Strategic prepayment
The new US administration carries out a kind of running on the spot. At the same time, a significant number of players in the international arena expect from it no longer vague and contradictory signals, but the announcement of a more or less meaningful program of action. The “waiting list” includes the vision of the Atlantic security system, the Ukrainian crisis, the US position in Iraq and Syria - the main problem regions of the Middle East.
The delay of the White House forces the parties to conflicts to deal with pressing issues on their own. Such a situation is dangerous primarily because in recent years the United States has directly or indirectly (which does not mean effectively) intervened in almost all key problems. The format of their decision exclusively at the regional level is new. On the one hand, it gives relative hope for practical results due to the specifics of the players' demands, on the other hand, it extremely complicates the negotiation field, the interaction mechanisms in which the participants have not worked out at all.
The steps that the White House is taking today, in terms of preparation and study, do not yet correspond to the scale of the goals and objectives set by Trump and his team. The White House, apparently, is guided by the formula "We take a step, if there is at least some profit from it." This inevitably leads (and leads) to a rather chaotic “pinprick”, which nevertheless can have long-lasting consequences. Therefore, the lack of clarity in the Russian-American negotiation process urgently requires Moscow to begin decisive steps to anticipate and anticipate with a focus on regional forces and coalitions. The challenges in the Middle East for Russia belong to the category of strategic, as they directly affect the maintenance and functioning of the commodity and currency markets. The extremely important factors that can be identified in this direction are quite visible contours of the end of the storming of Mosul and the subsequent (already real) raising the question of the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. The problems that will entail these processes will inevitably lead to a merger of the Syrian and Iraqi nodes into a single whole, which will require Russia to significantly expand the public policy boundaries in the region.
Kurdish land gatherer
Against the background of the strengthening of the economic relations of Ankara and Erbil, supported by the agreements of T. Erdogan and M. Barzani on access to the Turkish market, as well as resuscitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline early last year, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan is preparing to proceed to practical actions. The strengthening of Erbil’s positions was ensured by the victorious operations of the Peshmerga against the IG (banned in Russia), as well as by the equally successful consolidation of Kurdish and Arab tribes of the provinces of Nainava and Kirkuk, which today allows the Barzani regime to bring the important oil-bearing regions to its influence. He repeatedly blackmailed Baghdad with plans for separation, beating out for himself all the new preferences or deciding in his favor the questions of the division of raw materials and political dividends. However, it is currently able to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for real independence.
Having achieved recognition from Kurdish Shiites, as well as Arab tribes and tribal confederations of Ninawa and Kirkuk, Barzani ensured Erbil’s legitimate de facto management of oil assets, and also significantly increased the number of loyal (including armed) people. In addition, he gathered under his wing those communities that trust neither the United States, nor official Baghdad, nor Iran and its creatures, and at the same time are ready to gnaw through the radicals of the Islamic State.
By signing agreements with Turkey, Barzani provided markets, and together with the previous game with the Americans - a legal flow of investment in Iraqi Kurdistan, which practically does not depend on Baghdad and allows you to build economic and social infrastructure. The consolidation of the Peshmerga and Asaish forces (police, internal intelligence) guaranteed a relative legal framework and security. Barzani’s activity was also demonstrated in the international arena - over the past year he has held almost more high-level meetings than representatives of the Baghdad political establishment. Today, Erbil has gathered the necessary and sufficient resources for a completely independent policy regarding the conditional American and Iranian parties in Baghdad.
Earlier, Kurdish, government, and Iranian-Shiite forces, despite constant mutual accusations of “complicity” with the so-called caliphate, acted in forced coordination regarding the fight against the latter, as well as with radical Sunni groups, Al-Qaeda kidneys, fragments of the Saddam regime, while competing for oil areas. Each side advocated that these areas are their historical heritage.
Behind the legacy disputes are very specific interests. Under the treaties, the Iraqi government itself sells oil to the market, and Kurdistan deducts a certain share of contracts. However, Erbil believes that these conditions are not met, therefore, the situation can and should be withdrawn. The central government, in turn, takes the position that in the 2000-s autonomy and so received preferences to the detriment of the rest of Iraq.
Completion of the asset dispute in Nainawa and Kirkuk — the de facto inclusion of the oil-bearing areas of these provinces in Iraqi Kurdistan makes it absolutely unnecessary for the region to be part of Iraq. Previously, the southern oil pipelines, access to the ports of the Gulf and tedious blackmail on shared settlements with Baghdad were considered among the economic arguments in this regard, now Erbil has a reliable alternative. This is access to Turkish ports, adequate payments and payments, infrastructure and investments. These opportunities are directly dependent on the relationship of Barzani and his family "management" with Ankara. They are caused by counterclaims - to cut off the support of separatist anarcho-socialist Kurdish parties (PYD / YPG / PKK) in Syria and Turkey, to limit their access to money and trade in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to complicate the withdrawal to rear bases in Sinjar and Dahuk.
This creates problems for Erbil in relations with the PKK formations, which consider the Barzani clan and its political parties PDK and ENKS "capitalist hirers", "who have sold to Ankara traitors of the Kurdish people", "IS accomplices," etc., arrange sabotage and provocations. However, in response, the government of Barzani does not particularly hinder Turkey in operations against the PKK from the air and on its territory.
Here again some features come into force. Not all Kurdish socialists are radical apoists of the PKK, but almost all radicals are ethnic Kurds with their ancestral roots. It should be borne in mind that historically the provinces of Dahuk and Erbil, where many of the PKK’s logistical bases are located in the mountains, belong to the “heart” of the Kurdish region and are very hard to “press” on the local population and tribal confederations, while some originate from “Adam”, clan Barzani cannot. The replenishment and primary incorporation of Kurdish youth from Turkey into the PKK is also largely carried out in this region. Not being able to completely oust the backs of the PKK from his patrimony, Barzani makes serious concessions to Ankara on many issues, and also provides Erdogan with a relative "free hand" in Iraq.
Another problem is that the Yezidian Kurds of the north-east of Ninawa and Sinjar, first of all under the terrible rink of the IG, are abandoned by Sunnis, Shiites, Erbil, and the official government of Iraq (largely due to religious factors). They see in cooperation with the PKK at least some real support. Representatives of the Yezidis often do not hesitate to call punitive peshters, and the Barzani clan is accused of direct cooperation with the IG. But to offer the Yezidis an economic alternative adequate to the creation of Barzani, the followers of Ocalan are not able to.
It can be stated that despite these problems, the leader of Iraqi Kurds put "real politics" at the forefront. This can be seen in the example of supporting the ideas put forward by Ankara in exchange for specific economic benefits that strengthen the production and trading base of Iraqi Kurdistan. Using access to the Turkish market, Barzani successfully rebuilds the infrastructure of his region and even attracts foreign investment.
In this situation, it is not at all surprising that at the end of 2016, a number of completely clear statements came from Erbil. Thus, N. Barzani said that after the operation to liberate Mosul, Iraqi Kurds will raise the issue of holding a referendum on independence. In February, the representative of the Arab tribes of Ninawa M.A. Al-Huwet stated: “If N. al-Maliki returns to power, we will announce the separation of our region, contact Kurdistan and demand from the central government to transfer all our documents to Kurdistan” (al Maliki is considered a pro-Iranian censure. At the same time, al-Huwet demanded that the Shiite pro-Iranian militia and representatives of the Kurdistan Workers' Party be withdrawn from the region and leave one peshmergu, since "only Barzani defended our dignity and us." Similarly, M. Barzani himself spoke in January. Iraqi Kurds Shabak (Shiites) also in December declared unequivocal support for the government in Erbil and demanded accession to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Following in the format of “real politics”, Barzani developed activity not in the sphere of legal struggle against Baghdad, but in concrete work with the tribes and their confederations in the oil provinces and achieved practical results.
Deposit autonomies
All this suggests that even before the summer of this year (depending on the pace of the assault on Mosul), Iraq may be confronted with a section not only de facto, but also de jure. Baghdad has no forces to oppose Erbil. Offer conditions more favorable than the current autonomy, it is also not able to. All other players acting on the opposite side of Barzani, have too mixed interests in order to combine efforts. Iran does not have the support in the armed groups of the Iraqi Shiites, which it initially counted on. Moreover, many Iraqi Shi'ite religious leaders, who are not going to either copy the model of the government of the Islamic Republic or work in “number two” in their homeland, openly resist its strengthening.
It can be predicted that after the referendum (it will take place one way or another) in Iraqi Kurdistan, including Ninawa and Kirkuk, and the results are predictable, the region will be recognized as at least Turkey and will be postponed from Baghdad. Neither side can prevent this, although it can and will try to make life difficult for Erbil.
Tehran, unlike Ankara, is still considering an independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a frankly negative way. Iranians reasonably consider the US flirting with the Kurds as part of a pronounced anti-Iranian strategy, which aims to cut it off from Syria and Lebanon, and also aims to stimulate national currents in itself, for example, to recreate an analogue of the Mekhabad Republic, which has not been forgotten in the region. Iran, which aims to build the Kirkuk-Anadan oil pipeline, cannot be indifferent to see how these fields change jurisdiction, and is also not interested in sharing with anyone outside the potential for reconstructing the Kirkuk-Baniyas land oil-bearing artery, which opens up direct access to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea , bypassing the Arabian Peninsula, the Suez Canal and the Israeli coast. A. Khamenei’s adviser on international affairs, A. A. Velayatiy, explicitly stated last summer that, if the Kurds gained independence, this would be the second Israel.
Under no circumstances will Iran, which has spent enormous resources, refuse to maximize the advancement of its creatures back to the top posts of Iraq, as well as the policy of weakening pro-American figures. The recent visit of J. Mettis did not go unnoticed in the region, which was actually justified by Trump’s words that “if the US leaves Iraq, they will have to take oil with them”, and “IG formations could have been avoided if the US had established control over oil fields in the Middle East. " At the same time, the multi-star American general said strange words that, they say, the United States always paid up to a penny and will pay for Iraqi oil. Iran sees: the United States does not yet have a strategy, it is pulling time, which means that it is necessary to strengthen its positions.
It is also believed that Iran actively supports the actions of the PKK. However, if this were the case, Iran would deal with issues of interaction with the Syrian Kurdish cantons at a completely different level. Nevertheless, this does not mean that in the event of independence of Irbil, Iran will not try to play this card.
At such a "favorable" background, Rosneft quite unexpectedly for many signs, at first glance, a strange agreement with Erbil on trading Kurdish raw materials on a prepaid basis. He does this clearly without regard to Baghdad. Having a concession for a large field in the west of Iraq (“Block-12”), Rosneft does not go to the government to agree on what is available, but directly to Erbil. Is it necessary to get into such projects with very conditional efficiency even at such a difficult time? Should we strengthen the position of Iraqi Kurdistan while Iran is negative about this formation, and in Syria more than 10 are fighting thousands of Iraqis and Afghans who are being patronized by Tehran?
The answer will be paradoxical. Yes, it is necessary, necessary, but every action in this direction should be as accurate as possible.
First, the current Iraqi government should show that Russia has alternative opportunities in the region. The fact is that working conditions for foreign companies in Iraq are often simply ugly. By and large, the scheme looks like this: invest on shares with the Government of Iraq (no more than a quarter from the last), and then receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of raw materials - in reality, from 1,5 to 5 dollars per barrel produced and sold. That is, when income is received, the proportion relative to investments changes with the exact opposite. At the same time, the oil and revenues of the Iraqi government periodically disappear somewhere, but it does not want to recognize its debt. Nevertheless, it was under this scheme that the work of the main Russian and other foreign operators in the region was carried out. Therefore, to obtain additional bargaining positions in the base area of oil production is a necessary task, given the losses that our country suffered after losing concessions in Iraq and Syria.
Secondly, among the "gifts" of the Obama administration, we and Damascus went to the anarchist republic, whose forces, sponsored by the Americans, are approaching Raqqah. The more territories under the control of these formations, the clearer the contours of the division of Syria along the Euphrates. In this case, no one is going to stop there. In addition to Raqqa, the ultimate goal is Deir ez-Zor with its richest in light oil southern deposits. This is 60 percent of the total oil potential of Syria, the territory of the most profitable concessions in the past and, as in neighboring Iraq, the future resource base of a separate entity.
The Assad government is well aware of these threats. In Damascus, as one of the deputies of the Syrian parliament, D. Rabia, accurately stated, the operation in Raqqah “is considered as an attack on national sovereignty, because they are convinced that the director of this production is the CIA. At the same time, we support any actions by both the Kurds and external players in the fight against terrorism, provided that they are coordinated with the leadership of Syria. We will always speak in favor of any operation aimed at the destruction of militants in our country, but in practice these operations mostly pursue completely different goals ... In an effort to seize Raqqa, they are trying to take another step towards the federalization of Syria, but the people of the country reject this idea ".
Not only Ankara, which excludes any form of representation under the auspices of the PYD (which has an advantage in the political field of Syrian Kurdistan), since it considers it one with the PKK, but Damascus is also negative about the consideration of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
PYD, of course, is not a complete analogue of the PKK, but there are a lot of representatives of this movement, their voice is largely defining, the ideas that form the basis of this quasi-state entity, which is built in northeastern Syria, surprisingly resemble the provisions of “Apo” Ocalan ( "Apoism"). At the same time, the ideas of the founding father are translated into concrete actions on the ground (courts, councils, schools, police, self-defense forces). It is about building a network "state without state" - councils of self-governing entities with nationalized land and resources, otherwise called "democratic confederalism." The problem is that such a "confederalism" does not fit in with the concept of a traditional state.
By accepting such an “autonomy”, the Syrian government itself virtually refuses to exercise sovereignty over a given territory. And Damascus, of course, will not do it. The veil of “autonomy” can be removed by an outside observer, but not by Assad, whose father for a long time, in peak of Turkey, provided asylum to the founder of the PKK, Ocalan, with whom Bashar and his brothers were personally acquainted.
It is natural for the local tribes and ethnic groups in the province of Raqqa who are between “confederalism” and ISIS to choose the first, but the growth of this network structure inevitably leads to a future conflict between it, the Syrian government, Turkey, Iran and even Iraqi Kurdistan.
Russia is rather carefully trying to negotiate with representatives of the PYD / YPG, because in a number of areas (sowing Aleppo - canton Afrin) they and Damascus act as natural allies sandwiched between the Turkish border and “moderate” opposition, in the area of Kamyshly (Haseke province) the air base is used to work on the IG in Deir-ez-Zor. The Iranian side is also involved in the process. But it is already clear: consultations in the "fire regime" are not enough, there is a need to intensify efforts to separate the policies of this "autonomy", which today is supplied by the US weapons and is involved in US operations in Raqqah, for radical anarchists from the PKK and the treaty part. However, to say "split" is easier than to do. Moreover, today these formations do not put Erdogan with his army, much less Assad, innately. For their part, this is not very far-sighted, but reflects the scale of the destructive US intervention in the affairs of the region. And the severity of the problem will increase.
Nevertheless, based on the fundamental understanding of the obligations of Russia to preserve the unity of Syria, it is necessary to fully utilize all regional levers, use constraints, interests and contradictions.
Negotiations and ultimatums
There are serious disagreements between Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan, including armed conflicts. Turkey, in turn, is extremely disappointed that the United States violated the guarantees and did not insist on the transfer of Manbij’s Shield Euphrates and Kurdish territories to the right of the Euphrates under control. Ankara is generally quite rigidly set to squeeze out the PYD / YPG for the Euphrates. At the same time, she is even ready to give Washington a kind of ultimatum regarding joint actions. According to Turkish Prime Minister B. Yıldırım, the main condition for this is the US refusal to cooperate with some terrorist structures against others. He did not rule out unilateral actions against Manbij, because the United States at one time promised Turkey that the YPG terrorists would be withdrawn from this city, but did not keep their word. It is also believed in Ankara that in the event of active actions, Sunni tribes of the Rakka province would rather support them than the utopia of the "confederation".
The likelihood that Ankara will deploy an army to Manbidj after the final establishment of the line of demarcation between the forces of the SAR and its units in the province of Aleppo is extremely high. At the same time, such actions can informally be approved even in Damascus.
Turkey is now hampered by the threat of unavoidable military incidents on the line of demarcation, and also by persuading the US not to step up pressure before taking Raqa, but first of all there is no full analysis of possible physical and reputational losses before the referendum, as well as further concerted actions with Moscow.
In this situation, our close relationship with Erbil can serve as one of the pillars for the follow-up in Syrian Kurdistan, the real, rather than the nominal cooperation of its politicians with the regime in Damascus.
In Syria, there is the offspring of Barzani - the party ENKS, an alternative to the PYD, which is known for very unfriendly rhetoric towards the Assad government. Barzani himself reproached PYD no more and no less than in “collaborationism” in relation to Damascus. However, in one of the four points of the agreement concluded between Erdogan and Barzani in Diyarbakir, along with the opening of border crossings and the launch of the pipeline, there is a categorical refusal to support any Kurdish autonomy in Syria. This means that here Erbil will continue to follow in a rational manner, focusing on an agreement with Erdogan, against the federalization of Syria. And the political rhetoric in the nationalist vein is for internal use in the confrontation with the PYD and the PKK.
"Rosneft" has concluded a two-year trading contract with the government of Barzani, but with the formulation of a rather distant sight. The terms of the prepayment mean not only and not so much a commercial deal as the fact that Russia together with Turkey is ready to act as a strategic investor in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Objectively, its independence today is provided not only by the support of the United States, but also by the real balance of power and the attitude of Turkey, as well as Iran’s priorities related to the political struggle for the center and south of Iraq. While the United States does not have a pronounced plan of action in the region, Russia should maximally strengthen its positions through concrete economic and financial steps, as well as humanitarian actions.
The fact is that now Barzani is consolidating around himself all political forces for a big breakthrough. Following agreements with Turkey, he begins to establish a dialogue with the Yezidis, who are invited to isolate from the province of Ninawa Sinjar as a separate entity in exchange for considering in practical terms the problem of withdrawal of PKK cells from the region.
In the complete absence of any, even humanitarian support, the Yezidi leaders are ready to support Barzani. Khazim T. Beg stated a rather sad picture: “All nations refused to support the Yezidis, saying that the Iraqi constitution does not allow such support. Not a single foreign people kept their promises to the Yezidis, ”incidentally stating that the Yezidis can only count today on the regime in Erbil.
However, Barzani does not yet have sufficient economic resources to develop this area. Infrastructure efforts focus primarily on the east. In this situation, Russia's support for humanitarian initiatives in Sinjar can make life easier for Erbil, and also contribute to the liberation of the city from the logistical support of the PKK, which will definitely find a lively response in Turkey. The Yezidis bore the most cruel treatment of the IG, but they are not confessionally close even to Sunni and Shiite Kurds. Our country may well occupy this niche without entering into confrontations and discussions on religious grounds.
Such an approach will allow Russia to demonstrate that it is not against Kurdish statehood as such, as, by the way, many countries say. In Iraq, where the objective situation has developed, Russia, on the contrary, helps strengthen the Kurdish state, but in Syria it is necessary to maintain a single country with minimization of the depth of autonomy. Humanitarian support of the Yezidi region will allow for delicately avoiding many narrow issues, consolidate our positions in the event of a future activation (mandatory) of the United States, as well as knock out the thesis that Russia did not help the Kurdish ethnic group from under Syrian ill-wishers.
It is important to show: we are ready to support the construction of a national state where conditions have arisen based on understandable traditional principles, but we do not undertake to act as a sponsor of the utopia of “democratic confederalism”, which is now launched in Syrian Kurdistan. But Russia is not interested in either Ankara or Damascus in force actions, even if they are capable of besieging anarchists. It is necessary to launch the process of dividing the ideological base of the PKK and the PYD / YPG along the line of attitudes towards the traditional state and its institutions, and on this basis to begin a full-fledged dialogue. At the same time, it is necessary to enter into negotiations with local sheikhs and ethnic parties, following the example of the work of the Khmeimim Central Central Asian Board.
Today, Turkey is not ready to consider negotiations with representatives of Syrian Kurdistan considering PY as an analogue of the PKK, but if you revive collegial mechanisms of political representation when ENKS and PYD interact through the Kurdish Council and try to introduce representatives of Syrian Kurdistan to the international political field, the constitutional and Geneva process There are chances that rational arguments will contribute to the formation of a new contractual platform between the region and Damascus. These arguments include possible official investments, investments in the industrial sector and the social sphere. Only in this way will legal markets and trade, settlements and services emerge. This is in reality a monstrously difficult job, given the relationship of the parties, but the alternative is endless contradictions with all of its neighbors and the threat of all-round armed struggle without free access to resources.
Through the strengthening of positions in Iraqi Kurdistan and the assistance of Turkey and Erbil in the line of limiting the positions of the PKK, it is necessary to gradually convey to the policy of autonomy the futility and unrealizability of the “one Syria - two systems” concept. Otherwise, the region will inevitably face the most severe pressure of Ankara, Damascus and Tehran, the inability to raise funds.
At the same time, on the issue of official, diplomatic recognition of the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, most likely, one should be guided by Iranian positions. But Russia is able to mediate. Iran needs no more division of Syria than Turkey or the Syrians themselves. And it is quite possible that Tehran and Erbil will, with the participation of Moscow, come to some acceptable forms of cooperation, given Barzani’s flexibility and utmost pragmatism. Russia's specific activity can weaken US influence in this area, filling the “vacuum of expectations” regarding Washington’s policies.
In this situation, the best solution for Russia seems to be the maximum consolidation of economic positions through infrastructure projects in Iraqi Kurdistan and humanitarian activity in Sinjar without any public statements supporting Erbil’s independence before receiving signals from Tehran. It is more reasonable to distance oneself from the political struggle in Baghdad with a clear indication of the priority for effective and uninterrupted work on the oil clusters assigned to Russian companies, in compliance with obligations that can be further discussed with any of the parties.
The delay of the White House forces the parties to conflicts to deal with pressing issues on their own. Such a situation is dangerous primarily because in recent years the United States has directly or indirectly (which does not mean effectively) intervened in almost all key problems. The format of their decision exclusively at the regional level is new. On the one hand, it gives relative hope for practical results due to the specifics of the players' demands, on the other hand, it extremely complicates the negotiation field, the interaction mechanisms in which the participants have not worked out at all.
The steps that the White House is taking today, in terms of preparation and study, do not yet correspond to the scale of the goals and objectives set by Trump and his team. The White House, apparently, is guided by the formula "We take a step, if there is at least some profit from it." This inevitably leads (and leads) to a rather chaotic “pinprick”, which nevertheless can have long-lasting consequences. Therefore, the lack of clarity in the Russian-American negotiation process urgently requires Moscow to begin decisive steps to anticipate and anticipate with a focus on regional forces and coalitions. The challenges in the Middle East for Russia belong to the category of strategic, as they directly affect the maintenance and functioning of the commodity and currency markets. The extremely important factors that can be identified in this direction are quite visible contours of the end of the storming of Mosul and the subsequent (already real) raising the question of the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. The problems that will entail these processes will inevitably lead to a merger of the Syrian and Iraqi nodes into a single whole, which will require Russia to significantly expand the public policy boundaries in the region.
Kurdish land gatherer
Against the background of the strengthening of the economic relations of Ankara and Erbil, supported by the agreements of T. Erdogan and M. Barzani on access to the Turkish market, as well as resuscitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline early last year, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan is preparing to proceed to practical actions. The strengthening of Erbil’s positions was ensured by the victorious operations of the Peshmerga against the IG (banned in Russia), as well as by the equally successful consolidation of Kurdish and Arab tribes of the provinces of Nainava and Kirkuk, which today allows the Barzani regime to bring the important oil-bearing regions to its influence. He repeatedly blackmailed Baghdad with plans for separation, beating out for himself all the new preferences or deciding in his favor the questions of the division of raw materials and political dividends. However, it is currently able to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for real independence.
Having achieved recognition from Kurdish Shiites, as well as Arab tribes and tribal confederations of Ninawa and Kirkuk, Barzani ensured Erbil’s legitimate de facto management of oil assets, and also significantly increased the number of loyal (including armed) people. In addition, he gathered under his wing those communities that trust neither the United States, nor official Baghdad, nor Iran and its creatures, and at the same time are ready to gnaw through the radicals of the Islamic State.By signing agreements with Turkey, Barzani provided markets, and together with the previous game with the Americans - a legal flow of investment in Iraqi Kurdistan, which practically does not depend on Baghdad and allows you to build economic and social infrastructure. The consolidation of the Peshmerga and Asaish forces (police, internal intelligence) guaranteed a relative legal framework and security. Barzani’s activity was also demonstrated in the international arena - over the past year he has held almost more high-level meetings than representatives of the Baghdad political establishment. Today, Erbil has gathered the necessary and sufficient resources for a completely independent policy regarding the conditional American and Iranian parties in Baghdad.
Earlier, Kurdish, government, and Iranian-Shiite forces, despite constant mutual accusations of “complicity” with the so-called caliphate, acted in forced coordination regarding the fight against the latter, as well as with radical Sunni groups, Al-Qaeda kidneys, fragments of the Saddam regime, while competing for oil areas. Each side advocated that these areas are their historical heritage.
Behind the legacy disputes are very specific interests. Under the treaties, the Iraqi government itself sells oil to the market, and Kurdistan deducts a certain share of contracts. However, Erbil believes that these conditions are not met, therefore, the situation can and should be withdrawn. The central government, in turn, takes the position that in the 2000-s autonomy and so received preferences to the detriment of the rest of Iraq.
Completion of the asset dispute in Nainawa and Kirkuk — the de facto inclusion of the oil-bearing areas of these provinces in Iraqi Kurdistan makes it absolutely unnecessary for the region to be part of Iraq. Previously, the southern oil pipelines, access to the ports of the Gulf and tedious blackmail on shared settlements with Baghdad were considered among the economic arguments in this regard, now Erbil has a reliable alternative. This is access to Turkish ports, adequate payments and payments, infrastructure and investments. These opportunities are directly dependent on the relationship of Barzani and his family "management" with Ankara. They are caused by counterclaims - to cut off the support of separatist anarcho-socialist Kurdish parties (PYD / YPG / PKK) in Syria and Turkey, to limit their access to money and trade in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to complicate the withdrawal to rear bases in Sinjar and Dahuk.
This creates problems for Erbil in relations with the PKK formations, which consider the Barzani clan and its political parties PDK and ENKS "capitalist hirers", "who have sold to Ankara traitors of the Kurdish people", "IS accomplices," etc., arrange sabotage and provocations. However, in response, the government of Barzani does not particularly hinder Turkey in operations against the PKK from the air and on its territory.
Here again some features come into force. Not all Kurdish socialists are radical apoists of the PKK, but almost all radicals are ethnic Kurds with their ancestral roots. It should be borne in mind that historically the provinces of Dahuk and Erbil, where many of the PKK’s logistical bases are located in the mountains, belong to the “heart” of the Kurdish region and are very hard to “press” on the local population and tribal confederations, while some originate from “Adam”, clan Barzani cannot. The replenishment and primary incorporation of Kurdish youth from Turkey into the PKK is also largely carried out in this region. Not being able to completely oust the backs of the PKK from his patrimony, Barzani makes serious concessions to Ankara on many issues, and also provides Erdogan with a relative "free hand" in Iraq.
Another problem is that the Yezidian Kurds of the north-east of Ninawa and Sinjar, first of all under the terrible rink of the IG, are abandoned by Sunnis, Shiites, Erbil, and the official government of Iraq (largely due to religious factors). They see in cooperation with the PKK at least some real support. Representatives of the Yezidis often do not hesitate to call punitive peshters, and the Barzani clan is accused of direct cooperation with the IG. But to offer the Yezidis an economic alternative adequate to the creation of Barzani, the followers of Ocalan are not able to.
It can be stated that despite these problems, the leader of Iraqi Kurds put "real politics" at the forefront. This can be seen in the example of supporting the ideas put forward by Ankara in exchange for specific economic benefits that strengthen the production and trading base of Iraqi Kurdistan. Using access to the Turkish market, Barzani successfully rebuilds the infrastructure of his region and even attracts foreign investment.
In this situation, it is not at all surprising that at the end of 2016, a number of completely clear statements came from Erbil. Thus, N. Barzani said that after the operation to liberate Mosul, Iraqi Kurds will raise the issue of holding a referendum on independence. In February, the representative of the Arab tribes of Ninawa M.A. Al-Huwet stated: “If N. al-Maliki returns to power, we will announce the separation of our region, contact Kurdistan and demand from the central government to transfer all our documents to Kurdistan” (al Maliki is considered a pro-Iranian censure. At the same time, al-Huwet demanded that the Shiite pro-Iranian militia and representatives of the Kurdistan Workers' Party be withdrawn from the region and leave one peshmergu, since "only Barzani defended our dignity and us." Similarly, M. Barzani himself spoke in January. Iraqi Kurds Shabak (Shiites) also in December declared unequivocal support for the government in Erbil and demanded accession to Iraqi Kurdistan.
Following in the format of “real politics”, Barzani developed activity not in the sphere of legal struggle against Baghdad, but in concrete work with the tribes and their confederations in the oil provinces and achieved practical results.
Deposit autonomies
All this suggests that even before the summer of this year (depending on the pace of the assault on Mosul), Iraq may be confronted with a section not only de facto, but also de jure. Baghdad has no forces to oppose Erbil. Offer conditions more favorable than the current autonomy, it is also not able to. All other players acting on the opposite side of Barzani, have too mixed interests in order to combine efforts. Iran does not have the support in the armed groups of the Iraqi Shiites, which it initially counted on. Moreover, many Iraqi Shi'ite religious leaders, who are not going to either copy the model of the government of the Islamic Republic or work in “number two” in their homeland, openly resist its strengthening.
It can be predicted that after the referendum (it will take place one way or another) in Iraqi Kurdistan, including Ninawa and Kirkuk, and the results are predictable, the region will be recognized as at least Turkey and will be postponed from Baghdad. Neither side can prevent this, although it can and will try to make life difficult for Erbil.
Tehran, unlike Ankara, is still considering an independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a frankly negative way. Iranians reasonably consider the US flirting with the Kurds as part of a pronounced anti-Iranian strategy, which aims to cut it off from Syria and Lebanon, and also aims to stimulate national currents in itself, for example, to recreate an analogue of the Mekhabad Republic, which has not been forgotten in the region. Iran, which aims to build the Kirkuk-Anadan oil pipeline, cannot be indifferent to see how these fields change jurisdiction, and is also not interested in sharing with anyone outside the potential for reconstructing the Kirkuk-Baniyas land oil-bearing artery, which opens up direct access to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea , bypassing the Arabian Peninsula, the Suez Canal and the Israeli coast. A. Khamenei’s adviser on international affairs, A. A. Velayatiy, explicitly stated last summer that, if the Kurds gained independence, this would be the second Israel.
Under no circumstances will Iran, which has spent enormous resources, refuse to maximize the advancement of its creatures back to the top posts of Iraq, as well as the policy of weakening pro-American figures. The recent visit of J. Mettis did not go unnoticed in the region, which was actually justified by Trump’s words that “if the US leaves Iraq, they will have to take oil with them”, and “IG formations could have been avoided if the US had established control over oil fields in the Middle East. " At the same time, the multi-star American general said strange words that, they say, the United States always paid up to a penny and will pay for Iraqi oil. Iran sees: the United States does not yet have a strategy, it is pulling time, which means that it is necessary to strengthen its positions.
It is also believed that Iran actively supports the actions of the PKK. However, if this were the case, Iran would deal with issues of interaction with the Syrian Kurdish cantons at a completely different level. Nevertheless, this does not mean that in the event of independence of Irbil, Iran will not try to play this card.
At such a "favorable" background, Rosneft quite unexpectedly for many signs, at first glance, a strange agreement with Erbil on trading Kurdish raw materials on a prepaid basis. He does this clearly without regard to Baghdad. Having a concession for a large field in the west of Iraq (“Block-12”), Rosneft does not go to the government to agree on what is available, but directly to Erbil. Is it necessary to get into such projects with very conditional efficiency even at such a difficult time? Should we strengthen the position of Iraqi Kurdistan while Iran is negative about this formation, and in Syria more than 10 are fighting thousands of Iraqis and Afghans who are being patronized by Tehran?
The answer will be paradoxical. Yes, it is necessary, necessary, but every action in this direction should be as accurate as possible.
First, the current Iraqi government should show that Russia has alternative opportunities in the region. The fact is that working conditions for foreign companies in Iraq are often simply ugly. By and large, the scheme looks like this: invest on shares with the Government of Iraq (no more than a quarter from the last), and then receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of raw materials - in reality, from 1,5 to 5 dollars per barrel produced and sold. That is, when income is received, the proportion relative to investments changes with the exact opposite. At the same time, the oil and revenues of the Iraqi government periodically disappear somewhere, but it does not want to recognize its debt. Nevertheless, it was under this scheme that the work of the main Russian and other foreign operators in the region was carried out. Therefore, to obtain additional bargaining positions in the base area of oil production is a necessary task, given the losses that our country suffered after losing concessions in Iraq and Syria.
Secondly, among the "gifts" of the Obama administration, we and Damascus went to the anarchist republic, whose forces, sponsored by the Americans, are approaching Raqqah. The more territories under the control of these formations, the clearer the contours of the division of Syria along the Euphrates. In this case, no one is going to stop there. In addition to Raqqa, the ultimate goal is Deir ez-Zor with its richest in light oil southern deposits. This is 60 percent of the total oil potential of Syria, the territory of the most profitable concessions in the past and, as in neighboring Iraq, the future resource base of a separate entity.
The Assad government is well aware of these threats. In Damascus, as one of the deputies of the Syrian parliament, D. Rabia, accurately stated, the operation in Raqqah “is considered as an attack on national sovereignty, because they are convinced that the director of this production is the CIA. At the same time, we support any actions by both the Kurds and external players in the fight against terrorism, provided that they are coordinated with the leadership of Syria. We will always speak in favor of any operation aimed at the destruction of militants in our country, but in practice these operations mostly pursue completely different goals ... In an effort to seize Raqqa, they are trying to take another step towards the federalization of Syria, but the people of the country reject this idea ".
Not only Ankara, which excludes any form of representation under the auspices of the PYD (which has an advantage in the political field of Syrian Kurdistan), since it considers it one with the PKK, but Damascus is also negative about the consideration of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
PYD, of course, is not a complete analogue of the PKK, but there are a lot of representatives of this movement, their voice is largely defining, the ideas that form the basis of this quasi-state entity, which is built in northeastern Syria, surprisingly resemble the provisions of “Apo” Ocalan ( "Apoism"). At the same time, the ideas of the founding father are translated into concrete actions on the ground (courts, councils, schools, police, self-defense forces). It is about building a network "state without state" - councils of self-governing entities with nationalized land and resources, otherwise called "democratic confederalism." The problem is that such a "confederalism" does not fit in with the concept of a traditional state.
By accepting such an “autonomy”, the Syrian government itself virtually refuses to exercise sovereignty over a given territory. And Damascus, of course, will not do it. The veil of “autonomy” can be removed by an outside observer, but not by Assad, whose father for a long time, in peak of Turkey, provided asylum to the founder of the PKK, Ocalan, with whom Bashar and his brothers were personally acquainted.
It is natural for the local tribes and ethnic groups in the province of Raqqa who are between “confederalism” and ISIS to choose the first, but the growth of this network structure inevitably leads to a future conflict between it, the Syrian government, Turkey, Iran and even Iraqi Kurdistan.
Russia is rather carefully trying to negotiate with representatives of the PYD / YPG, because in a number of areas (sowing Aleppo - canton Afrin) they and Damascus act as natural allies sandwiched between the Turkish border and “moderate” opposition, in the area of Kamyshly (Haseke province) the air base is used to work on the IG in Deir-ez-Zor. The Iranian side is also involved in the process. But it is already clear: consultations in the "fire regime" are not enough, there is a need to intensify efforts to separate the policies of this "autonomy", which today is supplied by the US weapons and is involved in US operations in Raqqah, for radical anarchists from the PKK and the treaty part. However, to say "split" is easier than to do. Moreover, today these formations do not put Erdogan with his army, much less Assad, innately. For their part, this is not very far-sighted, but reflects the scale of the destructive US intervention in the affairs of the region. And the severity of the problem will increase.
Nevertheless, based on the fundamental understanding of the obligations of Russia to preserve the unity of Syria, it is necessary to fully utilize all regional levers, use constraints, interests and contradictions.
Negotiations and ultimatums
There are serious disagreements between Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan, including armed conflicts. Turkey, in turn, is extremely disappointed that the United States violated the guarantees and did not insist on the transfer of Manbij’s Shield Euphrates and Kurdish territories to the right of the Euphrates under control. Ankara is generally quite rigidly set to squeeze out the PYD / YPG for the Euphrates. At the same time, she is even ready to give Washington a kind of ultimatum regarding joint actions. According to Turkish Prime Minister B. Yıldırım, the main condition for this is the US refusal to cooperate with some terrorist structures against others. He did not rule out unilateral actions against Manbij, because the United States at one time promised Turkey that the YPG terrorists would be withdrawn from this city, but did not keep their word. It is also believed in Ankara that in the event of active actions, Sunni tribes of the Rakka province would rather support them than the utopia of the "confederation".
The likelihood that Ankara will deploy an army to Manbidj after the final establishment of the line of demarcation between the forces of the SAR and its units in the province of Aleppo is extremely high. At the same time, such actions can informally be approved even in Damascus.
Turkey is now hampered by the threat of unavoidable military incidents on the line of demarcation, and also by persuading the US not to step up pressure before taking Raqa, but first of all there is no full analysis of possible physical and reputational losses before the referendum, as well as further concerted actions with Moscow.
In this situation, our close relationship with Erbil can serve as one of the pillars for the follow-up in Syrian Kurdistan, the real, rather than the nominal cooperation of its politicians with the regime in Damascus.
In Syria, there is the offspring of Barzani - the party ENKS, an alternative to the PYD, which is known for very unfriendly rhetoric towards the Assad government. Barzani himself reproached PYD no more and no less than in “collaborationism” in relation to Damascus. However, in one of the four points of the agreement concluded between Erdogan and Barzani in Diyarbakir, along with the opening of border crossings and the launch of the pipeline, there is a categorical refusal to support any Kurdish autonomy in Syria. This means that here Erbil will continue to follow in a rational manner, focusing on an agreement with Erdogan, against the federalization of Syria. And the political rhetoric in the nationalist vein is for internal use in the confrontation with the PYD and the PKK.
"Rosneft" has concluded a two-year trading contract with the government of Barzani, but with the formulation of a rather distant sight. The terms of the prepayment mean not only and not so much a commercial deal as the fact that Russia together with Turkey is ready to act as a strategic investor in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Objectively, its independence today is provided not only by the support of the United States, but also by the real balance of power and the attitude of Turkey, as well as Iran’s priorities related to the political struggle for the center and south of Iraq. While the United States does not have a pronounced plan of action in the region, Russia should maximally strengthen its positions through concrete economic and financial steps, as well as humanitarian actions.
The fact is that now Barzani is consolidating around himself all political forces for a big breakthrough. Following agreements with Turkey, he begins to establish a dialogue with the Yezidis, who are invited to isolate from the province of Ninawa Sinjar as a separate entity in exchange for considering in practical terms the problem of withdrawal of PKK cells from the region.
In the complete absence of any, even humanitarian support, the Yezidi leaders are ready to support Barzani. Khazim T. Beg stated a rather sad picture: “All nations refused to support the Yezidis, saying that the Iraqi constitution does not allow such support. Not a single foreign people kept their promises to the Yezidis, ”incidentally stating that the Yezidis can only count today on the regime in Erbil.
However, Barzani does not yet have sufficient economic resources to develop this area. Infrastructure efforts focus primarily on the east. In this situation, Russia's support for humanitarian initiatives in Sinjar can make life easier for Erbil, and also contribute to the liberation of the city from the logistical support of the PKK, which will definitely find a lively response in Turkey. The Yezidis bore the most cruel treatment of the IG, but they are not confessionally close even to Sunni and Shiite Kurds. Our country may well occupy this niche without entering into confrontations and discussions on religious grounds.
Such an approach will allow Russia to demonstrate that it is not against Kurdish statehood as such, as, by the way, many countries say. In Iraq, where the objective situation has developed, Russia, on the contrary, helps strengthen the Kurdish state, but in Syria it is necessary to maintain a single country with minimization of the depth of autonomy. Humanitarian support of the Yezidi region will allow for delicately avoiding many narrow issues, consolidate our positions in the event of a future activation (mandatory) of the United States, as well as knock out the thesis that Russia did not help the Kurdish ethnic group from under Syrian ill-wishers.
It is important to show: we are ready to support the construction of a national state where conditions have arisen based on understandable traditional principles, but we do not undertake to act as a sponsor of the utopia of “democratic confederalism”, which is now launched in Syrian Kurdistan. But Russia is not interested in either Ankara or Damascus in force actions, even if they are capable of besieging anarchists. It is necessary to launch the process of dividing the ideological base of the PKK and the PYD / YPG along the line of attitudes towards the traditional state and its institutions, and on this basis to begin a full-fledged dialogue. At the same time, it is necessary to enter into negotiations with local sheikhs and ethnic parties, following the example of the work of the Khmeimim Central Central Asian Board.
Today, Turkey is not ready to consider negotiations with representatives of Syrian Kurdistan considering PY as an analogue of the PKK, but if you revive collegial mechanisms of political representation when ENKS and PYD interact through the Kurdish Council and try to introduce representatives of Syrian Kurdistan to the international political field, the constitutional and Geneva process There are chances that rational arguments will contribute to the formation of a new contractual platform between the region and Damascus. These arguments include possible official investments, investments in the industrial sector and the social sphere. Only in this way will legal markets and trade, settlements and services emerge. This is in reality a monstrously difficult job, given the relationship of the parties, but the alternative is endless contradictions with all of its neighbors and the threat of all-round armed struggle without free access to resources.
Through the strengthening of positions in Iraqi Kurdistan and the assistance of Turkey and Erbil in the line of limiting the positions of the PKK, it is necessary to gradually convey to the policy of autonomy the futility and unrealizability of the “one Syria - two systems” concept. Otherwise, the region will inevitably face the most severe pressure of Ankara, Damascus and Tehran, the inability to raise funds.
At the same time, on the issue of official, diplomatic recognition of the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, most likely, one should be guided by Iranian positions. But Russia is able to mediate. Iran needs no more division of Syria than Turkey or the Syrians themselves. And it is quite possible that Tehran and Erbil will, with the participation of Moscow, come to some acceptable forms of cooperation, given Barzani’s flexibility and utmost pragmatism. Russia's specific activity can weaken US influence in this area, filling the “vacuum of expectations” regarding Washington’s policies.
In this situation, the best solution for Russia seems to be the maximum consolidation of economic positions through infrastructure projects in Iraqi Kurdistan and humanitarian activity in Sinjar without any public statements supporting Erbil’s independence before receiving signals from Tehran. It is more reasonable to distance oneself from the political struggle in Baghdad with a clear indication of the priority for effective and uninterrupted work on the oil clusters assigned to Russian companies, in compliance with obligations that can be further discussed with any of the parties.
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