Fifty missiles to defeat Russia
How many rockets are needed to defeat Russia? The answer to the question may seem astounding and shocking. It seems that about fifty. And not ballistic with nuclear charges, but conventional cruise missiles, RGM / UGM-109D Block III and RGM / UGM-109E Block IV, modern modifications of the American cruise missile Tomahawk. One destroyer of the Arleigh Burke type (which can carry Tomahawk missiles up to 50) is quite enough to achieve victory over Russia in favorable conditions. How is this possible?
Such a ship could crush Russia. In the photo, USS Farragut (DDG-99), the destroyer of the class Arleigh Burke, carrying the 96 standard launch cells; according to some reports, carries to 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles
In military economic analysis, as well as in general in preparation for a serious war, it is very important to develop the ability to anticipate the actions of a potential enemy, to determine how the enemy can most effectively achieve his goals in a probable war.
It is known that our most likely adversary, in this case the United States and NATO, relied on high-precision weaponrepresented mainly by cruise missiles. In all the wars that have been waged by the United States since the “Storm in the Desert” (the war against Iraq in 1991), cruise missiles occupied a prominent place among the enemy's means of destruction, especially in the first stage of hostilities. Actually, Tomahawk Block III is a product of the modification of missiles, conducted on the basis of the experience of the Iraq war. The operations used hundreds of missiles: “Fox in the desert” (17-19 December 1998 raid on Iraq) - 415 missiles, Yugoslavia - about 700 missiles (including about 30% for administrative and industrial facilities), operation in Afghanistan in 2001 year - about 600 missiles, war in Iraq, 2003 of the year - about 700 missiles, operation in Libya in 2012 year - 112 missiles. That is, the forecast for a possible war involves the massive use of cruise missiles, mainly sea-based.
From the analysis of the experience of the application it followed that to hit a large industrial object it would take quite a lot of hits, from 6 to 10 and more. By virtue of what, a largely complacent conclusion was made: if the destruction of the infrastructure of even rather underdeveloped countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan required hundreds of cruise missiles, then Russia would have to need thousands, which clearly goes beyond the capabilities of even the US military budget. Indeed, only large power plants with a capacity of more than 5 MW in Russia are more than 600, and the length of transmission lines is 450 thousands of kilometers.
Meanwhile, the industrial and especially the energy system of the countries with which the United States has managed to fight for over the past 25 over the years, was significantly different from the Russian. She was not centralized to such a high degree as in the USSR (and Russia that inherited it). For example, the power industry of Yugoslavia at the time of the bombing was based on brown coal (the country's largest power complex Nikola Tesla in Obrenovac, in 40 km from Belgrade) and in hydroelectric power plants, among which the HPP “1” on the Danube was particularly distinguished. In Yugoslavia, power plants were built in every major city, taking into account the availability of energy resources, and therefore the Serbian power transmission system was rather poorly developed. The Americans therefore had to strike at each power plant in order to disable the country's power system.
In Russia, there is not only the Unified Energy System, which connects all the major power plants into a single network, but also the vast majority of the power industry has an even more centralized supply of fuel - natural gas.
In 2016, 457 billion cubic meters of gas was consumed domestically, of which 156 billion cubic meters was spent on electricity generation, 130 billion cubic meters in industry, and 87 billion cubic meters by boilers and the public. Natural gas acts not only as a fuel, but also as a raw material, in particular, for the production of such an important military material as nitric acid (all 10 factories in Russia that produce nitric acid are produced from ammonia, in turn, produced from natural gas). In the power industry, the share of gas in 2016 was 72,6% throughout the country, and it is gradually increasing. Only in Siberia, where there is a surplus of coal, the picture is reversed: 85,6% of fuel in the electric power industry falls on coal.
By and large, 4 / 5 industry, transport and urban economy in Russia depends on natural gas. Which is produced mainly in one place, on Yamal, and is transmitted through the system of gas pipelines to consumers and for export.
Map of gas pipelines in Russia. The most vulnerable points of the gas transmission system are circled in red circles: the Yamal “cross” (above), the node near Ukhta and the node at Aleksandrov-Guy (below)
One glance at the map of Russia's gas pipelines is enough to understand how vulnerable this industry is, which is key for the country as a whole and for defense in particular. It is enough to smash the main gas pipelines literally in three places in order to almost completely cut off the European part of Russia, where the bulk of the population and the bulk of industry, including the military, are located, from gas. And, as a result, from electricity, from heat, from raw materials.
Moreover, it is worth noting that on the map of gas pipelines there is a place where 17 large gas pipelines intersect at once. The place is known as the "cross." It is located on the bank of the Pravaya Khetta River, not far from the village of Pangoda, and indeed from the satellite looks like two crosses, painted directly on the tundra.
Yamal "cross" from space. No comments
It is very difficult to find an explanation for such a sabotage solution. Nothing prevented the pipelines from spreading over the tundra, placing them away from each other. If the enemy would cut one string, the others would remain whole. And in general, the dispersed system of gas pipelines is more difficult to destroy and easier to repair. But here something unimaginable was done. I can only push such an explanation to this strange fact. Since the “cross” of gas pipelines was built in the Soviet years, this could only be the case if the Soviet leadership, starting with L.I. Brezhnev was firmly, absolutely and adamantly convinced that there would be no war, there was no threat to this most vulnerable spot in the Soviet gas pipeline system.
Gas pipelines cannot be camouflaged; they are perfectly visible on satellite and aerial photographs, mainly because all trees and bushes in the right of way under gas pipelines are cut down for security purposes. And in general, the entire gas and gas transportation infrastructure is perfectly visible from the air: wells, gas compressor stations, gas pipelines, underground gas storages.
Not to be unfounded. Novoarzamas gas compressor station near Nizhny Novgorod. An object perfectly visible from the satellite and extremely vulnerable even to hit one cruise missile ...
Kasimov underground gas storage between Vladimir and Ryazan, south-east of Moscow, in 12 billion cubic meters of gas. By visibility and vulnerability is no different from the gas compressor station. If it is attacked by rockets, it will burn for a long time.
There is no doubt that the Americans have a comprehensive database with the exact coordinates of each such facility of the Russian gas industry. If they ever planned to strike at the gas industry, then the Yamal “cross”, of course, occupied the most honorable place in them. Still, with one blow, cut off 85% natural gas production!
Tomahawk is quite able to cope with the pipeline, since the modifications of Block III and Block IV are equipped with a warhead of WVU-36 / B with a charge of 340 kg of explosives. The explosion of the warhead should only break the pipeline tightness and strike a spark, and then the rest of the gas under pressure in the 54 atmosphere will do the rest. The force of the explosion is such that it pulls out and throws tens of meters of a steel pipe of a large diameter in the direction and creates a large funnel, above which a column of burning gas appears.
The result of the explosion of the gas pipeline near the town of Komenki, near Poznan, in Poland. Photo chosen because it is particularly clearly visible all the consequences of a gas pipeline explosion
It seems that the consequences of a missile strike on gas pipelines are more or less clear. The loss of 85% gas will lead to the shutdown of most of the power plants, to the cessation of the supply of electricity and heat to residential buildings, to a sharp reduction in the operation of railways. Electricity will remain only to the most edge, only for the most important objects and the most urgent needs. If the blow occurs in the winter, in extreme cold, the damage will be much greater than from nuclear bombing.
Now the whole question is what to do in this case. If a weak spot is found, then you need to cover it with something. There are several options available. First, the option is fast and not very reliable: covering the gas pipeline system with air defense systems. The Yamal “cross” can be covered with several C-400 complexes. But still there remains the likelihood of a massive attack with preliminary suppression of air defense, the likelihood of two or three waves of rocket attacks, so that one of them achieves the effect. Nevertheless, the benefit from the destruction of the Yamal “cross” fully justifies the consumption even of 200-300 cruise missiles in this place. And yet, the probable enemy has other options: to destroy gas wells or to undertake the destruction of gas compressor stations, without which it is impossible to transfer gas from Siberia. You can also hit on any part of the pipeline. It is obvious that air defense systems cover is not a solution at all. The system of gas pipelines is so long, and there are so many vulnerable objects on it that there are not enough existing air defense systems to ensure their reliable protection. Air defense it is advisable to cover the crossings of gas pipelines, distribution nodes, in order to deprive the enemy of the ability to immediately disable large segments of the gas pipeline system.
Secondly, it is possible to create an auxiliary system that will provide the existing system with combustible gas even in the case of the complete absence of Yamal gas. These can be rather large gas generators that will turn all kinds of things into combustible gas, everything that burns: coal, peat, wood, household garbage (dumps in this sense become strategic objects). Generator gas is noticeably worse than natural gas, but it will, however, allow holding on the minimum consumption the time that is necessary for the restoration of gas pipelines and the resumption of gas supply.
Thirdly, to somewhat deviate from the practice of centralized generation of electricity and set the task for each settlement and a more or less large plant to have its own source of energy (heat and electricity) for local resources, covering the most minimal needs. These can be small hydroelectric power stations, thermal power plants and boiler houses using local fuel or waste, or wind generators combined into wind farms.
From the point of view of the extreme vulnerability of centralized systems to a massive missile strike, the methods of dispersed production of military-significant raw materials, materials and military products become very interesting from a military economic point of view. The experience of the warrior in Germany shows: to destroy such a dispersed military industry, even in a very small area, requires an incredible number of bombs. If you carry out this business with the Russian scope and disperse the military industry across the Russian expanses, moving a large part to Siberia (where there are both local raw materials and local energy resources), then the Americans simply will not have enough cruise missiles and bombs to destroy it.
Such a ship could crush Russia. In the photo, USS Farragut (DDG-99), the destroyer of the class Arleigh Burke, carrying the 96 standard launch cells; according to some reports, carries to 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles
In military economic analysis, as well as in general in preparation for a serious war, it is very important to develop the ability to anticipate the actions of a potential enemy, to determine how the enemy can most effectively achieve his goals in a probable war.
It is known that our most likely adversary, in this case the United States and NATO, relied on high-precision weaponrepresented mainly by cruise missiles. In all the wars that have been waged by the United States since the “Storm in the Desert” (the war against Iraq in 1991), cruise missiles occupied a prominent place among the enemy's means of destruction, especially in the first stage of hostilities. Actually, Tomahawk Block III is a product of the modification of missiles, conducted on the basis of the experience of the Iraq war. The operations used hundreds of missiles: “Fox in the desert” (17-19 December 1998 raid on Iraq) - 415 missiles, Yugoslavia - about 700 missiles (including about 30% for administrative and industrial facilities), operation in Afghanistan in 2001 year - about 600 missiles, war in Iraq, 2003 of the year - about 700 missiles, operation in Libya in 2012 year - 112 missiles. That is, the forecast for a possible war involves the massive use of cruise missiles, mainly sea-based.
From the analysis of the experience of the application it followed that to hit a large industrial object it would take quite a lot of hits, from 6 to 10 and more. By virtue of what, a largely complacent conclusion was made: if the destruction of the infrastructure of even rather underdeveloped countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan required hundreds of cruise missiles, then Russia would have to need thousands, which clearly goes beyond the capabilities of even the US military budget. Indeed, only large power plants with a capacity of more than 5 MW in Russia are more than 600, and the length of transmission lines is 450 thousands of kilometers.
Meanwhile, the industrial and especially the energy system of the countries with which the United States has managed to fight for over the past 25 over the years, was significantly different from the Russian. She was not centralized to such a high degree as in the USSR (and Russia that inherited it). For example, the power industry of Yugoslavia at the time of the bombing was based on brown coal (the country's largest power complex Nikola Tesla in Obrenovac, in 40 km from Belgrade) and in hydroelectric power plants, among which the HPP “1” on the Danube was particularly distinguished. In Yugoslavia, power plants were built in every major city, taking into account the availability of energy resources, and therefore the Serbian power transmission system was rather poorly developed. The Americans therefore had to strike at each power plant in order to disable the country's power system.
In Russia, there is not only the Unified Energy System, which connects all the major power plants into a single network, but also the vast majority of the power industry has an even more centralized supply of fuel - natural gas.
In 2016, 457 billion cubic meters of gas was consumed domestically, of which 156 billion cubic meters was spent on electricity generation, 130 billion cubic meters in industry, and 87 billion cubic meters by boilers and the public. Natural gas acts not only as a fuel, but also as a raw material, in particular, for the production of such an important military material as nitric acid (all 10 factories in Russia that produce nitric acid are produced from ammonia, in turn, produced from natural gas). In the power industry, the share of gas in 2016 was 72,6% throughout the country, and it is gradually increasing. Only in Siberia, where there is a surplus of coal, the picture is reversed: 85,6% of fuel in the electric power industry falls on coal.
By and large, 4 / 5 industry, transport and urban economy in Russia depends on natural gas. Which is produced mainly in one place, on Yamal, and is transmitted through the system of gas pipelines to consumers and for export.
Map of gas pipelines in Russia. The most vulnerable points of the gas transmission system are circled in red circles: the Yamal “cross” (above), the node near Ukhta and the node at Aleksandrov-Guy (below)
One glance at the map of Russia's gas pipelines is enough to understand how vulnerable this industry is, which is key for the country as a whole and for defense in particular. It is enough to smash the main gas pipelines literally in three places in order to almost completely cut off the European part of Russia, where the bulk of the population and the bulk of industry, including the military, are located, from gas. And, as a result, from electricity, from heat, from raw materials.
Moreover, it is worth noting that on the map of gas pipelines there is a place where 17 large gas pipelines intersect at once. The place is known as the "cross." It is located on the bank of the Pravaya Khetta River, not far from the village of Pangoda, and indeed from the satellite looks like two crosses, painted directly on the tundra.
Yamal "cross" from space. No comments
It is very difficult to find an explanation for such a sabotage solution. Nothing prevented the pipelines from spreading over the tundra, placing them away from each other. If the enemy would cut one string, the others would remain whole. And in general, the dispersed system of gas pipelines is more difficult to destroy and easier to repair. But here something unimaginable was done. I can only push such an explanation to this strange fact. Since the “cross” of gas pipelines was built in the Soviet years, this could only be the case if the Soviet leadership, starting with L.I. Brezhnev was firmly, absolutely and adamantly convinced that there would be no war, there was no threat to this most vulnerable spot in the Soviet gas pipeline system.
Gas pipelines cannot be camouflaged; they are perfectly visible on satellite and aerial photographs, mainly because all trees and bushes in the right of way under gas pipelines are cut down for security purposes. And in general, the entire gas and gas transportation infrastructure is perfectly visible from the air: wells, gas compressor stations, gas pipelines, underground gas storages.
Not to be unfounded. Novoarzamas gas compressor station near Nizhny Novgorod. An object perfectly visible from the satellite and extremely vulnerable even to hit one cruise missile ...
Kasimov underground gas storage between Vladimir and Ryazan, south-east of Moscow, in 12 billion cubic meters of gas. By visibility and vulnerability is no different from the gas compressor station. If it is attacked by rockets, it will burn for a long time.
There is no doubt that the Americans have a comprehensive database with the exact coordinates of each such facility of the Russian gas industry. If they ever planned to strike at the gas industry, then the Yamal “cross”, of course, occupied the most honorable place in them. Still, with one blow, cut off 85% natural gas production!
Tomahawk is quite able to cope with the pipeline, since the modifications of Block III and Block IV are equipped with a warhead of WVU-36 / B with a charge of 340 kg of explosives. The explosion of the warhead should only break the pipeline tightness and strike a spark, and then the rest of the gas under pressure in the 54 atmosphere will do the rest. The force of the explosion is such that it pulls out and throws tens of meters of a steel pipe of a large diameter in the direction and creates a large funnel, above which a column of burning gas appears.
The result of the explosion of the gas pipeline near the town of Komenki, near Poznan, in Poland. Photo chosen because it is particularly clearly visible all the consequences of a gas pipeline explosion
It seems that the consequences of a missile strike on gas pipelines are more or less clear. The loss of 85% gas will lead to the shutdown of most of the power plants, to the cessation of the supply of electricity and heat to residential buildings, to a sharp reduction in the operation of railways. Electricity will remain only to the most edge, only for the most important objects and the most urgent needs. If the blow occurs in the winter, in extreme cold, the damage will be much greater than from nuclear bombing.
Now the whole question is what to do in this case. If a weak spot is found, then you need to cover it with something. There are several options available. First, the option is fast and not very reliable: covering the gas pipeline system with air defense systems. The Yamal “cross” can be covered with several C-400 complexes. But still there remains the likelihood of a massive attack with preliminary suppression of air defense, the likelihood of two or three waves of rocket attacks, so that one of them achieves the effect. Nevertheless, the benefit from the destruction of the Yamal “cross” fully justifies the consumption even of 200-300 cruise missiles in this place. And yet, the probable enemy has other options: to destroy gas wells or to undertake the destruction of gas compressor stations, without which it is impossible to transfer gas from Siberia. You can also hit on any part of the pipeline. It is obvious that air defense systems cover is not a solution at all. The system of gas pipelines is so long, and there are so many vulnerable objects on it that there are not enough existing air defense systems to ensure their reliable protection. Air defense it is advisable to cover the crossings of gas pipelines, distribution nodes, in order to deprive the enemy of the ability to immediately disable large segments of the gas pipeline system.
Secondly, it is possible to create an auxiliary system that will provide the existing system with combustible gas even in the case of the complete absence of Yamal gas. These can be rather large gas generators that will turn all kinds of things into combustible gas, everything that burns: coal, peat, wood, household garbage (dumps in this sense become strategic objects). Generator gas is noticeably worse than natural gas, but it will, however, allow holding on the minimum consumption the time that is necessary for the restoration of gas pipelines and the resumption of gas supply.
Thirdly, to somewhat deviate from the practice of centralized generation of electricity and set the task for each settlement and a more or less large plant to have its own source of energy (heat and electricity) for local resources, covering the most minimal needs. These can be small hydroelectric power stations, thermal power plants and boiler houses using local fuel or waste, or wind generators combined into wind farms.
From the point of view of the extreme vulnerability of centralized systems to a massive missile strike, the methods of dispersed production of military-significant raw materials, materials and military products become very interesting from a military economic point of view. The experience of the warrior in Germany shows: to destroy such a dispersed military industry, even in a very small area, requires an incredible number of bombs. If you carry out this business with the Russian scope and disperse the military industry across the Russian expanses, moving a large part to Siberia (where there are both local raw materials and local energy resources), then the Americans simply will not have enough cruise missiles and bombs to destroy it.
Information