charges under the unshakable military and political line of the West were sent to the Russian Defense Ministry. The information that “Donbass” and “Korets” are sent to the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk for the construction of a naval infrastructure in the Northern Azov region, added fuel to the fire, which is why resourceful alarmists immediately noted that “Moscow creates its own hands shaft of the most difficult problems. " We will not hide the fact that the admission of “Donbass” and “Korets” into the water area of the Sea of Azov is not the best decision of Moscow in the current military-political situation.
However, let's take a look at the situation in a different plane. First of all, it should be noted that the Donbass search and rescue ship / control ship sailed into the Azov Sea (this classification was received in the “independent” floating workshop PM-9, 304 Ave., which became part of the Black Sea Fleet on September 30 of the year 1970) was carried out with the aim of provoking retaliation by the Black Sea Fleet and Coast Guard Army of the FSB of Russia, which should have been expressed in the detention and verification of A-500, either on the way to the Kerch-Yenikalsky Canal, or already in the Azov Sea. Such a turn of events would have turned for Kiev into an excellent reason to accuse the Russian side of violating international maritime law, as well as the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the joint use of the Sea of Azov. It is logical that Moscow decided not to resort to the practice of our inadequate neighbor. At the same time, everybody is perfectly aware that any attempt to aggravate the situation in the Azov Sea region is fraught for the “Square” at best with the destruction of all that “scrap metal” that is being transferred to the Taganrog Bay area, and at worst - the loss of new territories of Donetsk, Zaporozhye and Kherson areas. And therefore we advise all alarmists to calm down, be patient and wait for the outcome, which is just around the corner.
In light of the modern Russian 3 flywheel of the highly maneuverable 3М54Е anti-ship missiles of the Caliber-NK family with a range of 220 km and an 10 flying height in the Russian military, diplomatic sources about the construction of Berdyansk military and military sources on the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources about the construction of Berdyansk military-maritime sources for the military-maritime security forces Also, “using A-500 as a command-staff ship and a floating base of armored boats” looks no different than another marasmic strategy from representatives of Ukrainian defense structures. And even if we take into account the presence at the disposal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of two or three anti-aircraft missile divisions C-300PS deployed between Mangush and Volodarsky, the alignment of forces remains virtually unchanged, since, first, the surface shares of the Sea of Azov do not fall The 30H6E radar guidance sector is well located in the viewing sector because of the overlap of the elevated terrain of the northern coast of the Sea of Azov with a screen, secondly, due to the minimum height of the target to be hit in 25 m, while the flight paths are anti-ship in Ariant "Caliber" and subsonic X-35U are at a height of 4 — 10 m.
Against the background of the APU’s lack of high-precision rocket armament capable of posing a significant threat to the maneuverable Russian Mongoose patrol boats, Ukrainian cannon and rocket artillery batteries transferred to Obitochnaya Spit area along the M14 highway (Odessa-Melitopol-Mariupol) are trying to play muscles before the Coastal guarding the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia, shelling “Grads”, “Hurricanes” and “Peonies” the territorial waters in the Sea of Azov, information about which was received on the evening of September 26. But everybody is perfectly aware of the magnitude of the consequences for Kiev, which will follow if the militants of the junta miraculously manage to harm the FSM of Russia’s FSM or merchant ships heading for Rostov-on-Don.
Much more questions raise another moment in the whole of this epic with the transfer of Ukrainian ships to the Sea of Azov. Neither the central news channels nor any other informational and analytical sources reported about it. Speech on the reconnaissance mission of the aircraft strategic radio engineering and electronic intelligence RC-135W "Rivet Joint" c onboard number "Z666" of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain, which hitherto was not a frequent guest in neutral airspace near the south-western borders of the Southern Military District, in particular, the Republic Crimea. Usually, the British “Rivets Joint” carry out reconnaissance of radio-emitting objects of the Russian Armed Forces (calculating DRLO radar operation modes, radar, target and target radar radar, counter-battery radar and with varying success decrypting protected tactical radio communication channels), especially in Kaliningrad, Leningrad and Pskov areas. After all, the Baltic operational direction has traditionally been the most complex part of the European theater, abounding in the most complex army network-centric means of data exchange, as well as the most advanced echeloned air defense system.
The upgrading of the coastal missile brigades of the Black Sea Fleet by the Bastion-P anti-ship complexes and anti-ship missile regiments of the VKS systems C-400 in the Crimea and the Krasnodar Territory were usually watched by the American Rivet Jounds and anti-submarine strategic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles RQ-YNT-Ynt. Global Hawk using SYERS-B / C ultra-zoom ultra-zoom cameras and side-facing AF / AIR radar AN / ZPY-4.
Since 20 September 2018, the British RC-135W has become a regular in the sky over the Black Sea, which clearly coincided with the transition of Ukrainian ships through the exclusive economic zone of Russia. This is indicated by the data of the tactical online map syria.liveuamap.com. And this only once again confirms that an absolutely disastrous idea of creating a naval infrastructure of Naval Forces in Berdyansk or Mariupol with the involvement of Donbass and Korets is only a fake from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the purpose of which was to distract from the reconnaissance operation agreed with London and analysis of radio-emitting means of the Russian group of troops in the Republic of Crimea.
It is most likely that the British were interested in the frequency ranges and modes of operation of various means of exchanging tactical information of the Black Sea Fleet and the BOHR PS of the FSB of Russia, as well as the methods of encrypting the signal of these funds. For these purposes, on board the British Rivet Joint modification there is not only a standard 85000 / ES-182 MUCELS (Multiple Communications Emitter Location System) multi-range electronic intelligence system, which can detect and analyze radio-emitting means (radio stations and data exchange terminals between different combat units and CP) in the range from 40 MHz to 17250 MHz at a distance of up to 900 km (depending on the radio horizon), but also the fundamentally new QinetiQ Tigershark 2 RER complex, which has no open information on the parameters to this day. It is logical that in this case, the Ukrainian surface ships Donbass and Korets acted as baits, which, in accordance with the tactical situation, were supposed to “jam” the air with a mass of cipher programs and radio channels of communication (protected by the frequency hopping mode) between Russian surface ships, anti-submarine aviation and the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. To work with the "complex ether" on board the RC-135W there is an on-duty shift of 9 cryptologists-linguists.
The second target for the British aircraft "Rivet Joint" could be the radar complexes of over-the-horizon detection, tracking and targeting of the Monolith-B, attached to the K-300P Bastion-P mobile coastal anti-ship missile systems. The importance of this radar lies in the fact that in the absence of the necessary airborne targeting equipment (for example, the anti-submarine IL-38H equipped with the aiming-search complex "Novella") due to the diversion to another section of the theater or the loss of "Monolith-B" provides a point combat control of the K-380P anti-ship battalion K-300P with comprehensive information about a remote over-horizon target, which is usually sufficient for targeting 2,3-fly-flying anti-ship onyx 3М55. This unique radar is capable of detecting enemy surface ships at a distance of 250 km (without opening its own location) in the passive mode of the RTR. In this case, the British could be interested in the active mode of the "Monolith-B", which allows detecting NATO KVG OVMS in the south-western part of the Black Sea at a record distance of 450 km. Ukrainian ships could also be used as bait.
Determining the frequency parameters of the active mode of this radar would allow the British “BAE Systems” to begin upgrading existing ones or developing promising ship-based EW tools at least to cover their destroyers Type 45 “Daring” and perspective frigates Type 26 “Global Combat Ship” from trans-horizon detection literally immediately after leaving the Bosphorus. What is this London for?
The answer is easy to extract from a long chronological chain. It has long been known that the main players of the North Atlantic Alliance are preparing to the fullest an operational-strategic reserve for future escalation scenarios with the involvement of Russia in all operational areas of the European theater of operations. London is also observing its interests. This clearly manifested itself in a slightly unbalanced and doubtful Russophobe, head of the British defense department Gavin Williamson, and corroborated information about the start of the Black Sea patrols of the Royal Sea Infantry patrons of the Black Sea Army in the front-line Kramatorsk (the city-headquarters of the Ukrainian military formations in the Donbass theater), and corroborating information about the beginning of the Black Sea patrols of the Royal Sea Infantry patrons 2019 year. Moreover, Williamson rather unexpectedly announced the reinforcement of the presence of British naval ships in the Black Sea, predicting the coming blocking of the port of Odessa by our Black Sea Fleet. Obviously, the rudiment of colonial thinking, firmly entrenched in the minds of the British establishment, will still have to be beaten out in effective ways that the Southern Military District has.
Information sources:
http://nevskii-bastion.ru/rc-135w/
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/425579.html
http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/podvig_donbassa_chto_stoit_za_pohodom_korabley_vmsu_v_azovskoe_more
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300ps/c300ps.shtml
https://www.rusdialog.ru/world/157674_1537622473
Information