1941 campaign of the year: the plans of the parties and the reasons for the defeats

More than 70 years have passed since the beginning of the deadly battle of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. However, the discussion about the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in that difficult for the country and bitter time for the entire multinational Soviet people does not subside. In this article, the outcome of the 1941 campaign of the year will be viewed through the prism of confrontation between the German and Soviet strategic prewar planning. Plans, miscalculations, reasons for victories and defeats of the opposing sides will be disclosed in detail.

A common thread throughout the article is the idea that the plan of the 1941 campaign of the year, both of the Nazi and Soviet command, is based not on one single document, but on several. Thus, in order to ascertain the intentions of the opposing sides, it is necessary to consider not separate separate documents, but their interrelated totality. The Soviet plan for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of Europe in 1941, undeservedly entrusted to oblivion, as well as its role in disrupting the German plan for the rapid defeat of the Red Army and the occupation of the territory of the USSR right up to the Urals, is particularly highlighted.

The German planning for the 1941 military campaign of the year is based on the OKH Directive No. 21, better known as the Barbarossa Plan, linked to it in terms of the Japanese attack on the USSR Kantokuen, the operation plan against the industrial area of ​​the Urals, theses to the report on the occupation of Russian territory and the reorganization of the ground forces after the end of Operation Barbarossa, as well as the OKH Directive No. 32 “Preparations for the period after the plan of Operation Barbarossa”.

When planning the defeat of the Soviet Union, the High Command of the Wehrmacht proceeded from the message that Germany was opposed by a “colossus with feet of clay,” which in order for it to collapse on its own only needed to be slightly pushed. As a result, the stake was placed on a "lightning war" and another "blitzkrieg". The main forces of the Red Army were expected to meet up to the line of the Western Dvina - Dnieper rivers. As part of the troops of the Western Front, the presence of the largest grouping of Soviet troops was assumed, which was planned to be surrounded by forces of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups with two concentric strikes on Minsk from the area of ​​Suwalki and Brest. The attacks on Leningrad and the Crimea were supposed to be delivered by the forces of the 4th and 1st tank groups with the support of the armed forces of Finland and Romania, reinforced by German formations in advance.

Four weeks were allocated to the Wehrmacht to crush the main forces of the Red Army to the line of the Western Dvina-Dnieper rivers, after which it was supposed to re-establish operational communications between Army groups Center and South in the area of ​​Gomel behind the Pripyat Marshes. Army Group North after two weeks of hostilities by July 5 was to capture Daugavpils, Center - Minsk, South - Novograd-Volynsky, and two more by July 20 - Opochka, Orsha and Kiev, respectively. The week was allocated for the subsequent Wehrmacht capture by Pskov, Smolensk and Cherkassy by July 27, three for the capture of Leningrad and Moscow by August 17, as well as the exit to the Sea of ​​Azov in the Melitopol region. 1050 km from Brest to Moscow was to the Wehrmacht to go for 8 weeks or 56 days - an average of 130 km per week, up to 20 km per day. At this stage, the organized resistance of the Red Army Wehrmacht was supposed to suppress, and the most densely populated part of the USSR to occupy.

After reaching the Leningrad-Moscow-Crimea line, the main part of the German divisions was to be withdrawn to Germany to reduce the Wehrmacht to 34 divisions from 209 to 175 and reorganize into tropical divisions to capture the British colonies. For the occupation of the western part of the USSR, it was planned to leave 65 divisions (including 12 tank, 6 motorized and 9 guard). The German satellites were supposed to mobilize in July, complete the regrouping and concentration of their troops in August, in order to launch a new offensive in late August - early September - Italy, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania together with the occupation forces of the Wehrmacht deep into the RSFSR and Japan to the Far East and Siberia.

By October 19, after nine weeks of the new offensive, the Wehrmacht was to capture the Urals. The active hostilities were supposed to end there, and the 1941 campaign of the year after 17 weeks of fighting ended. Japanese appetites spread to the Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia in Baikal and Buryatia, inclusive. 1800 km from Moscow to Chelyabinsk Wehrmacht had to go for 9 weeks or 63 days - an average of 200 km per week, to 30 km per day. The increased pace of the offensive was due to the absence of organized resistance of the Red Army and a sharp decrease in population density.

From now on, the Wehrmacht was supposed to gain a foothold in the conquered territories and begin preparations for the 1942 campaign of the year. The European territory of the USSR was divided into four formations - the Baltic states, Ukraine, Russia and the Caucasus. 9 security divisions and two army groups, North with headquarters in Moscow (27 divisions) and South in Kharkov (29 divisions), were allocated for their occupation. In the Army Group North, the Baltic states were allocated 8 front, to Western Russia (central Russian industrial region and the Northern Volga region) 7 front, 3 etc., 1 md and Italian corps, to Eastern Russia (Southern and Northern Urals) - 2 front, 4 td, 2 md, one Finnish connection. In the Army Group “South”, 7 PD, one by one Slovak and Romanian formation, Eastern Ukraine (Don, Donbass and Southern Volga) 6 DD, 3 td, 2 md, 1 cd, one Hungarian connection, the Caucasus (including Kavkaz-Iran group) 4 DD, 3HDX, 2 TD, 1 md and Spanish building.

In the 1942 campaign of the year, the Wehrmacht remained, capturing Western Siberia and Central Asia, to complete their campaign against the USSR. At the same time from Central Asia, Germany opened a direct road to India. After Japan captured China and Mongolia, the border between the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire could pass along the Yenisei. The naval and air forces of Germany were to resume in full scale the "siege of England." The preparation of the landing in England was to serve a twofold purpose: to bind the forces of the British in the metropolis, and also to cause and complete the emerging disintegration of Great Britain. To seize Egypt from Libya, two tank divisions, Palestine and Iraq from Bulgaria and Turkey — 14 divisions (5 front, 3 gd, 4 etc., 2 md) still stood out, and for the attack on Iran and Iraq from Transcaucasia as part of the occupying forces The Caucasus was formed the group "Caucasus-Iran" as part of 2 gds, 2 etc. and 1 md.

63 divisions were assigned to the occupation of Western Europe - 11 to Norway, 1 - to Denmark, 2 - to Holland, 43 - to France, to capture Gibraltar and transfer to Spanish Morocco to protect the strait, and, if possible, to seize the Atlantic islands, 6 - to Balkans. "The defense of the Atlantic coast of North and West Africa, the seizure of British possessions in West Africa and the territory controlled by de Gaulle, is given to the French, who will receive the necessary reinforcements during the development of military operations" (Directive No. 32. Preparations for the period after the plan of Operation Barbarossa) ). In reserve, OKH remained 31 division.

The Soviet plan to counter the aggression of Nazi Germany was based on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies from 15 in May 1941, plans to cover the border with border military districts, orders to create anti-tank artillery brigades (PTR) and airborne corps , the offices of the 13, 23, 27, 19, 20, 21, and 22 armies, the proposal of G.K. Zhukov about the beginning of the construction of fortified areas on the border with Hungary and the rear line of Ostashkov - Pochep, an order to create an army group of the Russian State Control Committee, and with the beginning of military operations of new armies and divisions.

The military leadership of the Red Army envisaged a strike by the Wehrmacht from East Prussia in the direction of Daugavpils, an attempt to encircle Leningrad with the forces of the Finnish troops and an amphibious assault force landed by the Nazis in Estonia, a concentric attack from Brest and Suvalki on Volkovysk and Baranovichi to encircle the troops of the Western Front, with their subsequent advance on Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow, as well as from Poland to Kiev. The main grouping of the Wehrmacht, the General Staff of the Red Army expected against the troops of the Southwestern Front, whose troops, by virtue of this, surpassed the grouping of the Western Front.

To counteract the designs of Nazi Germany, the Soviet leadership plotted a huge trap for the Wehrmacht. The northern flank from Leningrad to Bialystok and the southern from Izmail to Lvov were reliably covered from deep tank breakthroughs by anti-tank artillery brigades. Two dispersed enemy tank groupings by the Pripyatsky marshes were passed to Orsha and Kiev, where they were guaranteed to be destroyed by concentric strikes of the RGK armies from Polotsk and Mogilyov to Minsk, as well as Chernigov and Cherkassy to Zhytomyr.

Combining the shock groups of the Western and Southwestern fronts near Warsaw, the Soviet command surrounded the troops of the German Army Group Center and South with their utterly extended communications. With the subsequent advancement of the Soviet troops to the Baltic coast, the remaining troops of Army Group North would be surrounded. For the liberation of the European countries enslaved by the Nazis, the formation of new armies with fresh rifle and cavalry divisions, in the capital of which one after another Soviet landing corps would be landed, was coming to an end. At the sight of the lightning defeat of Germany, its satellites would hastily disassociate themselves from the Nazis (see the 1 scheme).

What happened during the real clash of two opposing armies? In early June 1941, the weaker Army Group South was unable to cope with the stronger Southwestern Front. The 1 Panzer Group, which had failed to break the resistance of the 1 anti-tank artillery brigade and numerous Soviet mechanized corps in a grand tank battle near Rovno, Lutsk and Brody, was stopped at the distant approaches to Kiev. By this time in the north, the more successful 4 tank group had already captured Pskov.

However, the most dramatic situation developed in the defense zone of the Western Front. The 3-I tank group, having easily passed the Vilnius 7 and 8 pabr for the protection from it under Lida and Grodno, reached Minsk at the end of June (see the 3 scheme). Joining here with the 2 tank group, it was completely unexpected for the Soviet command, surrounded by troops of the Western Front. After receiving information about the environment of the Soviet troops near Minsk, Stalin personally went to the Defense Commissariat to ascertain the situation at the front.

Convinced of the imminent and inevitable catastrophe of the Western Front, as well as the complete failure of the Soviet plan and the absence of the slightest prospect of its realization, Stalin brought Zhukov to tears. Being tormented by vague doubts about the fate of the country he leads and his personal fate, in an extremely depressed state, he left the capital and went to his nearest summer cottage. According to Mikoyan’s testimony, “when they came out of the Commissariat, he said this phrase:“ Lenin left us a great legacy, and we, his heirs, all this asking ... Ali ... ”We were amazed by this statement of Stalin. It turns out that everything is irretrievably lost? ”(A. Mikoyan. So it was).

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Soviet troops were concentrated west of the Western Dvina-Dnieper line and south of the Pripyat marshes. Due to this circumstance, the defeat of the Western Front did not justify the hopes of the Wehrmacht command, which faced Smolensk with the new Western Front restored at the expense of the RGC armies (see the 2 scheme). Having torn off the lightning-quick defeat of the main forces of the Red Army by the Wehrmacht, the USSR not only was able to continue its struggle against the Nazis, but also acquired such powerful allies as England and America. In connection with the failure of the prewar plan of defeating Germany, the Soviet Union began implementing measures aimed at a long standoff with Nazi Germany.

With the filing of his associates, Stalin returned to ruling the country at the head of the State Defense Committee, which absorbed all the power in the country and unified the functions of the government, the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the party. The formation of the partisan movement, the party underground and the sabotage war began in the occupied areas. From east to west of the country, echelons with evacuated enterprises and specialists were pulled, destined to restore the defense industry in the rear areas of the country. The formation of more and more new divisions and volunteer formations began. All material and human resources of the country of the Soviets were mobilized. For the Soviet people, the war became truly Great and Patriotic.

After suppressing 1941 in August instead of taking Moscow, the resistance of the Soviet troops near Smolensk, in September, the Wehrmacht, instead of advancing deep into the territory of the USSR, was forced to deal with the Soviet troops near Kiev. The schedule of the Wehrmacht offensive and the entry of Japan into the war against the USSR in the Far East and Siberia was thwarted. In view of Japan’s indifference to the west, the transfer of troops from Siberia and the Far East began from the east. In order to persuade Japan, frozen in indecision, to its side, and that instead of the USSR it had already set out to attack the United States, the German command decided to take Moscow in the deep autumn of the 1941 year.

But here in the path of the Wehrmacht, newly-created Soviet divisions set up for a victorious march through Europe got up. Having destroyed one part near Vyazma in the fall, and the other thoroughly patting near Bryansk, in the winter near Moscow the Wehrmacht encountered Siberian and Far Eastern divisions, which not only defended the Soviet capital, but also threw the enemy far to the west. Japan’s entry into the war against the United States predetermined the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, now acting separately, uncoordinated and disconnected - victoriously ending the war now Germany had to Vladivostok and Japan in Washington, which was completely unrealistic for them beyond their strength and capabilities.

Germany’s attempt in 1942 to capture the Caucasus and stall Soviet industry by cutting off the transportation of Transcaucasian oil on the Volga ended in a crushing defeat for the Nazis and their satellites near Stalingrad. The failure of the German offensive near Kursk in the summer of 1943 marked a radical change in the war. In 1944, the Soviet army began the liberation of Nazi territory occupied by the Nazis, and the Western allies, after the defeat of Germany became obvious, belatedly opened a second front in France. After the defeat in the spring of 1945 of Nazi Germany, it was the turn of militaristic Japan, which, after the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in China by the Red Army and the American as radioactive ashes, aviation Hiroshima and Nagasaki on September 2 accepted the terms of unconditional surrender.

It must be recognized that both the Soviet and Nazi plans for the 1941 campaign of the year remained unfulfilled. As a result, in the 1941 year, as the Wehrmacht in Siberia did not meet with Japanese troops, the Soviet Union did not liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke. The main reasons for disrupting Germany’s plan were the underestimation of the Soviet people’s determination to defend their freedom and independence, the error in determining the location of the main forces of the Red Army regarding the Western Dvina-Dnieper rivers and the Pripyat swamps, as well as linking Japan’s war on the Nazi side with the successes of the Wehrmacht Eastern front.

The main reasons for disrupting the implementation of the plan for the USSR should be considered the erroneous assumption of placing the main forces of the Wehrmacht as part of Army Group South, incorrect determination of the depth of the concentric strikes of the 2 and 3 tank groups of the Army Group Center for surrounding the Western Front troops in general and the direction of the strike of the 3-th tank group in particular. The strengths of the Soviet plan include the stationing of armies of the RGCs west of the Dnieper and the planned formation of a large number of divisions with the start of hostilities, which led to a two-fold restoration of the Western Front, a breakdown in the Wehrmacht offensive and Japan’s refusal to attack the USSR

Thus, despite the seemingly crushing defeat of the Red Army and the occupation of a large part of the USSR in 1941, the positions of the Soviet Union in the long run were more stable than that of Germany. Unable to embody his regular blitz, Hitler ran into a strong adversary motivated for a long time with powerful allies. While his ally in Japan, instead of helping Germany defeat the USSR, attacked America, which he strengthened not so much as weakened Germany. We can say that in the 1941 year, Germany, having won in tactics, lost in strategy, while the USSR lost in tactics and won in strategy. Ultimately, having won the 1941 campaign of the year, Nazi Germany naturally lost the Great Patriotic War to the Soviet Union.

1 schema. The actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the May plans to cover the border of the border military districts 1941 of the year and the task set in June 1941 to the group of reserve armies. Reconstruction of the author. Source: Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part of 2. Plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // https://topwar.ru/38092-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-2-plan-razgroma-vermahta-na-territorii-sssr.html

2 schema. Fighting in the West direction from June 22 to July 9 1941. Source: Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part of 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // https://topwar.ru/38337-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-3-krah-plana-razgroma-vermahta-na-territorii-sss .html

.
3 schema. Expected by the Soviet command and the real direction of attack 3-y tank group. Source: Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part of 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR. Ibid

Comments

[Mordvin 3]

Germany won the campaign in the 41 year? Nonsense. They did not achieve their goals.

[vladimirZ]

The Soviet plan to counter the aggression of Nazi Germany was based on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies of May 15, 1941, plans to cover the border with the border military districts, orders for the creation of anti-tank artillery brigades (ptabr) and airborne assault corps , directorates of the 13th, 23rd, 27th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies - from article

Frankly weak article, compiled from a common historical material.
Well, the above quote from the article already speaks of the almost ignorance of historical material by the author.
In 1941, the Soviet command was guided not by the "plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces" of May 15, 1941 (no development was signed by Major General A. Vasilevsky for that period), but by the Strategic Defense Plan (Considerations) of September 18, 1940, signed I.V. Stalin, which provided for active strategic defense at the first stage of the outbreak of the war - the period of mobilization of the main forces of the Red Army.

[To be or not to be]

vladimirZ Today, 07:40 ↑ "Frankly weak article, compiled from general historical material."
One article does not master such a topic ..

And even without considering the outcome of the strategic game of the Red Army’s high command held in 1940–1941, it’s impossible to talk about the parties’ plans
"The course of the game was reported by the Chief of the General Staff, Army General K. A. Meretskov, who, in particular, said:" When developing the Charter, we proceed from the fact that our division is much stronger than the division of the German fascist army and that, in a meeting battle, it certainly break up the German division. In defense, our division will reflect the blow of two or three enemy divisions. In the offensive, one and a half of our divisions will overcome the enemy’s defense. "

It became clear to Stalin that the General Staff allowed a biased assessment of both their troops and their likely adversary [172]. D.G. Pavlov was also biased when at the meeting on December 28, 1940 he proved that we have the right and duty to entrust the tank corps with tasks to destroy one or two tank or four or five enemy infantry divisions. At the same meeting, on January 13, 1941, the speech of the commander of the Belarussian Special Military District, Pavlov, who began by evaluating the past meeting and the games held, was stopped by Stalin, who asked: "What are the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the troops led by you?" D. G. Pavlov tried to get off with a joke, saying that this happens in military games. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the party did not like such a joke, and he remarked:

"The commander of the district’s troops must be proficient in military art, be able to find the right solutions in any conditions, which you didn’t succeed in the game."
http://www.warmech.ru/1941war/sher_6_2.html
https://liewar.ru/nakanune-vojny/289-chto-vsegda-
skryval-o-pre-military-planirovanii-marshal-pobedy
.html

[antivirus]

"THERE'S ONLY THE AWESOME GOOD ..."
in the secret notes of the district military commissars- "no deviators ..." - there was already a future Victory

[VS]

were in May their KSH in GS)))

[ammunition]

Quote: vladimirZ

Frankly weak article, compiled from a common historical material.

Weak And the material is not general historical .. so .. semi-mythical.
-------------------
This topic is so great and deep that in one article it is impossible even to lay out a fair scheme. In the sense, a schematic sketch is impossible. At least a number of articles are needed.
-------------------
For example there is subtopic , a small part of the question. Namely - " The real combat effectiveness of the Hitler and Soviet troops at the time of June 22 1941 "
And a comparison. And analysis.
The fact!! That the Hitler system was exclusively imprisoned for the army. And only to the army. All other issues were subordinate to the main. Or secondary.
Therefore! It is not surprising that the Germans managed to create new and highly effective tactical and technical methods of warfare. Plus, well-developed to the intricacies of the communication system and the interaction of the combat arms and individual units and formations.
--------------
The USSR was initially sharpened for peaceful construction.
Thus ... our army, at the initial stage of the war, was simply weaker tactically.
We exceeded the Germans in the ability to fight, only for the operation Bagration! Bagration is a masterpiece.
----------------
So ... you need to start with an assessment of the combat readiness of the armies. This is percent 20 of the whole question of the Great Patriotic War.
IMHO. -))

[vladimirZ]

It is not surprising that the Germans managed to create new and highly effective tactical and technical methods of warfare. Plus, well-developed to the intricacies of the communication system and the interaction of the combat arms and individual units and formations. - ammunition

I agree with you. The Germans were able, unlike other armies in Europe, including Soviet Union, to create a perfect at that time mechanism of warfare, which can conditionally be called a “military blitzkrieg”, designed to inflict quick defeat on its opponents.
They skated this mechanism in Poland, and then in France, where they inflicted a quick defeat on the allied armies of France and England.
This mechanism was based on concentrated armored strikes dissecting narrow sections of the front and then converging far behind enemy lines, surrounding them.
Moreover, you correctly write "worked out to the finer points, communication systems and interaction of the combat arms and individual units and formations" in these shock armored formations. Everything - communications, self-propelled artillery, motorized infantry, engineering units, aviation, worked for tank shock units, having equal speeds of movement with them.
No one could resist the Germans in a new mechanized war with the outdated tactics of the old positional warfare.
Our Red Army was also preparing for the old tactics of warfare; the experience already lasting of World War II was not worked out in it. The plan (Considerations) of October 1940 was based on principles, including the mobilization period of the Red Army, during which the border troops were to keep the enemy. It is unclear how they imagined it was an "active defense" of understaffed and not timely brought into combat readiness troops.
It took 2 years of a difficult war, millions of dead and captured while the Red Army learned to resist the German troops, first exhaust the strike forces, knock them out, maintain positional defense, and only by the Battle of Kursk did they successfully control and defeat the Wehrmacht's armored strikes.
The Germans lost the war, despite their new tactics of warfare, strategically. Counting on a blitzkrieg at the head of troops throughout Europe, they miscalculated in assessing the potential of the Red Army, in the strength of the spirit of the Soviet people, united by the new socialist system, in the severity of the climate of the upcoming large space of Russia, in the ability of the USSR leadership to conclude a military alliance - a coalition with the United States and England against fascist Germany.

[zenion]

In addition, the author saw Zhukov crying, and Stalin broke a half-box of matches, lighting Herzegovina Flor and went to cry to the cottage. For that reason, apparently in hindsight it was written in the visit journal that Stalin received the people's commissars and military commanders all day, until late at night. But for the author it is more important what Suvorov-Rezun wrote than what is written in these documents.

[GAF]

Quote: vladimirZ

Frankly weak article, compiled from a common historical material.

Chronicler. He laid out geographical maps in front of him and scribbled the borders along the Yenisei, etc., with a goose pen on parchment, imagining himself the commander in chief of the armies of the opposing countries. I would at least read Halder's diaries or something, since I have already outlined the theme of my hard work.

[BAI]

41 years old, despite the defeat near Moscow. - a clear victory for Germany. Failure to plan does not mean defeat. In part, but victory is achieved. But if we consider the global plan of the entire military company as the main goal, then the breakdown of the blitzkrieg is the defeat of Germany.

[yehat]

I want to fix it a little. what defeat near Moscow ??? (not counting a few local episodes where the Germans really were defeated in the rearguard)
collapse of plans - yes, of course. Failures - yes. But near Moscow, the Wehrmacht did not suffer any real defeat! There was a depletion of forces for the offensive, slaughter, exchange of losses, beneficial to the USSR, but not defeat. Do not repeat propaganda cliches!
Moreover, the seriously weakened Wehrmacht troops were able to inflict heavy losses on the Red Army in the winter, trying to counterattack, which nullified all the successes of the autumn.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: yehat

I want to fix it a little. what defeat near Moscow ???

Yes Yes:)))))

Quote: yehat

But near Moscow, the Wehrmacht did not suffer any real defeat!

Of course not. It’s just that Army Group Center, having almost gotten into the encirclement (there was a time when it was supplied with a single railway line), was forced to scoop up from Moscow so that the staff seriously feared that it could not be stopped, and only Hitler’s order step back "stopped it. And so yes, no defeat, only victories

Quote: yehat

Do not repeat propaganda cliches!

So do not repeat, but teach history at your leisure. At least within the school textbook for grades 6-7 of the Soviet school, or when WWII passed there.
Well, if you prefer foreign, I highly recommend Kurt von Tippelskirch's “History of the Second World War”. I guarantee that you will be surprised how much the opinion of the German school textbooks on the battle of Moscow confirms the opinion of the German infantry general, knight of the Knight's Cross, who served (including) as head of the intelligence department of the general headquarters of the German ground forces

[antivirus]

do not offend them

[yehat]

the Germans fell into a drape situation because the replenishment of the units did not come.
the group lost by December 60% of the initial set of tanks, and those that were the majority experienced operational problems, the personnel of the infantry units lost up to two-thirds of the veterans. And even taking into account the newcomers, the kit rarely reached 70% of the original ones (and this is already close to the loss of combat effectiveness). Also, the Germans lost about half of the truck fleet (mainly due to wild diversity, fuel, roads, and other reasons), demoralization, cold (the troops have summer equipment!)
All this led to the fact that the group significantly lost its ability to deliver counterattacks and even defend itself, which led to several crises.
I want to add that this group, thrown back from Moscow, killed about 4 times more troops than it was itself.
Is it a defeat? Rurik drowned a century ago, leading a battle with a bunch of Japanese. Is this a defeat?
I insist that the Wehrmacht did not suffer defeat near Moscow, it was different.
Rather, the Red Army escaped defeat, thanks to the timely organization of defense Zhukov. So the way out is a draw. Like Rzhev, it’s also a draw, and on the southern flank of the Kursk operation I also think it turned out to be a draw. But what is the different price paid for this?

[Igor V]

[quote = yehat] I want to fix it a bit. what defeat near Moscow ??? (not counting a few local episodes where the Germans really were defeated in the rearguard)
collapse of plans - yes, of course. Failures - yes. But near Moscow, the Wehrmacht did not suffer any real defeat! There was a depletion of forces for the offensive, slaughter, exchange of losses, beneficial to the USSR, but not defeat. Do not repeat propaganda cliches!
Moreover, seriously weakened Wehrmacht troops in the winter were able to inflict heavy losses on the Red Army, trying to counterattack, which nullified all the successes of the fall. [/ Quote]
Well, of course, the Germans were a little tired and decided to run west for 200 kilometers, abandoning equipment, wounded and frostbite, so as not to interfere. Some, however, decided to go prisoner. And so, there was no defeat! As Rokossovsky wrote, if there hadn’t been so much snow, then the Germans would have been driven further 200 kilometers.
I would like to ask such commentators: "do you really not know the story, or is there any sense in deliberately distorting the story?" In any case, such comments do not go to VO, you will be considered a stupid person, that’s the whole conversation.

[VS]

"" The Germans were a little tired and decided to run west for 200 kilometers ""

- Well Duc - it was cold - so we decided to keep warm with a little run)))

[Bakht]

Winter of the 41st, near Moscow, a German tankman jumps out of a wrecked German tank and falls into a snowdrift. A minute later he rises and climbs back into the burning tank.

[VS]

and so eight times ...

[novel66]

regulated temperature Oleg

[yehat]

defeat is when Katukov ambushed almost all of Guderian’s tank vanguard near Moscow. A defeat is when the same Katukov, several days later, was forced into the forehead to attack a heightened fortified anti-theft tower and where the remains of his brigade burned down. And when they successfully attacked, they suffered heavy losses (about half), but they inflicted losses several times harder than their own, could not gain a foothold, retreated not far away and gained a foothold - this is not a defeat.
You can indulge in legal interpretation as much as you like, but neither the Red Army nor the Wehrmacht suffered defeat in the fall of 41 (although both sides were close), only the strategic plan of the German war was defeated, ambitions were defeated, the German Arms Committee was defeated, defeat Konev personally and several other Red Army commanders, including Pavlov, personally defeated Guderian. The Leningrad Defense Committee was defeated. Leningrad was not taken, but the environment was also a disaster. This is where the real defeat is.
I would like you to finally understand how strong the enemy was the 70. Wehrmacht divisions that started this war. About a third of them did not survive until the new year, and do not underestimate the feat of the Russian soldiers who fought with them.
And these stupid statements “200 km ran means defeat”, etc. don't say better.
About Rokosovsky generally sur. Everyone understands that the Germans fought better in the summer. And Moscow would not have been kept if the July weather dragged on until October, because at critical moments everything was decided by hours and companies, not days and divisions.

[zenion]

It is necessary to justify Bavarian beer and help the Germans a little. The word Victory is the signing of the surrender of one of the parties and the inability to conduct hostilities. These defenders of Germany, do not want to read the generals of the Wehrmacht, how can we trust what was under Stalin, the generals of the Red Army.

[zenion]

But, when the Germans were thrown back near Moscow, then the people of the USSR and the Red Army appeared what the Nazi Nazis did and this made them kill the Germans. Not to die, but to force the Germans to be killed, "to spite Stalin." The people made a regrouping, forced to invent new weapons and generally create evacuation plans and everything that the Americans and current lovers of Bavarian beer write about.

[yehat]

Germany did not win the company, but the Wehrmacht achieved all the main combat missions in 41 years.

[Bashibuzuk]

As for the cliche, here the opponents got excited.
The Wehrmacht was about to march along Red Square in September-October, approximately. With the subsequent transformation of the area into the sea. Not performed. This is victory? Or how? So ... the cliche should be careful.
Our troops campaign of 1941 about .... with an ending or. The battle of Moscow was won.
The German troops did not carry out the 1941 campaign. The battle of Moscow - .... with an ending, or.
Well, in general, we can say that both countries, both armies - flawed the plans for 1941 with a bang.
For the German mentality, this is a defeat.
Russian mentality - in parallel. We also failed in 1942, with greater success than even 1941.
And we won the final victory.
We proceed from this.

[yehat]

Pyrrhic victory was won.
the country was recovering to the level of 38 years and 15 years.

[Bashibuzuk]

And we do not evaluate the results of the victory, and indeed the victory itself.
We look - won or not.
We won. Fascist Germany - lost.
And she was Pyrrova. The victory of either Hannibalov or Aleksandrov or Stalin - again, to the Russian mentality - in parallel.
Interested in - TOTAL. But not a process.

[antivirus]

yes, the price is high, BUT PURCHASES IS ENOUGH FOR TEACHING ALL TO 7 THEN 10 CLASSES AND EXIT TO SPACE
you can watch the number of gyms in schools and felt boots + quilted jackets / per capita in 50 g
ALREADY ALREADY ONE !!!! PHYSICIST!!!!! ON THE BREAKDOWN OF FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCE ---
"A GERMANY LOST SCHOOLS OF PHYSICS" ---
the result of the war in the last line

[To be or not to be]

Quote: yehat

Pyrrhic victory was won.
the country was recovering to the level of 38 years and 15 years.

A military victory was won. The fascist coalition led by Nazi Germany was defeated. Red flag over Reistag
Political Victory !! The Soviet system survived. The Union of Peoples of the USSR showed its unity. The socialist economic system survived and surpassed the system of the capitalist West working on the 3rd Reich
As a result of the Victory, a number of European countries embarked on the socialist path of development. And formed in response to the NATO-Warsaw Treaty.
There were no wars in Europe until 1991

[Rey_ka]

Is the atomic bomb in 1949 the 38th level? Space at 61 level of the 39th ??

[zenion]

yehat. Of course, it was necessary to surrender, so that Russia would not be there and there would be no Russians, but only those who would like to serve the enemies, for the time being, would remain.

[yehat]

what the hell )))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: yehat

Germany did not win the company, but the Wehrmacht achieved all the main combat missions in 41 years.

It will be said more precisely, did not achieve a single one.

[Bakht]

It's good that they wrote "combat"
But even this does not improve what is written. The main combat mission of the Wehrmacht was to weaken the combat effectiveness of the Red Army and defeat it. Not performed. The main political task is to destroy the USSR. Not performed.
At the tactical and operational level, they decided something. But not the main ones.
In fact, the British say that "the Germans win all the battles except the last. With the last they lose the war"

[zenion]

What combat missions did they complete? Cross the border to die, how did the army of Napoleon die?

[andrewkor]

In my opinion, the funeral bells of the Barbaross plan sounded during the Battle of England (to a small extent) and in the Balkan company (especially)!

[yehat]

the battle for England was very strange. almost half of the regular army of the Britons was released in Dunkirk, which sharply complicated the prospects of the landing, the “battle” itself was in the air and its purpose was only intimidation. In reality, only submarines seriously threatened England. Preparations for the crossing in the lamb were, but stopped. So the "battle for England" is not an indicator. And in the Balkans, the Wehrmacht was effective. I don’t see any calls here.
the calls were of a different kind — sheer passivity in not resolving the problems of the Western Front, the inability of Italy and Japan to support Germany on time.
Hitler's particular disappointment is Italy. To a small extent, its regular failures affected the collapse of the Reich. Another call - Spain did not give access to the British base in the strait into the Mediterranean Sea. Guderian’s cut report on the state of the USSR tank forces (according to the report, it was shown to be 2 times less than what was actually predicted and 4 times less than what was actually) —that kind of calls there were!

[nivander]

mdya --- that on the border of the USSR from Germany and her allies are guarded by 14,7,23,8,11.10,3,4,5,6,, 26,12 of the army of the first echelon, the author clearly forgetting, or maybe did not The article is a clear reprint of the Czech "Hanichka" with a colorful Czech vidin

[Anyone]

Quote: BAI

41 years old, despite the defeat near Moscow. - a clear victory for Germany. Failure to plan does not mean defeat. In part, but victory is achieved. But if we consider the global plan of the entire military company as the main goal, then the breakdown of the blitzkrieg is the defeat of Germany.

The breakdown of Blitzkrieg - this was, so to speak, a delayed defeat of Germany. As for the significant losses in manpower, equipment and territories of the first six months of the war, this is natural. The defense (in the manner in which it was implemented along the entire length of Germany’s possible offensive) could not fend off the attacks. Similarly, in 1945, like a knife through oil, we passed the defenses of the Kwantung Army. Very motivated, by the way, even taking into account the position of the Japanese in the metropolis.

[yehat]

the article is pseudo-truthful, completely inconsistent in detail with reality.
even Stalin’s quote is not documented in any way. But given for persuasiveness.
Evaluation of the battles under Exactly false. Pavlov’s assessment is false.

Suppressing in August 1941, instead of capturing Moscow, the resistance of Soviet troops near Smolensk, in September the Wehrmacht, instead of advancing deep into the territory of the USSR, was forced to crack down on Soviet troops near Kiev

There is a historical fact of the Kiev operation, how deceitfully the conditions for its implementation are described!

But here on the way of the Wehrmacht stood the newly made Soviet divisions created for the victorious march in Europe

and again a lie!
I don’t even want to continue further - It seems that the article was published not on documents, and not even on Wikipedia, but based on shameful little books like an icebreaker, a set of sick fantasies.
I want to add also a completely delusional description of the goals that Japan and Germany set for themselves in the war. The Germans NEVER planned to move to Vladivostok. The Japanese never planned to take Washington.
And the author of the article did not even consider it necessary to announce the officially announced goals for these countries to enter the war,
not to mention strategic motives.
It’s a pity that you can’t put the minuses now. I would put a fat minus in this article, consisting of a bunch of forgeries and juggles!

[yehat]

I want to write my vision about the causes of the defeats of the Red Army in 41 years.
the main reason is the poor controllability of the army in all aspects. From communication technologies and lack of equipment, to the experience of personnel and lack of education. This manifested itself in many directions - inaccurate information about the condition of the troops, an incorrect assessment of the needs of the army, an incorrect assessment of real combat effectiveness, based on this, unrealistic plans and orders for industry, etc.
because of this, formally numerous and even staffed with a large number of units of military equipment, in reality, the army was several times inferior in combat effectiveness to the German army, even high moral training did not help. I would like to remind you that even the Germans were far from as rosy as it seemed to many.
They also had enough problems, but they were solved due to more trained personnel.
I would like to recall the memories of a signalman in the early days of the war, who told how his company, which was in the fortifications (there was even a pillbox), attacked only 1 German platoon and powerlessness, with which he observed that they could do nothing and lose the battle.

[ammunition]

Quote: yehat

the main reason is the poor controllability of the army in all aspects. From communication technologies and lack of equipment, to the experience of personnel and lack of education. This manifested itself in many directions - inaccurate information about the condition of the troops, an incorrect assessment of the needs of the army, an incorrect assessment of real combat effectiveness, based on this, unrealistic plans and orders for industry, etc.

It was. For objective reasons. But only with this the disaster of the 41 year cannot be explained.

Quote: yehat

the army was at times inferior in combat effectiveness to the German army,

Not! Not at times. But inferior in a noticeable way.
Another cause of the disaster is At least sabotage of some generals and officers.
The conviction of the German command that the USSR was a “colossus with feet of clay” was not sucked out of their fingers. There were some actual reasons to think so. Another thing is that they overestimated the "opposition" in the army and the people.

[yehat]

the reasons for this are Finnish winter conflict. There it was clear that the Red Army had big problems.
What is curious, the scenario of disgusting leadership, as in the Finnish conflict, was repeated by Mehlis during the defense in Crimea.

[zenion]

Mehlis was not a commander!

[yehat]

No! Not at times

exactly what at times. mainly due to tactics, the command and control system of the troops, the training of INDEPENDENT initiative officers, and the much larger army support forces.

for example, take aviation. At the beginning of the war, the individual skills of our pilots were not bad, there were many competent navigators.
But, there were problems a large fleet of outdated aircraft, there were few sane radio stations, coordination from the ground was often near zero, ground support, warning and reconnaissance services were absent, specialized intelligence officers were not enough, airdrome services were staffed minimally with personnel and equipment, infrastructure, spare parts and instructions service - could not service a large number of departures.
All this led to the fact that very often ours in the sky were in the minority, possessing an overwhelming number on earth. And accordingly, suffered losses that differ significantly.
it is a fact!

[VS]

The main reasons are TWO.
1st — wrong planning in case of war. While waiting for the main forces of the Germans north of woodland - ours decided to attack, in the ANSWER, anyway, in another place - from KOVO. our main forces ...
As Tymoshenko himself said, they chose an unsuccessful scenario for entering the war.
2nd - disruption of the execution of orders of the General Staff in the districts in the pre-war days ..
The remaining reasons - there are many of them - and the general unwillingness of the army to fight this year due to unfinished reforms, etc. - secondary though important too. But they - exacerbated the first two reasons.

[yehat]

blame for the choice of plans does not make sense - the Germans brilliantly prepared for the start of the war, and the initial data of the Red Army general staff did not give an objective picture. For example, the combat readiness of the tank fleet in the border mechanized corps was overstated by at least 40%.
Due to the rampant low literacy of the commanders, many of the initial details of the plan were distorted and, as a result, gave a serious bias away from the facts.
Finally, I will give 1 fact - in the winter of 40-41. only 10% of the Red Army commanders could fulfill the order to move the units, guided by the map. Traffic on the terrain was carried out three times slower than even outdated standards. What controllability can we talk about here?

[VS]

it's all - the "general unavailability" of the Red Army)))

And the unreasonable plans for the event of war - the idiotic and adventurous deployment of our troops in which we had to attack the "non-main" enemy forces in the south immediately after the German attack while he rushing his main north of woodland - this is the main reason .. And stupid reluctance to take into account the realities of the army - this is - a criminal adventure ..
Ie - there is a main reason - the stupidity of the plans themselves, which were messed up and betrayed, including on the ground ..

[yehat]

yes there was no reluctance. Prepared in earnest.
The problem was different. The mechanized corps on the marches lost 2/3 of their composition, in battle most of their tanks didn’t penetrate far from the thick frontal armor of German tanks, coordination of actions ate the battle was weak, support forces (artillery, infantry) practically did not help. The dimensions of the hulls made them slow and difficult to supply. I estimate their real strength as 1/5 of what was planned. And this was the main striking force in the Western Military District, which was constantly supervised by the high command. Such a monstrous failure to evaluate - this is the reason for the defeats in 41 years. I would like to recall that the Red Army gained experience in Spain, Finland, Mongolia, maneuvering in Poland, 2 major exercises, but this experience almost did not make it into the army. Soviet military advisers were present in Germany and saw their teachings and training, as well as Soviet agents saw the war in Ethiopia. But many of the officers involved in the battles were rotten.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

I would like to recall that the Red Army gained experience in Spain, Finland, Mongolia, maneuvering in Poland, 2 major exercises, but this experience almost did not make it into the army.

You apparently have no idea what forces and means participated in those conflicts, but only those who cannot compare the total strength of the Red Army and what it had to deal with on June 22nd can seriously talk about the experience that commanders and personnel received.

[yehat]

you are apparently too impudent, since you can confidently talk about what I have an idea.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

you are apparently too arrogant

There is nothing to be impudent here, but there is data, for example, according to Khalkin-Gol, that there was a grouping of 57 thousand military personnel, i.e. one and a half hulls by force. Well, and what experience in front-line operations (I’m not even talking about strategic operations) could the Red Army commanders participating in those battles get? Tell me if you know ...

[VS]

about zagnobili the best - not a ride))) It would have rolled 20 years ago or even 210 but not today)))

MK marches - this is - the result of improper deployment of troops. When in the end they did not go to Lublin from KOVO but started chasing after the tanks of the Germans who were not there))) As Vlasov told his subordinates - we rush along the border = front - so that the Germans give the impression that we have a lot of tanks ..... we scare them like (((

[zenion]

You quote Rezun-Suvorov in some places, and Mark Solonin in some places. From there is your historical knowledge.

[VS]

If you tell me, then I have enough of my "knowledge"))) but for rezunov and corned beef my "knowledge" is just like a sickle in one place)))

[yehat]

Yes, what a sabotage! The officers did not have very bad life in the army at that time, they were really happy!
Violation of discipline, frankly not fulfilling one’s duties, stupid resting on laurels without self-training, theft - this is all your sabotage. And Pavlov is a vivid example of this.
Of the entire troop band on the western front, only one division used artillery in the early days of the war. In my opinion, this fact is enough to describe what is happening.

[VS]

one fact EVERYTHING to “explain” is difficult))) And it’s not worth it to explain EVERYTHING in one piece)))
Believe me - for 10 years of picking on the topic, while not specifically focusing on "betrayal", too many facts have been drawn that simply can not be explained as a mess)))

Here's a fact for you - in TWO different districts, in the GAP and KAP, generals of the level of deputy commanders of the district on ONE day - June 19, give commands - to remove all optics and send it urgently for verification to the district workshop - to Riga and Minsk))) AS you can explain this fact - a mess ??))

People who do not know the "nuances" of optics in artillery - immediately carry nonsense - a planned check it is so planned !!)))

[yehat]

what a coincidence, and on January 1, 40, both of these suspicious types celebrated the New Year without saying a word. The drop in fighting efficiency was simply disastrous. Why not sabotage

[VS]

if you lower bg intentionally - that’s sabotage (((

[VS]

that is, you do not know that in artillery they do not carry optics to district workshops AT ALL))))

[yehat]

do not measure people on your own
and no need to judge, thinking that what you came up with is the only option.

[VS]

I do not understand - what are you talking about?))

I gave you an example with sights which in TWO DIFFERENT districts - were seized on the oral instructions of generals at the level of the deputy commander of the district and asked your opinion - this is a mess - ONE day - in the corps and howitzer regiments - June 19, in those days when border guards divisions ??))

Alas - optics in the artillery DO NOT take them to district workshops for verification)) This is not the pressure gauges in the boiler room))) So - an attempt to remove the sights and all other optics to the heap in the KAP and GAP is not a mess, namely the fact of treason)) )

[yehat]

uh, oral instructions? then there is no documentary evidence :)
then what are we talking about?
maybe, according to oral orders, they still forced to attack Mars, and not to the west?

[VS]

Well, it began ...))

Right now, you’re just like some kind of rezun ...))

If these orders are written in memoirs or diaries of eyewitnesses, then this is WRITTEN evidence. In the GAP near Brest, the sights were taken to Minsk ..

[zenion]

yehat January 17, 2018 12:55 a.m. But you forgot to write that there were a lot of spring boots that the soldiers of the Red Army had to put on when marching to Europe. It is surprising that the Germans did not capture these boots. It can be seen that Soviet boots did not fit on German legs and the Germans were sick of one look. You resemble the Austrian soldier who went on the attack, and towards him a huge Russian warrior with a large snot from his nose. At the sight of this snot the Austrian vomited, he threw the rifle and ran to the medical unit and got into the cholera hut. Why are you trying to justify the Germans what is behind this, except that you want to write your point of view, in contrast to everything that has already been written by historians and the military. You write with the words of US preachers how they see the war in Russia.

[yehat]

nonsense again. what for excuses Germans?
the Reich was an openly predatory and cannibalistic state.
OK, Untermensch, read how they spread their type of Aryan

[32363]

The Soviet plan of the defeat of Germany and the liberation of Europe in 1941 is undeservedly forgotten oblivion.

more details about this plan, in the early days of the war, the Germans seized the prisoners of war from Russian-German translators.

[yehat]

translators appeared during the operation of the division of Poland to solve delineation issues. I recall that at that time cooperation was established at the level of the local army leadership. This was not in any way connected with the attack on Germany.
finally, I remind you that the USSR and Germany had extensive contacts - for example, tank and aviation schools, inspection of the latest weapons, the construction of a German aircraft factory in Moscow, etc. It would be very strange NOT to find German translators.

[32363]

Quote: yehat

translators appeared during the operation of the division of Poland to solve delineation issues. I recall that at that time cooperation was established at the level of the local army leadership. This was not in any way connected with the attack on Germany.
finally, I remind you that the USSR and Germany had extensive contacts - for example, tank and aviation schools, inspection of the latest weapons, the construction of a German aircraft factory in Moscow, etc. It would be very strange NOT to find German translators.

it’s one thing to find a translator from a militia near Moscow, and another to soldiers (not border guards) at the border.

[yehat]

border guards should not have German translators ???

[ccsr]

Quote: 32363

it’s one thing to find a translator from a militia near Moscow, and another to soldiers (not border guards) at the border.

In fact, in the intelligence departments of the border districts, these were regular posts for officers. Yes, and in intelligence posts, translators have always existed, so finding a translator in the border region is not such a problem.

[VS]

not translators but - phrasebooks this is called. In the Red Army there were many phrasebooks - in all languages ​​- with ALL countries neighbors))) And because. war with Germany was most likely in the moment that the German-Russian was more available)))

[Nehist]

How much can this fake about Stalin’s self-elimination write something? There is a journal of visits, it is in the public domain. Who when and how much visited Stalin. A messy article, all in a bunch and facts and conjectures. And then you really need to start with the Fritz Plan developed by General Marx. As well as the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg. For they were the material on the basis of which F. Paulus created the final version known as Directive 21 Barbarossa

[Lexus]

Now it’s easy to reason and condemn.

[yehat]

it’s better to reason than silently swallow propaganda from textbooks or from books ala icebreaker.
For many years I studied a variety of materials in order to approximately understand what was happening in the 41st. for example, when in July-August our bombers flew without cover to bomb the Germans, where the majority died, at least 70 elite fighter pilots from the Leningrad air defense system (each of whom could shoot 30-40 aircraft per war) were sitting on the ground, because that they forgot about them during the redeployment and they traveled to the existing airfields for a long time, and then they waited a long time for the arrival of the cars, and after all there were quite a few and 16, which were several thousand (this is from their own memoir). And then you hear stories about weak aviation and untrained pilots. Not aviation was weak. About the same with tanks.

[Nemesis]

The Germans reached Moscow because there was a coward in the Kremlin who did not dare to strike first ... Yes, the USSR was not ready for war and we would have to retreat, but not to Moscow .... Perhaps to Kiev, or Smolensk, but not to Moscow ... A sudden strike of the entire bomber aviation of the USSR somewhere on June 20, 1941 could completely confuse the Germans with all the maps and inflict tangible damage ... It should have been bombed 1) Railway junctions and airfields 2) Fuel and lubricant depots and ammunition depots 3) Food depots and places of accumulation of tank units ... After the Soviet Air Force attacks on these key points, the German troops, if they had not completely lost their ability to attack, would surely have significantly lost their penetration ability

[To be or not to be]

Nemesis "The Germans reached Moscow because there was a coward in the Kremlin"
Cowards in the Kremlin did not sit in those terrible times
Read the congresses of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks beginning with the 15th congress. And especially the political reports of the Central Committee ... this was already said in 1927
"XV CONGRESS OF THE CPSU (B.)

2-19 December 1927

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
December 3, THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE USSR "
http://www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/10-13.html
1. Strengthening interventionist tendencies in the imperialist camp and the threat of war (in relation to the USSR) is one of the main factors in the current situation.
2. The stabilization of capitalism is becoming more and more rotten and unstable.
At the 16th Congress, the POLITICAL REPORT of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE XVI CONGRESS OF THE CPSU (B.)
June 27, 1930 “Now there is an economic crisis in almost all industrialized capitalist countries. Now there is an agricultural crisis in all agrarian countries. Instead of“ prosperity ”, poverty of the masses and a tremendous increase in unemployment. Instead of agricultural growth, the ruin of millions of peasants. Illusions are crumbling. about the omnipotence of capitalism in general, the omnipotence of North American capitalism in particular. Winning songs in honor of the dollar and capitalist rationalization are getting weaker. Pessimistic howls about the "mistakes" of capitalism are getting stronger. And the "universal" noise about the "imminent death" of the USSR is giving way to the "universal" evil hissing about the need to punish "this country," which dares to develop its economy when a crisis reigns around. "
XVII Congress of the CPSU (B.)

January 26 - February 10, 1934

Verbatim report First meeting (January 26, 1934, evening).
1. The case is clearly heading towards a new war ... fascism has now become the most fashionable commodity among militant bourgeois politicians. I am talking not only about fascism in general, but primarily about fascism of the German type, which is incorrectly called National Socialism, because with the most careful examination it is impossible to find even an atom of socialism in it
2. Finally, the fourth think that the war should be organized against the USSR. They are thinking of breaking up the USSR, dividing its territory and making profit at its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that only some military circles in Japan think so. We know that the same plans are hatched in the circles of political leaders of some European countries.
http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/1934vkpb17/1_2_1.php
You read everything as if today ..

[wax]

“Bomb” with an unreadable result and meet with the alliance of all capital countries against the USSR. It is good that Stalin looked strategically, therefore the USSR secured peace for 50 years ahead, as Stalin said, and confidently strove for superiority over America, until the top of the CPSU wavered

[Nemesis]

You write nonsense and the saddest thing is that you write it consciously and don’t understand the essence ... Germany has already fought with England, and the United States fought an undeclared war with Germany ... As for Hitler’s allies, the USSR still had to fight with them, only in unfavorable conditions, because of the cowardice of the Kremlin, most of the aircraft of the USSR burned down at airfields, without any benefit, under the blows of the Luftwaffe ...

[To be or not to be]

.. "the commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District, Major General (and later Chief Marshal of Aviation) A. A. Novikov. In his memoirs, he describes in detail the first days of the war and the situation in Leningrad during this period. Novikov emphasized: he fully realized that what happened is not provocation or misunderstanding only after the interrogation of the first captured Ju88 crew from detachment 3 / KGr806, shot down by guns of the 194th anti-aircraft defense regiment on the night of June 24. According to Alexander Alexandrovich, in the person of the crew commander, Lieutenant E. Satorius (E . Satorius) he met "a cruel and merciless enemy, physically and spiritually prepared for a great war," whose icy arrogance made a strong impression "
Was the Kremlin in Leningrad?
.. more here
http://www.solonin.org/article_udar-po-aerodromam
-mifyi-i
http://warspot.ru/2227-22-iyunya-1941-goda-srazhe
nie-za-nebo
http://militera.lib.ru/h/hazanov_db2/06.html
Putin is to blame. we’re going through it now

[Nemesis]

And who appointed this stupid man to command the military district, is it not the Kremlin ?!

[yehat]

Zhukov Novikov directly blamed the encirclement of Leningrad and the death of about a million people - so poorly the man organized the preparation of the city.

[yehat]

front-line airfields were heavily bombed due to commonplace slovenliness. The requirements of the charter on the defense of objects and special orders (such as masking an airfield) were not systematically met. No cover was provided from high-altitude scouts, a system of alternate aerodromes was not set up on time, and aerodrome services were often understaffed.
They received the latest aircraft, but only 40% of the pilots knew how to use them at least somehow, their maintenance was even worse. Etc.

but it's easier to call one person a coward ...

[Nemesis]

During the war in Spain, SB bombers destroyed the heavy cruiser of the Francoists and seriously damaged the German pocket battleship ... Disguise and stuff, of course, are omissions and serious, but the main fault lies with the Kremlin, because it was the Kremlin that did not give the USSR Air Force an order to deliver a preemptive strike , which could and certainly would play a significant role in repelling the Nazi attack on the USSR ..

[VS]

what other preemptive strike should our air force have inflicted on the Germans? Cho are you carrying)))

At the May KSH, the actions of our Air Force were checked - in the event of an attack by Germany. The Germans attacked first but introduced B.G. in advance in the Air Force, the dispersal of regiments and disguise did not allow the Germans to destroy our Air Force, although the Germans exceeded their strength many times))) I understand that after these KSHs, after which, on May 24, Stalin held a meeting with the Air Force of ALL districts - you never heard of go)))

[Nemesis]

He carried Stalin, who did not give a timely order to the army ... A herd of rams led by a lion - lions! Pride of lions led by a ram - rams! And this your Novikov was appointed by Stalin and the company, and not Hitler ...

[VS]

This is Stalin - a ram ??)) Well, well ..)))

[yehat]

There is a video of attacking airfields. shooting from the ME-110 is especially interesting.
at most of our airfields there were no defense measures — there was no camouflage, the planes stood in tight rows.

[VS]

And this despite the fact that the order for increased b ... g was issued on the 18th and orders for camouflage and prohibition of crowded and linear placement - also on the 18th (((

Pavlov at 1.30 on the 22nd sets tasks to Kopts and Tayursky - to raise and disperse the Air Force, to bring in full battlefield. and they answer - the planes are already dispersed and disguised - by order of the NPO (((
Pavlov at 3 o'clock gives EVERYONE an order - to open red packets as well and in the Air Force at the Kopts an order for INCREASED bg. give away AFTER the attack only. Moreover, pilots and cadets are forbidden to engage in combat - to continue flights without paying attention to the Germans ..
Call this mess?

[VS]

a mess it’s not difficult to cover up treason)) .. BUT - on June 21 it began - the canceling of the elevated BG introduced on June 18 by the cops. in the air forces of the districts, the removal of weapons and fuel drain is a mess in your opinion ??)) Moscow EXACTLY did not give commands to THIS - cancel the preparedness of the General Staff readiness No. 2 in the Air Force)))

[ccsr]

Quote: Nemesis

You write stupidity and the saddest thing is that you write it consciously and do not understand the essence ..

Read the report on the results of the Finnish war - then you can understand why Stalin understood the impossibility of starting a large-scale war against Germany, the best army in the world at that time.

[Nemesis]

The one who only defends always loses ... Stalin refused a preemptive strike on Germany with bomber aircraft, and then, having lost the lion's share of the aircraft, drove tanks and infantry into suicide attacks without covering the Air Force ... I don’t see logic or logic in Stalin’s actions .. .

[VS]

А
it was he who drove the troops in the early days that he lost the Air Force or what ??))) Did you hear about the May KSHI? If you knew what kind of KShI they were, you would understand why ALL Air Force commanders were shot in the end - ALL districts except OdVO ..

[Nemesis]

The bad king is always the people and the boyars are to blame. The boyar is appointed by the king himself. If the boyars are bad, then there is no king ... And if the people are guilty, then such a king would roll from Russia ...

[VS]

Yes, you are a strategist)))

[Bakht]

Absolutely crazy article. The author did not even bother to read directive 21. And he writes obvious nonsense

Four weeks were allocated to the Wehrmacht for the defeat of the main forces of the Red Army to the line of the Western Dvina - Dnieper rivers, after which it was supposed to restore operational communication between the Army groups “Center” and “South” in the Gomel region behind the Pripyat swamps.

And here's what the plan really looked like

Thus, the prerequisites will be created to turn powerful parts of the mobile troops north, so that, in cooperation with the northern army group, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction to Leningrad, destroy enemy forces operating in the Baltic. Only after ensuring the fulfillment of this urgent task, which should be followed by the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should operations begin to take Moscow as an important center of communications and military industry.

If the author's turn to the north and the turn to the south are one and the same thing, then there is nothing to discuss.

[ccsr]

Author: Sergey Lebedev writes:

Highlighted undeservedly the oblivious Soviet plan to defeat Germany and liberate Europe in 1941, as well as his role in disrupting the German plan for the rapid defeat of the Red Army and the occupation of the territory of the USSR right up to the Urals.

I would like to know where the author took the details of this plan, or at least references to it in the guiding documents of the 1941 People’s Commissariat of Defense, not to mention other power structures of the USSR at that time.
I think that this “plan” is a figment of the imagination of unscrupulous “historians” like Solonin or Rezun, who have no idea about military planning at that time. It is a pity that such stupidity is disseminated by all and sundry.

[yehat]

no, the plan is not the fruit. He really existed. There were just 28 other defense plans that I know of. And only one was approved and not the one to which the link. And the author of the article does not say a word about this ...

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

no, the plan is not the fruit. He really existed.

If you say so, then take the trouble to give its exact name, date of approval and government decision to develop such a plan. I hope you don’t have to explain that, in addition to military planning, the plan of war with Germany should radically change the annual (five-year) national economic plan of the whole country - so bring here at least the number of the Decree of the Government and the Central Committee to be taken seriously when discussing pre-war planning.

[yehat]

you are confused. not a war plan, but a defense plan. and not the government, but the general staff.
and the government knew only about one thing - the approved plan.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

you are confused. not a war plan, but a defense plan. and not the government, but the general staff.

Well, give the general plan of defense of the USSR developed in the General Staff - not just in words and without telling about 28 plans, but a specific one, approved at the level of the government of the country.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

There were just 28 more defense plans,

Do you yourself believe that there were enough people in the General Staff to create these 28 defense plans? And then, against whom specifically to defend - do not bother to tell, taking into account the length of our borders, starting from Finland and ending with the Far East.

[VS]

28 plans - this is famously)))

[yehat]

plans for a war with Poland, plans for a war with England, plans for Japan, plans for Turkey and Persia, plans for the border with Manchuria and China, plans for Finland, plans for Romania. 28 - not so much.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

plans for a war with Poland, plans for a war with England, plans for Japan, plans for Turkey and Persia, plans for the border with Manchuria and China, plans for Finland, plans for Romania. 28 - not so much.

Can you tell us the details of these GS plans?

[VS]

we actually talk about the war with Germany)))

[ccsr]

In the 1942 campaign, the Wehrmacht remained, capturing Western Siberia and Central Asia, to complete its campaign against the USSR.

This is complete nonsense - Hitler did not even plan this in delirium.

[yehat]

Hitler planned to seize territories to the Urals and move to Persia to India.
About the same as Napoleon planned.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

Hitler planned to seize territories to the Urals and move to Persia to India.

Nobody pulled you by the tongue - give us a document where Hitler set the task to create at least a plan for these conquests. And dreams about this do not bother anyone - with the same success we can say that he dreamed of conquering the United States, as he declared war on them in 1941.

[Bakht]

It did not seem to be up to the Urals. But the movement to Persia and Iraq was directive 32

c) when the preconditions are created for this due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to prepare the operations of the motorized expeditionary force from Transcaucasia against Iraq related to the operations specified in paragraph “b”

[ccsr]

Quote: Bakht

c) when the preconditions are created for this due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, to prepare the operations of the motorized expeditionary force from Transcaucasia against Iraq related to the operations specified in paragraph “b”

This is just an assumption, due to the word "when" - the prerequisites may not appear at all.
It is impossible to build a real plan of action if the results of the implementation of previous military operations are unknown, because it will be profanity.

[Bakht]

Perhaps you are right. But .... did you ask for a document? There is a document. It is quite official, printed in 9 copies, endorsed by the Supreme (i.e. Hitler). Exactly the same as directive 21 (Barbarossa plan).

[ccsr]

Quote: Bakht

There is a document.

Bring his details and link, and deal with the end - then we will see what kind of document it is. By the way, an endorsed document does not mean that it will enter into force without a directive - it just means that the head examined it, but the decision on it can be delayed. It is a common practice to present documents at a high level.

[Bakht]

I said Directive 32. Pans for further operations. Exactly the same was drawn up about directive 21. Everyone knows how this ended
http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/
1011943

[ccsr]

Quote: Bakht

I said Directive 32.

Interestingly, did you even read it to the end and understand what is written in it?
"Directive No. 32" Preparation for the period after the implementation of the plan of operation "Barbarossa"
11.06.1941"
I hope that the meaning of the word “after” should not be transferred to the military, especially since the war with Great Britain is not over?
But the most important thing is this last point:

d) I ask gentlemen of the commanders in accordance with these preliminary designs make plans, think through and conduct appropriate organizational preparation and report back to me in a timely manner so that I can develop the final directives already during the campaign to the East.

I specially translate for those who do not understand the meaning of military directives - Hitler reported in June 1941, when the war with the USSR had not yet begun, about POSSIBLE further actions of the Wehrmacht after the final defeat of the Red Army. And the words "I ask" instead of the word "I order to develop" means that Hitler simply wanted to know the opinion of the military about the capabilities of the Wehrmacht after the end of the war with the USSR. I do not think that in September-October 1941 the German commanders could believe that they would succeed in Hitler's planned campaign to the East and Asia, after the Barbaross plan had failed at the initial stage.

[yehat]

everything is written in mine kampf, there are a bunch of comments from staff officers before the war
the same directive 21 just describes the plans before the Urals.
Goering was given a clear guideline - the actions of aviation to the Urals.
Below is a link to directive 32 on southbound traffic. Everything is.
Lord, yes, any lump in his memoirs writes about all these plans - Guderian, Keselring and others.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

Goering was given a clear guideline - the actions of aviation to the Urals.

The bombardment of enemy rear lines does not mean the ultimate goal of a ground operation - this is the ABC.

Below is a link to directive 32 on southbound traffic. Everything is.

You carefully read it and if you have military knowledge, you will understand what the word "premises" means.

[Bakht]

A bit wrong. The directive 21 plans to the Urals are not spelled out. Even the notorious line AA is not indicated. Directive 21 aimed to defeat the main forces of the Red Army. And forcing the USSR to surrender. Nobody was going to go to the Urals.
Directive 32, by contrast, pointed to possible operations again after the defeat of the USSR and ... most importantly, the collapse of the British defense in the Middle East. Moreover, the main emphasis in directive 32 was placed on Turkey. And the main group was to operate through the territory of Bulgaria and Turkey. Transcaucasia was an auxiliary direction. There is not a word about India at all.

[VS]

"" The Soviet plan to counter the aggression of Nazi Germany was based on the strategic deployment plan of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies of May 15, 1941. ""

- one more reason (((

I just can’t understand - where do they all climb from and climb then?)))

HOW can a draft of the General Staff of which there were SEVERAL for the General Staff is obliged to compose different options in case of a possible war with a potential adversary - to pass off as a document approved by the government ???

"" The main reasons for the failure of the implementation of the plan for the USSR should be considered the erroneous assumption of the deployment of the main Wehrmacht forces as part of the army group "South", ""

- nonsense .. THERE WAS NOT such an assumption))
To the author - the next one, either a rezun or a falsifier, or a lazy person who does not want to read anything other than shabbers - to study the book M.V., classified from 1969 to 1992 Zakharov "On the eve of the great trials" yes - "General Staff on the eve of the war", also the work of the chipboard from the Institute of Military History - "1941 - lessons and conclusions" of the same Baghramyan's memoirs - to understand - who was waiting for what)))) which In general, there were plans - in the General Staff and which were approved by Stalin ...

One pleases the author is not hiding under a network clicker as many rezuns))))

Sincerely, Kozinkin Ol.

[yehat]

there is one more nuance - how the army could manage to implement the plan, signed a month before the war)))

[VS]

the funny thing is that the general withdrawal of troops that began at the end of May and especially in June was on - is tied to maps from mid-May))))

Zhukov began to compose this plan at the end of April)) Right after they signed a neutrality agreement with Tokyo. After which Zhukov, the great strategist, decided - Japan will no longer threaten us with war if we are the first to hit Germany and it is possible to embed it first)) And then he began to compose this plan. - a preemptive strike - “dated May 15”))) Stalin fooled the fools in the head for this very stupidity and explained that Japan, which Zhukov did not mention at all as a probable opponent in the “plan of May 15” - in this case would still be OBLIGATED help Hitler and at least declare war on the Soviet Socialist Republic.))) On May 5-6, Zhukov dropped directives for new infantry regiments - against a preemptive strike plan, but after catching up with Stalin, these oligarchs did not work out in addition to districts - in armies, corps and divisions, new practiced at all. And the new checkpoints sent instead of the beginning of June - by June 20, from the districts to the General Staff - remained there not considered)))
But when the withdrawal of troops by the BCP began in early mid-June, he actually went on the May maps))) to the "plan of May 15"))) (the two-volume by the answers of the commanders had already been released in the fall of 2017 and by the spring the three-volume according to the pre-war plans and to the directives of the General Staff before June 22 - S. Chekunov))))

[Captain45]

Quote: V.S.

Sincerely, Kozinkin Ol.

I apologize, Oleg, are you the author of the books: “Who overslept the beginning of the war”, “The secret of the tragedy of June 22.” “Why didn’t they shoot Zhukov?” I downloaded it on Militere.ru. Very interesting, thanks for the work.

[VS]

Do you want to take off the last two-volume - "The Secret of the tragedy of June 22nd" ??? Let's get the box in PM)))

Now I'm preparing a scribble for Rezun with Solonin just)) There I will show the maximum chronology of June)))

[Net]

Konev once answered the question in the article’s title: “You can't tell the truth, but I don’t want to lie.”
I have a feeling that Stalin and the NKVD are allies of Hitler. At least the first year of the war. Free or not is another question. Stalin was so afraid for his power that he destroyed the entire leadership of the army. Or drove to jail. Instead of professionals, ignoramuses and "Komsomol members" came. When the war began, Hitler supported the NKVD.
Commanders of all levels were waiting for instructions from Comrade Stalin personally. But they were not there. The Germans calmly surrounded and destroyed the units. If the commanders began to fight on their own, then the NKVD officers came and shot the military commanders. Is it because Konev was silent?
When the armchair swayed, Stalin whimpered: “Brothers and sisters, save my power ...” I wonder how many millions of NKV’s Descendants shot (primarily officers) as “deserters” and “spies”, helping the Nazis destroy the personnel? Are there any ratings?

[zenion]

Is it from Bavarian beer?

[VS]

"" If the commanders began to fight on their own, then the NKVD officers came and shot the military commanders. ""

horror))))

[Captain45]

Quote: Net

I have a feeling that Stalin and the NKVD are allies of Hitler. At least the first year of the war.

Ek poked you, sickly

[yehat]

waiting for directives is not what Stalin was waiting for. By the way, not everything was in his power.
they waited so as not to substitute for a sub-game at a lower level.

[Falcon5555]

Achtung-Achtung. This is not a historian, but a delirium generator. He already wrote here in 2014.

[gerkost2012]

What is this parody on a military historical theme? The material was pulled in pieces by various authors, including the trepach Suvorov. Suddenly, for no apparent reason, “Zhukov’s tears”, and what’s the phrase “at the suggestion of his comrades, Stalin took the leadership” ... Yes, it was a difficult time and there was no time for sentiment.
However, this ikspert should know the facts, including the remarkable victory of the Red Army at the end of November (November 17 – December 2) 1941 near Rostov, when under the command of Marshal Tymoshenko the group that didn’t know the defeats of Kleist and the Germans was defeated 28/29 November 1941, they fled from Rostov by more than 120km to the Mius Front position! And then, just a three-hour w / h, there was a counterattack of the Red Army near Moscow! What strategic victory the Germans of the campaign of the 41st can speak of, if after these counterattacks of the Red Army it became clear that they would inevitably lose the war with the Soviet Union!
It is surprising that a serious VO site publishes all this nonsense. Is it for an easy discussion?

[ccsr]

Quote: gerkost2012

It is surprising that a serious VO site publishes all this nonsense. Is it for an easy discussion?

Indeed, all illiterate nonsense is published here, but apparently the income of the resource owners depends on this.

[VS]

"" The bad king is always the people and the boyars are to blame. The boyar is appointed by the king himself. If the boyars are bad, then there is no king ... And if the people are to blame, then such a king would roll from Russia .. ""


- demagogy. ALWAYS around the king, there have always been and will be crap boyars. And the bad king - such boyars all spoiled everything and pumped. In a good one - such boyars regularly get stuck on a stake ..

Ivan the Terrible - WHAT were the boyars? Did he fulfill his task? Performed ..
Did Peter have worthless boyars? There were. Did Peter fulfill his tasks? Fulfilled.

Was Stalin an Opposition? It was. Tried to crap? They tried. OTHER had the boyars? WASN’T He able to save his country and save him from the West? Smog. Boyar planted on a stake, or how hunchback and EBN with them the country of gondonil? He planted ... And quickly enough ... But some managed to spoil anyway ...

[Bayun]

The first to die in a war ... a war plan, both strategic and tactical.

18-20 year old boys can only KILL HEROES against 30-40 year old professionals. This is the root of the misfortune of 1941 for the Red Army.