VKS and Russian naval aviation will try to "block oxygen" over the Baltic Sea
Multifunctional radar with passive phased array AN / MPQ-53 - the main component of the airplanes of the family "Patriot PAC-2 / 3"
The current leadership of the Baltic states can be considered a very malleable material for military-political "modeling". Daily incited to anti-Russian sentiment and rhetoric "aggressive actions" sucked from the finger aviation The aerospace forces and the Russian Navy, the Baltic Trinity law enforcement agencies, provide the Pentagon with an untouched field of opportunities for accelerated militarization of the North European approaches to our borders in the Kaliningrad and Leningrad Regions. The foundation of this militarization began to be actively laid since the operational transfer of the 52nd tactical fighter wing of the US Air Force from the German airfield Spangdahl to the Polish air base Redzikovo. Armed with this wing, 25 F-16C / D Block 50 multipurpose fighters were able to reach AGM-158B JASSM-ER tactical missiles (range of about 1200 km) to such strategically important cities in the depths of the European part of Russia, such as Kursk, Oryol, Bryansk, Pskov, Tula and Moscow.
Of course, most of these missiles, if necessary, will be intercepted using the C-300PM1, C-400 and Pantryr-C1 complexes, as well as MiG-31BM interceptors deployed in the Western Military District, but this threat cannot be ignored either, since JASSM -ER can now be used not only from the Falcons of the 52 airframe, but also from the suspensions of the Polish F-16C, which means that more than 100 high-precision missiles can be expected from the Polish airway alone. The Polish air force and the 52 tactical fighter wing can be considered an important strike component in the concept of a strategic aerospace offensive against Russia, along with the B-1B “Lancer” strategic rocket carriers and Ohio-class attack submarines. Also in the militarization of the Baltic states, the ground component of the NATO Allied Forces is actively involved. Its activities are focused mainly on an attempt to create two lines of defense (1-i - in the Baltic states, 2-i-in Poland), as well as to retain control over the Suwalki corridor, the 70-kilometer section of the Polish-Lithuanian border, through which two major transport branches: Suwalki - Kaunas and Augustow - Seiriy.
The possibility of quickly taking control of this “corridor” by the forces of the 11 th Army Corps Army of Russia, as well as the 76 th Guards Airborne Assault Division and the Belarusian army, under the cover of X-NNX-X divisions and 300-th anti-aircraft missile regiments, for more than two decades, cause a serious headache for strategists in the command of NATO allied forces, because Lithuania and Latvia alone, in case of an escalation of a major conflict in Northern Europe, will deprive the coalition of the existing 1-kilometer handicap on Pskov operas -insulating direction. It is in connection with this that we are witnessing today the staying in Poland on a rotational basis of the US Army 400 Armored Brigade, armed with the 183 MBT M1545A500 / SEP Abrams, the Stryker armored personnel carriers and the M1A90 / 1 infantry fighting vehicles MXNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXVXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXVXXXXXXXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXXXX7 of X of the United States of America.
With regard to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, this is the transfer of infantry and mechanized units of the Army of Great Britain, Germany and Canada, which are also in the countries on a rotational basis in the amount of several thousand people who regularly take part in the Saber Strike military exercises. But if we have been familiar with this threat for several years, and a strategy has long been developed to counter the enemy in the area of Suwalki and Avgustov using tank and motorized rifle brigades armed with MBT T-72B3, T-90S and modern infantry fighting vehicles, as well as artillery subunits of MLRS with 9K515 Tornado-S and Smerch complexes, capable of attacking the enemy with NURS 9M532 / 533 with self-aiming combat elements, as well as promising missiles 9M542 with GLONASS-correction, then another invention of the Minister of Defense of Lithuania Raimundas Karoblis, announced a few days earlier, can be interpreted as an attempt to "block" the naval aviation of the Baltic fleet and VKS within a small section of airspace over the Gulf of Finland.
It is about creating a “unified air defense system” covering the airspace over the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden, which, according to Karoblis, should be an effective complement to the current NATO Air Force police mission patrolling the eastern air borders of NATO on the Baltic It is powered by the Typhoon fighter units of the German / British Air Force, the Royal Netherlands Air Force's F-16C and the Mirage-2000-5 Fighters of the French Air Force deployed at the Lithuanian Siauliai airbase and the Estonian Avb Emari. These fighters, present on the above airfields in the number of 4 units (1 link), pose virtually no threat to the Su-30CM 72 of the MA of the Baltic Fleet MA, as well as the Su-35С multifunctional fighter aircraft of the Russian Airspace Forces deployed at Avb Besovets.
Multi-role fighters "Mirage-2000-5" French Air Force participating in the mission of the "air police" over the Baltic. In addition to the outboard fuel tanks, you can see the MICA-EM mid-range air combat rocket and the IRIS-T melee on the suspension nodes.
For example, the Mirages are equipped with outdated RDY radar antennas capable of detecting Su-30CM at a distance of about 120 km, as well as MICA-EM air combat missiles with an effective range at medium altitudes - 50-60 km and large - 75-90 km, while our “Dryers” have longer-range URVB RVV-SD with a range of up to 120 km. We don’t take Meteoras, because at the moment they have gained initial combat readiness only as part of the ammunition sets of the Swedish JAS-39C / D fighters equipped with the MS-20 standard hardware and software kit. But what does Carblis plan envisage?
The first is the creation of an air defense positional area based on the Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems in the Vilnius area. For the Pentagon, such a naive openness of the Lithuanian side (without thinking about the consequences of the leadership of the latter) is truly a “chocolate” period. After all, for example, the permission of Vilnius to transfer several Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the southern part of the country will technically allow Americans to “close” the high-altitude airspace above the eastern half of the Kaliningrad region and the north-western part of Belarus. As a result, in the event of a major conflict in the Baltic theater of operations and in Eastern Europe, the tasks of the Kaliningrad regiments C-300PM1 and C-400 will include not only intercepting tactical aviation of the airborne forces of NATO and cruise missiles JASSM-ER, but also destroying the MIM- anti-aircraft missiles 104C, launched by our tactical aviation, which provides air support to motorized rifle subunits, which retain control over the Suwalki Corridor; there is no other way.
Meanwhile, short-sighted Carblis did not take into account a small tactical moment: in case of escalation of a large-scale conflict, the divisions Patriot PAC-2 deployed near Vilnius will be within the radius of destruction of the Tornado-S and Smerch multiple-launch rocket systems, and also complex "Iskander-M". And if a certain percentage of highly accurate corrected / guided missiles of these systems can intercept the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile complex, the operational-tactical ballistic missiles 9М723-1 "Iskander-M" will certainly not be easy targets for MIM-104F interceptors. Conclusion: “Patriots” near Vilnius will fall in the first hours after the beginning of the escalation. Nevertheless, the configuration of the “unified air defense system” proposed by Carblis provides for the deployment of the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense missile divisions also in the vicinity of Tallinn and Helsinki, as well as in Latvia and Sweden (in the latter case we can talk about the island Gotland).
In the case of the Tallinn-Helsinki air defense knot, a rather unpleasant situation may arise for the Baltic Fleet naval aviation, which consists in creating an air interdiction zone and restricting access and maneuver A2 / AD at the exit from the Gulf of Finland. The distance between the southern coast of Finland and the northern coast of Estonia is only 60 km, and therefore the deployment of even the usual Patriot PAC-2 air defense systems using these MIM-104C SAM systems with semi-active radar GOS will force the IL-38 anti-aircraft radar systems into these two areas. multi-role fighters descend to a height of 35 - 40 m, where you can "hide" from the radiation of radar AN / MPQ-53 behind radio horizon of the water surface.
If we are talking about the “Patriot PAC-3” complexes, which have MIM-104F interceptor missiles with active radar homing heads (they are capable of destroying not only ballistic targets, but also aerodynamic ones at a distance of about 70 — 80 km), then flying to ultra-small ones altitudes (“behind the screen” of the radio horizon) does not ensure the safe operation of our naval aviation over the Gulf of Finland, because MIM-104F can be induced both by targeting airplanes from DRLO E-3D British air forces and by targeting tactical fighters th ODBC NATO, equipped with terminals «Link-16» system. On the face of an attempt to block the naval aviation of the Russian Navy and the aerospace forces in neutral airspace over the Gulf of Finland, while for the formation of the long-range anti-submarine defense lines in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, the Il-38 and Il-38Н aircraft must be able to patrol up to eastern borders of the Danish island of Bornholm.
In the situation with the Patriots deployed in the suburbs of Tallinn and Helsinki of two modifications, the Smerch and Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems will not bring the desired result, since the distance from these positions to the likely deployment sites of the Russian MLRS in the Leningrad Region (Kingisepp and Torfyanovka) is 165 and 185 km, respectively. Operational-tactical Iskander-M missile systems again come to the rescue, ballistic missiles of which are fully capable of massively working on these targets. Consequently, in the "clearing" of the anti-aircraft barrier over the Gulf of Finland our difficulties will not arise.
At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the possible deployment of the batteries of the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense system through the town of Vestervik and the island of Gotland (Sweden), as well as the west coast of Latvia. Here a completely different tactical alignment emerges. For example, if the 152 Guards Missile Brigade (Kaliningrad Region), in the version with ballistic missiles 9М723-1, can reach the positions of “Patriots” on the western coast of Latvia “Iskander-M” in the version with ballistic missiles 240М270-400, because of the distance 350 - 9 km , then striking the forces of the same brigade against the positions of the American complexes in Vestervik and the northern part of Gotland will not work, since the range from the Kaliningrad region. to these boundaries is 723 and 1 km, respectively, which significantly exceeds the range of operational-tactical ballistic missiles such as 300МXNUMX-XNUMX, which is XNUMX km.
The only variant of this operational tactical missile system, whose range covers both Vestervik and the northern coast of Gotland, is the Iskander-K, whose ammunition assembly is represented by the inconspicuous tactical long-range cruise missile 9М728 (Р-500). In theory, having a range of 500 — 700 km (according to data from various sources) and a small effective reflecting surface from 0,05 to 0,07 square. m, P-500 missiles are able to easily reach the locations of US anti-aircraft missile divisions in the above coastal and insular regions of Sweden; but in practice, to destroy them with the help of these cruise missiles will not be so easy. Why?
First, the P-500 (9М728) are subsonic cruise missiles whose flight speed ranges from 830 to 940 km / h, which makes it much easier for the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 to calculate the first interception using MIM-104C anti-aircraft missiles and MIM-104F, given that objects with an effective scattering surface of about 0,05 square. m detected by the standard version of the multifunctional radar AN / MPQ-53 at a distance of about 55 km. Secondly, in existing photographs illustrating the launch of 9М728 missiles, one can draw attention to the fact that the cruise turbojet bypass engine TRDD-50AT (“Product 36МТ”) is located directly at the nozzle module in the tail section of the rocket (this can be seen from the air intake maximum offset to the tail block). It says only one thing: at the exit of the hot jet there is not even a minimal cooling circuit, which would at least slightly reduce the infrared signature of the rocket; which means that on the approach to the Patriot batteries, part of the P-500 missiles can be intercepted by modern Swedish-designed anti-aircraft missile systems RBS-70NG, RBS-90, Stinger-RMP staff and any other modern air defense missile systems, missiles which have a semi-automatic laser guidance system interfaced with a TV / IR sight or are equipped with an infrared homing head. Thirdly, the low subsonic flight speed does not allow the P-500 rocket to make vigorous anti-aircraft maneuvers with 12 overload and more units, and therefore it is ten times simpler to intercept it than the hypersonic ballistic version 9М723-1.
Launch of a tactical long-range cruise missile 9М728 (Р-500)
But the main advantage of the island of Gotland in terms of creating an “anti-aircraft umbrella” over the central part of the Baltic Sea is the presence of a large number of prevailing heights within 30 — 50 m. If the radars of illumination and guidance AN / MPQ-53 and AN / MPQ- The 65 of the Patriot PAC-2 and the Patriot PAC-3 complexes, the range of the radio horizon for targets flying at an altitude of 50 m will be from 45 to 50 km. This will cover about 35% of the distance from Gotland to Estonia, which means that in order to “close” the low-altitude section over the Baltic Sea, all that remains is to locate the PAC-3 battery in the area of the Latvian city of Pavilosta. As a result, the only proven means that can destroy these batteries and “open” neutral airspace over the Baltic Sea for our naval aviation are the strategic cruise missiles X-101 (with massive use from the missile weapons of the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 rocket carriers) as well as multipurpose X-32 anti-ship / anti-radar missiles, which have speed in 4,6М on the flight path, and also dive to the target almost at a vertical angle close to 90 °.
Nevertheless, in this case it is impossible to count on 100% destruction of the Patriot PAC-3 battery, since we are talking about all the same MIM-104F antimissiles with active radar homing of the millimeter-wave range, which can work on the sheer-dive X- 32, without relying on AN / APG-65 radar, which has a limitation on the angle of elevation of the beam in 83 degrees. Destroying one such positional air defense area outside the “ballistic” version of the Iskander will require a significant amount (several dozen, or hundreds) of X-101 and X-32. I would like to note that the plan for creating a “unified Baltic defense system” voiced by the head of the Latvian defense department is not a fantasy of his inflamed brain, but most likely is as close as possible to the concept of containment of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy in the region that is thoroughly worked out by the Pentagon and the Swedish Defense Ministry. A convincing example of this was the largest Aurora-2017 military exercise in the past two decades, which took place from 11 to 29 in September of 2017.
The maneuvers involving 21 thousand troops (19500 people of Sweden and 1500 people of NATO military bases) also affected the very strategic island of Gotland, where the US Army deployed a Patriot PAC-2 / 3 anti-aircraft missile battery. one or more standard M901 launchers on the 4 transport-launch launchers with MIM-104C anti-aircraft missiles, as well as several M903 launchers for new ERINT interceptors (MIM-104F). And this means that the North Atlantic Alliance is already quite seriously not only considering, but also considering the prospect of forming a layered air / missile barrier on the way of the Baltic Fleet aviation of the Russian Navy.
Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=21116
https://vpk.name/images/i197697.html
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-816.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/erint/erint.shtml
http://pvo.guns.ru/other/usa/patriot/index01.htm
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/s400/s400.shtml
Information