Worst scenario for Damascus and Moscow in action: the United States organized a deserted slaughter for attrition
Just one week before the start of the World Cup (FIFA-2018), a complete understanding began to come that all, without exception, raids of desert formations of the Igilovsky pseudo-caliphate (ISIS, ISIS, as well as Jebhat al-Nusra are prohibited in the Russian Federation) from “sleeping enclave "to the remote fortified areas of the Syrian and Hezbollah government forces in the area of the pumping stations T2 and T3 in April-May 2018, as well as the point missileaviation The U.S. Air Force strike on the SAA military facilities in the area of T2 station, carried out on May 24, 2018, was absolutely no ordinary coincidence. They should be interpreted as nothing more than a chain of interconnected local military actions of the Western coalition aimed at promptly "softening" the defense capability of disparate SAA units in southern Syria before a decisive blow. The latter was supposed to take place at a time when most of the elite brigades and divisions of Assad’s troops would be immersed in the tasks of preparing for the military liberation of the southern opposition-terrorist enclave of Dar’a-Essaouida-El-Quneitra.
Washington’s hybrid operation against government forces in the south of the Syrian Arab Republic began on the night of 7 on June 2018 of the year with a powerful offensive surge of ISIS from the “sleeping enclave” between the provinces of Homs and Deir ez-Zor in the direction of the “Husham’s pocket” and the strategically important transport site near the city of Abu Kemal, which plays a crucial role in providing ground communications, involved in the transfer to the Syrian theater of war Iranian divisions of the IRGC (including the corresponding boiling technique), and volunteer units acting in concert with the "Hezbollah". Literally in one day, the enormous 90-kilometer sector of the territory along the Euphrates bed returned to control of the pseudo-caliphate, which the Syrian army spent several days a month earlier. The terrorists also restored fire control over the T2 - El Meyadin station highway, thanks to which the stronghold on the T2 could receive military-technical support from Deir ez-Zor in a timely manner. Now this transport branch is lost, which even more unties the hands of the IG to completely block the route Palmyra - Abu-Kemal. But let's try to find out: what could be the main help for such effective actions of the pseudo-caliph, in addition to diverting the most combat-ready CAA units to the south-western FSA “de-escalation triangle”?
4 and 5 June The United States Air Force, in conjunction with the militant Kurdish forces of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), made active attempts to oust the ISIL groups from the Al-Shafakh boiler located on the east bank of the Euphrates. Despite the small size of this enclave (5x35 km), the number of militants here amounts to not hundreds, but thousands, as indicated by the high density of cities, villages, as well as the dominant heights located in their neighborhoods (Hadzhin district). As a consequence, the reinforced artillery and air strikes of the American KMP and Air Force led to the formation of the IG from hopelessness began to retreat to the west, followed by the forcing of the Euphrates in the area of Abu Kemal. The defensive potential of government forces in this city over the past few months has noticeably weakened (compared to the first weeks after liberation) amid the withdrawal and distribution of large army units between Husham and the south-west of the country.
The result was the most powerful attacks on individual CAA strongholds around Abu Kemal from the pseudo-caliphate units, which began on the night of June 8. By the evening of the same date, on the "Twitter" page of the news agency "AFP Beirut" there was information that the city was again captured by terrorists, and CAA units were pushed to the outskirts; but after a few hours this news was refuted by the Federal News Agency, citing sources in the command of the Syrian Armed Forces. Nevertheless, if we proceed from the updated online map, as well as from the direct participation of the headquarters of the Western coalition in pushing the ISIS field commanders to the regular storming of southern Syrian cities, we get a disappointing picture of Abu Kemal, El Meyadin, and dozens of villages the course of the Euphrates may again be in tactical "cauldrons" surrounded by ISIL formations in the western direction and Kurdish troops "Syrian Democratic Forces" in the eastern direction. And there is no doubt that the problems of igilov's "cannon fodder" moving across the desert to replenish the factions on the west coast of the Euphrates by the western coalition will absolutely not appear in the coming months, and possibly years.
As we have noted in our previous works, the enormous reserves for this, represented by thousands of IG terrorists, are in two sectors today: the largest 175-kilometer border enclave on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, covering the provinces of Deir-ez-Zor and Haseke (here the SDF and coalition staged a staged “cleansing” of igilovtsevs, with whom in reality there are close negotiations on the transfer to the front from the CAA), as well as in a similar-sized “cauldron” located in the northern Iraqi province (governorate) of Ninawa. From these enclaves, militants in groups of several hundred people are transported to training camps near the Syrian city (military base) of the USMC and USF Hasek through completely legalized convoys in the east of the SAR, which was repeatedly stated both in our defense department and in the Syrian one. After the appropriate "advanced training" and the issuance of equipment by American troops, part of the ex-igilovtsev is sent to the structures of the SDF and the so-called New Syrian Army for future battles near the city of Deir ez-Zor. The rest is in new desert enclaves located in the 55-kilometer “security zone” in the At-Tanfa region. The latest attention is riveted today.
Some two weeks ago, the southwestern territories of the Syrian Arab Republic were associated by experts only with the last symbol of the “enclave war” - the “southern de-escalation triangle”, after the fall of which the longstanding destabilizing activity within the state would be reduced to nothing. But in parallel with the above alarming situation in the Deir-ez-Zor and Abu-Kemal region, as if by magic, the situation suddenly became aggravated in the desert region of Essaouida and Damascus, which is absolutely unusual for this region of Syria. The new enclave length 30 km and width 14,7 km grew by leaps and bounds. 3 villages (Quarah, Khirbat Sarim, and Khirbat El-Umbashi) in Essaweida, as well as the dominant height in the province of Damascus, from which the militants for several days control the eastern wing of the enclave, fell into the hands of the pseudo-caliphate. To suppress the new terrorist tactical "pocket", the most combat-ready brigades of the CAA 9 armored division, as well as the attached artillery regiment and, of course, the regiments of the 15 division of the Special Operations Forces of Syria were involved.
The map shows that the command of the Syrian army decided to attack the igil enclave in Essaouida exclusively from the Damascus-Essaouida key highway (from the west), as well as an extensive branch of roads encircling the small town of Shahba. This is explained not only by the facilitated delivery of ammunition, equipment and reinforcements from Damascus, as well as by the presence of a large number of heights to the west of the enclave, but with the aim of stopping the possibility of escaping igilovtsy to the territory of the Dar'a bridgehead - Al-Suweida - Quneitra, which are eagerly awaited the field commanders of the Free Syrian Army, awaiting the arrival of a new "cannon fodder" for the start of large-scale clashes with the Syrian Arab Army. The distance from the new “ISIL pocket” to the south-western FSA bridgehead does not exceed 35 km, and therefore the beginning of the first assault, for example, only from the north, would lead to a situation that was observed in the tenths of February 2018 year when igilovsky was clearing Boiler "in the province of Hama. Then, several hundred terrorists were able to successfully break through the 20-kilometer-long desert area and join the FSA and Tahrir ash-Sham militants in the “Idlib gadyushnik”. This time, the command of the Syrian armed forces provided for a similar course of events.
The question may arise: how could an ISIL enclave arise in the operational depth of the Syrian territory almost from scratch? The answer is quite simple. The legs are growing from the concept of supplying the Free Syrian Army group across the open section of the Jordanian-Syrian border, where Jordanian border guards bribed along the Pentagon line are closely involved in the process of moving military equipment into the “de-escalation triangle” and human resources in the form of “Air “Rukban” of new fighters and, of course, Western advisers for tactically correct redistribution of troops between key OH: Dar'a, Essaouyda and Khan Arnabah. But if between the militants of the “Free Syrian Army” in the “de-escalation triangle” and the Jordanian border guards, all approaches are open, then there is about 42 km of territory controlled by the government forces between the new Igilov’s “boiler” in the east of Essaouida and the Jordanian-Syrian border. The conclusion suggests itself: if the government controls the desert border areas in southwestern Syria, it is only at the sectoral level in the form of separate checkpoints and strongholds, which does not correspond to the list of existing threats. It is precisely in connection with the presence of such gaps in the protection of the border that we today observe the appearance of all kinds of “terrorist pockets” deep in the territory of the SAR.
The goal of throwing igilovtsy into this region is to divert and weaken the powerful reserves of the CAA (9, 15 divisions, Tiger Forces, and Hezbollah), originally aimed at storming opposition groups “rebels,” which ultimately gives the latter enough time to prepare fortifications, as well as regrouping the offensive "fist", which in a few weeks or months should clash with the troops of Bashar al-Assad. At the moment, direct participation in improving the combat capability of the FSA backbone in the area, with the assistance of Amman, is being done at the expense of the US Armed Forces with direct funding from Saudi Arabia. This can be clearly seen from the significant influx of militants into the area in recent weeks: even now the total number of detachments of the Free Syrian Army and militants of Dzhebhat al-Nusra here can exceed 20 thousand people. The process of increasing the grouping will continue until the Syrian army blocks the M5 and Al-Rams-Dar'a highways.
The whole complexity of what is happening is precisely that all of a sudden and clearly organized by the States the next “boiler” of the ISIL is now pulling out of the CAA the considerable resources necessary for the attack from Dar'a’s tactical protrusion. Moreover, on the syria.liveuamap.com map, you can pay attention to the 6,4-kilometer-long Mahajah isthmus, which, if desired (more precisely, by a command from the Pentagon), can be blocked by FSA thugs in just a few hours! In the "pot" will be the thousands of government forces in Syria. Therefore, the most correct decision at the beginning of the Syrian Arab Army operation would be to overlap an even narrower tactical isthmus 2700 meters wide in the area of Busra al-Hariri, which will allow you to quickly restore the required communication lines of Syrian forces on the outskirts of the city of Dar'a.
There are a lot of fears at the disposal of the opposition-terrorist FSA units from the so-called "southern front" and the "Al-Nusra" grouping a decent number of unguided tactical short-range missiles "Omar" (handicraft production of An-Nusrovka), as well as more serious products - The 610-mm Zelzal-2 / Abu-Baker long-range tactical missiles developed by the rocket industry of the Islamic Republic of Iran and captured from the Syrian army during a multi-year military campaign. "Lobsters" are equipped with powerful high-explosive fragmentation warheads and are capable of removing significant damage to both the urban infrastructure and the mechanized units of the CAA at a distance of several kilometers. So, at the beginning of 2017, these missiles wiped out the Muaviyas school in the center of Dar'a. So the ridicule of our commentators regarding the “rusty pipes” is absolutely out of place here: the level of threat from them is extremely high and already requires the placement of “Pantsirey-С1” in Daria.
Even more problems are created by the long-range 3,55-tonne “Zelzal-2”, attributed to rocket artillery. “Zelzal-2”, being a more long-range version of the X-LUM-X rocket 9М21, is capable of “laying down” on a battlefield with a circular deviation of about 700 — 1000 meters. The range of action may exceed 210 km. Based on this, we determine that the militants of the “southern front”, in coordination with Washington, can launch several Zelzal-2 from the Daria region in the environs of the US-British military base At-Tanf, which Hezbollah or the CAA will immediately be charged with which data missiles are also composed. This development will play into the hands of both the United States, which has declared support for the “southern rebels”, and Israel, which may again accuse the Syrian leadership of non-compliance with the agreements and the go-ahead for the pro-Iranian Hezbollah to take part in hostilities near the Syrian-Israeli border.
So, a fully predictable step by Damascus and Moscow after the expiration of the ultimatum (June 14), presented to the militants earlier, could be the deployment in the desert to the west of the “de-escalation enclave” of the Buk-M2E anti-aircraft missile systems, which can intercept Zelzaly-2 and any other militant missiles launched in the direction of the American military facilities in At-Tanf, on the ascending branch of the trajectory. Only this method will avoid provocations that are successful for the Western coalition.
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