Military Review

Strategic pendulum. Part of 4

34
What happened on the northern flank of the Battle of Galicia at this stage of the battle? The Austrians clearly overestimated the result of the Tomaszewski battle, considering the 5 th army incompetent.


F. Conrad von Gettsendorf was deceived by M. Auffenberg's boastful reports and considered it possible to move the majority of the army of the latter southward by striking the right flank of the Russian 3 army advancing on Lviv.

Meanwhile, replenishment was infused into the 5 Army, and on August 22 it again launched an offensive, playing a decisive role in the ensuing battle. August 22 The 25 Corps conducted a successful battle at Mashev with the Austro-Hungarian 10 Corps (more than 1,6 thousand Austrians were captured), on August 25 troops of P.A. Plehve, interacting with the 21 Army Corps of the 3 Army, inflicted Posadov defeated a group of Joseph Ferdinand (lost 2,4 thousand people by prisoners and 18 guns).

The toughest 26-27 battles of August ended in a Russian victory thanks to the bold maneuver of P. A. Plehve. First, the cavalry corps formed by it was thrown to the rear of the Austrian 4 Army: at Krasnobrod and Frampol he made a mess in the Austrian rear, defeating the wagon train and part of the cover, further contributed to the defeat of the Archduke I. Ferdinand in the interests of the 3 Army. Secondly, wedging between the Archduke group and the 4 army, P.A. Plehve moved two groups of corps of his army in divergent directions - assisting the neighbors: the right group (25 and 19 body) contributed to 4, and the left (5 th, 17 th and equestrian corps) - 3 th armies.


43. Russian battery is shipped through the Galician river.

The threat to the rear of the enemy, who acted against the 4 and 9 armies, had a positive effect on the situation prevailing on the front of these armies. Before that, the frontal attacks of their troops on the fortified positions of the enemy were unsuccessful - and the armies waited for the completion of the maneuver of the 19 and 25 corps.

But the operational breakthrough on the front of the Russian 9 and 4 armies at Lublin and Hill later also was successful. Of great importance was the fact that three fresh corps (18 Army, Guards and 3 Caucasus Army) were sent by the Russian Supreme Command to the northern flank of the Battle of Galicia. This allowed these armies to go on the offensive, which led to a major success in the battles of 20 on August at Sukhodol and 22 on August at Lopenniki. A head-on battle with the Austro-Hungarian 10 Corps broke out with the assistance of the neighboring 5 Corps. 1-I Guards Infantry Division (especially the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment) suffered serious losses near Vladislav. The trophy was also serious: under the Sukhodolami, up to 60 officers and 5 thousand soldiers of the Austrian 2 and 24 divisions of the 10 corps were captured and captured, 8 machine guns were captured. F. Konrad Gettsendorf wrote about the heavy losses of the 10 corps, noting that 89 and 90 people remained in the 500 and 800 infantry regiments, respectively. [Feldmarchal Conrad. Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918. B. IV. Wien, 1923. S. 663.].

21 August 100-I landshturmennaya brigade was defeated (near 500 people were captured). Under Lopenniki, as a result of the battle with units of the 3 Grenadier Division of the Grenadier Corps, almost the entire 45 regiment (regiment commander and 1575 soldiers and officers) of the Austrian 24 division was captured. The Guards rifle brigade, having suffered significant losses, hit the 95-th landscape team, captured the battery in the area of ​​Wojciechow, the 23-division of the 18-th army corps captured more than 1 thousand prisoners, machine guns and guns, 45-division, more than 1,5 thousand prisoners, machine guns and guns, 2-division, more than 9 thousand prisoners, machine guns and guns, XNUMX division captured more than XNUMX ths. Thousands of prisoners, XNUMX mountain guns, machine guns. This testified to the success of the soldiers of the XNUMX Army.

The Austrians were assisted by divisions of the Silesian Landwehr Corps. Corps R. von Voirsh was involved in stabilizing the situation on the front of the broken 10 corps. General R. von Voirsh is an excellent front commander, and his unit is one of the best in the Kaiser army.

The effect of this compound was found immediately. Thus, the Romanov Forest and Urshulin 3-th Caucasian Army Corps with a brigade of the 82 Division, a counterattack of the German 4 Landowning Division of the Corps R. von Voirsch, were captured, losing thousands of people to 1.

The heroic battles of the Guards and Grenadier Corps near Tarnavka are associated with the name of the corps R. von Voirsh.

By the evening of August 26, the Guards and Grenadier corps advanced to 1 km, with great losses, taking possession of the heights at Ursulin and Zarashev, and then lay under the fierce fire of parts of the 5 corps. The 2-th Grenadier Division, the consolidated brigade and the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps suffered heavy losses from the enemy’s combined fire from the forest and heights east of Tarnavka. But then the Life Guards Moscow Regiment again attacked the Tarnaw Heights, knocking over German and Austrian units and, with the support of the Guards grenadiers, captured 30 guns of the German 4 groundworking division (including 6 150-mm howitzers).

On August 27, the Guards Corps overturned the right flank of the 5 Corps of the enemy, and this success was transmitted to the entire front of the 4 Army - and in some areas the enemy began to retreat in disorder, throwing weapon and surrendering to the masses. 5 captured [White A. The Battle of Galicia C. 311.], about half of them are Germans. As a result of these battles, the Russian guards in the battles of 26-27 of August captured most of the artillery of the German corps - 42 guns [Zvegintsov V.V. Leib Guard Moscow Regiment 7.11.1811.-7.11.1936. Paris, 1936. C. 48.]. The losses of the Moscow Life Guards Regiment - 63 officer and 3200 soldiers, the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment - 50 officers and 2500 soldiers.

As a result, the right flank of the Austrian 1 Army and the German corps were defeated and began to withdraw. The materials of the Reichsarkhiv testify to the loss of the Silesian Landveor Corps during the 3 of the day of the fighting to more than 8 thousand people (including to the 7 thousand in the 4-th Landward Division) [Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 2. S. 334.]. A large number of prisoners testified to the severe defeat of the enemy's 3's corps - the Austrian 5 and 10 of the army and the German Silesian Landverny. The 18 Corps reached the Vistula, and the guards and grenadiers broke through the Austro-German front in a key area - at Tarnavka. And it was of major strategic importance. 4-I army captured 9 days before 15 thousands of prisoners and 55 guns.

As a result, 27 August under the blows of the 4 and 9 armies, the enemy who was threatened with a deep bypass of the 25 and 19 corps of the 5 army, faltered. The departure of the 5 Army's units to the rear of the enemy's 1 Army, led to the command of the latter deciding to divert the operational association for p. San The maneuver of the levoflang group of the 5 Army was the most dangerous for the enemy's 4 Army. On August 27, the Russians captured Tomashev (moreover, over 1 thousand prisoners were captured). August 28 The X. NUMX Corps of P. A. Pleve's army defeated the group of Joseph Ferdinand, who was covering the rear of the Austrian 5 Army.





7 card. Gorodok battle Dates in a new style

The South-Western Front is entering a general offensive. Under his onslaught, having large forces of the Russian 5 Army in the rear of M. Auffenberg's troops, the Austrians “broke down” and from August 30 began a general retreat.









47. Photos from the Galician front.

The 5 army became a free force in the Gorodok battle (meaning similar to the role of the English expeditionary corps at the final stage of the Marne battle, but the 5 army acted much more actively), to retard the actions of the Austrians, nothing more.

In the battles with the armies of the northern flank at the stage of the Gorodok battle, only the captured enemy lost more than 20 thousand people, 71 gun and a large number of machine guns. From the remnants of the army group of G. R. Kummer, the Austrians formed one division (106), while what remained of the 100-th landscape team and the 95-th division was withdrawn from the front and used as staged troops.

On the southern flank, the enemy struck at the joint between the 3 and 8 armies, primarily against the corps of the internal flanks. At the direction of the main attack, a group of troops was created, superior in terms of forces and means to the 3 and 8 army. The enemy, who possessed twice as large forces, seized the left flank of the 8 army. The Austrian 2-I Army with a blow from Komarno 27 August rejected the 24-i Army Corps for the river. Scherzhets.

The battles for Ravu the Russian 26-27 of August on the front of the 3 Army were among the hardest in the Battle of the Galician. The terrain favored the enemy, representing forest and swamp defiles, in which the Austrians created a strong defensive line in two lines. By the end of August 27, Rava-Russkaya remained in the hands of the Austrians. The key position of the 10 Corps "Goat Ridge" repeatedly passed from hand to hand. By the evening of August 29, the Austrians managed to cut in between the Russian 3 and 8 armies, and the fate of the battle on the southern flank of the Galician battle hung in the balance. The offensive by E. Böhm-Ermolli broke into the center of the 8 Army.



The situation in the Lviv direction was becoming very difficult for the Russians. 8-I army counterattacked using the latest reserves, but the coverage of its left flank was stopped. The Austrians, having shifted the center of gravity of their efforts to the 8-th army band, were late. At the front of the armies of P. A. Plehve, A. E. Evert and P. A. Lechitsky, a turning point occurred. 28 August Russian captured Tomashev and began to threaten the rear of the strike force of the Austrians. From the north to the rear of the Austrian 4 Army, the 5 and 17 Corps of the 5 Army were already leaving.

On the August 8 Army 30 sector, the enemy led persistent repeated attacks against the right flank and center, especially against the 8 Corps, but all these attacks were not only repulsed - 7, 8 and 24 Corps themselves switched to offensive.

The Austro-Hungarian troops interrupted the battle and began to retreat, because their 4 and 1 armies were threatened with defeat.



The result of the 2 offensive of the 21-30 August Army armies of August was the heavy defeat of the Austro-Hungarian 1 Army and Joseph Ferdinand group and the retreat of the 2, 3 and 4 armies. The maneuver of 5 army corps groups broke the Austrian front connectivity - helping the rest of the army of the front, the 5 army applied a deep coverage maneuver, advancing in eccentric directions.

Thus, an attempt by the Austrian command, interrupting the offensive between the Vistula and the Bug and gathering on its right flank more than 2 / 3 forces of the Galician front, defeat the Russian 3 and 8 army and liberate the city of Lviv, after 6 days heavy fighting ended in failure - despite the tactical successes of the Austrian 3 and 2 armies. The Austrian 30 divisions had to retreat quickly - fearing for their communications, over which the threat of a flanking attack from the Russian 9, 4 and 5 armies hung from the north.

The Austrians themselves, according to the commander M. Auffenberg, characterized the Gorodok battle as a “call for happiness,” realizing that it was unlikely to change the situation in the current circumstances. The pursuit of the Austro-German troops, though not as decisive as it could be, led them to new losses. Thus, the 14 Army Corps almost destroyed the Austrian brigade near the village of Lipy 31 August. On the same day, the 5 body captured more than 400 prisoners and 8 howitzers, and the 17 body captured more than 2 thousand prisoners, transports and many weapons. In the area of ​​Rava Ruska, up to 9 of thousands of prisoners were captured, 30 guns, a lot of machine guns. The 10 Cavalry Division captured the 31 of August - 1 of September in the Javorov region of the Austrian 6 and 14 corps, 4 howitzers, 2 light guns, a lot of projectiles and wagons.

To be continued
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  1. Horseman without a head
    Horseman without a head 31 January 2018 06: 20 New
    17
    Tarnavka is a cool battle. So many guns at once!
    1. XII Legion
      XII Legion 31 January 2018 07: 19 New
      18
      Yes, you are absolutely right.
      Captains Vinikovsky and Wolfman in st. "The night attack of the combined brigade of the 2nd Guards Division near Tarnavka No. 2 of the VIZH for 1939. The following interesting details of the battle are given (dating - in a new style, Sources - CVIA affairs: f. 2118, op. II, d. No. 14, l. 726; d. No. 69, l. 47; d. No. 100, l. 6-8; f. 2177, op. I, d. No. 28, l. 1-5; d. No. 154, l. 53; f. 2179, op. I; d. No. 152, l. 14.).
      ... the brigade, in addition to the Life Guards Moscow Regiment, included the 205th and 206th Infantry Regiments of the 52nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Battalion of the 81st Infantry Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division of the 3rd Caucasian Corps. The composite brigade also included the 1st division of the 2nd (guards?) Artillery brigade and three batteries of the 52nd artillery brigade. ...
      Thus, the combined 1st brigade of the 2nd Guards Division under the command of General Kiselevsky consisted of one regiment, which was part of its organizational structure, and two regiments of different divisions of another corps.
      On the night of September 7-8, General Kiselevsky received an oral order from the commander of the 3rd Caucasus Corps in the morning of September 8 to attack at the village of Vysoke the positions of the 4th Landwehr German division of the Wojrs Corps, which occupied heights east of Tarnavka.
      .
      The attack was scheduled for 9 a.m. Its main object was the Tarnava Heights, which were the most fortified section of the right flank of the Vojrs Corps. About three Russian divisions with the support of 8 guns were supposed to advance on an 136 km front, which is an average of 1 divisions and 0,5 guns per 22 km of the front. The defense forces totaled two German divisions of four-regiment composition.
      Consequently, the Russians had slight superiority.
      ...
      The idea of ​​this plan was based on the diversion of enemy forces by the frontal offensive of the combined brigade and the delivery of a decisive blow to the flanks of the Germans. For the combined brigade, the task was the most difficult, for the enemy occupied the commanding heights, and it was necessary to advance in open terrain.
      At dawn on September 8, the Germans, in order to disrupt the impending Russian attack, opened strong flanking artillery fire in the concentration area of ​​the combined brigade, preventing its units from taking up their original positions on the eastern outskirts of Vysoka.
      Russian artillery, despite the fact that the attack was scheduled at 9 o’clock, began artillery preparation only at 9 o’clock; this thwarted the beginning of the attack and allowed the Germans to carry out artillery counter-training. Starting at 9 o’clock, the Russian artillery fired intensively throughout the day .... Fire control was centralized in the hands of the artillery inspector of the Grenadier Clorpus ...
      Starting the attack between 16.30 and 17.15, parts of the 2nd Grenadier Division, the combined brigade and the 3rd Caucasian Corps suffered heavy losses from enemy artillery and infantry fire from a height east of Tarnavka and from the forest north of it. The enemy’s fire system was not suppressed by Russian artillery fire, which was conducted throughout the day. Therefore, the units moved very slowly ...

      Having received an order to cease operations at 22.30 from the head of the combat unit, the units advancing to the right and left of the combined brigade stopped and began to put themselves in order. At the initiative of the brigade commander, intelligence was sent to a height east of Tarnavka, which established that the German units were assigned to the return ramp for cooking food in pots (there were no camp kitchens). Considering that this is the most convenient moment in order to catch the enemy by surprise, the brigade commander decided to continue the attack, but only without firing, with the expectation of surprise.
      On the right flank of the brigade, on a wide front about 2 km, the Moscow Life Guards Regiment advanced, which, by the decision of the brigade commander, delivered the main blow to the forehead to a height east of Tarnavka. To the left, with a ledge back, the 205th and 206th infantry regiments advanced ...
      Thus, the attack of the strongly fortified position of the enemy was assigned to one regiment (without two companies), which attacked at a front of 2 km. These forces clearly did not correspond to the width of the front of the attacked section, although the brigade commander, having at his disposal two more regiments, could facilitate the task of the Moscow regiment by taking at least one other regiment to the front line. However, a night attack plan had one important advantage: it provided speed and surprise and therefore promised success even without regrouping.
      About 23 hours, the Moscow regiment, advancing without firing, with a bayonet attack destroyed the German military guard, put up on the crest of the height by German units that had gone to dinner. Moving forward another 100-200 m, the Russian units went to the artillery positions of the Germans, where they took by surprise all the servants, interrupted her and took possession of the guns.
      After some confusion, units of the 4th German Landver Division tried to counterattack the Moscow regiment, which had already occupied the Tarnava height (ridge and its eastern part). But the Germans' counterattack was approached by the reserve reserve of the combined brigade, and the Russian units began to create a defense system around each of the three groups of captured guns. Understanding that the Germans will continue to try to take away the lost artillery and positions, the brigade commander took urgent measures to transport the captured guns to the rear and requested help from the 3rd Caucasian Corps. He contacted the corps commander and received troops to strengthen the defense; however, the removal of artillery that night was completely unsuccessful due to the neighbors' unwillingness to help with the provision of artillery harnesses.

      During the night, the enemy several times tried to take control of the trenches occupied by the brigade, but each time the Russian counterattacks successfully fought off. At about 5 a.m. on September 9 they again launched an attack from Tarnavka, but this time their efforts were in vain. At 6 a.m., the artillery preparation of the new German attack began, which was carried out at 7 a.m. 30 minutes. from the direction of east of Tarnavka. The attack was also repelled. The last time the Germans carried out artillery preparation at 8 o’clock, apparently apparently having completely lost hope of capturing the Tarnavsky heights, refused further attempts to attack.
      As a result of the brigade’s night attack, 28 German guns were captured, of which six 150-mm howitzers. The 4th German Landver Division, having suffered heavy losses, began to retreat westward in disarray. The resulting breakthrough of the front provided the main forces of the 4th Army with the development of further success from the morning of September 9.

      The sudden night attack of the combined brigade on the night of September 8–9, 1914 at Tarnavka can serve as an example of successful night actions. It was a consequence of the conscious need to break through the strongly fortified position of the enemy, which required great effort and sacrifice during the daytime offensive. The night attack was carried out without much preparation, since it was actually a continuation of the daytime offensive.
      The success that ended the attack of the combined brigade was ensured by its surprise. If the German units did not expect a night attack from the flank in the direction of the forest northeast of Tarnavka and bypassing the Tarnavsky heights from the south, then all the more they did not expect a head-on blow to these heights. Therefore, the choice of the direction of the main strike in this particular case was made correctly.
      The numerical composition of the combined brigade can be equated to the infantry division. An attack at night as part of a division was common in World War II. A successful example of an attack of heights at Tarnavka is proof of the possibility of attracting an entire rifle division for a night offensive.
      The combined brigade launched an offensive in a strip 5-7 km wide. To directly guard the advancing units, patrols were advanced forward. Behind the patrols, infantry advanced in thick chains, with intervals of 200 m between companies. Reserves and supports went directly behind the forward chains ...
      The attack on German positions was preceded by intelligence sent directly by the brigade commander. This intelligence determined the location of the enemy and his weapons, in particular artillery positions. Moreover, she found that units of the enemy were set aside for the return ramps of the Tarnavsky height for cooking food. This allowed the brigade commander, firstly, to choose the most convenient moment for the attack and, secondly, to strike at a decisive place, i.e. in artillery positions, depriving the enemy at the very beginning of the battle of almost all of his division artillery.
      The reasons for the success of the night attack of the combined brigade include the wide initiative, decisiveness and excellent leadership of the brigade commander General Kiselevsky, who himself was directly on the battlefield at crucial moments and personally gave instructions to regiment commanders. Having correctly assessed the situation created by the onset of darkness and skillfully using it, the brigade commander with a bold, energetic and sudden bayonet strike ensured the further success of the entire army. At the crisis moment of the battle, he helped units by timely advancement of reserves.
      The Russian soldiers fought confidently, courageously and once again proved that with the able leadership of their commanders they are capable of much.
      .
      The combined brigade, having prepared the conditions for a subsequent night attack for the subsequent offensive of units of the entire 4th Army, thereby proved that the tactical success of a night attack can be turned into operational success.
      1. XII Legion
        XII Legion 31 January 2018 07: 39 New
        20
        And the Moscow regiment mentioned in the text of Zvegintsov V.V. Leib of the Guard on November 7.11.1811, 7.11.1936.-November 1936, XNUMX. Paris, XNUMX.
        Noted:
        At 7 p.m. ... the non-stop movement of the regiment began
        attack. Following their commanders, the companies in closed ranks, fast strides, trimmed on the move, moved forward ...
        The first 300 steps of the company went without loss, as they passed dead space, and enemy artillery continued to shell the trenches at the Lord’s Court and the hollow with a grove.
        But as soon as the companies crossed the hill, all the Austro-German artillery (48 both light and heavy guns) transferred their fire to them.
        Shell explosions clouded with smoke the entire battle order of the regiment, tearing down a whole group of people.
        The regiment also suffered heavy losses from machine gun and rifle fire to cover the enemy artillery.
        ...
        The companies rushed off .. to get to the guns as soon as possible.
        Only the magnificent composition of the Guards regiment, with its best soldiers of peaceful training, could go on the attack under such destructive fire, running about 2000 steps.
        ... near the cannons, the Muscovites met a worthy opponent. The servants of the guns and infantry cover, following the example of their officers, defended themselves to the last, firing from rifles and revolvers. ... There were almost no prisoners ...
        The regiment captured all the artillery ..., except for one battery, which managed to get out of position. ...
        ... During the night, the enemy launched three large and several small counterattacks that were repelled by bayonets. Counterattacks were carried out on three sides, and the regiment was almost surrounded by the enemy.
        The miraculous heroes of Muscovites proved themselves worthy descendants of the Borodino and Anab-Konak heroes not only with an unprecedented disdain for death ... when they took 42 guns, but they showed special fortitude and excellent discipline in repelling enemy attacks that began in the night and intensified from the very early morning August 27th. Under the scorching rays of the sun, without food and water, they heroically reflected the furious repeated attacks of the Germans ...

        The case is unique - the capture of almost the entire artillery of an entire division!
        1. Horseman without a head
          Horseman without a head 31 January 2018 07: 44 New
          18
          Thanks for the more than comprehensive answer.
          Interesting and detailed notes!
          1. Bouncer
            Bouncer 31 January 2018 08: 56 New
            19
            Join
            Chic and very characteristic for the RIA combat episode
            Be trimmed under fire and ahead with officers.
            Kiselevsky handsome

            Grew from the brigade commander of the 2nd GVPD to whom 10 army (summer of the 17th)
        2. Streletskos
          Streletskos 31 January 2018 10: 54 New
          16
          Counter fights and night attacks - a highlight of the Russian army?
          Are strong
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 31 January 2018 07: 24 New
    12
    You read and see firsthand how the Russian troops “didn’t” want to fight in the WWI ...
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 31 January 2018 10: 55 New
      18
      It was not worth delaying the war
      As Sun Tzu used to say: quickly did not win, put up quickly and you will win more than with the continuation.
      By the end of the year it was necessary to put up
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 31 January 2018 07: 47 New
    +7
    In the field infirmary ...
    The night will tear sore threads.
    It is unlikely that they will reach the morning.
    I ask for one, write,
    Write three lines, sister.
    Here is the address of my poor wife.
    Write her a few words,
    That I am shell-shocked harmlessly in my hand,
    I’ll recover and be healthy.
    Write that boy Vova
    I kiss as soon as I can.
    And the Austrian helmet from Lviv
    I'm a gift to him shore.
    And write to your father separately,
    How glorified our valiant regiment
    And that I was mortally wounded in the chest,
    Performing my military duty ... Poems from that time were written by the half-forgotten now Sergey Kopytkin ..
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 31 January 2018 10: 56 New
      17
      Very beautiful poem
      Thank you parusnik
  4. Lieutenant Teterin
    Lieutenant Teterin 31 January 2018 08: 13 New
    11
    A wonderful and very informative article. Reading about the actions of the Guards Corps, I am once again convinced that the training of the Russian personnel in those years was at an amazing height. I look forward to continuing with interest. The author — my sincere gratitude for the work done! hi
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 31 January 2018 10: 57 New
      16
      I fully join your words Mr. Poruchik! hi
      1. Bouncer
        Bouncer 31 January 2018 19: 52 New
        15
        And take me))
  5. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 31 January 2018 08: 36 New
    17
    If such a comparison can be made, then Goetzendorf, a man who was not afraid to take risks, had a counterbalance in the person of P. A. Pleve.
    Do not be afraid to go on an eccentric offensive and drag 2 groups of your corps by the ears of your neighbors - the crumbling 4th army and too far to the south and carried away by Lvov 3rd army.
    In addition to the confrontation, of all the commanders, probably the only one who thought about the front-line operation was stabilizing the front and giving it integrity, actively interacting with neighbors
    1. Bouncer
      Bouncer 31 January 2018 08: 57 New
      17
      Yes, and how everything was on time wink
      1. Streletskos
        Streletskos 31 January 2018 10: 58 New
        16
        Foresight combined with competent implementation is the key to success good
        And not only for the general
  6. Streletskos
    Streletskos 31 January 2018 11: 03 New
    16
    An interesting continuation of the informative
    And the actual (Galicia again toil, like Poland)) cycle
  7. Albatroz
    Albatroz 31 January 2018 12: 50 New
    +3
    Not only a test, photos are interesting
    I especially liked the collage with 4 at once.
    The poor fellow of Austria sits and looks at the crowd of Russians, wondering where did I go?))
    The best shooters) The insignia were similar, so to speak a step towards sniping
    1. Streletskos
      Streletskos 31 January 2018 13: 05 New
      17
      Yes, and the giants are funny. German at least in the Preobrazhensky Regiment))
      1. Albatroz
        Albatroz 31 January 2018 14: 38 New
        +3
        Our soldiers also read our newspapers and writing letters in this photo. Allegedly completely illiterate
  8. Dashing
    Dashing 31 January 2018 14: 39 New
    +5
    This gigantic battle demonstrated amazing skill and brilliant training of all military branches of the RIA. As an artilleryman, I can’t help but propose the following quote: “The Russian howitzer battery of the mortar division in the battle near Tarnavka on August 26 gave a classic example, having managed to fire six German batteries by firing only 200 grenades. 34 guns were captured at an enemy position, around them lay Broken crews and horses. The Germans were poking around to take out the guns from under the fire, but that only increased their losses ... "N.N. Yakovlev "August 1, 1914."
  9. Adjutant
    Adjutant 31 January 2018 18: 01 New
    +2
    I would also like to note the valor of the southern armies of the South-Western Front - the 3rd and 8th, which lasted until the breakthrough of the 3 northerly armies was completed.
    Here is what an eyewitness writes ("Parts of the VIII Army Corps in the battle near Gorodok in September 1914"):
    About how strong the Austrians were in this battle and that they brought large reinforcements to the forces at their disposal, already small in number, testifies sent by Commander VIII. corps to the army headquarters telegram No. 64 dated Aug 28. (Sep 10) ....: from a small town to the Povitensky forest a column of 3-4 versts in depth sets in, a column with a depth of a versts separated from Morga, heading to Peterswald. From the west, two columns, each more than two miles deep, approach the Gorodok on the highway. From Rzeszisana, a column one mile deep comes to Kamenobrod. Two columns advancing along two roads from Liskowice to Dobrostany, two versts deep each. "The fact that the Austrians' forces were very significant at the very beginning of this battle is already evidenced by the fact that they decided to throw them over such a serious barrier, like the line of Gorodok lakes, and launch an offensive with them, risking, if they fail, to have the same line of lakes to which they could be pressed and experience all the disadvantages and risks of such a situation ... it was impossible to make such a move with little effort The pulling towards the front of the VIII. Corps of significant reinforcements also indicates that the enemy attached great importance to this front and strained efforts to break through here to Lvov, as at the point closest to this strategic center important to them

    And the Russian army withstood the hesitation of this pendulum (north-south).
  10. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 31 January 2018 18: 22 New
    15
    Interesting photos
    1. Bouncer
      Bouncer 31 January 2018 19: 50 New
      15
      Weighty)
      And they were not afraid that they would carry away))
      I mean - before the war)))
  11. BRONEVIK
    BRONEVIK 31 January 2018 18: 25 New
    15
    To the topic of the articles of the cycle
    1. Bouncer
      Bouncer 31 January 2018 19: 51 New
      15
      What's in the article, what's in the comments - a selection of rare photos
      Class
  12. soldier
    soldier 31 January 2018 19: 05 New
    15
    The 1st Guards Infantry Division (especially the Life Guards Preobrazhensky Regiment) suffered serious losses near Vladislavov.

    The fighting near Vladislavov is a very important milestone in the battle path of the Preobrazhensky in the Great War.
    http://warspot.ru/765-preobrazhentsy-atakuyut-bez
    -artillerii
    1. Bouncer
      Bouncer 31 January 2018 19: 41 New
      15
      Yes
      Sometimes dispensed with artillery
    2. Bouncer
      Bouncer 31 January 2018 20: 10 New
      15
      Here he is.
      Colonel Evgeny Mikhailovich Kazakevich.

      He distinguished himself at the head of the Transfiguration near Vladislavov and was awarded the 2th Degree for the successful command of the 4nd Battalion.
  13. Some kind of compote
    Some kind of compote 31 January 2018 20: 36 New
    15
    Fracture good
    We are waiting for the end of an interesting cycle good
  14. Square
    Square 1 February 2018 05: 56 New
    +1
    M. Auffenberg strong commander
    And no luck - the war had just begun, but ran into Pleva. So "von Komarof" remained)
  15. barbiturate
    barbiturate 3 February 2018 12: 05 New
    0
    If the Germans had abandoned the Austrians alone, then by summer 1915, ours would have dictated peace terms to Austria) What wonderful personnel regiments were in 1914, the German landver could not withstand their attacks, but it is much stronger than the Austrians (IMHO). It is all the more unfortunate that such valuable troops of the guard and the support of the throne were so casually spent

    “Exactly at 5 o’clock the regiment took its starting position. Silent enemy batteries allowed 12 companies of the regiment to turn around without interference. The sun was beating right in their eyes, and, being in the palm of their hand, were an excellent target.

    Colonel Galfter, who was in front, turned to his fighters:

    - Glorious Muscovites! Forward! Remember the honor of the regiment!

    And - he went, covering his face with a sapper shovel. And the regiment harmoniously, as on Krasnoselsky maneuvers, moved after him.

    We, the gunners, with inexpressible emotion watched through binoculars for this formidable, beautiful and tragic spectacle.

    The first 500 steps the regiment went without loss. And then hell began. In the ranks of the advancing mouth, clouds of shrapnel began to break. Here the company commanders Shtakelberg, Nishchenko, Klimovich are falling. Behind the advancing chains there are more and more dead and wounded ...

    About half an hour this climb to Calvary continues. Here they reach the foot of the mountain and lie in dead space. However, it is necessary to hurry - the enemy is already rolling out the guns from the trenches in order to shoot these valiant remnants of fire with shots.

    But the fire of the guns seemed to be silent. Numbness seized their servants when the faces of the Russian soldiers moved very close, very close.

    Finally, everything calmed down. Around the German guns, which became quiet and harmless, the remains of the regiment - 7 officers and about 800 soldiers gathered. In this indicative attack near Tarnavka, Muscovites lost 57 officers and more than 2000 privates killed and wounded. "

    Oh, what courage and what losses ... although, in 1914, the Germans fought, throwing their guards at the English machine guns, only the Germans and the Allies quickly studied and used their developed economies to produce heavy guns and shells, aircraft, etc. d, but we had big problems with this until the revolution.
  16. Blue cop
    Blue cop 3 February 2018 14: 57 New
    15
    Attacks of the Russian personnel regiments did not withstand the personnel regiments of the German army (for example, the 1st and 17th army corps near Gumbinnen, the 20th army corps near Orlau-Frankenau).
    It’s a pity the colors of the armies of all the opponents that perished in the fire of the first year of the war.
    And glory to Russian weapons!
  17. Adjutant
    Adjutant 4 February 2018 12: 02 New
    +1
    A bit about Tarnavian trophies and heroes.
    As rightly noted in the article, 42 Austro-German guns became trophies of the Russian troops near Tarnavka (only the German 1st battery of the 11th artillery regiment of 6 guns was able to leave) - with 24 being evacuated at night, and the rest the next day . N. M. Kiselevsky wrote that 16 light guns were evacuated at about 3 o’clock on August 27 and delivered at vil. It is not good; 12 guns (including 6-150 mm howitzers) were mounted at the eastern side of the grove near the folklore at about 6 o’clock on August 28th. Dombrovka guarded by the officer guard of the Life Guards of the Moscow Regiment; about 18 hours on August 27, even 16 guns were evacuated. Several machine guns were also captured - for example, only the 82nd Dagestan Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Caucasus Army Corps, which had secondary tasks in the battle of Tarnavka, captured 4 machine guns.
    The Germans admit the loss of only 26 guns, noting the fact that only 4 were saved. Obviously, part of the captured Russian guns were Austrian (this is evidenced, for example, by the fact that 2 captured guns were mountain), belonging to parts 5- th Army Corps - and in the battles of Tarnavka, in addition to the 2nd Guards Infantry Division of the Guards Corps, units of the Grenadier and 3rd Caucasian Army Corps took part.
    The heroes of the battle near Tarnavka were the newly made St. George cavaliers: lieutenants of the Life Guards of the Moscow Regiment A.P. Adamovich (V.P. from 30. 01. 1915. posthumous), capturing 5 guns, S. S. Nekrasov (V. P. from 30. 01. 1915.), captured 4 guns, M.N. Protopopov (V.P. from 31. 01. 1915.), captured 4 guns, E. Orekhov (V.P. from 31. 01. 1915 .), capturing 6 guns, lieutenant V.I. Popov (V.P. from 31. 01. 1915.), capturing 4 guns.
    hi