Afghanistan, what did we pay for in blood?
The war in Afghanistan claimed thousands of lives of the best Soviet soldiers who devotedly served the ideals of their betrayed homeland — about this wording is estimated by modern politicians and historians from the events of nearly thirty-three years ago. However, there are other opinions regarding the entry of the Soviet contingent into this mountain region. Below we will discuss the reasons for the decision of the Soviet leaders to send the fortieth army to fight the Mujahideen and the Dushmans, as well as their consequences for both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, and for other interested international actors.
Considering the events of the early eighties, it should be said that Afghanistan was interested in the Soviet Union exclusively from the point of view of its own security. First, the territory of this state enjoyed special attention from the strategic adversary of the Soviets - the United States, and it was not prudent to cede influence in the region. Secondly, the existence of a common border obliged Soviet officials to closely monitor the ongoing changes within the neighboring state. Thirdly, the revolution that took place in April 1978, as a result of which the communist leader Nur Mohammed Taraki came to power, forced to support the development of a socialist state in this extremely backward country. Soon, attempts to carry out reforms came up against the resistance of the conservative part of society, even before the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, a civil war began there. In September, 1979, a new coup took place in Afghanistan - Taraki was overthrown, Amin seized power.
The April revolution and the civil war in Afghanistan proved for the Soviet leaders one of those unpleasant and unwelcome surprises that had a significant impact on the geopolitical situation in the region. On the one hand, the triumph of the pro-communist party should be perceived as an ideological victory, but on the other hand the USSR turned out to be completely unprepared for such a development of events. For the development of developed socialism in a Muslim country, the overwhelming majority of whose population was illiterate, enormous costs were required. In addition to financial investments, Afghanistan needed intellectual support, as there were no own specialists in almost all spheres of state life. Society was still at the stage of feudalism. In fact, Soviet officials were faced with a difficult choice: to help Afghanistan embark on the path of socialism and incur enormous costs, or to lose credibility in the international arena and get the country engulfed in civil war on its southern border, refusing to intervene. The USSR preferred to intervene in the conflict.
In deciding whether to enter the Soviet military forces, many of the politicians did not understand what this belligerent country actually represents. The operation was planned to be carried out with lightning speed, but this was the main miscalculation of the leadership. The idea of demonstrating the power of the Soviet Army to the international community, to put it mildly, was unsuccessful. However, loud accusations against Soviet officials who made the decision to send Soviet troops into the territory of a mountainous state cannot be called justified. Some political scientists claim that the Union simply had no other way out. In case of refusal to participate in the fate of Afghanistan, one of the parties would be supported by the United States, with the subsequent deployment of a system of missiles aimed in a certain direction. Today, the Russian man in the street at the mention of the Afghan war calls it meaningless and unsuccessful, some authors call the events in this state a crushing defeat. However, such statements are superficial and based on limited perception and lack of knowledge in this matter.
The best soldiers from the elite units were thrown into battle against the Mujahideen and the Dushmans, and the Soviet soldiers had to fight with a significant part of the local population. The pro-Soviet governments of Karmal, and then Najibullah, could not fulfill their promises, they used force methods to preserve power. Local residents, fanatically guarding their freedom, took such actions as an attempt to limit it. Skillful opposition propaganda intensified the fire of civil war. The complexity of the military operations was in the specific nature of the country: the population preferred the partisan variant of the confrontation and was well armed. In addition, Afghans from a very early age practiced possession of cold and gunshot weapons, although they did not have sufficient knowledge of tactics and strategies.
The situation was also aggravated by military assistance to the rebels from the United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and even the PRC.
European publications actively disseminated the shocking facts of the “Soviet occupation of peaceful Afghanistan,” which allowed pro-American states to send weapons to the rebels. The European powers sent the latest types of weapons to the region with the aim of testing and demonstrating them, covering their true goals with talk of support for a free nation. Refugees from the “hot spot” were accepted mainly by Islamist states. Today, the blatant facts of plundering humanitarian aid by Pakistani officials, as well as recruiting accidents to militant groups, are becoming known. The leaders of the belligerent opposition eagerly exploited the illiteracy and fanaticism of the local population, arming them against Soviet soldiers. Many of the rank-and-file militants sincerely believed that they were defending their fatherland and for the death of the infidel communists could deserve paradise after death. In addition, during the armed clashes, the complete inability and unwillingness of the government army of Afghanistan to shed blood for communist ideals became clear.
The fighting in the mountainous areas brought serious losses of personnel, but the army gained considerable combat experience. Officers and privates showed amazing courage and loyalty, operations were carried out at the highest level, Soviet paratroopers received loud fame. However, it was far from easy to fight the Afghans. Having suffered a crushing defeat in open clashes, they switched to a completely new tactic for the Soviet army of numerous ambushes, spontaneous attacks, night raids and the installation of stretch marks, as well as the mining of bridges, crossings and roads. The enemy possessed a wide network of agents and, at times, was aware of the upcoming operations in great detail. Losses among Soviet soldiers began to grow. Opposition leaders had a high level of education, including in military affairs, and each of them belonged to a wealthy class, which supported respect for them from the local population. However, the insurgents did not have enough competent commanders of low rank, and this circumstance was used as much as the Russians could.
The Soviet government, directing the military contingent, did not take into account the national characteristics of the country, which also increased human losses. Often, civilians took up arms under the cover of night and slaughtered sleeping Russian soldiers. As practice has shown, the laws of the European war are not being observed by Asians, and manifestations of honor are generally perceived as weakness and scorned. The rebels were not uniform. Among them were several groups, the main of which were considered moderate nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists. The Sunnis were present in both groups, while a small number of Shiite Muslims also had their own parties and gangs.
The flow of weapons to the rebels was established from Pakistan in a caravan way. In order to block supplies across the Pakistani border, Soviet commanders developed various operations, but failed to do this in practice. Despite the fact that the main border line was closed, weapons continued to flow, albeit in smaller quantities. Dushmans and Majahideen received military aid by caravans passing along narrow and unknown mountain paths, which were completely blocked out of the 40th Soviet army.
As a result of more than nine years of fierce battles that entailed enormous human, economic and moral costs, the military contingent did not achieve any significant result. Afghanistan, according to some political scientists, has become a “black hole”, which was absorbing millions of Soviet rubles and thousands of human lives at incredible speeds.
From the beginning of 1985, the Soviet government began to attempt to establish a dialogue with the most appropriate leaders of the bandit groups. The tactics of the Soviet military command has changed and now represented the organization of ambushes, as well as the conduct of individual reconnaissance operations, large-scale stripping stopped. The government army gained valuable combat experience and could carry out important military activities on its own. Gradually began the withdrawal of contingent from the country. In 1986, six regiments are withdrawn, while the PDPA publicly refuses a monopoly on power in the state. In Afghanistan, a new stage of development is beginning, fortunately, less bloody than the previous one.
The result of the Afghan war for the Soviet Union was an increase in discontent among the citizens. Many simply did not understand the causes and objectives of government action. They refused to believe in the slogans put forward, and mistrust appeared in society, fueled by stories of atrocities and failures in battles with the Mujahideen, as well as tears of parents who lost their sons. The consequences of the ferment of opinions caused by the Afghan war are still manifest in modern Russia.
The international community, unfortunately, did not take into account the sad experience of the USSR and after a few decades, NATO troops entered Afghanistan. Today, the problem of troop withdrawal is one of the most acute problems of the military-political alliance.
Considering the events of the early eighties, it should be said that Afghanistan was interested in the Soviet Union exclusively from the point of view of its own security. First, the territory of this state enjoyed special attention from the strategic adversary of the Soviets - the United States, and it was not prudent to cede influence in the region. Secondly, the existence of a common border obliged Soviet officials to closely monitor the ongoing changes within the neighboring state. Thirdly, the revolution that took place in April 1978, as a result of which the communist leader Nur Mohammed Taraki came to power, forced to support the development of a socialist state in this extremely backward country. Soon, attempts to carry out reforms came up against the resistance of the conservative part of society, even before the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, a civil war began there. In September, 1979, a new coup took place in Afghanistan - Taraki was overthrown, Amin seized power.
The April revolution and the civil war in Afghanistan proved for the Soviet leaders one of those unpleasant and unwelcome surprises that had a significant impact on the geopolitical situation in the region. On the one hand, the triumph of the pro-communist party should be perceived as an ideological victory, but on the other hand the USSR turned out to be completely unprepared for such a development of events. For the development of developed socialism in a Muslim country, the overwhelming majority of whose population was illiterate, enormous costs were required. In addition to financial investments, Afghanistan needed intellectual support, as there were no own specialists in almost all spheres of state life. Society was still at the stage of feudalism. In fact, Soviet officials were faced with a difficult choice: to help Afghanistan embark on the path of socialism and incur enormous costs, or to lose credibility in the international arena and get the country engulfed in civil war on its southern border, refusing to intervene. The USSR preferred to intervene in the conflict.
In deciding whether to enter the Soviet military forces, many of the politicians did not understand what this belligerent country actually represents. The operation was planned to be carried out with lightning speed, but this was the main miscalculation of the leadership. The idea of demonstrating the power of the Soviet Army to the international community, to put it mildly, was unsuccessful. However, loud accusations against Soviet officials who made the decision to send Soviet troops into the territory of a mountainous state cannot be called justified. Some political scientists claim that the Union simply had no other way out. In case of refusal to participate in the fate of Afghanistan, one of the parties would be supported by the United States, with the subsequent deployment of a system of missiles aimed in a certain direction. Today, the Russian man in the street at the mention of the Afghan war calls it meaningless and unsuccessful, some authors call the events in this state a crushing defeat. However, such statements are superficial and based on limited perception and lack of knowledge in this matter.
The best soldiers from the elite units were thrown into battle against the Mujahideen and the Dushmans, and the Soviet soldiers had to fight with a significant part of the local population. The pro-Soviet governments of Karmal, and then Najibullah, could not fulfill their promises, they used force methods to preserve power. Local residents, fanatically guarding their freedom, took such actions as an attempt to limit it. Skillful opposition propaganda intensified the fire of civil war. The complexity of the military operations was in the specific nature of the country: the population preferred the partisan variant of the confrontation and was well armed. In addition, Afghans from a very early age practiced possession of cold and gunshot weapons, although they did not have sufficient knowledge of tactics and strategies.
The situation was also aggravated by military assistance to the rebels from the United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and even the PRC.
European publications actively disseminated the shocking facts of the “Soviet occupation of peaceful Afghanistan,” which allowed pro-American states to send weapons to the rebels. The European powers sent the latest types of weapons to the region with the aim of testing and demonstrating them, covering their true goals with talk of support for a free nation. Refugees from the “hot spot” were accepted mainly by Islamist states. Today, the blatant facts of plundering humanitarian aid by Pakistani officials, as well as recruiting accidents to militant groups, are becoming known. The leaders of the belligerent opposition eagerly exploited the illiteracy and fanaticism of the local population, arming them against Soviet soldiers. Many of the rank-and-file militants sincerely believed that they were defending their fatherland and for the death of the infidel communists could deserve paradise after death. In addition, during the armed clashes, the complete inability and unwillingness of the government army of Afghanistan to shed blood for communist ideals became clear.
The fighting in the mountainous areas brought serious losses of personnel, but the army gained considerable combat experience. Officers and privates showed amazing courage and loyalty, operations were carried out at the highest level, Soviet paratroopers received loud fame. However, it was far from easy to fight the Afghans. Having suffered a crushing defeat in open clashes, they switched to a completely new tactic for the Soviet army of numerous ambushes, spontaneous attacks, night raids and the installation of stretch marks, as well as the mining of bridges, crossings and roads. The enemy possessed a wide network of agents and, at times, was aware of the upcoming operations in great detail. Losses among Soviet soldiers began to grow. Opposition leaders had a high level of education, including in military affairs, and each of them belonged to a wealthy class, which supported respect for them from the local population. However, the insurgents did not have enough competent commanders of low rank, and this circumstance was used as much as the Russians could.
The Soviet government, directing the military contingent, did not take into account the national characteristics of the country, which also increased human losses. Often, civilians took up arms under the cover of night and slaughtered sleeping Russian soldiers. As practice has shown, the laws of the European war are not being observed by Asians, and manifestations of honor are generally perceived as weakness and scorned. The rebels were not uniform. Among them were several groups, the main of which were considered moderate nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists. The Sunnis were present in both groups, while a small number of Shiite Muslims also had their own parties and gangs.
The flow of weapons to the rebels was established from Pakistan in a caravan way. In order to block supplies across the Pakistani border, Soviet commanders developed various operations, but failed to do this in practice. Despite the fact that the main border line was closed, weapons continued to flow, albeit in smaller quantities. Dushmans and Majahideen received military aid by caravans passing along narrow and unknown mountain paths, which were completely blocked out of the 40th Soviet army.
As a result of more than nine years of fierce battles that entailed enormous human, economic and moral costs, the military contingent did not achieve any significant result. Afghanistan, according to some political scientists, has become a “black hole”, which was absorbing millions of Soviet rubles and thousands of human lives at incredible speeds.
From the beginning of 1985, the Soviet government began to attempt to establish a dialogue with the most appropriate leaders of the bandit groups. The tactics of the Soviet military command has changed and now represented the organization of ambushes, as well as the conduct of individual reconnaissance operations, large-scale stripping stopped. The government army gained valuable combat experience and could carry out important military activities on its own. Gradually began the withdrawal of contingent from the country. In 1986, six regiments are withdrawn, while the PDPA publicly refuses a monopoly on power in the state. In Afghanistan, a new stage of development is beginning, fortunately, less bloody than the previous one.
The result of the Afghan war for the Soviet Union was an increase in discontent among the citizens. Many simply did not understand the causes and objectives of government action. They refused to believe in the slogans put forward, and mistrust appeared in society, fueled by stories of atrocities and failures in battles with the Mujahideen, as well as tears of parents who lost their sons. The consequences of the ferment of opinions caused by the Afghan war are still manifest in modern Russia.
The international community, unfortunately, did not take into account the sad experience of the USSR and after a few decades, NATO troops entered Afghanistan. Today, the problem of troop withdrawal is one of the most acute problems of the military-political alliance.
Information