Soviet occupation plan about. Hokkaido and Japan's post-war projects
The US administration began to develop the issues of occupation of Japan after 10 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Department of Post-War Programs was set up in the State Department under the leadership of Secretary of State Hella. One of the central issues of a rather heated discussion among committee members was the attitude towards the imperial system of government in Japan.
Hot disputes went on for a long time. In May 1944, the committee decided that the imperial system should be preserved, the territory of Japan should not dismember, the Japanese government would independently manage the country. However, this was the opinion of the diplomats. The American military, who strengthened their influence during the war, had their own views on the future occupation policy in Japan.
Soon after Germany’s surrender, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff began to tackle this problem. For the consideration of issues related to the occupation, the so-called "White team" was created. The generals and colonels assigned to this team were concerned not so much with the problems of the future of Japan as with current issues of troop use.
Planning the landing of southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic), and then in March of the following year on the east coast of the main Japanese island of Honshu (Operation Coronet), the developers of these operations proceeded from the likely prospect of losing up to one million American half a million British soldiers and officers.
However, according to the calculations made, after Japan’s capitulation, 23 divisions or 800 thousand people would be required for its occupation. Answering the question whether this is not a lot, members of the White Team cited the following arguments: “Japan’s peculiarity is that even after the central government’s surrender, local resistance in various parts of the country can be continued. There are reports that Japan has been announced mobilization of volunteers, and therefore must be prepared for a worse situation. " Without the participation of the USSR, the war would take a protracted nature and would have stretched 2 of the year! Japanese losses could be up to 10 millions of people.
Although at the beginning of 45, the Allied Command firmly retained the initiative in the Pacific theater of military operations, Japan did not think about ending the war. She launched preparations for repelling the offensive by the US-British troops on the Japanese islands, as well as for defense in Korea and northeastern China, deciding to turn the area into an "impregnable fortress."
The entry into the war of the Soviet Union was beneficial for the United States, England, China and other countries that fought against Japan.
From a military point of view, the allocation of 800 thousand troops for the occupation of Japan hardly created a big problem. The problem was different. After the capitulation of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, public opinion in the United States intensified expectations of the speedy return of American soldiers to their homeland. How will the Americans perceive the continuation of the war?
Taking care of public opinion, President Truman’s inner circle began to speak out in favor of occupying Japan together with allied states. Admiral Leahie believed that the number of American occupying units should be reduced as much as possible and that the United States should not take primary responsibility in governing Japan. It must be assumed that the note “On reducing the participation of the US military in the occupation of Japan and the early demobilization of military personnel” compiled by Lehi reflected Truman’s sentiments.
Having received this note, the headquarters accelerated the development of a plan for the dismemberment of Japan into the occupation zones. Its creators proceeded from the fact that the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines and a number of other countries should participate in the war against Japan, except for the United States. In addition to Britain, which, as the closest ally of the United States, was considered a natural participant in the occupation of Japan, it was also planned to attract China. It was taken into account that Japan, justifying its aggression, led propaganda about the struggle of the yellow race against "white imperialism". The occupation by the Chinese army of part of Japan’s territory would have undermined this propaganda and weakened the “racial character” of the occupation.
The prospect of Soviet participation in the war against Japan created the preconditions for the wide use of Soviet forces for the subsequent occupation of part of the Japanese islands. However, American politicians worried that in this case the Soviet Union would receive greater rights in the management of Japan.
Meanwhile, military considerations forced the American command to insist on the obligatory involvement of the USSR in defeating Japan. US Secretary of War Stimson wrote a memorandum to Truman from 2 on July 1945 d: “Having started the invasion, we will have, in my opinion, to end it with even more fierce battles than those that took place in Germany. As a result, we will suffer huge losses and we will be forced to leave Japan. " Therefore, during the Berlin conference, despite the information received about the successful testing of the atomic bomb in America, Truman emphasized that "the United States expects help from the USSR." In response, Stalin assured that "the Soviet Union will be ready to take action by mid-August and that it will keep its word."
The plans of the Soviet command in the Far East envisaged the conduct of the Manchurian offensive, the South Sakhalin offensive and the Kuril landing operations, as well as the landing of a large landing force on the island of Hokkaido.
The landing operation on this island was to begin from the territory of South Sakhalin after its release.
On August 1945, 87, Stalin confirmed the order to prepare the 1th Rifle Corps for participation in the landing operation on Hokkaido Island. Marshal Vasilevsky, following the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, ordered the commander of the troops of the 2st and XNUMXnd Far Eastern fronts, the Pacific fleet and the Air Force in the Far East to be ready for an operation in Hokkaido by the end of August 23, 1945.
By this time, the leadership of the United States already had a concrete plan for the occupation of the Japanese metropolis by the armed forces of four states - the USA, Great Britain, the USSR and China.
In determining the occupation zones, the Americans proceeded from the fact that the central region of the main Japanese island of Honshu with a developed infrastructure should be controlled by the United States. Kyushu Island was supposed to highlight the UK. The backward agrarian regions of the island of Shikoku were intended for Chinese troops.
The assumed Soviet occupation zone by area even exceeded the American one. The USSR was supposed to deploy its military units not only on the whole island of Hokkaido (the second largest among the Japanese islands), but also to occupy the north-eastern part of Honshu.
However, the possession of the atomic bomb prompted Truman to completely abandon the plan for the allocation for the USSR of the occupation zone on the Japanese islands. Truman admitted in his memoirs: “Although I fervently wanted to involve the USSR in the war with Japan, then, based on the difficult experience of Potsdam, I became firmly convinced not to allow the Soviet Union to take part in governing Japan. In my heart I decided that after defeating Japan, all power in this country will be handed over to General MacArthur. "
Moreover, in the general order No. 15 sent to Stalin by 1 on August of the surrender of the Japanese armed forces, Truman “forgot” to indicate that the Japanese garrisons in the Kuril Islands should surrender to the Soviet troops. This was a signal that Truman might violate the Yalta agreement on the transition of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.
Stalin responded with restraint, but firmly, proposing to make the following amendments to General Order No. 1: "Include all Kuril Islands in the area of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops, which, according to the decision of the three powers in Crimea, should come into the possession of the Soviet Union.
Include in the area of the surrender of the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops the northern half of the island of Hokkaido, adjacent to the La Perouse Strait, located between Sakhalin Island and Hokkaido.
The demarcation line between the northern and southern half of the island of Hokkaido should be drawn along the line running from the city of Kushiro along the eastern shore of the island to the city of Rumoe on the western shore of the island, with the inclusion of these cities in the northern half of the island. "
Explaining the desirability of obtaining the occupation area in the territory of Japan itself, Stalin pointed out that "this ... is of particular importance for Russian public opinion. As you know, the Japanese in 1919-1921 kept the entire Soviet Far East under occupation of their troops. Russian public opinion was would be seriously offended if the Russian troops did not have an area of occupation in any part of the actual Japanese territory "(Impcommiss: And here the Leader of all Nations is always right - me, as an individual part of Russian public opinion," t "and resent the absence of a Soviet occupation of Japanese islands!). Stalin called his proposals modest and expressed the hope that they would not meet objections.
Truman agreed "to include all the Kuril Islands in the area, which should surrender to Soviet troops in the Far East." As for the second proposal for the occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido, it was rejected by Truman. Moreover, on behalf of the American government, he expressed a desire "to have rights to aviation bases for land and sea aircraft on one of the Kuril Islands, preferably in the central group. "
Not concealing his displeasure with Truman’s response, Stalin rather sharply refused to provide the United States with bases in the Kuril Islands, stating that “requirements of this kind are usually made either to a defeated state or to such a federal state that is itself unable to protect“ part of its territory. ” it was given to understand that, in accordance with the Yalta agreements, the USSR has the right to dispose of the Kuril Islands at its discretion.
On August 22, in the first half of the day, Stalin ordered Marshal Vasilevsky to suspend preparations for the landing on Hokkaido. And 27 August 45, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, Colonel-General Ivanov sent a Supreme order "To avoid creating conflicts and misunderstandings regarding the Allies, categorically prohibit sending any ships and planes to Hokkaido island."
So it was decided to "make the occupation of Japan exclusively an American enterprise."
PS Among the further possibilities were the creation of the Japanese People’s Democratic Republic from the Soviet occupation zone along the lines of the GDR and the DPRK while dividing Germany and Korea occupied by the allies, respectively, and leaving Japan united along the lines of post-occupied Austria.
Information