Dotted Libya
Along with Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan, Libya is one of the hottest spots in the Near and Middle East. After the destruction of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi and his own country as a whole, there is no more.
Tribal alliances, clans, Islamists and fragments of Gaddafi’s army are fighting over pipelines, oil terminals, control of the coast and deserted internal Libya, paying little attention to the UN and its special representatives. Some support Egypt and the UAE. Others - Qatar and Turkey. Saudi Arabia plays a role in the Libyan conflict. EU countries, Russia and the United States in Libya are competing. Despite its internal instability, neighboring Tunisia is used by external players (primarily Washington) as a springboard from which to try to influence the Libyan situation. But there are special interests in what is happening in Libya, in Algeria, seized on the threshold of a possible change of the supreme leadership of an acute economic crisis in the near future. Let's look at the situation from this point of view, based on the materials of the experts of the Institute of Informatics Biology S. Balmasov and A. Bystrov.
Long way to negotiation
The settlement of the crisis is possible only through dialogue between Libyans, and the country has every chance to fix it. This was announced on April 19 by the Algerian Minister for the Maghreb, the African Union and the League of Arab States A. Mesahel, while traveling to the Libyan city of Zintan. Algeria has been participating in international mediation efforts aimed at a political settlement of the Libyan crisis since the end of 2016. Previously, these attempts were blocked by Moroccans within the framework of the “Shirarat agreements”, which they conducted in tandem with the UN special representative M. Kobler. As a result, a government of national consensus (PNS) was created, headed by F. Saraj. However, ignoring the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Tobruk, Marshal H. Haftar, who wanted to be the Minister of Defense of Libya, led to the beginning of a political crisis.
The Missurata and part of the Tripolitan representatives in the presidential council at Saraj refused to accept Huftar as a negotiating partner. This intensified the alliance of the three main sponsors of Tobruk: Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Now we can say that it was a political-military program to eliminate the system of tri-power in the country and establish control over the main hydrocarbon fields and oil terminals in the zone of the "Libyan oil crescent." At the same time, the Algerian mediation program was launched with the involvement of Tunisia. The president of this country, B. K. Es-Sebsi, depends on the Algerian elite and has joined the system of building a new model of mediation, trying to remove Rabat from the game and fail the UN plan to resolve the Libyan crisis, supported by Rome.
Paris and, to a lesser extent, Washington stand behind Tobruk and his sponsors. For Saraj and Misuratov, which constitute its main combat force, are Italy and Qatar. There are tripolitans who, at the beginning of 2017, started a revolt against Saraj and Haftar. Their leader, H. Al-Ghveli, wants to re-establish the General National Congress (OWC), which ceased to exist on the basis of the “Shirati agreements”. It can be assumed that Doha was behind the Tripolitans, who decided to thwart the attempts of Saraj with the support of the UN Special Representative Kobler and Rome to agree with Hoftar on his entry into the PNS. Part of the Misuratov clans also tended to this. Al-Ghveli’s speech against Qataris and Turks failed these attempts.
As a consequence, the main parties to the intra-Libyan conflict are facing a rejection of the prospect of preserving the “united and indivisible Libya” because of the impossibility of doing it by military means with fundamental differences on the division of power. The attack a month ago by the militants of the Benghazi Liberation Brigade (BOB) of the oil terminals of Ras Lanuf and Es Sidr was a landmark for such sentiments. BOB sponsors Qatar, and its militants get weapons from arsenals in Misrata. This attack was the end of an attempt by Rome and the UN to preserve the “Shirati agreements”. A counterattack by the forces of Haftar followed, supported by front-line attack aircraft, piloted by Americans employed by the UAE Akademiya. Sidr and Ras Lanuf were beaten off in March, and Haftar began to attack the southern part of Libya - Fezzan.
The success of this operation should put under the control of Tobruk the extraction and shipment of oil from the south-western fields, giving him the opportunity to export. This makes the problem of political survival of the Mysuratovs and Tripolitans extremely acute. In addition, Sebha is the largest logistics hub on the way from Chad and Niger, as well as the largest gold trading center in the south of the country, and local sheikhs made their fortunes. Sebha - and a transshipment center for channels of illegal migration from Africa through Libya to the EU countries. In addition to the sums that remain with local intermediaries, there is the prospect of receiving large financial grants from the EU to fight it. Control of Sebha makes her master a political partner of the EU.
The future of Libya is decided in Fezzan. Huftar forces are trying to develop an attack on Tammenhaft airport 20 kilometers from Sebha. Possessing an absolute advantage in the air, the marshal's army is experiencing problems "on the ground" due to the resistance of local tribes. Tamenkhant is being defended by misuratovs from the “third force”, BOB and the National Guard tripolitan al-Gwayli. This confirms that today they are all fed and controlled by Qatar. The Aulyad Suleiman tribe, which controls Sebhu, refused to support Haftar. Previously, support for the "third force" had a tuba. A month ago, Tobruk was counting on assistance from Aulyad Suleiman and part of the tuba. But the negotiations on the achievement of a compromise between these tribes, operatively organized by the Italians and representatives of the government of Saraj in late March - early April in Italy, these plans brought down.
Haftar lost not only the assistance of the sheikhs, Aulyad Suleiman, but also the support in the clan Tuba in the person of Sheikh M. Sidi Kali, who, after returning from Rome, refused him alliance. At the same time, Italy created a frontier guard out of the fighters and Aulad Suleiman to fight the penetration of Islamists and illegal migrants into Libya. Part of the funds for this should provide the EU. The diplomatic victory of Rome means the defeat of Paris, which had leverage on the sheikhs of Aulad Suleiman since the Second World War. France was "knocked down" by the presidential election: the activity of its administration and the military in the Libyan direction had faded, taking into account the forthcoming cadre rotation.
Italy’s interest in the control over Fezzan is due to the fact that the main hydrocarbon asset of the Italian ENI in the region is the Elephant (Al-Fiil) field, connected by the Rayaniyya pipeline to the Sharar field (owned by NOC-Repsol-Total-OMV-Statoil). The local "oil guard" under the command of field commander A. Bakr al-Suki since December 2016 has blocked Al-Fiyil. Now al-Suki is an ally of Mysuratov and has provided them with fighters. This became possible after the Saraj government paid off wage arrears at the expense of ENI. At the same time, oil pumping began in the interests of the main partner of Italians in Libya: Libyan National Oil Corp (NOC-West).
The second force that blocked the work of this oil hub, were the fighters of the Zintan tribe, who were considered allies of Khaftar. They curtailed support for Tobruk, the Haftra offensive, and activity in the region. The reason is an agreement of understanding with the misuratovists, reached in 2017 year with the mediation of Rome. It is respected, and oil production and transportation has begun. Its interruption in March and mid-April was the fault of unknown detachments. We can talk about the gangs of supporters of the IG, who departed from under Sirte, and sabotage by the people of Haftar.
The latter is seeking footholds among the tribes of Fezzan. He entered into negotiations with the tribe of megarh, to which his main field commander in the area, M. Ben Nail, belongs, and with the tribe of Gaddaf, which has an armed militia and extremely hostile relations with Auliyad Suleiman. In 2016, armed clashes broke out between them in Sebha. Southeastern tribes can become another ally of Khaftar, above all Zvay, to which his mother belongs. But this tribe is based in Kufra, far from Sebha. The eastern tuba of the Galmai clan also lives there, while supporting Haftar. But they will not be able to seriously influence the situation. This forces Algeria to try to launch intra-Libyan negotiations through its own mediation, for which the Minister for the Maghreb went on a Libyan tour.
At the same time, the Tunisian president of es-Sebsi is advancing to the front line, who should, through the leader of the An-Nahd party (Tunisian analogue of the Muslim Brotherhood) R. Gannush, reanimate contacts with Qatar and the Tripolitan Brothers. This was resisted by Haftar, who plans to meet with Es-Sebsi in Tunis before discussing the new format of participants before the start of Ramadan (May 26). His sponsors, Abu Dhabi and Cairo, are categorically opposed to the participation of the Prokatarian “Brothers” in the negotiation process and have once managed to prevent Gannush from participating in the peacekeeping efforts of Algeria. This makes the Algerian-Tunisian mission of resuming negotiations extremely problematic.
Algerian "non-intervention"
The Algerian leadership is demonstrating dissatisfaction with the actions in Libya of the “big powers”, primarily the United States and Russia. During his visit to Libya, Mesahel said that the purpose of the trip was “to protect the political dialogue threatened by the claims and actions of the United States and the Russian Federation, which could further internationalize the crisis.” The statement was made at a meeting with Marshal Haftar and Chairman of the Parliament A. Salah. He proposed to do "without the intervention of foreign powers not bordering the Libyan territory." According to the logic of the Algerian authorities, if Russia starts trying to solve other people's problems, increasing its political influence, the United States, in order to prevent its gain, try to carry out a counter-project - with its own hands or with the help of its allies, which aggravates the crisis and postpones its decision. According to Algeria, examples of such developments are the situations in Syria and Ukraine, repeating in Libya. This response from the leadership of the ANDR was due to reports that the new US administration was considering the question of dividing Libya into Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan with options for their additional crushing. Accordingly, according to Mesachel, the next clash of Americans and Russians on foreign territory will only lead to another round of confrontation, and he openly declares that his mission is aimed at “carrying a message of hope from Algeria who does not want to see a repetition of the tragedy of terrorism in Libya”.
The Libyan interlocutors of Mesahel welcomed the efforts of Algeria in bringing the Libyans' points of view closer, although representatives of Benghazi hinted that not everyone welcomes the intervention of Algeria itself. The Algerians are trying to strengthen the position of the government of Saraj, for which Mesahel met with representatives of the Zintan brigade, an ally of Haftar. Her presence on the distant approaches to Tripoli (about 200 km to the south) makes him vulnerable, does not allow Haftar to fight outside Tripolitania and send enough troops to Fezzan to win the battle for Tamenhunt air base. According to the Algerian leaders, the Kirenaik Marshal, feeling the support of Russia and Egypt, torpedoes peacemaking efforts. At the same time, Saraj called on the EU, the UN and the League of Arab States to take "urgent actions to end the military escalation in southern Libya."
Algeria’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s actions is also related to consultations held in April in Moscow with representatives of Misurata, Haftar’s opponent, on the path to uniting Libya. The leadership of the ANDR suspects Russia of trying to “buy misurattsev.” Algeria cannot help but express concern about this, since, in his estimation, “battalions from Misrata play an important role in repelling Haftar’s offensive against the Tamenhant base in Fezzan”. Concerns about the ADR exacerbate the fact that the situation for Saraj is worsening in Tripoli, where despite the March truce between the local militia and government forces, the latter, according to Algerian estimates, "loses control of the capital," while sympathy for Haftar as "a strong ruler" grow up.
Note that this was the first open expression of dissatisfaction on the part of Algeria over the actions of Russia and the United States in Libya. However, Algeria cannot force Moscow to change its position. He is unable to refuse to export Russian weapons. At the same time, trade relations between the two countries are at a minimum level (excluding military-technical cooperation less than a billion dollars a year). That is, economically, Algeria is not able to act on Russia and is trying to influence Libyan leaders, but it does not have the tools to subjugate it, since bribery attempts, as practice shows, are not universal levers. Algeria does not have the resources to resist the “big powers”, although it can cool its relations with both Russia and the United States, which is too expensive for ANDDR for the intrigues in Libya.
Minority factor
As stated above, the main events in the struggle for power in Libya are unfolding between the forces of Marshal Haftar and the allied forces of the Saraj government (including from Misrata), but the third influential party to the conflict are members of national minorities. Nablus Berbers distance themselves from engaging in war on either side in Tripoli, retaining their strength. For other minorities, the situation is not so straightforward. The Tuaregs who supported Gaddafi were forced to leave many areas or weaken their influence in them, moving away to the extreme south-west of the country or in Mali. Negroid tuba in the Libyan south fighting with neighboring Arab tribes for almost the entire existence of Libya without Gaddafi.
Located along the Libyan border, the tuba gained control over the movement of goods and people through it, which, in the face of declining revenues from the export of hydrocarbons, became one of the most important sources of income for the country's population. For him are bloody clashes with Arab (and sometimes with the Tuareg) neighbors. Over the past six years, the tuba has shown itself to be a force to be reckoned with. Meanwhile, for a long time, the tube problem was considered peripheral. The main battle for power in Libya was in a densely populated coastal strip, including control of the oil ports. However, now that the country has become a “migration springboard” for people in Africa who want to get to Europe, even Brussels had to reckon with it.
At the beginning of 2017, the government of Saraj signed an agreement with the European Union to establish control over migration flows from Libya. The role of the tuba, which influence the situation on the southern border, which neither Haftar nor Tripoli control, has also automatically increased. Under these conditions, in parallel, including with the Algerian mediation (through the channels of the special services through their communications in Chad), consultations began between the government of Saraj and the tuba. In April, they first signed with Deputy Saraj A. Kedjman, and then broke off the agreement on control of the southern borders of the country, aimed mainly against illegal migration. A significant part of potential migrants to Europe is entering Libya in the border-controlled part of the border. Industrial goods (including cigarettes and food), livestock, drugs and weapons are transported along the same route.
The situation arose due to the lack of unity in the ranks of the tuba. According to the data of Algeria, the “border” agreement was canceled by the National Assembly of the tuba, the interests of which (participation in the sharing of profits from cross-border smuggling) were not taken into account. This caused clashes between the tuba. On the other hand, their discontent caused violation of the agreements by the parties. It was about claims for control over the border by the Arab competitors tuba. In this regard, Algerian sources report clashes in the cities of Murzuk, Sebha and Oubari. The situation plays into Haftar’s hand, testifying to the weakness and inability of Saraj to unify the country.
Despite autonomy from the center, the leaders of the Tuba are in no hurry to “leave” the broken country, whose presence allows them to benefit from agreements between the EU and Tripoli. Their strength is not too great (the number of Libyan tubas is 52 – 60 thousand). A significant part consider the entry into “reconstituted” Libya with the establishment of a stable government less evil than the war with the Arabs. They do not have warm feelings for Haftar, whose power reminds many of them of the discrimination of the times of Gaddafi, but among them he deserved his position as a person with greater capabilities than Saraj to restore order and establish a unified power. Other leaders of Libya also seek to attract the tube to their side, so that, thanks to their influence on the border situation, they should put themselves in an advantageous position before the European Union.
The unwillingness of a full-scale war with them was caused by fears that if the situation escalated, their numerous brethren from Chad, Sudan and Niger (more than 650 thousand people) would come out on the side of the Libyan tuba. As for the Algerian authorities, they do not have positions among the Libyan minorities. So far, they have concentrated on Tripoli and Benghazi. Only at the expense of its capabilities in Chad and Niger, Algeria is able to influence the Libyan tuba, influencing the EU’s reaction to Libya ...
Tribal alliances, clans, Islamists and fragments of Gaddafi’s army are fighting over pipelines, oil terminals, control of the coast and deserted internal Libya, paying little attention to the UN and its special representatives. Some support Egypt and the UAE. Others - Qatar and Turkey. Saudi Arabia plays a role in the Libyan conflict. EU countries, Russia and the United States in Libya are competing. Despite its internal instability, neighboring Tunisia is used by external players (primarily Washington) as a springboard from which to try to influence the Libyan situation. But there are special interests in what is happening in Libya, in Algeria, seized on the threshold of a possible change of the supreme leadership of an acute economic crisis in the near future. Let's look at the situation from this point of view, based on the materials of the experts of the Institute of Informatics Biology S. Balmasov and A. Bystrov.
Long way to negotiation
The settlement of the crisis is possible only through dialogue between Libyans, and the country has every chance to fix it. This was announced on April 19 by the Algerian Minister for the Maghreb, the African Union and the League of Arab States A. Mesahel, while traveling to the Libyan city of Zintan. Algeria has been participating in international mediation efforts aimed at a political settlement of the Libyan crisis since the end of 2016. Previously, these attempts were blocked by Moroccans within the framework of the “Shirarat agreements”, which they conducted in tandem with the UN special representative M. Kobler. As a result, a government of national consensus (PNS) was created, headed by F. Saraj. However, ignoring the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Tobruk, Marshal H. Haftar, who wanted to be the Minister of Defense of Libya, led to the beginning of a political crisis.
The Missurata and part of the Tripolitan representatives in the presidential council at Saraj refused to accept Huftar as a negotiating partner. This intensified the alliance of the three main sponsors of Tobruk: Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Now we can say that it was a political-military program to eliminate the system of tri-power in the country and establish control over the main hydrocarbon fields and oil terminals in the zone of the "Libyan oil crescent." At the same time, the Algerian mediation program was launched with the involvement of Tunisia. The president of this country, B. K. Es-Sebsi, depends on the Algerian elite and has joined the system of building a new model of mediation, trying to remove Rabat from the game and fail the UN plan to resolve the Libyan crisis, supported by Rome.
Paris and, to a lesser extent, Washington stand behind Tobruk and his sponsors. For Saraj and Misuratov, which constitute its main combat force, are Italy and Qatar. There are tripolitans who, at the beginning of 2017, started a revolt against Saraj and Haftar. Their leader, H. Al-Ghveli, wants to re-establish the General National Congress (OWC), which ceased to exist on the basis of the “Shirati agreements”. It can be assumed that Doha was behind the Tripolitans, who decided to thwart the attempts of Saraj with the support of the UN Special Representative Kobler and Rome to agree with Hoftar on his entry into the PNS. Part of the Misuratov clans also tended to this. Al-Ghveli’s speech against Qataris and Turks failed these attempts.
As a consequence, the main parties to the intra-Libyan conflict are facing a rejection of the prospect of preserving the “united and indivisible Libya” because of the impossibility of doing it by military means with fundamental differences on the division of power. The attack a month ago by the militants of the Benghazi Liberation Brigade (BOB) of the oil terminals of Ras Lanuf and Es Sidr was a landmark for such sentiments. BOB sponsors Qatar, and its militants get weapons from arsenals in Misrata. This attack was the end of an attempt by Rome and the UN to preserve the “Shirati agreements”. A counterattack by the forces of Haftar followed, supported by front-line attack aircraft, piloted by Americans employed by the UAE Akademiya. Sidr and Ras Lanuf were beaten off in March, and Haftar began to attack the southern part of Libya - Fezzan.
The success of this operation should put under the control of Tobruk the extraction and shipment of oil from the south-western fields, giving him the opportunity to export. This makes the problem of political survival of the Mysuratovs and Tripolitans extremely acute. In addition, Sebha is the largest logistics hub on the way from Chad and Niger, as well as the largest gold trading center in the south of the country, and local sheikhs made their fortunes. Sebha - and a transshipment center for channels of illegal migration from Africa through Libya to the EU countries. In addition to the sums that remain with local intermediaries, there is the prospect of receiving large financial grants from the EU to fight it. Control of Sebha makes her master a political partner of the EU.
The future of Libya is decided in Fezzan. Huftar forces are trying to develop an attack on Tammenhaft airport 20 kilometers from Sebha. Possessing an absolute advantage in the air, the marshal's army is experiencing problems "on the ground" due to the resistance of local tribes. Tamenkhant is being defended by misuratovs from the “third force”, BOB and the National Guard tripolitan al-Gwayli. This confirms that today they are all fed and controlled by Qatar. The Aulyad Suleiman tribe, which controls Sebhu, refused to support Haftar. Previously, support for the "third force" had a tuba. A month ago, Tobruk was counting on assistance from Aulyad Suleiman and part of the tuba. But the negotiations on the achievement of a compromise between these tribes, operatively organized by the Italians and representatives of the government of Saraj in late March - early April in Italy, these plans brought down.Haftar lost not only the assistance of the sheikhs, Aulyad Suleiman, but also the support in the clan Tuba in the person of Sheikh M. Sidi Kali, who, after returning from Rome, refused him alliance. At the same time, Italy created a frontier guard out of the fighters and Aulad Suleiman to fight the penetration of Islamists and illegal migrants into Libya. Part of the funds for this should provide the EU. The diplomatic victory of Rome means the defeat of Paris, which had leverage on the sheikhs of Aulad Suleiman since the Second World War. France was "knocked down" by the presidential election: the activity of its administration and the military in the Libyan direction had faded, taking into account the forthcoming cadre rotation.
Italy’s interest in the control over Fezzan is due to the fact that the main hydrocarbon asset of the Italian ENI in the region is the Elephant (Al-Fiil) field, connected by the Rayaniyya pipeline to the Sharar field (owned by NOC-Repsol-Total-OMV-Statoil). The local "oil guard" under the command of field commander A. Bakr al-Suki since December 2016 has blocked Al-Fiyil. Now al-Suki is an ally of Mysuratov and has provided them with fighters. This became possible after the Saraj government paid off wage arrears at the expense of ENI. At the same time, oil pumping began in the interests of the main partner of Italians in Libya: Libyan National Oil Corp (NOC-West).
The second force that blocked the work of this oil hub, were the fighters of the Zintan tribe, who were considered allies of Khaftar. They curtailed support for Tobruk, the Haftra offensive, and activity in the region. The reason is an agreement of understanding with the misuratovists, reached in 2017 year with the mediation of Rome. It is respected, and oil production and transportation has begun. Its interruption in March and mid-April was the fault of unknown detachments. We can talk about the gangs of supporters of the IG, who departed from under Sirte, and sabotage by the people of Haftar.
The latter is seeking footholds among the tribes of Fezzan. He entered into negotiations with the tribe of megarh, to which his main field commander in the area, M. Ben Nail, belongs, and with the tribe of Gaddaf, which has an armed militia and extremely hostile relations with Auliyad Suleiman. In 2016, armed clashes broke out between them in Sebha. Southeastern tribes can become another ally of Khaftar, above all Zvay, to which his mother belongs. But this tribe is based in Kufra, far from Sebha. The eastern tuba of the Galmai clan also lives there, while supporting Haftar. But they will not be able to seriously influence the situation. This forces Algeria to try to launch intra-Libyan negotiations through its own mediation, for which the Minister for the Maghreb went on a Libyan tour.
At the same time, the Tunisian president of es-Sebsi is advancing to the front line, who should, through the leader of the An-Nahd party (Tunisian analogue of the Muslim Brotherhood) R. Gannush, reanimate contacts with Qatar and the Tripolitan Brothers. This was resisted by Haftar, who plans to meet with Es-Sebsi in Tunis before discussing the new format of participants before the start of Ramadan (May 26). His sponsors, Abu Dhabi and Cairo, are categorically opposed to the participation of the Prokatarian “Brothers” in the negotiation process and have once managed to prevent Gannush from participating in the peacekeeping efforts of Algeria. This makes the Algerian-Tunisian mission of resuming negotiations extremely problematic.
Algerian "non-intervention"
The Algerian leadership is demonstrating dissatisfaction with the actions in Libya of the “big powers”, primarily the United States and Russia. During his visit to Libya, Mesahel said that the purpose of the trip was “to protect the political dialogue threatened by the claims and actions of the United States and the Russian Federation, which could further internationalize the crisis.” The statement was made at a meeting with Marshal Haftar and Chairman of the Parliament A. Salah. He proposed to do "without the intervention of foreign powers not bordering the Libyan territory." According to the logic of the Algerian authorities, if Russia starts trying to solve other people's problems, increasing its political influence, the United States, in order to prevent its gain, try to carry out a counter-project - with its own hands or with the help of its allies, which aggravates the crisis and postpones its decision. According to Algeria, examples of such developments are the situations in Syria and Ukraine, repeating in Libya. This response from the leadership of the ANDR was due to reports that the new US administration was considering the question of dividing Libya into Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan with options for their additional crushing. Accordingly, according to Mesachel, the next clash of Americans and Russians on foreign territory will only lead to another round of confrontation, and he openly declares that his mission is aimed at “carrying a message of hope from Algeria who does not want to see a repetition of the tragedy of terrorism in Libya”.
The Libyan interlocutors of Mesahel welcomed the efforts of Algeria in bringing the Libyans' points of view closer, although representatives of Benghazi hinted that not everyone welcomes the intervention of Algeria itself. The Algerians are trying to strengthen the position of the government of Saraj, for which Mesahel met with representatives of the Zintan brigade, an ally of Haftar. Her presence on the distant approaches to Tripoli (about 200 km to the south) makes him vulnerable, does not allow Haftar to fight outside Tripolitania and send enough troops to Fezzan to win the battle for Tamenhunt air base. According to the Algerian leaders, the Kirenaik Marshal, feeling the support of Russia and Egypt, torpedoes peacemaking efforts. At the same time, Saraj called on the EU, the UN and the League of Arab States to take "urgent actions to end the military escalation in southern Libya."
Algeria’s dissatisfaction with Russia’s actions is also related to consultations held in April in Moscow with representatives of Misurata, Haftar’s opponent, on the path to uniting Libya. The leadership of the ANDR suspects Russia of trying to “buy misurattsev.” Algeria cannot help but express concern about this, since, in his estimation, “battalions from Misrata play an important role in repelling Haftar’s offensive against the Tamenhant base in Fezzan”. Concerns about the ADR exacerbate the fact that the situation for Saraj is worsening in Tripoli, where despite the March truce between the local militia and government forces, the latter, according to Algerian estimates, "loses control of the capital," while sympathy for Haftar as "a strong ruler" grow up.
Note that this was the first open expression of dissatisfaction on the part of Algeria over the actions of Russia and the United States in Libya. However, Algeria cannot force Moscow to change its position. He is unable to refuse to export Russian weapons. At the same time, trade relations between the two countries are at a minimum level (excluding military-technical cooperation less than a billion dollars a year). That is, economically, Algeria is not able to act on Russia and is trying to influence Libyan leaders, but it does not have the tools to subjugate it, since bribery attempts, as practice shows, are not universal levers. Algeria does not have the resources to resist the “big powers”, although it can cool its relations with both Russia and the United States, which is too expensive for ANDDR for the intrigues in Libya.
Minority factor
As stated above, the main events in the struggle for power in Libya are unfolding between the forces of Marshal Haftar and the allied forces of the Saraj government (including from Misrata), but the third influential party to the conflict are members of national minorities. Nablus Berbers distance themselves from engaging in war on either side in Tripoli, retaining their strength. For other minorities, the situation is not so straightforward. The Tuaregs who supported Gaddafi were forced to leave many areas or weaken their influence in them, moving away to the extreme south-west of the country or in Mali. Negroid tuba in the Libyan south fighting with neighboring Arab tribes for almost the entire existence of Libya without Gaddafi.
Located along the Libyan border, the tuba gained control over the movement of goods and people through it, which, in the face of declining revenues from the export of hydrocarbons, became one of the most important sources of income for the country's population. For him are bloody clashes with Arab (and sometimes with the Tuareg) neighbors. Over the past six years, the tuba has shown itself to be a force to be reckoned with. Meanwhile, for a long time, the tube problem was considered peripheral. The main battle for power in Libya was in a densely populated coastal strip, including control of the oil ports. However, now that the country has become a “migration springboard” for people in Africa who want to get to Europe, even Brussels had to reckon with it.
At the beginning of 2017, the government of Saraj signed an agreement with the European Union to establish control over migration flows from Libya. The role of the tuba, which influence the situation on the southern border, which neither Haftar nor Tripoli control, has also automatically increased. Under these conditions, in parallel, including with the Algerian mediation (through the channels of the special services through their communications in Chad), consultations began between the government of Saraj and the tuba. In April, they first signed with Deputy Saraj A. Kedjman, and then broke off the agreement on control of the southern borders of the country, aimed mainly against illegal migration. A significant part of potential migrants to Europe is entering Libya in the border-controlled part of the border. Industrial goods (including cigarettes and food), livestock, drugs and weapons are transported along the same route.
The situation arose due to the lack of unity in the ranks of the tuba. According to the data of Algeria, the “border” agreement was canceled by the National Assembly of the tuba, the interests of which (participation in the sharing of profits from cross-border smuggling) were not taken into account. This caused clashes between the tuba. On the other hand, their discontent caused violation of the agreements by the parties. It was about claims for control over the border by the Arab competitors tuba. In this regard, Algerian sources report clashes in the cities of Murzuk, Sebha and Oubari. The situation plays into Haftar’s hand, testifying to the weakness and inability of Saraj to unify the country.
Despite autonomy from the center, the leaders of the Tuba are in no hurry to “leave” the broken country, whose presence allows them to benefit from agreements between the EU and Tripoli. Their strength is not too great (the number of Libyan tubas is 52 – 60 thousand). A significant part consider the entry into “reconstituted” Libya with the establishment of a stable government less evil than the war with the Arabs. They do not have warm feelings for Haftar, whose power reminds many of them of the discrimination of the times of Gaddafi, but among them he deserved his position as a person with greater capabilities than Saraj to restore order and establish a unified power. Other leaders of Libya also seek to attract the tube to their side, so that, thanks to their influence on the border situation, they should put themselves in an advantageous position before the European Union.
The unwillingness of a full-scale war with them was caused by fears that if the situation escalated, their numerous brethren from Chad, Sudan and Niger (more than 650 thousand people) would come out on the side of the Libyan tuba. As for the Algerian authorities, they do not have positions among the Libyan minorities. So far, they have concentrated on Tripoli and Benghazi. Only at the expense of its capabilities in Chad and Niger, Algeria is able to influence the Libyan tuba, influencing the EU’s reaction to Libya ...
Information