Collusion in Suez
There is evidence that the Doomsday War was a joint special operation by the USA, Israel and Egypt
“A real sensation,” I gasped, opening a black dermatine folder with a folder, where there was a clue to one of the amazing puzzles of modern times. One of the most secret secrets of American diplomacy and the modern world pattern peeped out of a folder containing an analytical note in the Politburo dated 1975. For a long time I got acquainted with Wikileaks and when opening the old archives, I did not see materials of such quality. Now we can definitely say how the world in which we live went on its difficult path. This historical the turnaround took place in 1973-1974.
At that time, the Soviet Union was the most powerful, foremost power of the world. By the pace of development, by the growth of national wealth, by the growing military power he was not equal. The United States and Great Britain experienced a severe crisis, France and Italy were leaning towards the Soviets. It is rightly said that by this time the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, although it did not try to humiliate and crush past opponents. The Vietnam War undermined America, the American people were dissatisfied with the many casualties, and the Soviet military equipment in the hands of the Vietnamese was undermining the power of America. Cubans struck blow after blow at positions of the West in Africa. The Vietnam War brought down the dollar, broke his bond with gold, and it rolled down.
The Soviet Union built new rockets, dreamed of conquering space, imported oranges from Morocco, listened to jazz, sang songs and believed in a bright tomorrow - absolutely justified. During these years, the brightest books of the Strugatsky brothers, full of joyful forebodings, were written. In the Middle East, Soviet influence was omnipresent; Soviet instructors and military advisers worked in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and the Americans barely kept on the Arabian periphery, where King Feisal and Sheikhs drove camels in oases in the eternal sands and watched foreign companies pumping five cents of oil per barrel. America relied on Israel, which was more a burden than a benefit: it had to be defended, and the rejection of the Zionist state by its neighbors spoiled the game for the Americans.
At this time, Henry Kissinger and his colleagues thought through a complex multi-path, which was implemented within a few months. As a result, players changed places at the chessboard. The dollar consolidated and became a world currency again - but without gold filling, the United States won back the leadership, the oil sheikhs began to swim in luxury, the Soviet Union lost its position in the Middle East and began to creep into the abyss. Socialism has lost, capitalism has become much more radical than in the past. And all this was the result of a special operation in the Middle East.
As we learned from the found memorandum, the rulers of Egypt, Israel and the United States entered into an agreement in 1973. They staged and fought the October War - the Jews call it the Yom Kippur War and the Arabs the Ramadan War. During this war, the autocratic ruler of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, betrayed the Arab cause, betrayed his military ally, Syria, and doomed its army to destruction, devoured the Palestinians, betrayed friendship with the Soviet Union. The United States won back Egypt and then other countries in the region. They initiated an oil embargo that hit the pockets of overly well-lived ordinary Americans and Europeans, but brought American bankers untold riches. The Israeli leadership sacrificed two thousand of their best soldiers - they were sent to their deaths to help America take over the region. Golda Meir, whom the Jews loved so much, without flinching, gave her soldiers to be torn apart in dugouts in the Suez and in tank battles at the Chinese farm. In gratitude, America backed Israel with dozens of Security Council vetoes, billions of dollars in aid, and gave it the green light for its most adventurous plans. After the defeat caused by Sadat's betrayal, Syria went into isolation and reached the present day when this regime - the last miraculously surviving chunk of the former Middle East - is undergoing daily attacks from Saudi and American henchmen.
The Doomsday War ended with a meeting on the lawn of the White House, where America's new and old friends spread pax americana to the Middle East. For me, this war was also an amazing page in my personal biography. A young paratrooper-paratrooper, I participated in it, crossed the Suez Canal, captured the heights of Jable Attack, withstand shelling along with my comrades and beat off the ranks of the infantry. My unit was abandoned by helicopter deep into the desert and cut off the main Egyptian communication between the rear and the front, the Suez-Cairo highway. We were left to stand a wall between the First and Third armies of Egypt, and then in our location, on the 101-m kilometer from Cairo, there were negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis. I know firsthand all the vicissitudes of that distant and, as it now turns out, fateful war that changed the path of human development. And with considerable pain I learned today that my comrades and I were a bargaining chip in a tricky game that we all - Russians, and ordinary Americans, and Israelis, and Arabs - lost.
Witness
By chance, the personal archive of Ambassador Vinogradov fell into our hands. Vladimir Mikhailovich Vinogradov was the USSR ambassador to Cairo during the days of the 1973 war, and subsequently co-chair of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister and RSFSR Foreign Minister. Vinogradov witnessed many interesting pages of history: he established relations with post-war Japan, which no one suspected of a future power, the Islamic Revolution in Iran broke out with him, he knew the Shah, talked with Ayatollah Khomeini many times, informed him about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, survived a raid on the embassy. His story about the Islamic revolution in Iran, also discovered by us in its archives, will still attract readers and analysts.
Vinogradov left numerous materials about his service in Cairo. Here is a detailed record of his conversations with Anwar Sadat, and a story about how Sadat came to power, ousting all supporters of Nasser, and then changing the foreign policy and internal course of Egypt. The full publication of the Cairo diaries of the ambassador, a man of high culture, perceptive and knew a lot, will reveal to the readers and researchers the secrets of the era.
But the archive jewel is an amazing document written by Vinogradov in 1975. This is typewriting with editing inks, a draft of the memorandum under the heading "The Middle Eastern game", apparently sent to the top leadership of the country. Vinogradov’s long participation in the Middle Eastern game allowed him to understand the essence of what was happening, although he could not foresee the dire consequences that Henry Kissinger’s cunning intrigue would cause.
The school version of the 1973 – 1974 war is as follows. President Sadat, along with Syrian President Hafez al-Asad (the father of the current President Bashar), prepared a surprise attack on a relaxed Israel on Yom Kippur, or Judgment Day, when half of the Israeli army was on vacation. They managed to achieve some success, but then with a bold cast of the Israeli General Ariel Sharon broke through the front line, was deep in the rear of the enemy, cut off the supply route of the Third Army (stationed on the east coast of Suez), surrounded Suez and threatened Cairo. Under these conditions, the Security Council adopted a resolution on a cease-fire, and then negotiations began, culminating in the White House lawn.
Vladimir Vinogradov, a man who had two hundred conversations with Sadat, and throughout the war stood at the headquarters of the commander, rejects this official version. He argues that the attack of the Arabs on Israel was neither sudden nor unexpected. Nor was the surprise of General Sharon’s raid. All of this was planned and conceived by Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir and Anwar Sadat. Part of the plan was the destruction of the Syrian army.
Twenty five questions
Vinogradov’s memorandum begins with twenty-five questions. At first, he questions the version of the surprise attack.
1. The decision on the war was made back in April 1973, jointly by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and what Jordan knew, and America knew, and consequently, Israel.
2. The Soviet Union a few days before October 6 massively evacuated members of the families of Soviet citizens who worked in Egypt and Syria. Could this have gone unnoticed by American and Israeli agents?
3. Under the guise of maneuvers, the Egyptians concentrated all their troops for a throw through the canal. Two or three days before the outbreak of hostilities, it was impossible not to notice this concentration of Egyptian troops.
Following this are other riddles.
... 7. Why did the Egyptian armed forces, forcing the Suez Canal, not begin to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, although in this direction they were not opposed by serious Israeli forces (they simply were not there)?
8. Why did the Egyptian armed forces have no plans at all for a further offensive, even in the event that the crossing of the channel was successful?
9. Why did the United States not provide Israel with military assistance immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, but waited several days before starting air transportation over the air bridge? Why did the United States give the Egyptians the opportunity to beat the Israeli troops, having begun to act decisively so late?
... 12. Why were the flanks of the Second and Third Egyptian armies at Sinai not closed?
13. How could it happen that the first Israeli tanks "imperceptibly" slipped on the west coast of the Suez Canal?
14. Why did Sadat stubbornly refuse to take any drastic measures to eliminate the Israeli breakthrough?
... 17. Why on the West Bank in the rear of the Egyptian troops did not have any reserves?
Vinogradov proceeds with the work of Sherlock Holmes, who, as the reader remembers, suggested: “Drop all the impossible - what remains, and will be the answer, no matter how incredible it may seem.”
He writes: “If you consider Sadat a true patriot of his country, you will not find answers to the simplest questions. But if we assume other motives for the behavior of Sadat, as well as the Americans and the ruling elite of Israel, then we get such a picture that even tremble: it turns out a picture of the collusion between Sadat, the United States and Israel’s top leadership. A conspiracy in which each member, however, pursued his own goals. A collusion in which each side did not know all the details of the game of the other side. Collusion, in which each side, despite the agreement, sought to replay the other. If we assume this, then all puzzled questions will receive logical and only possible answers. ”
Further, Vinogradov, from his ideal observation platform, the ambassador in Cairo, describes the attitudes of all the protagonists.
Egypt
For Sadat, who came to power after Nasser’s death and took an anti-Naser course, the internal situation became increasingly intolerable. His authority fell catastrophically even among his own people, the Egyptian bourgeoisie. Outside, he was isolated. There was only one hope - on relations with the United States. In order to get along with the United States, it is necessary to abandon close relations with the Soviet Union, and then improve its precarious situation inside and outside the country with the help of America.
What could be better for this purpose than military action? No, not war, but such actions that would not lead to defeat, but would help preserve dignity. For Sadat, the action plan is clear. Must be military action, they will help "relieve pressure" that has accumulated in the army. They must show what the Egyptian armed forces are capable of. These actions should not be designed for a major victory, it is not needed, it can not even be - after all, everyone says that the Egyptian army is equipped with low-quality Soviet weapons. Costs, military setbacks, etc. - all this will be written off at the expense of bad Soviet weapons and the political position of the Soviet Union, which can be blamed for snatching the victory from the hands of the Arabs.
Therefore, the task before the troops will be set minimal: forcing the Suez Canal, the seizure of the bridgehead - no matter what size - and hold it until the Americans come into play. They had to enter the Middle East.
USA
The wind of the national liberation movement threw the United States from the Middle East, and this area is very important for them: here are the world's largest oil reserves, here is the strategic Suez Canal, here are the southern southern approaches to the Soviet Union, here is the epicenter of the anti-colonial struggle. Here is the outpost of the United States - Israel, which rests on the fear of the Arabs. Israel needs to be supported, but the Arab states are getting stronger.
Israel needs to act more flexibly; by its policy - unyielding and rude - it prevents America from establishing ties with Arab countries. The United States has a double task in relation to Israel: to preserve it as its support, but also to bring down the pride, to force the Israelis to sacrifice the few to preserve the most important thing.
It is necessary to get the opportunity to "save" Israel, but first let the Arabs be able to beat the Israelis in a controlled manner: put a certain number of Israeli lives for the sake of the subsequent "salvation" of Israel.
The United States may have made it clear to Sadat that they have nothing against "limited" hostilities. So ironically, the United States knew about the upcoming military actions, and the ally of Egypt, the Soviet Union was not informed.
Israel
The Israeli ruling elite can not help the main patron and the feeder - the United States of America.
At the same time, the US also needs a stronger position in the Middle East. Who are their friends here besides Israel? One king Faisal. But if the USA enters the Middle East, the influence of the Soviet Union will diminish, and you can always agree with the capitalists, money does not smell for them. Americans need help, it is in the interests of Israel itself.
The weak link is Egypt. Everyone knows Sadat’s attitude toward progressive movement within the country and towards the Soviet Union. In addition, it is the largest Arab state. And with Syria, you can try to get rid of and by military means, there are good chances.
Together with the Americans, the idea was born to give up the line of defense along the canal and retreat to the passes. This also offered Rogers plan in 1971 year. But this, of course, as a last resort, but it is necessary to make war, not to give it away without a fight!
As for Syria, we must seize the opportunity and smash the Syrian armed forces. That is why the Israeli high command, having received information about an unprecedented concentration of Egyptian and Syrian troops, pulled all the troops to the borders of Syria and sent no reinforcements to Sinai, to the Suez Canal, from where much more powerful Egyptian troops seemed to be moving. Israeli soldiers in Sinai were to play their part in a political play - the role of martyrs who were predestined to slaughter.
Course of the game
Game Sadat fell from the start. Everything went wrong, as expected, Vinogradov writes. The Soviet Union resolutely acted on the side of the Arab states not only politically, but also the supply of the most modern military equipment. In fact, he took the risk of confrontation with the United States. Sadat never counted on it.
Another blow: Soviet weapons, possessed by Egyptian soldiers and officers, turned out to be of the highest quality. It was better than the American armed Israelis.
(As an Israeli soldier of that time, I must confirm the ambassador’s words. The Egyptians had legendary Kalashnikovs, and we had old-fashioned FN Belgian rifles, they had infantry equipped with “little ones”, Russian anti-tank missiles, and we had old 105 guns without recoil guns. Mm to fight with tanks. Until the new American weapons came, we could not cope.)
Another blow: the training of troops, achieved at one time under the guidance of Soviet advisers and specialists and in Soviet military instructions, in many cases surpassed the Israeli one. Plus high morale of soldiers and officers. It was all unexpected.
Egyptian forces forced the canal several times faster than planned. Losses accounted for just 10% - while planned at a rate of one third! The Arabs beat the Israelis. It was bad news for Sadat: crumbled game plans. What should the Americans do now? Sadat, roughly speaking, outplayed himself, played too well.
And so the Egyptian troops, having crossed the channel, got up. They simply took and stood three or five kilometers from the canal - there was no further military plans. There were no Israeli troops in front either, the main forces of Israel were occupied on the Syrian front. And Sadat began to expect the approach of the Israeli forces! Unbelievable, but true: he stood and waited for the Syrians to take the brunt of the entire Israeli army! He was waiting to give the Americans the opportunity to join the game, and all plans were violated.
The Israeli military command and political leadership were alarmed by the results of the first days of hostilities, which began to evolve in a completely different way than expected. Everything was aimed at Syria, but its own losses were great, and every kilometer became a nightmare. Rescued, however, Sadat: he stood and did not move, although all the troops could be transferred to Syria. The Syrians retreated, but their armed forces were not destroyed, the Soviet equipment made up for the failed ones, and after all, Israel’s goal was to completely destroy Syria militarily. This did not work out, but the Syrians could no longer attack Israel. Now it was necessary to punish Sadat - his army turned out to be too effective, and most importantly, during these days, he not only moved away from the Soviet Union, but seemed to approach him: after all, it was not without reason that he was sent a weapon along the air bridge. And sea shipments? Soviet ships went to Alexandria one by one.
The Israeli attack on Syria stops, the troops rush to the south, on Sinai, with an accelerated march, where Sadat is looking forward to them.
Jordan could have cut this vulnerable path from north to south, but this was not part of the game plans of the Americans and Sadat. Israeli forces rolled southward unhindered.
The breakthrough of the Israeli troops on the west coast of the Suez Canal is generally the darkest episode of this war. Here is one of two things: either the amazing military illiteracy of the Egyptians (and it is impossible to admit it), or a deliberate action (it is difficult to admit, but possible).
The striking complacency, even the president’s indifference to the very fact of the penetration of Israeli tanks, is striking. To all the questions, when the channel still swam across only five tanks, he answered: nothing serious, this is a “political” (?!) Operation. Even when a solid Israeli foothold formed on the west bank, Sadat did not cease to repeat that this group has no military significance in military terms!
The measures that seemed to have been taken to eliminate the breakthrough were simply ridiculous, the president did not heed any advice given to him from Moscow. He deliberately let the Israelis into Africa. Apparently, to the Israelis themselves, all this seemed very strange - in any case, eyewitnesses write.
Why the Americans did not stop the Israelis? The answer may lie in their desire to have a lever to put pressure on Sadat, Vinogradov writes.
Results
The United States "saved" Egypt by eliminating the Israeli breakthrough to the west bank of the canal.
The United States gave Israel an opportunity (with the help of Sadat) to deliver a strong military strike against Syria.
The United States, through subsequent disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, secured Israel, since zones were created with UN troops and the cease-fire commitments were again made.
The United States reimbursed Israel for all its losses in the war (of course, in technology, the Israeli casualties were not important to the United States).
The United States, with the help of Sadat, entered the Middle East, trying to demonstrate that they are the only possible peacekeepers in the area.
Sadat launched an anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union and everything connected with it as payment for services. And this was one of the main goals of the United States.
The position of Sadat in the first months after the October war in the country on the crest of "victories" was greatly strengthened.
Egypt in the first weeks after the war rightfully again took the lead among the Arab states.
The idea of socialism in the Arab world was dealt a severe blow.
But a year has passed and Sadat's position has rocked. The authority of Egypt fell again, Vinogradov wrote in January 1975 of the year.
The Syrians quickly understood Sadat’s game: 12’s October 1973, when Egyptian troops landed on the east bank of the Suez Canal suddenly stopped fighting, Syrian President Hafez Asad told the Soviet ambassador that he was confident in the conscious nature of Sadat’s actions, which he called a betrayal of towards Syria.
Not only the Russian ambassador in Damascus, but also Jordan’s Prime Minister Abu-Zeid Rifai, told Vinogradov about Syria’s opinion, saying that Assad was firmly convinced that the Israelis ’breakthrough to the west coast of the Suez Canal was done by Sadat’s consent - implementing its far-reaching disengagement plan and the introduction of the US in the Middle East.
According to Rifai, King Hussein of Jordan wanted to enter the war and cut Israeli communications, but Sadat told the Jordanians not to move. Jordanians also suspect Sadat of foul play, Vinogradov finishes.
Although suspicions of this kind were spread earlier, Vinogradov’s memorandum is the first serious document of the participant in the events who owned the information. Among Vinogradov's notes there are quite a few remarks that allow deciphering the history of American penetration into the Middle East and the history of the fall of Egypt - deindustrialized, impoverished, torn by internal contradictions and controlled by the military junta, closely related to the “fake war” of 1973.
Soviet weaponwhich were owned by Egyptian soldiers and officers, was better than the American, who were armed with the Israelis
“A real sensation,” I gasped, opening a black dermatine folder with a folder, where there was a clue to one of the amazing puzzles of modern times. One of the most secret secrets of American diplomacy and the modern world pattern peeped out of a folder containing an analytical note in the Politburo dated 1975. For a long time I got acquainted with Wikileaks and when opening the old archives, I did not see materials of such quality. Now we can definitely say how the world in which we live went on its difficult path. This historical the turnaround took place in 1973-1974.
At that time, the Soviet Union was the most powerful, foremost power of the world. By the pace of development, by the growth of national wealth, by the growing military power he was not equal. The United States and Great Britain experienced a severe crisis, France and Italy were leaning towards the Soviets. It is rightly said that by this time the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, although it did not try to humiliate and crush past opponents. The Vietnam War undermined America, the American people were dissatisfied with the many casualties, and the Soviet military equipment in the hands of the Vietnamese was undermining the power of America. Cubans struck blow after blow at positions of the West in Africa. The Vietnam War brought down the dollar, broke his bond with gold, and it rolled down.
The Soviet Union built new rockets, dreamed of conquering space, imported oranges from Morocco, listened to jazz, sang songs and believed in a bright tomorrow - absolutely justified. During these years, the brightest books of the Strugatsky brothers, full of joyful forebodings, were written. In the Middle East, Soviet influence was omnipresent; Soviet instructors and military advisers worked in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and the Americans barely kept on the Arabian periphery, where King Feisal and Sheikhs drove camels in oases in the eternal sands and watched foreign companies pumping five cents of oil per barrel. America relied on Israel, which was more a burden than a benefit: it had to be defended, and the rejection of the Zionist state by its neighbors spoiled the game for the Americans.
At this time, Henry Kissinger and his colleagues thought through a complex multi-path, which was implemented within a few months. As a result, players changed places at the chessboard. The dollar consolidated and became a world currency again - but without gold filling, the United States won back the leadership, the oil sheikhs began to swim in luxury, the Soviet Union lost its position in the Middle East and began to creep into the abyss. Socialism has lost, capitalism has become much more radical than in the past. And all this was the result of a special operation in the Middle East.
As we learned from the found memorandum, the rulers of Egypt, Israel and the United States entered into an agreement in 1973. They staged and fought the October War - the Jews call it the Yom Kippur War and the Arabs the Ramadan War. During this war, the autocratic ruler of Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, betrayed the Arab cause, betrayed his military ally, Syria, and doomed its army to destruction, devoured the Palestinians, betrayed friendship with the Soviet Union. The United States won back Egypt and then other countries in the region. They initiated an oil embargo that hit the pockets of overly well-lived ordinary Americans and Europeans, but brought American bankers untold riches. The Israeli leadership sacrificed two thousand of their best soldiers - they were sent to their deaths to help America take over the region. Golda Meir, whom the Jews loved so much, without flinching, gave her soldiers to be torn apart in dugouts in the Suez and in tank battles at the Chinese farm. In gratitude, America backed Israel with dozens of Security Council vetoes, billions of dollars in aid, and gave it the green light for its most adventurous plans. After the defeat caused by Sadat's betrayal, Syria went into isolation and reached the present day when this regime - the last miraculously surviving chunk of the former Middle East - is undergoing daily attacks from Saudi and American henchmen.
The Doomsday War ended with a meeting on the lawn of the White House, where America's new and old friends spread pax americana to the Middle East. For me, this war was also an amazing page in my personal biography. A young paratrooper-paratrooper, I participated in it, crossed the Suez Canal, captured the heights of Jable Attack, withstand shelling along with my comrades and beat off the ranks of the infantry. My unit was abandoned by helicopter deep into the desert and cut off the main Egyptian communication between the rear and the front, the Suez-Cairo highway. We were left to stand a wall between the First and Third armies of Egypt, and then in our location, on the 101-m kilometer from Cairo, there were negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis. I know firsthand all the vicissitudes of that distant and, as it now turns out, fateful war that changed the path of human development. And with considerable pain I learned today that my comrades and I were a bargaining chip in a tricky game that we all - Russians, and ordinary Americans, and Israelis, and Arabs - lost.
Witness
By chance, the personal archive of Ambassador Vinogradov fell into our hands. Vladimir Mikhailovich Vinogradov was the USSR ambassador to Cairo during the days of the 1973 war, and subsequently co-chair of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister and RSFSR Foreign Minister. Vinogradov witnessed many interesting pages of history: he established relations with post-war Japan, which no one suspected of a future power, the Islamic Revolution in Iran broke out with him, he knew the Shah, talked with Ayatollah Khomeini many times, informed him about the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, survived a raid on the embassy. His story about the Islamic revolution in Iran, also discovered by us in its archives, will still attract readers and analysts.
Vinogradov left numerous materials about his service in Cairo. Here is a detailed record of his conversations with Anwar Sadat, and a story about how Sadat came to power, ousting all supporters of Nasser, and then changing the foreign policy and internal course of Egypt. The full publication of the Cairo diaries of the ambassador, a man of high culture, perceptive and knew a lot, will reveal to the readers and researchers the secrets of the era.
But the archive jewel is an amazing document written by Vinogradov in 1975. This is typewriting with editing inks, a draft of the memorandum under the heading "The Middle Eastern game", apparently sent to the top leadership of the country. Vinogradov’s long participation in the Middle Eastern game allowed him to understand the essence of what was happening, although he could not foresee the dire consequences that Henry Kissinger’s cunning intrigue would cause.
Among the notes of the former Soviet ambassador to Egypt, Vladimir Vinogradov, there are quite a few remarks that allow deciphering the history of American penetration into the Middle East and the history of the fall of Egypt.
The school version of the 1973 – 1974 war is as follows. President Sadat, along with Syrian President Hafez al-Asad (the father of the current President Bashar), prepared a surprise attack on a relaxed Israel on Yom Kippur, or Judgment Day, when half of the Israeli army was on vacation. They managed to achieve some success, but then with a bold cast of the Israeli General Ariel Sharon broke through the front line, was deep in the rear of the enemy, cut off the supply route of the Third Army (stationed on the east coast of Suez), surrounded Suez and threatened Cairo. Under these conditions, the Security Council adopted a resolution on a cease-fire, and then negotiations began, culminating in the White House lawn.
Vladimir Vinogradov, a man who had two hundred conversations with Sadat, and throughout the war stood at the headquarters of the commander, rejects this official version. He argues that the attack of the Arabs on Israel was neither sudden nor unexpected. Nor was the surprise of General Sharon’s raid. All of this was planned and conceived by Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir and Anwar Sadat. Part of the plan was the destruction of the Syrian army.
Twenty five questions
Vinogradov’s memorandum begins with twenty-five questions. At first, he questions the version of the surprise attack.
1. The decision on the war was made back in April 1973, jointly by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and what Jordan knew, and America knew, and consequently, Israel.
2. The Soviet Union a few days before October 6 massively evacuated members of the families of Soviet citizens who worked in Egypt and Syria. Could this have gone unnoticed by American and Israeli agents?
3. Under the guise of maneuvers, the Egyptians concentrated all their troops for a throw through the canal. Two or three days before the outbreak of hostilities, it was impossible not to notice this concentration of Egyptian troops.
Following this are other riddles.
... 7. Why did the Egyptian armed forces, forcing the Suez Canal, not begin to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, although in this direction they were not opposed by serious Israeli forces (they simply were not there)?
8. Why did the Egyptian armed forces have no plans at all for a further offensive, even in the event that the crossing of the channel was successful?
9. Why did the United States not provide Israel with military assistance immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, but waited several days before starting air transportation over the air bridge? Why did the United States give the Egyptians the opportunity to beat the Israeli troops, having begun to act decisively so late?
... 12. Why were the flanks of the Second and Third Egyptian armies at Sinai not closed?
13. How could it happen that the first Israeli tanks "imperceptibly" slipped on the west coast of the Suez Canal?
14. Why did Sadat stubbornly refuse to take any drastic measures to eliminate the Israeli breakthrough?
... 17. Why on the West Bank in the rear of the Egyptian troops did not have any reserves?
Vinogradov proceeds with the work of Sherlock Holmes, who, as the reader remembers, suggested: “Drop all the impossible - what remains, and will be the answer, no matter how incredible it may seem.”
He writes: “If you consider Sadat a true patriot of his country, you will not find answers to the simplest questions. But if we assume other motives for the behavior of Sadat, as well as the Americans and the ruling elite of Israel, then we get such a picture that even tremble: it turns out a picture of the collusion between Sadat, the United States and Israel’s top leadership. A conspiracy in which each member, however, pursued his own goals. A collusion in which each side did not know all the details of the game of the other side. Collusion, in which each side, despite the agreement, sought to replay the other. If we assume this, then all puzzled questions will receive logical and only possible answers. ”
Further, Vinogradov, from his ideal observation platform, the ambassador in Cairo, describes the attitudes of all the protagonists.
Egypt
For Sadat, who came to power after Nasser’s death and took an anti-Naser course, the internal situation became increasingly intolerable. His authority fell catastrophically even among his own people, the Egyptian bourgeoisie. Outside, he was isolated. There was only one hope - on relations with the United States. In order to get along with the United States, it is necessary to abandon close relations with the Soviet Union, and then improve its precarious situation inside and outside the country with the help of America.
What could be better for this purpose than military action? No, not war, but such actions that would not lead to defeat, but would help preserve dignity. For Sadat, the action plan is clear. Must be military action, they will help "relieve pressure" that has accumulated in the army. They must show what the Egyptian armed forces are capable of. These actions should not be designed for a major victory, it is not needed, it can not even be - after all, everyone says that the Egyptian army is equipped with low-quality Soviet weapons. Costs, military setbacks, etc. - all this will be written off at the expense of bad Soviet weapons and the political position of the Soviet Union, which can be blamed for snatching the victory from the hands of the Arabs.
Therefore, the task before the troops will be set minimal: forcing the Suez Canal, the seizure of the bridgehead - no matter what size - and hold it until the Americans come into play. They had to enter the Middle East.
USA
The wind of the national liberation movement threw the United States from the Middle East, and this area is very important for them: here are the world's largest oil reserves, here is the strategic Suez Canal, here are the southern southern approaches to the Soviet Union, here is the epicenter of the anti-colonial struggle. Here is the outpost of the United States - Israel, which rests on the fear of the Arabs. Israel needs to be supported, but the Arab states are getting stronger.
Israel needs to act more flexibly; by its policy - unyielding and rude - it prevents America from establishing ties with Arab countries. The United States has a double task in relation to Israel: to preserve it as its support, but also to bring down the pride, to force the Israelis to sacrifice the few to preserve the most important thing.
It is necessary to get the opportunity to "save" Israel, but first let the Arabs be able to beat the Israelis in a controlled manner: put a certain number of Israeli lives for the sake of the subsequent "salvation" of Israel.
The United States may have made it clear to Sadat that they have nothing against "limited" hostilities. So ironically, the United States knew about the upcoming military actions, and the ally of Egypt, the Soviet Union was not informed.
Israel
The Israeli ruling elite can not help the main patron and the feeder - the United States of America.
At the same time, the US also needs a stronger position in the Middle East. Who are their friends here besides Israel? One king Faisal. But if the USA enters the Middle East, the influence of the Soviet Union will diminish, and you can always agree with the capitalists, money does not smell for them. Americans need help, it is in the interests of Israel itself.
The weak link is Egypt. Everyone knows Sadat’s attitude toward progressive movement within the country and towards the Soviet Union. In addition, it is the largest Arab state. And with Syria, you can try to get rid of and by military means, there are good chances.
Together with the Americans, the idea was born to give up the line of defense along the canal and retreat to the passes. This also offered Rogers plan in 1971 year. But this, of course, as a last resort, but it is necessary to make war, not to give it away without a fight!
As for Syria, we must seize the opportunity and smash the Syrian armed forces. That is why the Israeli high command, having received information about an unprecedented concentration of Egyptian and Syrian troops, pulled all the troops to the borders of Syria and sent no reinforcements to Sinai, to the Suez Canal, from where much more powerful Egyptian troops seemed to be moving. Israeli soldiers in Sinai were to play their part in a political play - the role of martyrs who were predestined to slaughter.
Course of the game
Game Sadat fell from the start. Everything went wrong, as expected, Vinogradov writes. The Soviet Union resolutely acted on the side of the Arab states not only politically, but also the supply of the most modern military equipment. In fact, he took the risk of confrontation with the United States. Sadat never counted on it.
Another blow: Soviet weapons, possessed by Egyptian soldiers and officers, turned out to be of the highest quality. It was better than the American armed Israelis.
(As an Israeli soldier of that time, I must confirm the ambassador’s words. The Egyptians had legendary Kalashnikovs, and we had old-fashioned FN Belgian rifles, they had infantry equipped with “little ones”, Russian anti-tank missiles, and we had old 105 guns without recoil guns. Mm to fight with tanks. Until the new American weapons came, we could not cope.)
Another blow: the training of troops, achieved at one time under the guidance of Soviet advisers and specialists and in Soviet military instructions, in many cases surpassed the Israeli one. Plus high morale of soldiers and officers. It was all unexpected.
Egyptian forces forced the canal several times faster than planned. Losses accounted for just 10% - while planned at a rate of one third! The Arabs beat the Israelis. It was bad news for Sadat: crumbled game plans. What should the Americans do now? Sadat, roughly speaking, outplayed himself, played too well.
And so the Egyptian troops, having crossed the channel, got up. They simply took and stood three or five kilometers from the canal - there was no further military plans. There were no Israeli troops in front either, the main forces of Israel were occupied on the Syrian front. And Sadat began to expect the approach of the Israeli forces! Unbelievable, but true: he stood and waited for the Syrians to take the brunt of the entire Israeli army! He was waiting to give the Americans the opportunity to join the game, and all plans were violated.
The Israeli military command and political leadership were alarmed by the results of the first days of hostilities, which began to evolve in a completely different way than expected. Everything was aimed at Syria, but its own losses were great, and every kilometer became a nightmare. Rescued, however, Sadat: he stood and did not move, although all the troops could be transferred to Syria. The Syrians retreated, but their armed forces were not destroyed, the Soviet equipment made up for the failed ones, and after all, Israel’s goal was to completely destroy Syria militarily. This did not work out, but the Syrians could no longer attack Israel. Now it was necessary to punish Sadat - his army turned out to be too effective, and most importantly, during these days, he not only moved away from the Soviet Union, but seemed to approach him: after all, it was not without reason that he was sent a weapon along the air bridge. And sea shipments? Soviet ships went to Alexandria one by one.
The Israeli attack on Syria stops, the troops rush to the south, on Sinai, with an accelerated march, where Sadat is looking forward to them.
Jordan could have cut this vulnerable path from north to south, but this was not part of the game plans of the Americans and Sadat. Israeli forces rolled southward unhindered.
The breakthrough of the Israeli troops on the west coast of the Suez Canal is generally the darkest episode of this war. Here is one of two things: either the amazing military illiteracy of the Egyptians (and it is impossible to admit it), or a deliberate action (it is difficult to admit, but possible).
The striking complacency, even the president’s indifference to the very fact of the penetration of Israeli tanks, is striking. To all the questions, when the channel still swam across only five tanks, he answered: nothing serious, this is a “political” (?!) Operation. Even when a solid Israeli foothold formed on the west bank, Sadat did not cease to repeat that this group has no military significance in military terms!
The measures that seemed to have been taken to eliminate the breakthrough were simply ridiculous, the president did not heed any advice given to him from Moscow. He deliberately let the Israelis into Africa. Apparently, to the Israelis themselves, all this seemed very strange - in any case, eyewitnesses write.
Why the Americans did not stop the Israelis? The answer may lie in their desire to have a lever to put pressure on Sadat, Vinogradov writes.
Results
The United States "saved" Egypt by eliminating the Israeli breakthrough to the west bank of the canal.
The United States gave Israel an opportunity (with the help of Sadat) to deliver a strong military strike against Syria.
The United States, through subsequent disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, secured Israel, since zones were created with UN troops and the cease-fire commitments were again made.
The United States reimbursed Israel for all its losses in the war (of course, in technology, the Israeli casualties were not important to the United States).
The United States, with the help of Sadat, entered the Middle East, trying to demonstrate that they are the only possible peacekeepers in the area.
Sadat launched an anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union and everything connected with it as payment for services. And this was one of the main goals of the United States.
The position of Sadat in the first months after the October war in the country on the crest of "victories" was greatly strengthened.
Egypt in the first weeks after the war rightfully again took the lead among the Arab states.
The idea of socialism in the Arab world was dealt a severe blow.
But a year has passed and Sadat's position has rocked. The authority of Egypt fell again, Vinogradov wrote in January 1975 of the year.
The Syrians quickly understood Sadat’s game: 12’s October 1973, when Egyptian troops landed on the east bank of the Suez Canal suddenly stopped fighting, Syrian President Hafez Asad told the Soviet ambassador that he was confident in the conscious nature of Sadat’s actions, which he called a betrayal of towards Syria.
Not only the Russian ambassador in Damascus, but also Jordan’s Prime Minister Abu-Zeid Rifai, told Vinogradov about Syria’s opinion, saying that Assad was firmly convinced that the Israelis ’breakthrough to the west coast of the Suez Canal was done by Sadat’s consent - implementing its far-reaching disengagement plan and the introduction of the US in the Middle East.
According to Rifai, King Hussein of Jordan wanted to enter the war and cut Israeli communications, but Sadat told the Jordanians not to move. Jordanians also suspect Sadat of foul play, Vinogradov finishes.
Although suspicions of this kind were spread earlier, Vinogradov’s memorandum is the first serious document of the participant in the events who owned the information. Among Vinogradov's notes there are quite a few remarks that allow deciphering the history of American penetration into the Middle East and the history of the fall of Egypt - deindustrialized, impoverished, torn by internal contradictions and controlled by the military junta, closely related to the “fake war” of 1973.
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