Military intelligence. Combat experience
Relying on the colossal combat experience gained during the Great Patriotic War, at its final stage, the Red Army Intelligence Directorate set about improving the service of military intelligence. In the autumn of 1944, a front rally of reconnaissance officers of the 2 of the Baltic Front was held, devoted to discussing all aspects and problems facing the military intelligence service in which almost all senior intelligence officers of the armies from this front participated. The senior officers of the Intelligence Directorate of the Front Guard, Colonel K. Andreev, Guard Lieutenant Colonel F. Rakitsky, Guard Major B. Golikov, Captain I. Maslyansky spoke at this meeting. The motto of this meeting was the order of Supreme Commander JV Stalin: "To study the enemy, improve intelligence - the eyes and ears of the army, remember that without this you cannot beat the enemy for sure."The combat experience of the Soviet service of military intelligence of the period of the Great Patriotic War is of undoubted interest for specialists, since many of the problems characteristic of military intelligence at that time remain relevant both for reconnaissance units and subunits of the Russian army and for special purpose units. special services and law enforcement.
According to Captain Maslyansky, an officer of the 7 Infantry Corps Infantry Corps, every day of fighting on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War, even individual combat episodes constantly bring something new to the tactics of the troops, sometimes radically changing the prevailing ideas about the use of a particular method. and means of struggle. All these new methods and techniques of combat, gained in the practice of our units, are transferred in the order of exchange of experience from commander to commander and again find their application in various clashes with the enemy. Depending on the type of battle and the situation that has been created, one or another method of struggle is chosen, and information about the enemy, the number of his manpower, equipment, his plans and his immediate plans are taken into account. To have complete data on the plans and actions of the enemy, it is necessary to conduct continuous reconnaissance in its various forms, in particular, reconnaissance by force.
Combat reconnaissance is usually associated with some loss of manpower and equipment and achieves the desired result only with its skillful conduct. Here is one of the examples of reconnaissance in force, as a result of which the task was successfully accomplished and the enemy suffered considerable damage.
In winter, the 1944 of the year before the front of the defense of the 146 th rifle division in the area of one of the settlements for several days there was a strong movement of enemy infantry and vehicles, which naturally caused our command interest in the enemy grouping in this sector.
The commander of the 951 Infantry Regiment, Major D. Stepanov, was tasked with conducting reconnaissance in the vicinity of one settlement. The enemy in this area had a solid defense with a well-developed network of trenches, dugouts and bunkerhouses. The approaches to the leading edge were mined, wire barriers were installed.
Having received a reconnaissance mission in battle, Stepanov immediately established round-the-clock observation from among the officers, and himself with the reconnaissance group commander K. Islamov and artilleryman V. Makarevich made a thorough reconnaissance of the upcoming area of action. After that, an intelligence work plan was defined, which precisely indicated its composition and tasks. From small units were allocated to the exploration of three small groups. Each group received a specific object for action.
During the training period for four days, the entire officer corps thoroughly studied the enemy, the approaches to it, and identified targets for artillery. The gunners and machine-gunners in the hours of limited visibility created firing positions ahead of the battle formations of infantry units and carefully camouflaged them. On the eve of reconnaissance actions, at night, part of the artillery was concentrated in the area of firing positions, and the other part was covered in trenches of the front edge of the defense. Sappers in the enemy’s minefields they discovered made aisles, and in wire obstacles they cut the wire in several places without removing it, however, so that the enemy could not see anything at dawn.
Communication was arranged, a signal table was developed for the control, which all the officers knew. Artillerymen and mortar guns indicated the goal. Intelligence groups at the same time comprehensively prepared and trained. A day before the start of the actions, they advanced to the front line, where they studied all the approaches to the object of their actions, and each group individually presented its task clearly.
An hour before the start of active operations, reconnaissance groups put on camouflage gowns and two or three people in rushes and crawled to the previously prepared starting line. Then, hiding behind thick bushes, in the same order, they imperceptibly for the enemy got close to him at a distance of 300 meters and lay down in the snow. By this time, units for support in case of an enemy counterattack were also concentrated.
When the arrows returned to their original position, the machine-gunners opened concentrated fire at the front edge of the enemy and fired at it continuously for three minutes. At this point, the gunners, rolling out the guns from the shelters, made a direct artillery bombardment of the previously distributed targets. Mortars hit the front of the enemy with all their fire, and the supporting artillery and mortar batteries fired at German neighboring areas to prevent the enemy’s flanking machine guns from firing.
As a result of the sudden and coordinated artillery and mortar fire on the prepared targets, all the firing points of the Germans and a significant amount of manpower were destroyed. The enemy came in complete confusion. Having no connection, he couldn’t summon his artillery and mortar fire for 13 minutes.
The scouts, acting in three groups, one from the front and two flowing from the flanks, in strict interaction with each other, under the general guidance of the regiment commander D. Stepanov, during the artillery raid came close to the enemy's trenches. And when our gunners and mortar gunners moved the fire to the rear of the enemy and hit its flanks so that the Germans could not retreat or counterattack, the scouts, having thrown trenches and dugouts with grenades, broke into the trenches.
Within a few minutes, they destroyed the German soldiers entrenched in the trenches, in the unbroken bunkerhouses and dugouts, and completely captured the enemy stronghold. At the same time, they seized one company mortar with mines, two boxes of grenades and another weapon.
The enemy opened artillery and mortar fire and after a while twice threw people into 30 – 40 counterattacks, trying to dislodge the scouts and regain the lost line, but in vain. Our fighters, having taken a perimeter defense and armed with captured grenades and a mortar, with the support of their artillery, twice repelled enemy counterattacks with heavy losses for him and continued to hold the line until the order to withdraw was received. In the evening, having evacuated the wounded and the weapons seized from the enemy, the scouts returned without loss to their unit.
Our artillerymen played a significant role in successful reconnaissance in force. They, as always, showed high proficiency, endurance and ability to fight in any situation, perfectly combined their fire with the actions of the reconnaissance party, which ensured its success.
Conducted reconnaissance in force, carefully prepared in advance and accomplished suddenly, with excellent artillery work, achieved its goal. She gave the commander of the 146 Infantry Division the information about the enemy, which was required by the conditions of the situation.
Guards Colonel K. Andreev and Guards Lieutenant Colonel F. Rakitsky gave several illustrative examples of combat operations by reconnaissance groups from the 52 Guards Division when the enemy was stationed in a fortified area with a well-developed network of trenches, blindings, and DZOTs during the Nevel Offensive in October-November 1943 of the year.
Combat structures of the first line of defense of the enemy were located at a distance of 40 – 50 meters from each other. With the help of short lines of communication, these structures were connected with a continuous trench running parallel to the outline of the front edge. Solid wire barriers, adapted to the terrain and hidden from our observation, girded the trenches and only a distance of 30 – 50 meters from them. The first line of trenches was saturated with dispersed fire weapons. In a word, before the front of our compound a typical picture emerged of the new German line defense.
It should be noted that the scouts of the compound had not yet had to act in such conditions before this time. In previous battles, they always had the opportunity to choose to search for a completely isolated object (firing point) or, at least, an object remote from other firing points on 150 – 300 meters.The search party usually consisted of an exciting group and one or two supporting groups. Minefields and wire obstacles on the tracks, which were previously located on 100 – 150 meters in front of the enemy’s firing positions, were easily and imperceptibly ignored by special fencing teams. The neighboring firing points with the target object were successfully suppressed by artillery fire, the gaps of which did not interfere with the actions of the reconnaissance party. In such a situation, an exciting group evaded the intended combat structure from the rear or from the flank and with a sudden throw attacked him. Success has always been guaranteed.
The changes in the defense of the Germans put our intelligence officers in a difficult position. Old methods of reconnaissance searches could lead to unnecessary losses, waste of material resources, loss of time and, most importantly, questioned the success of intelligence. We didn’t have new ways of providing reconnaissance search, and they had to be obtained by combat.
Some mysterious regrouping was seen in the enemy’s disposition. The scouts were ordered to capture the prisoner. The insignificant distance between the firing points in the first line of the German trenches did not allow the search party to penetrate the rear or the flank of the intended object. I had to act on the forehead. At the same time, our capture team was discovered at once by several enemy observers. The enemy at close range opened machine-gun fire on this group, and put into action up to six firing points located to the right and left of the target. The firing means of the reconnaissance party allowed to affect only a part of the German firing points that had found themselves. Our gunners and mortar gunners could not assist in suppressing enemy fire, since the firing points were in close proximity to each other and from the object chosen to capture, the gaps interfered with the actions of the search party. The scouts reached the first line of the trenches, but under the pressure of the enemy, who had launched grenades from the neighboring trenches, they were forced to retreat without capturing the prisoner.
But the lessons of this first unsuccessful search were not in vain. The intelligence officers took into account the experience gained in the battle and outlined new methods for providing reconnaissance search at the forefront of the Germans continuous defense. Preparations for the next reconnaissance action took 5 days. A capture group of six experienced intelligence agents and five support groups were identified, four of which were three people and one out of five people. On the terrain, similar to that on which it was necessary to conduct reconnaissance, a training was conducted on the coherence of actions of all groups of the search party. The paths of movement of each group were thoroughly studied, mined areas were explored. Each of the five support groups was aimed at a specific firing point, which it would have to suppress. For targets that could not be completely destroyed during the search, but which could come to life with the commencement of the withdrawal of the reconnaissance party and pursue it with fire, two artillery batteries were prepared.
In the evening, the reconnaissance party began the task. Having advanced somewhat from the initial position, the support groups dispersed to both sides of the capture group and began to approach each other with their specific object (1 scheme). After 25 – 30 minutes, the support groups approached the enemy’s firing points on 20 meters, and the exciting group continued to move to the intended object and a few minutes later, without opening fire, it broke into the enemy’s trench, killed two enemy machine-gunners, and captured the third.
However, the captured enemy soldier managed to cry out. The Germans' firing point immediately opened fire on an exciting group, but was immediately suppressed by the supporting group. After her, the Germans opened fire on an exciting reconnaissance group, but were also shackled by the fire of the respective groups. But here the new firing point of the enemy, located near the capture group, on its right side, came into effect. This point had to be suppressed by the most exciting group, since the corresponding support group during the rendezvous period deviated somewhat to the right of its intended purpose.
Capturing a prisoner and neutralizing the enemy’s firing point next to them, the capture group began to retreat, while the supporting groups covered their withdrawal with their fire. Then began to withdraw and provide groups. At this time, artillery and mortar fire was opened along the leading edge of the enemy in order to allow the entire reconnaissance party to completely withdraw from the sphere of enemy fire. Several similar searches were carried out on other sectors of the front, which also gave successful results.
The senior officer of the 3 th Shock Army of the Guard Army, Major P. Golikov, made a presentation entitled “Selected Intelligence Examples to Overcome the Water Frontier”.
The reconnaissance of the enemy troops with overcoming the water line complicates the activities of the scouts and requires them, besides the usual fighting qualities (silent operations, good camouflage, secretive creeping, etc.), also the ability to swim well, and also to overcome water frontiers with the help of standard and improvised transport means. No matter how good a scout is on land, in a swamp or in a forest, he may be (without adequate training) helpless in the water. Consequently, in order to have experienced dexterous scouts, they must be selected, taught and trained.
The experience of combat operations in the Great Patriotic War showed that those units and formations in which they do not learn to overcome water obstacles have unilaterally trained reconnaissance aircraft. Such scouts skillfully operate in the steppes, forests and swamps, but with access to the water line, when intelligence has to be conducted through a water barrier, they become deadlocked. And, conversely, comprehensively trained scouts operate successfully, regardless of the situation, terrain, weather conditions, etc. Let us give an example of the actions of the reconnaissance party of the 127 Infantry Division from the 63th General Army Army in the autumn of 1942.
Our units moved behind the Don and were preparing to strike at the flank of the German group that had broken through to Stalingrad. It was known that the left flank of this group was provided by the Romanian and Italian units that had occupied the defense on the right bank of the Don from the Veshenskaya village to the village of Sirotinskaya.
The city of Serafimovich on the right bank was held by our units as a springboard. The enemy with all his strength sought to knock out our units from the city and thus deprive us of a springboard on the right bank of the Don. In the battle for the city of Serafimovich, the enemy threw the 3-I Italian infantry division, which we almost completely destroyed. Intelligence contributed to this success. The scouts accurately and timely reported on the accumulation of enemy infantry behind the heights and the beginning of its advancement to the front edge of the defense. This allowed our command to prepare its units for a counterattack and promptly bring them into battle from the direction in which the enemy did not expect to meet resistance.
It was established by observation that the enemy was concentrating troops in the area of the village of Verkhne-Fomikhinskaya (12 km north-west of the city of Serafimovich). It was necessary to establish exactly what parts are concentrated in the specified area; their number; composition; weapons; national identity and intent.
The division commander, Colonel S. Merkulov, ordered the chief of intelligence of the division, Captain Batyrev, to smuggle a group of intelligence officers across the Don river in the area of the village of Verkhne-Chirskaya; the scouts should, secretly passing the line of defense of the enemy and going deeper into 12 km to its rear, capture near the village of Verkhne-Fomikhinskaya prisoner.
Junior lieutenant Yakovlev, senior sergeant Zinoviev, sergeant Gladkov and Red Army man Kostrubov were selected for the reconnaissance party. These scouts were experts in their field.
Summoning Junior Lieutenant Yakovlev, Batyrev set him a reconnaissance mission. It was a dark, damp autumn night, when scouts under the cover of darkness, using a shrub from Don Vineyard, stretching to the Ust-Khoperskaya stanitsa, quietly reached the left bank of the Don, where the prepared boats were located.
Before starting the crossing, Yakovlev decided to check the enemy’s vigilance. To this end, he took a couple of boats from the place designated for the crossing, and organized a false crossing. As soon as the boats pushed off the coast, two enemy machine-gun machine guns opened fire from the Ust-Khoperskaya area. It was clear that the Germans are not sleeping. While the men distracted the Germans with a false crossing, the scouts, who were not noticed by the enemy, swam across the r. Don.
The scouts crawled noiselessly at the most firing points and by dawn they were already in the depths of the enemy rear, in the area of the intersection of roads north-east of Verkhne-Fomikhinskaya.
The scouts took refuge not far from the German trench. Here they had to lie the whole day before dark.
Could anyone think that the scouts would take the risk of sheltering near the German dugout? It seemed incredible, but it was on the absurdity of such an assumption that Lieutenant Yakovlev built his calculations. At nightfall, the scouts secretly began to make their way to the river, where a prepared boat was waiting for them.
By 24 hours they got to the place of crossing, silently boarded the boat and safely delivered the captive to the command.
In the morning, in the dugout, the division intelligence chief interrogated the prisoner. The German showed that he was a native of Upper Silesia and was in France, where their battalion was formed. Later he was enlisted in an artillery regiment, with which he got on the Soviet-German front. The regiment was ordered to go to the area of the city of Serafimovich to help the third Italian division. Documents of the killed soldiers and officers testimony of the prisoner was confirmed.
A few days later, four brave scouts received battle orders.
Here are some examples of actions of military intelligence officers belonging to a later period - October - November 1943, when the 364-Infantry Division of the 7-Infantry Corps took part in the Nevelsk offensive operation.
A group of scouts under the command of sergeant Rudoy was ordered to organize a night search with a crossing over the Bolshoi Ivan lake in the Nevelsky district (the southern part of the Pskov region) to capture the control prisoner. The training was given two days.
Having received the task, foreman Rudoy immediately organized observation of the enemy, while he himself began to study the terrain. The width of the lake in the intended area of the crossing reached 2,5 km. The enemy could not wait for an attack in this place.
Assessing the situation, Rudoy began to prepare for the task. There were no transport facilities in the specified area. Then the scouts made rafts from the dry forest and disguised them on the shore of the lake. In the process of preparation, the question arose: what to do so that, when crossing, not to deviate in the darkness of the night from the intended landing point? On a compass, you can deviate - starless nights, landmarks are almost invisible. At night, to overcome the water surface in two and a half kilometers and arrive at the scheduled point is possible only with accurate orientation.Senior Rudoi quickly got out of this difficulty. He plotted a landing site on the opposite bank of the lake, and then reinforced the rifle, adapting it for shooting at night, in the direction of the intended location. With the beginning of the actions, one fighter, being at the rifle, had to shoot out of it with tracer bullets, while the reconnaissance aircraft, proceeding from the shots, should be sent a little to the left. In order to cause the enemy suspicion of firing at one point with tracer bullets, Rudoi put two machine guns on the flanks, intending them also for firing tracer bullets only in different directions. Thus, single rifle shots should have been blurred by the general firing of machine guns.
On the night scheduled for action, the scouts, guided by rifle shots, crossed over to the opposite shore of the lake and hid in the bush. There were no Germans in the trenches located on the shore of the lake, and the scouts plunged five hundred meters into the forest. They found fresh tracks on the snow that had just fallen. Soon, two figures appeared on the trail. The Germans walked without suspecting anything, and talked animatedly.
As soon as the Germans reached the ambush, the scouts quickly and silently captured.
The prisoners — a non-commissioned officer and a soldier — were taken to headquarters and gave valuable information about the enemy regrouping of troops.
There were cases when scouts overcame a water line under water, using a reed stem for breathing. This method was used in the summer in places where the lakes were not too deep. Especially he justified himself in cases where a group of intelligence officers had to be missed to the rear of the enemy, and the lake deduced for his battle formations.
Intelligence agents have widely used the cape as crossing means. They were adjusted as follows: four cape-tents were stitched and packed with straw (for lack of straw, it was possible to use dry moss, etc.). For the strength of the raincoat, filled with straw, surrounded by a wooden frame. Such a raft could withstand three people fully armed in the water. It could be done anywhere in one hour. In addition, he had the advantage that when firing a bullet or splinter hit did not affect its carrying capacity. Rubber cameras from cars, empty barrels, cans, etc. were widely used as improvised means of transport.
The examples given here by no means exhaust all the methods and means used in conducting reconnaissance of enemy troops with overcoming water obstacles. Template intelligence should not be. In each case, intelligence officers need to resort to the method that best suits the given situation, while showing cunning, resourcefulness and ingenuity.
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