Military Review

Romania in the WWI. Unfulfilled opportunities

43
From the very beginning of the war, the Entente and the central powers sought to draw Romania into its side. Interest in it was determined by the fact that the Romanians could put the army in 600 000 people, the country also occupied an important strategic position - on the flank of the eastern front. The Romanians themselves, led by Prime Minister I. Brattian (it was he who had the real power in royal Romania) took a pragmatic position: we must enter the war, but wait for the right moment for this.


Romania with 1883 was linked to Austria and Germany by an alliance treaty. In the German General Staff seriously counted on the Romanian divisions. Planning to abandon their main forces to the west at the beginning of the war, the Germans believed that the Austrians, together with the Romanians, would be able to pin down the Russian army in the east. With the beginning of the war, Vienna and Berlin demanded to speak with them. For the immediate performance on the Austro-German side was the Romanian king Karl Hohenzollern. In Russia, they feared that the king might organize provocations on the Russian-Romanian border in order to draw Romania into the war on the side of the enemy.

Romania in the WWI. Unfulfilled opportunities

Karl (right) and Kaiser Wilhelm.

But the performance of the Romanians in 1914 on the side of the central block could bring not only negative consequences for Russia and the Entente in general. Romanians could not forge many Russian troops. But to get a crushing answer is yes. At the beginning of 1915, instead of a heavy offensive in the Carpathians against the rested Austro-Hungarians, the Russian army could strike at the Romanians - the weakest member of the enemy coalition. In addition, the performance of Romania against Russia automatically put Bulgaria in the Russian allies. She had a vital interest in this — the return of the southern Dobrudja, captured by the Romanians. So, the Romanians fell into ticks from the north and south. And then, through the territory of Bulgaria, the Russian army was close to Constantinople and the Black Sea straits.

In fact, the performance of Romania on the side of Austria-Germany, and even at the very beginning of the war, was excluded. The pro-German position of the king had no support in society and the ruling elite. The majority believed that fighting for Austria-Germany was not in the interests of Romania. The defining position was that of Bratian, to wait for the winner to be clearly identified in the war - and to speak on his side by the end of the war. In the meantime, Bucharest has declared itself neutral; the Austro-German demand to act on their side was rejected. Formally, according to the contract, it was required that Russia be the attacking side, but after all, Austria and Germany began the war. In September, the old Germannofil king 1914 died. The new king did not try to push through some of his own line.

The Romanians for the most part wanted the Entente to be the winning side. The Entente, seeing such a predisposition, made efforts to attract Romania to its side. In particular, the claims of Romanians to Transylvania were recognized. Among the considerations of the Russian command, who threw their troops into the bloody Carpathian operation, not the last was to persuade Rumania to launch.

In Romania itself, supporters of the Entente began a noisy campaign for the quickest possible entry of Romania into the war. By the spring of 1915, their campaign was at its peak. Brian began to hint that the Romanians will perform in the spring. And this time was really suitable for performance. The situation was quite favorable: Bulgaria had not yet entered the war against the Entente, the Russian front was held in the Carpathians, the Serbian front was holding out, Italy was entering the war over the Entente. And Transylvania was very weakly covered.

The Romanian performance could have confused all the cards in the Austro-German headquarters. On April 19 (2 May BC), an offensive was launched on the Russian front near Gorlitsy. There is already concentrated shock group under the command of Mackensen. Austro-Germans waited for success - they would break through the front and force the Russian armies to the Great Retreat. Leaving the enemy of large territory and huge losses will be a heavy shock for the Russian army, the ruling circles and society.

The Romanian offensive threatened not only the loss of Transylvania. It saw a strategic bypass from the southern flank of the entire Eastern Front of Austro-Germans. Their only reserve was the Mackensen grouping. There were no other forces for quick transfer to the threatened direction. The attack near Gorlitsy would have to be canceled. Troops destined for him would go to Transylvania. The Russian army would receive a respite and prepared an offensive on the Carpathian front.

In May, Italy declared the 1915 war against Austria-Hungary. The Austrian command had to transfer 5 divisions from the Serb front and 2 divisions from Galicia to the newly formed front. In total, the Italians forged the 20 Austro-Hungarian divisions. The weakening of the Austro-Hungarians on their front would have taken advantage of the Serbs. Under the blows from all sides, Austria-Hungary could collapse.

On the Romanian territory was the only way by which Germany transported weapon the Turks. With the performance of Romania, these deliveries would be blocked - and the Anglo-French forces would have a chance to reverse the situation in the Dardanelles.

In general, if Romania came out in the spring of 1915, this could change World War I, leading to faster defeat for the central powers. A war would be shorter, less bloody and less destructive for all.

In fact, the rulers of Romania excluded her performance in the spring of 1915. Proponents of immediate accession feared that Romania might be late for the war and would be unnecessary. But Brattianu saw that the war would still be long. Therefore, we must continue the policy of waiting - until more favorable conditions arise. One of those who knew the Romanian prime minister described his position as follows: “We will deceive everyone and enter the war in the end, just to have time for the peace conference as a member of the winning coalition.”

Romanians seem smarter than the Italians. Those after all quickly agreed on everything with the Entente and, having declared war, immediately launched an offensive. But the Italians, entering the war, did not at all expect that they would face heavy fighting. The calculation was that the Austro-Hungarians tightly bound the Russian and Serbian fronts - and against the Italians the Austro-Hungarians already had no one to put up. The Romanians also saw that in the spring of 1915 the Austro-Hungarians still had quite strong reserves. In particular, their counterattacks forced the Russian troops from Bukovina to retreat. Facing a still strong adversary was not part of the calculations of Bucharest.

The script of the Romanian speech in the spring of 1915 implies the salvation of Russia. After all, the fateful grouping of Mackensen would have been distracted by the Romanians. But just this Romanians would never have done. They received information about the German troops that appeared in the Carpathians - not far from Romania itself. This information was particularly bad for the Romanians and their willingness to speak. They were afraid of the German army (yes, everyone was afraid of her). Concentrating their forces at Gorlitsa in the spring of 1915, the Germans completely ruled out the performance of the Romanians. After all, they understood that they would have to fight with these German forces then, and not only Russian ones.



By the end of 1915, the army of the central block defeated Serbia. Freed more 300 000 soldiers, the question arose - where to send them next? Among other things, the project was discussed to strike at the beginning of 1916 in Romania. This was seen as a preemptive strike. Nevertheless, it was decided not to add another front to those already existing. Yes, and the Romanians were in a hurry in this period to take the form of complete loyalty to the central powers.

In May-June, 1916 came another favorable moment for the Romanian entry. Russian troops under the command of Brusilov inflicted a heavy defeat on the Austro-Hungarian armies. In the Hungarian parliament, there were calls for withdrawal from the war. In Bucharest, they were frightened that with their waiting policy they could miss the moment.

The historian A. Kersnovsky wrote: if the Romanians had acted right away, then “the position of the Austro-German armies would be catastrophic from the critical one, and with skillful use of the Romanian capabilities, we would be able to disable Austria-Hungary.” But Brian would not be Brian, if he hadn’t saved that moment either. Instead of an immediate speech, he again delayed the negotiations. In Bucharest did not see the need for immediate intervention. Nor have they seen it in Petersburg - otherwise the Romanians would accept all the demands (not intending to fulfill them later - in the spirit of Anglo-French diplomacy) - if only the Romanians would act faster.

In addition to diplomatic discrepancies, Kersnovsky adds to the Romanians one more reason to postpone the performance - they had to sell the Austro-Germans all that was still possible and then go to war with them. So, even the cunning of Petersburg would not have accelerated the Romanians. But, if in May-June the Austro-Germans did not know how to plug holes on the Russian front, then by September they already had something to transfer against the Romanians. The Romanians were quickly defeated.

The Romanian disaster affected not only Romanians. The whole weight of the collapsed Romanian front had to be shouldered by the Russian army. With heavy casualties, she attacked Austro-Hungarians in the Carpathians in order to draw their forces to themselves, easing the position of the Romanian ally. From other sites, 36 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions were removed and transferred to Romania — more than 500 000 fighters, a quarter of the forces of the Russian army. An emergency transportation of a huge number of troops subjected Russian railways to heavy stress. There is an opinion that it was Romanian transportation that completed the breakdown of the Russian railway sector at the beginning of 1917. Because of this frustration, there were interruptions in the supply of St. Petersburg - which caused the demonstrations that turned into a revolution.

Of course, the Romanians themselves are to blame for their catastrophe. But not only. A. Kersnovsky notes that the Russian command was able to prevent a catastrophe, but missed them.



In general, the Russian command, headed by Alekseev, was against the involvement of Romania in the war. It was clear that Romania could put up a weakly armed and inexperienced army, not provided with any ammunition or other types of equipment. The security was supposed to go at the expense of the Russian side. In general, a weak ally will bring more problems rather than help.

In addition, the Romanians arranged their performance with unacceptable requirements for Russia. Their claim to Transylvania and other lands with a Romanian majority was recognized. But Bucharest solicited more - even the Ukrainian and Serbian lands. The approach of the Anglo-Franks here was this: to agree to all the demands of the Romanians, to promise them everything, just to drag them into the war. It’s just that they didn’t intend to fulfill their promises later, and it’s not their promise. It was agreed after the war to see what the Romanians really could reveal. The approach of Russia was different - after all, the demands of the Romanians touched it immediately and directly. Among other things, Romania demanded the sending of Russian troops to Dobrogea - against the Bulgarians. But a direct clash with the Bulgarian troops was undesirable for Russia.

Romania requested to send 5-6 Russian buildings, approximately 250 000 people. Alekseev categorically rejected this "monstrous harassment." He promised 50 thousands, but he felt sorry for them, sending 30 thousands. Such forces could not do anything against the beginning of the offensive of the central armies. But 250 000 could, together with the Romanians, repel the offensive of a common enemy. Then, under the pressure of the ensuing catastrophe, the Russian headquarters was forced to rush to Romania much more troops.

The duty of General Alekseev was not to reject "harassment", but to foresee the possibility of catastrophic development, if not support the Romanians in advance. To foresee that their catastrophe will inevitably affect Russia. The interests of Russia demanded not ranting that he, de, would not be engaged in "dragging chestnuts for the Romanians with Russian hands." Russia's interests demanded the use of opportunities that arose with the accession of Romania.

From Romania it was possible to strike around the flank of the entire Austro-German front. The Russian Stavk had to immediately and substantially reinforce the Romanians and coordinate with them the direction of their main attack - from Moldova to the northeast. Already at the beginning of the offensive, it was possible to reach the rear of the Austro-Hungarian armies and intercept the few Carpathian passages there, catch the Austro-Hungarians in a bag.

There was another strategic opportunity: to strike from Romania to the south - on Bulgaria. Such an opportunity was seen and feared by Hindenburg and Konrad, the commanders-in-chief of the enemy. She saw and the head of the Russian strategy Alekseev. At the beginning of 1916, he himself put forward such an idea: the Romanians and Russians from the north, the Allied army of the Allies from the south, jointly took Bulgaria into ticks and took it out of the war, then liberated Serbia. Turkey cut off the same way. And then the combined forces of the Entente attacked from the Balkans to the north.

However, the Western Allies did not agree on an offensive from the south and north. They energetically encouraged Romania to speak, but at the critical moment they did not help her. The Salonika army of General Sarrail spent in idle time when the Russian army was bleeding in the Carpathians, trying to pull the enemy away from the Romanians.

And the Romanians themselves would hardly have willingly agreed to a strategy. They clearly did not want to advance to the northeast or south - to the place where it smelled of roast, where they had to face a serious clash with the enemy. They were concerned only with the occupation of the weakly protected Transylvania.

But, if Russia provided Romanians with strong support, then it could require agreement on plans. In exchange for sending Russian troops, Romania had to strike from Moldova to the north - in the flank and rear of the Austro-Hungarians on the Russian front. Here the Romanians were supposed to concentrate their main forces, no less than 250 000 bayonets. It was necessary to convince the Romanians: it is pointless to attack somewhere in Transylvania, isolated from the main eastern front.



But the Russian General Headquarters wanted to see in the statement of Romania not opportunities, but only disadvantages, like stretching an already huge front. Alekseev was against the entry of Romania. And when they still imposed a Romanian ally on him, the general took an indifferently ignoring position towards him. Russian Stake has stepped back from any participation in the development of the Romanian strategy. Left to themselves Romanians ordered very badly.

The entry of Romania gave the Russian Stavka possible keys to victory. An offensive from the Moldavian Carpathians or Dobrudja could have been strategically successful. But the flank position of Romania was never realized. The rate chose to continue the bloody and already fruitless offensive in Galicia. Alekseev regretted for the Romanian 5 front of the Russian corps in August 1916. In December, I had to send 15 cases, but without any benefit. Russia and the Russian army cost him much thoughtlessness.

It was necessary either to resolutely back up the Romanians immediately, or not to allow their entry at all. The Russian General Staff and the government with the Foreign Ministry resisted their entry - it was necessary to be more stubborn. If you could achieve non-entry - it would be better for everyone.

Indeed, in fact, the entry of Romania only prolonged the war - contrary to the hopes of Paris and London, which pushed the Romanians to join. A quick and shattering victory over Romania raised the despondent spirit of the peoples of the central bloc. Germany strengthened confidence in the ultimate victory. In occupied Romania, the Germans pumped a million tons of oil, requisitioned two million tons of grain. Both the uplifted spirit and the material resources received were vital for Germany to continue the war until the fall of 1918.

In modern Romania, there is also an opinion: it was better not to get involved in 1916 in a war that cost the hardest losses, but to maintain neutrality. Austria-Hungary still waited for the collapse and collapse - in 1918 the Romanians would have taken Transylvania without a war, without losing a single soldier, without suffering any ruin. Perhaps it would also be with Russia and Bessarabia.

That's just the 1916 Romanians really wanted to enter the war, because they then did not foresee the serious consequences of this. To keep them from joining could only counter this Russia. But the Anglo-Franks pushed through the entry of Romania, and the Russian side could not withstand their pressure. In relations between Paris, London and St. Petersburg was dependent. Yes, and the Russian command was somewhat relaxed after Brusilov’s success. Austro-Germans no longer expected the ability to respond quickly to Romanians. There was also a false hope that the Bulgarians were shackled in the south by the Allied Thessaloniki Front. Therefore, the Romanians do not come in, and they don’t need support ... As in the spring of 1915, Stavka and Petersburg assessed the situation with confidence, not suspecting that a catastrophic turn was already a few steps away.

In general, the disaster was inevitable.
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43 comments
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  1. Vard
    Vard 18 March 2018 06: 54
    +1
    Romania the hyena of Europe ... How can you snatch something where you can not miss ... But at the slightest threat it raises a howl ...
    1. Severski
      Severski 18 March 2018 19: 20
      +1
      Here on the site they used to say that this is Poland. European hyena. Now what is Romania. Announce the entire list of hyenas, and what is it based on, please.
  2. andrewkor
    andrewkor 18 March 2018 07: 45
    +1
    The proud descendants of the Dacians received Lyuli everywhere they met with their ambitions. And today, the revival of "Greater Romania" excites the fragile minds of these not to Europeans, and may end in another hail.
    1. Severski
      Severski 18 March 2018 19: 21
      0
      They took Plevna in 1878, Budapest in 1919.
      1. Yaroslav 2
        18 March 2018 20: 02
        +2
        Quote: Severski
        They took Plevna

        Mm, participated in the battles for Plevna. The Romanians did not always receive lyuli, and even won in some places, but attributing to them Plevna is too much.
      2. alatanas
        alatanas 20 March 2018 19: 58
        -1
        By yourself ?!
  3. Streletskos
    Streletskos 18 March 2018 08: 14
    +18
    In fact, not everything is so simple.
    Many arguments are theoretical.
    For example, a key fact has been ignored - the signing of the Russian-Romanian convention of September 18 (October 1), 1914. Its content was as follows: Russia pledged to resist any attempt to violate the territorial status quo of Romania and recognized the “right to annex the regions, the majority of whose population the Romanians and the Romanian populated areas of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy constituted. ”The Convention explained that“ Romania could occupy the above-mentioned territories at a time that it considers convenient. ”In Bukovina, the distinction should be made on the basis of the ethnic majority. Finally, Russia promised to take care of attracting to the agreement of their allies - England and France.
    As for the Romanian government, it made an obligation to maintain neutrality favorable to Russia until the day of occupation of the above lands.
    Pokrovsky believed that Romania received Transylvania for only "benevolent neutrality." American G. E, Torrey agrees with this, considering the convention "brilliant success" to Bratian. So why was Romania in a hurry?
    This is just an example of a lack of understanding.
    At each stage of the World War (before Romania joined it), both the situation and the specifics of the negotiation process changed. And these nuances are the subject of serious analysis.
    1. Yaroslav 2
      18 March 2018 10: 46
      +1
      Quote: Streletskos
      For example, a key fact has been ignored - the signing of the Russian-Romanian convention of September 18 (October 1) 1914

      Well, there is an opinion that this is not a key fact, but a passing episode. How could Romania get Transylvania for neutrality? Russia (Entente) will defeat the Austro-Hungarians with its sweat and blood and will so easily give the lands to the Romanians who did not fight? The Romanians were immediately warned not to interpret the convention like that. What land can they get only through participation in the war. This was stated in a previous article - rumyniya-v-pervoy-mirovoy-voyne.
      1. Streletskos
        Streletskos 18 March 2018 14: 14
        +15
        This passing episode led to the fact that the Romanians are the 2 most critical years
        pulled the bull by the horns
        How could Romania get Transylvania for neutrality? Russia (Entente) will defeat the Austro-Hungarians with its sweat and blood and will so easily give the lands to the Romanians who did not fight?

        this is part of philosophy
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 18 March 2018 08: 22
    +2
    Be that as it may, Romania has achieved its goal; it has gained vast territories, which it still owns.
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 18 March 2018 08: 43
      +17
      Well, dear Olgovic, perhaps from Romania it was more useless as a neutral country. At least not so much of Russia's troops and efforts were consumed - and our diplomacy understood this very well.
      By the way, the agreement is the result of the Galician victory.
      And I drew attention to the nuances and considerations in this article, because Yesterday, someone Avt (such a shark is painted on a nickname) drew attention to the issue of quality-matching articles. Simply, if you proceed from the promise, it doesn’t matter what is said, because
      Whatever it was
      , it remains only to shrug.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 18 March 2018 11: 46
        0
        Quote: Streletskos
        Well, dear Olgovic, perhaps from Romania it was more useless as a neutral country. At least not so much of Russia's troops and efforts were consumed - and our diplomacy understood this very well.

        Dear Peter, there was no discussion of the neutrality of Romania at all, even in Romania itself. It was only about which side to speak on.
        Those. Russia would incur costs in any case, and approximately the same.
        Quote: Streletskos
        Just based on the message - no matter what is saidBecause
        Whatever it was
        , it remains only to shrug.

        The article says a lot about the ERRORS of Romania, which, supposedly, would have received Transylvania, etc., and WITHOUT entering the war and losses. Therefore, I said that Romania, with all the mistakes and miscalculations,
        Be that as it may, I got my way, got the vast territories that I still own
        those. entered right (for yourself).
        And NOBODY would have given her anything (as the author affirms) if she had avoided the war.
        Such examples after PMV-Did not have. Given only to those who fought on the side of the Entente. They were taken from those who fought against. hi
        1. Streletskos
          Streletskos 18 March 2018 14: 13
          +15
          Because Romanians pulled so much
          Why did the question of neutrality still stand
          etc. etc.
          I am surprised that this important convention has not been considered.
          What reported
        2. Streletskos
          Streletskos 18 March 2018 14: 19
          +16
          Olgovich
          Given only to those who fought on the side of the Entente. They were taken from those who fought against.

          In fact - so for sure hi
        3. Yaroslav 2
          18 March 2018 14: 53
          +1
          Quote: Olgovich
          The article says a lot about the ERRORS of Romania, which, supposedly, would have received Transylvania, etc., and WITHOUT entering the war and losses.

          Quote: Olgovich
          NOBODY would have given her anything (as the author affirms) if she had avoided war.

          I’ll clarify: the author himself does not say so. He only conveyed the opinion available in modern Romania - that it could be so. In any case, the war should have ended with the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the question - where to stick Transylvania? If the Romanians fussed at the last moment and, taking advantage of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, occupied Transylvania, then Versailles could have recognized this. Just alternatives are not visible.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 18 March 2018 15: 21
            0
            Quote: Yaroslav 2
            He only conveyed the opinion available in modern Romania - what could be so

            ONE of the available
            Quote: Yaroslav 2
            where to stick Transylvania? If the Romanians fussed at the last moment and, taking advantage of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army, occupied Transylvania, then Versailles could have recognized this. Just no alternatives viewed.

            How is it not visible? belay
            Transylvania is purely inHungarian land. Why would they give it to the non-combatants of Romania? request Her Hungary for a while, soon by the way, returned by the results of the arbitration.
            Everything repeated in WWII and it was again taken from Hungary in favor of a member of the anti-Hitler coalition.
            But the question is still being discussed ...
            1. Severski
              Severski 18 March 2018 19: 24
              +1
              As far as I know, Romanians have always made up the majority of the population of Transylvania. Therefore, to call her purely Hungarian is not entirely correct.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 19 March 2018 07: 22
                0
                Quote: Severski
                Romanians have always made up the majority of the population of Transylvania. Therefore, to call it purely Hungarian is not entirely correct.

                Absolutely correct, because Transylvania was never part of Romania.
                Romania appeared only in 1881 g
                1. Severski
                  Severski 19 March 2018 15: 20
                  +1
                  In the same way, we can say that the Russian Federation appeared only in 1991.
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 20 March 2018 11: 37
                    0
                    Quote: Severski
                    In the same way, we can say that Russian Federation appeared only in 1991.

                    She appeared in 1917 g
        4. fuxila
          fuxila 18 March 2018 15: 34
          +1
          You are mistaken, the Danes who managed to regain Northern Schleswig, while not taking part in the WWI, managed to do this.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 18 March 2018 15: 52
            0
            Quote: fuxila
            You are mistaken, the Danes who managed to regain Northern Schleswig, while not taking part in the WWI, managed to do this.

            Did Schleswig pass Denmark, as, for example, Transylvania Romania?
            Not at all: there was held plebiscite and the Danish majority of Schleswig seized earlier from Denmark, decided to return to Denmark.
            With the opposite result, I could stay in Germany.
  5. populist
    populist 18 March 2018 09: 06
    +3
    Good article and I really liked it. good The third plus is mine. Particularly interesting is the analytics of missed opportunities.
    But the respected author all the time mentions the chief of staff of General Alekseev, completely leaving in the shadow of “our great commander and strategist” Emperor Nicholas II.
    "(September 5) 1915 Nicholas II assumed the title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief." Romania entered the war on August 14, 1916. Therefore, whoever is responsible for diplomatic failures before the Romanian campaign and for military failures in the course of it? Right on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and concurrently Emperor of All Russia Nicholas II. negative
    1. Adjutant
      Adjutant 18 March 2018 09: 20
      +2
      Therefore, all responsibility for diplomatic failures before the Romanian campaign

      So they were worth analyzing in this good article.
      If they certainly were)
      and for military failures during this

      that is, even for the defeat of the Romanian army? lol
      Protect nothing to add.
      We also need a specific person switchman - found. But it doesn’t happen that only one person is guilty of something (despite all the powers) - Putin or Nikolai 2.
      Alas.
      1. populist
        populist 18 March 2018 10: 12
        +1
        We also need a specific person switchman - found. But it doesn’t happen that only one person is guilty of something (despite all the powers) - Putin or Nikolai 2.
        Alas.

        Alas, but as it happens! Especially under imperial, royal and similar authority. The main strategic mistake of Nicky 2 is that he climbed onto the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief and even abandoned Petrograd.
        You have an interesting historical parallel ... wink
        So they were worth analyzing in this good article.

        Maybe the author will take up this topic?
        that is, even for the defeat of the Romanian army? lol

        By itself. We read from the author.
        But not only. A. Kersnovsky notes that the Russian command had the opportunity to prevent a catastrophe - but missed them.

        The Russian Headquarters had to immediately and substantially reinforce the Romanians

        Brusilov writes about this in his memoirs.
        1. Adjutant
          Adjutant 18 March 2018 10: 33
          +1
          Eco Well, everything is simple with you.
          Some memoirs (which always reflect the subjective assessment of one person), one historian.
          And other historians and memoirs?
          Okay.
          What can I say - take it, analyze
    2. Yaroslav 2
      18 March 2018 10: 55
      +1
      Thanks for the plus.
      Quote: populist
      But the respected author all the time mentions the chief of staff of General Alekseev, completely leaving in the shadow of “our great commander and strategist” Emperor Nicholas II.

      To be honest, I relied on the work of A. Kersnovsky. He blamed everything on Alekseev, or simply the Russian Headquarters and did not mention Nicholas II at all. And the real role of the emperor must be understood.
  6. KVU-NSVD
    KVU-NSVD 18 March 2018 09: 44
    +7
    The author reproaches Alekseev for not wanting to send five corps at once to the aid of Romania, who started the war ... And then, they said, they had to plug holes in 15 corps, but late and almost this is one of the reasons for the defeat of Russia and the revolution. But for some reason the idea is not allowed that these five corps would be meaningless and the Romanians would not have saved one fig ... But at that moment they were more necessary for the other .. We cannot fully understand the motives of the military and politicians, and history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood ..
    1. populist
      populist 18 March 2018 10: 29
      0
      We cannot fully understand the motives of the military and politicians.

      Then why are we here? To measure the length of the calibers of Bert's big gun?
      and history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood ..

      History teaches by examples ... sad But only smart what
    2. Yaroslav 2
      18 March 2018 11: 16
      +3
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      We cannot fully understand the motives of the military and politicians, and history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood ..

      To evaluate a real decision, one has to look: what other decisions were possible. Maybe. these other decisions were better - and then it is clear that the real decision must be evaluated if not as a direct mistake, then certainly not as the best decision. In August 1916, the Russian headquarters decided to continue the offensive in Galicia (on the Stokhod river) + the offensive against well-fortified German positions in Belarus and the Baltic states. All these offensives were worth great losses and were inconclusive. Therefore, the transfer in August of efforts (at least part of them) to Romania would certainly not worsen anything.
      1. KVU-NSVD
        KVU-NSVD 18 March 2018 11: 23
        +4
        Without going into details (otherwise you need to write an article, but laziness .. winked ) I’ll say only as a clarification on the comment made above: The difference between historians and historical characters is that the former judge based on facts throughout the period, and real people make decisions based on the moment and are often guided by the most unimaginable motives .. and condemn them for the shortsightedness is wrong .., just at that moment the foresight was seen from a completely different angle ... But thank you for the article, I look forward to continuing ... hi smile
  7. Serge Gorely
    Serge Gorely 18 March 2018 13: 17
    +3
    Pikul was told (not verbatim) “If Romania becomes our ally, 16 divisions are needed to protect it. If it becomes an enemy, 16 divisions are needed to neutralize it. In any case, 16 divisions ...
    1. albert
      albert 18 March 2018 18: 23
      +1
      Romania for Russia in WWI, like Italy for the Germans in WWII. As an adversary, as an ally, as an ally, worse. A suitcase without a handle, in general.
    2. Severski
      Severski 18 March 2018 19: 29
      +1
      Vaughn Hindenburg said that if the Romanians would take the side of the Germans, they would win.
      Although who is Hindenburg and who is Pikul? Heaven and earth
      1. Serge Gorely
        Serge Gorely 18 March 2018 19: 50
        0
        Quote: Severski
        Vaughn Hindenburg said that if the Romanians would take the side of the Germans, they would win.
        Although who is Hindenburg and who is Pikul? Heaven and earth

        So that Romanians, that "brothers" Bulgarians - fought for Germans ... Who took them, limotrophs, into account?
        1. Severski
          Severski 19 March 2018 01: 45
          0
          In World War I, the Romanians fought on the side of the Entente, like the Russians, against the Germans.
    3. Okolotochny
      Okolotochny 18 March 2018 20: 38
      +2
      "In any case, we are losing 15 combat divisions" - the novel "I have the honor."
    4. Yaroslav 2
      19 March 2018 09: 34
      +1
      In fact, it took almost 50 divisions to defend Romania.
      1. Gopnik
        Gopnik 19 March 2018 15: 38
        0
        These 50 divisions would just as well have fought with the same Austro-German divisions on the Eastern Front, only on a different site. Only without Romanians in the allies.
  8. Severski
    Severski 19 March 2018 01: 49
    +1
    The author claims that the Romanians had come out on the side of the Germans, the Bulgarians would have become allies of Russia:
    In addition, Romania’s uprising against Russia automatically put Bulgaria in its Russian allies. That one had a vital interest in this - the return of southern Dobrudge, captured by the Romanians.

    What this statement is based on is not clear. Bulgarians lost much more land in favor of Serbia, Greece and Turkey. And the main enemy of the Bulgarians, it was customary to consider Serbia.
    1. Yaroslav 2
      19 March 2018 09: 45
      +1
      Romania is also an enemy for the Bulgarians then; for starters, the Bulgarians and Romania would have sorted out Dobrudja (all the more so as a strong ally - Russia would have appeared). And then somehow with the Serbs for Macedonia. I do not see the incomprehensibility.
      1. Severski
        Severski 19 March 2018 15: 23
        0
        Romania is also an enemy, as are Greece, Turkey and Serbia proper. Why did you decide that the Bulgarians wanted to attack Romania first? Unclear. Acre your rhetoric, I see no evidence. It’s not clear where everything is clear from you.
      2. alatanas
        alatanas 20 March 2018 23: 04
        0
        Bulgaria took active military action against Romania because of allied considerations when Romania began to fight against Austria-Hungary, declaring war on Romania .. It was just that the Russian command did not expect Romania to capitulate in two weeks. That's why I had to fight RI against the Bulgarians in Dobrudja and retreat to the river. Seret from 1916 to 1917