Soviet agent ripped off the US "Bindweed" operation
The fight of intelligence and counterintelligence in Russia and the United States does not stop for a minute. One of the well-prepared and implemented operations of listening to the submarine cable communication networks of the Soviet Navy should be described in more detail.
What served as the reason for the emergence of the idea of listening to secret communication lines located at the bottom of water basins adjacent to the territory of the Soviet Union at the end of the 70s can only be assumed. Perhaps this thought prompted the study of the experience of German submarines during World War II, when German experts listened to transatlantic communication cables. Perhaps a thorough study of the navigational charts of the Russian coast, which are marked on the prohibition of fishing in some areas. And maybe in connection with other events.
Additional study of the location of Soviet submarines and possible locations of communication lines of bases with the control headquarters led to the determination of the future location of the operation - the Sea of Okhotsk. According to calculations, it was there that could be located the secret underwater cable connecting the submarine base in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky with the headquarters in Vladivostok and Moscow. American experts assumed that information about rocket firing, combat training, technical information on systems for providing and servicing submarines, strategic and tactical planning was transmitted via this cable. US intelligence experts have assumed that, based on the secrecy and inaccessibility of these communication lines, information on them was transmitted either in clear text or with a minimum level of cryptographic security.
In addition to the Sea of Okhotsk, the Baltic and Barents seas were considered by the division of underwater operations of the US Navy Intelligence Agency (chief James Bradley). The choice of the Sea of Okhotsk was based on the fact that it was here that one of the largest bases of strategic-purpose submarines was located, which was located at a sufficiently large distance from the controls. But this option had problems: the sea area is more than 600 thousand square meters. miles and find at its bottom cable thickness 13 centimeters is not an easy task. Bradley suggested finding warning and prohibition signs on the shore using a periscope - this would significantly limit the search area, since trawl fishing and underwater work should be prohibited at the place where the secret communication line was laid. Another difficulty had to be overcome: the cable was located at a depth of about 130 meters, and the work of divers at such a depth is fraught with mortal danger. But this problem was solved. The submarine "Halibat", planned to participate in the operation, was equipped with a decompression chamber and created a new diving equipment.
Americans had a bad experience searching for Soviet telephone lines in the 70s near the island of Sicily. As a result of several trips of submarines, an Italian cable from the times of the past war was discovered. Therefore, it was worth the great work to persuade the country's leadership to give the go-ahead to the operation of connecting to a secret communication line in the territorial waters of the USSR. The region of Kamchatka was of interest to the US intelligence services also because here, in addition to the submarine base, there was a proving ground intended for firing intercontinental ballistic missiles. And, of course, information on the results of missile launches should be transmitted via a hidden line of communication.
At that time, secret operations abroad by US special forces were carried out only with the permission of the so-called “40 committee”, which included the director of the CIA, the chairman of the joint committee of the chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces and other persons of the government and congress. The chairman of this committee was Kissinger, who has the right to independently, without the approval of the committee, decide on the conduct of foreign intelligence operations. Bradley’s detailed, convincing report convinced Kissinger, who took responsibility for the risk involved in the operation of installing the listening device on himself.
Preparation for the Khalibat submarine operation and route planning took some time. After all, entering the territorial waters was a gross violation of the sovereignty of the country, and the submarine to connect to the cable needed to come as close as possible to the Soviet coastline. On the submarine "Khalibat" they additionally installed special equipment and a deep-sea apparatus for rescuing divers: airlock and decompression chambers.
In October, 1971, the submarine “Halibat” left Maryland and headed for the Sea of Okhotsk. The route was laid through the Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea, which made it possible to avoid undesirable encounters with Soviet ships. The way that the ships pass in two weeks, "Halibat" overcame in more than four weeks. Since this submarine was built in 50-e, its reactor did not allow to develop high speed, and the device located on the light hull, reduced the speed of movement even more. Before entering the Sea of Okhotsk, the submarine maneuvered for several hours between the islands of the Kuril Ridge and Kamchatka. The participants of this operation recalled that they well remembered the beautiful view of the active volcano, which they saw through the periscope. Most of the crew of the submarine did not know about the true reasons for the trip - they believed that the main purpose of the voyage was to search for parts of Soviet missiles at the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk. The crew included a group of specialists in servicing special equipment used to connect to communication lines and process the information received.
Being at the periscope depth, the submarine slowly surveyed the navigational signs located on the coast. Every three hours, in order to check the absence of tracking, the Soviet submarine “Halibat” had to turn back. It took more than a week to search. Finally, a sign was noticed on the shore, which warned that due to the presence of cable in the area, all underwater work was prohibited. A radio-controlled device with a built-in camera and a powerful searchlight was lowered to the bottom. Using this device, we managed to find a cable in muddy water. The boat moved away from the coast and "hung" over the cable line. Divers fixed on the cable a special equipment that could receive signals through several channels at once, but only for several days. Power device supported lithium battery.
After connecting the listening equipment, the specialists on board the submarine were able to check the operation of the device. Testing was successful. Since the official version of the campaign of the American submarine near the Russian coast was the search for a sunken Soviet anti-submarine missile, the divers loaded the wreckage of the found missile into a special tank and the Khalibat headed for the US to its base. It took three months for the submarine to reach its native shores. The wreckage of the rocket was transferred to a secret laboratory.
After processing the information received, the specialists highly appreciated the information received. It turned out that a significant part of the negotiations of the Soviet leadership of the Navy and the submarine base was conducted in clear text or encrypted with a primitive code.
Success inspired the American intelligence intelligence services. Since the equipment used in the Sea of Okhotsk for listening could record information flows only through several channels, the scouts set their technical services the task of creating a device that would not only receive a signal from all cable channels, but also be able to work autonomously for at least several months. This would allow the submarine not to be near the cable line, but with the frequency of several months to record the information recorded for this period. By order of the intelligence department of the underwater headquarters fleet Bell Corporation has developed a device called a cocoon for its shape, which could effectively perform the desired functions. This device was a cylinder over six meters long and about a meter wide and weighing about six tons. A nuclear power plant was built into the cocoon. This new device did not need to be attached directly to the cable, it was located next to it, using the induction effect to read information.
In August, 1972, the device was placed on a submarine, and "Khalibat" again went to the campaign in the direction of the Sea of Okhotsk. This time, the divers easily found the cable and mounted the “cocoon” next to it. Radio electronics specialists were convinced that the equipment works perfectly and effectively intercepts. A week later, the boat headed back to the shores of the United States to return for the received information in a month. But a big problem arose when divers removed cassettes with records after a while. On this day, the strongest storm broke out in the Sea of Okhotsk. They failed to withstand the anchors of a submarine at a great depth — it began to float sharply, dragging divers behind itself, who were connected to it with hoses. The rapid ascent of the boat endangered the lives of divers. Only skillful actions of the team allowed to save them.
The delivered information was so valuable information that its source was called the “gold mine”. Campaigns "Halibat" became regular and this operation was given the name "Convolvulus". And the Bell company received a task to improve the “cocoon”. To eliminate the situation with the cliff of anchors, special “skis” were mounted on the submarine, which allowed the boat to lie down gently on the ground.
In 1975, the nuclear submarine “Sivulf” came to replace the out-of-date Halibat boat. And although this boat was not new, significant funds were allocated for its modernization. For two years, Sivulf participated in the implementation of the "Convolvulus" plan. But in the process of trips to the Sea of Okhotsk, the lack of a submarine emerged - high noise. In the campaigns it covered two modern submarines. One of them provided the search and blocking of the Soviet anti-submarine systems, the other had to divert the enemy's boats from the Sivulf.
In the late seventies, in connection with the appearance in the Soviet Navy of a new generation of Delta-type submarines, the concept of using strategic naval nuclear forces changed. The American leadership was very concerned about adopting a boat with a range of more than 8000 kilometers, which made it impossible for them to be controlled by American anti-submarine systems. Information was urgently needed on changes in the concepts of the Soviet leadership on the use of strategic nuclear forces. The experts of the American special services gave an opinion on the need to listen to cable lines running along the bottom of the Barents Sea. The reason for choosing this new water area is that the main locations of the Delta submarines are located on the coast of the Barents Sea.
A few more problems worried American intelligence services. Almost always, Soviet submarines appeared in the areas of NATO exercises even before the arrival of boats of participants. A sudden and qualitative leap in the construction of new Soviet submarines is the release of multi-purpose silent boats of the type "Victor III", which were not inferior in their characteristics to American submarines. These facts aroused suspicion that there was a leak of secret strategic information. After the summit meeting, an operation was approved to wiretap the Soviet cable line in the Barents Sea. So the operation "Convolvulus" began to be implemented in another area of the Soviet marine area. But to accomplish this mission, this time the most modern nuclear submarine “Perch” was brought in, adapted for conducting reconnaissance operations. The upgraded listening equipment was mounted on the submarine. Before reaching the Barents Sea, Perch undertook a hike over the data accumulated by the cocoon in the Sea of Okhotsk. The hike to the Barents Sea was delayed due to the summit-American negotiations on arms limitation. After the parties signed the SALT-2 contract, the Perch submarine went on a mission. Since the operation seemed very risky, the route was chosen unusual: Alaska - Bering Strait - North Pole - Barents Sea. The main team did not know the true purpose of the campaign - everyone believed that the new route was being developed.
To accommodate a special electronic intelligence group, the torpedo compartment was rebuilt, and the boat also had explosives for self-detonation in case of emergency. On a warm August evening of 1979, the submarine went camping. Analysts at the U.S. intelligence agencies suggested searching for a cable leaving the White Sea, since the cable was supposed to connect the Soviet submarine repair and construction center with the mainland. Using proven technology, experts quickly found an underwater cable and installed a listening device nearby. The result of the work of the Percha team was appreciated by the US leadership and President Carter.
In the summer of 1980, the Perch submarine not only removed the information from listening devices in the Sea of Okhotsk, but also installed an additional “cocoon” in the Barents Sea.
The new president, Reagan, who came to power, after reading a report on underwater reconnaissance operations in Russian coastal waters, approved their further continuation.
But the next operation according to the "Convolvulus" plan, which was conducted by the Sivulf submarine in the Sea of Okhotsk, ended in failure. The submarine commander, while maneuvering, leaned his "skis" straight on the cable. This could have caused the cable line to malfunction and would have detected the listening device during cable repairs. In addition, the storm rose again, which hampered the work of the team of divers. After removing the information from the instruments, the submarine with great difficulty detached from the bottom and headed to the home base.
After a fairly short period of time, photographs were taken from satellites where, in the area where the listening devices were located in the Sea of Okhotsk, a concentration of a large number of Soviet ships was found. Fears of the American special services were confirmed. Soviet technical ships both eavesdropping apparatus were lifted from the bottom and sent to a military base. The ownership of these devices was precisely known, as they were labeled to indicate that they were owned by the United States.
When analyzing the events that took place, American experts confirmed that this is not an accidental Russian fortune. It is established that Soviet experts knew almost exactly the location of listening devices. The option was excluded that the Russians discovered the equipment because of the “bulk” of the “Sivulf” on the cable, since the ship of technical services with deep-water devices on board was already heading to the point of recovery during the operation of the “Sivulf” in the Sea of Okhotsk. From all this, a reasonable conclusion was made about the presence of information leaks in the military or political circles of the United States familiar with the operation "Convolvulus".
The American intelligence officers were faced with a solution to the most difficult problem: did the failure in the Sea of Okhotsk Sea area mean that the Soviet secret services found listening devices in the Barents Sea, is it dangerous to send the Perch boat to pick up information to the Kola Peninsula? After a long observation by all available means of the situation in the Soviet north, in 1982, the submarine was sent to the Barents Sea in a very intricate way. The voyage lasted more than five months: along the coast of South America - Cape Horn - Falkland Islands - across the Atlantic to the Barents Sea. At this time, next to the cable was installed a new modification of the "cocoon", equipped with a device detonation in the case of lifting to the surface.
The luck of the team was personally noted by President Reagan. Only in 1984, the boat “Perch” returned to the Barents Sea to retrieve information from the “cocoon” - this was her fifth trip on the program “Bindweed”. The delivered information was very important: information about the principles of managing Russian submarine cruisers, the degree of combat readiness, tactics and strategy of the submarine fleet in various military-political situations. But the most important information received was that the new Soviet military doctrine did not plan to use strategic submarines in the first nuclear strike — they were part of the strategic reserve.
American intelligence agencies did not cease to search for Soviet agents in their units. In 1985, the FBI found that the communications officer of the US submarine headquarters had been working for the intelligence services of the USSR since 1968. He transmitted ciphers, copies of secret documents, information on coding systems. Thanks to him, the Soviet leadership knew about the patrols of American submarines, the latest developments in the field of modernization of US submarines. These data allowed the Soviet Union to keep up with the American developers in the field of construction and equipment of the latest submarines.
Another blow befell the American intelligence services. The arrest of an employee of the National Security Agency (NSA) Pelton, who informed the Soviet side about Operation Convolvulus and transferred a significant amount of secret material. Pelton became a Soviet agent for two main reasons: he was in dire need of money and held a grudge against the leadership, which not only did not improve him in the service, but also demoted him after a lie detector test. The test on the detector showed that he has homosexual inclinations, and the NSA tried to get rid of such employees. Information on the "Convolvulus operation" Pelton became available after listening to records of negotiations on the Soviet line of communication, delivered by submarines from trips to the Sea of Okhotsk. In addition to this information, Pelton handed over information about the security systems of the NSA and the procedure and methods of data collection by means of electronic intelligence into the hands of Soviet intelligence agencies. The trial of Pelton was closed, and he was sentenced to three life sentences for damage caused to US security.
There are many similar stories of opposition between the two most influential states of the world in the 70 and 80 years of the last century. Over the past years, the political, economic and military situation in Russia and in the countries of the former Soviet bloc has changed. Scientific thought to create new types of weapons has advanced far ahead. And at present, not a single state has a guarantee that the latest developments in the area of intelligence technology will not be used against it.
Information