Demyansky boiler and operation for its evacuation
About two hundred and fifty kilometers south of Leningrad, between the lakes Ilmen and Seliger, at the beginning of 1943, the German front was still deeply wedged in the shape of a mushroom into Soviet territory. It was the front of the German 2 Army Corps around Demyansk. In the "mushroom" there were twelve divisions, approximately 100 000 people. The width of the "mushroom" leg was only ten kilometers. If Demyanskiy ledge in the event of a renewed attack on Moscow could ever be the ideal starting point for this operation. The Soviet General Headquarters was well aware of this, so during its great winter offensive 1941-1942. he turned his attention to the hills of Valday. The Soviet troops did everything possible to break through the German barrier between the lakes Ilmen and Seliger and crush the German front near Leningrad and Rzhev with a blow to the rear of Army Groups North and Center. Hitler also wanted to maintain this position as a springboard for an attack on Rzhev.
The divisions of the 2 of the German corps stood firm. However, 8 February 1942 year they were surrounded, and subsequently they had to get supplies by air. At the end of April 1942, the attack from the outside and a counterattack from inside the bag was reestablished with the main German border on the Lovat River. The bridges that were built again restored the corridor between the main German front of the 16 Army from Staraya Russa to the Hill and divisions in the Demyansk region. Of course, this corridor leading to the demyansk battle zone was dangerously narrow, but the 2 Army Corps held it. He blocked the Russian land road between the lakes Ilmen and Seliger, restricting five Soviet armies. However, the entire 1942 year there was a constant threat that the Soviet units would be able to cut off the Demyan "mushroom" at its foundation, for many months the 100-thousandth German military contingent was on the verge of disaster.
The Soviet High Command realized this possibility and made the demyansky front one of the centers of its large winter offensive, 1942, the offensive, which, according to Stalin, was to end with the complete destruction of the German front in the East. Demyansk was an important factor in the calculations of Stalin. Just as Stalingrad was supposed to be a decisive blow that would crush the southern front of the Germans, so the Soviet offensive on Demyansk was an attempt to liquidate the front of Army Group North. On the Volga, Soviet troops managed to make a decisive breakthrough and smash the 6 army. In Valdai, on the contrary, Stalin miscalculated.
To destroy the 2nd German corps of 100 people, Marshal Tymoshenko deployed three armies: the 000th and 11th armies had to attack the northern front of a narrow strip of land from Lake Ilmen, and the 27st shock army - to hit the corridor from the south. The northern group consisted of thirteen rifle divisions, nine rifle brigades and tank compounds with a total of 400 tanks. Three German divisions opposed this powerful force: the 8th Jaeger, 81st and 290th Infantry divisions. Tymoshenko’s southern group consisted of seven rifle divisions, four rifle brigades and tank formations with 150 tanks. Before them stood the only German division - the 126th Infantry Division from the lands of the Rhine and Westphalia.
The offensive began on November 28 of 1942, with massive artillery preparation. It was followed by carpet bombing. The Russians completely dominated the air, the German troops in the Demyansk region did not have substantial support for the Luftwaffe, as there was not a single significant tank formation. In the first hours of the battle, the Red Army men made several breakthroughs in the northern front of the corridor. Tymoshenko put his reserves in the gap. Lieutenant-General Hyone, who commanded the troops inside the corridor, threw sappers, communications men, gunners, and drivers into the breakthrough areas. They took all of the supply and repair companies' mouths, each combat-capable person was sent to the threatened fronts of the corridor. But all in vain. A decisive breakthrough to the rear of the 16 Army could occur at any time.
In this dangerous situation, when it became clear that General Hyun’s divisions would not hold out any longer, Army Group North was taking a risky step. In early December, Field Marshal von Kühler removed three divisions of his 18 Army from very weak lines along Lake Ladoga, rings around the Oranienbaum Sack and from Volkhov and sent them into the Demyan corridor. Hitler did not want to give up his strategy to protect every centimeter of the territory already conquered. He persisted in his theory that far advanced and vulnerable strongholds must be defended in order to maintain convenient starting positions for future attacks. Therefore, the battalions transferred from the north and the regiments of the three divisions immediately entered into battle. Due to this, the deadly breakthrough of the Russians to the north was once again prevented. The most difficult situation was in Rosino. There, Soviet units broke through to the south with powerful tank support. But in a fierce battle, the Germans managed to block the breakthrough there and create a new frontier.
Almost unbelievable. Why Tymoshenko with a huge superiority in manpower and technology, with a powerful concentration of attacks on several points could not achieve a strategic breakthrough of the German front? Over the long period of the “state of siege”, German defensive positions were thoroughly strengthened. Superbly acted in conjunction with the infantry anti-aircraft, self-propelled, artillery and assault guns. In the next two weeks, Tymoshenko continuously tried to break through the northern front with his divisions and tank brigades, then their strength dried up. More than two hundred Soviet-torn Soviet tanks stood in front of the German defensive line.
On the southern front of the Demyan "mushroom" 2 in January, the 1-I Shock Army Tymoshenko launched another full-scale attack. For forty-six days, from November 28 to January 12, three Soviet armies lost more than 10 000 killed, as well as the 423 tank. German losses were a little less. The fierceness of the battle is confirmed by the fact that the list of dead, wounded and missing in the demyan corridor 17 767 officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. Seventeen thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven people in fifty-seven days, from November 28 to January 23! Huge price for the outpost on the Valdai Hills. But there could be no doubt that the Russians would attack again. There could be no doubt that the price would rise and sooner or later the entire garrison would die. Another Stalingrad.
Should we continue to take such a risk, given the lack of strength at all the lines? Battle commanders responded - no. "No," replied Colonel-General Zeitzler, the chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Germany. He tried to convince Hitler to sanction the withdrawal of forces from the bastion in Valdai, but he was at first deaf to all arguments. "Hold on" - was his thesis. The front “fortresses” of the front would be, as he believed, starting points for future attacks. Hitler was still committed to the strategy of conquering the Soviet Union through the occupation of its vast expanses and economically important territories. The terrible warning of destroyed Stalingrad shook him a little, but he was still not ready to completely reconsider his position.
When it became clear in the second half of January 1943 that the 6 Army died in Stalingrad because they hadn’t received an order to leave the Volga for the Don in time, Colonel General Zeitzler again turned to Hitler for permission to save 100 000 people in Demyansk from 6 fate Army, save these important for the command of the German Army ground divisions. Hitler no longer flatly rejected the request; now he hesitated between common sense and stubbornness. 31 January 1943, the year Hitler gave way to Zeitzler's insistent demands. The next day, February 1, Zeitzler in the 16 Army radiogram gave the 2 Corps a green light for evacuation. The de facto off-road was to be made gradually, in order not to leave a single gun.
Evacuation and working columns were formed, rail tracks were laid, log roads were built, a system of tracks was created that radially emerged from the mushroom cap into the corridor, allowing several columns to be output simultaneously. People worked intensively, and prisoners were involved in the work. Snow blowers puffed throughout. This is how "Highway No. 1", "Wooden Avenue", "Kurfürstendamm" and "Silesian Promenade" appeared.
The Germans tried to deceive the Soviet command, issuing preparation for evacuation as preparation for an offensive. Messengers, partisans and intelligence officers reported on their observations to the Soviet command, but the Russians perceived the information with distrust. Reports of intelligence officers from the combat zone, photographs of aerial reconnaissance really spoke of strengthening the German front at Demyansk, but the withdrawal would have been more logical. Get a report on horses. Infantry divisions returned them from the rear areas to the front. Doesn't such a measure mean preparation for a retreat?
The Soviet High Command decided to launch a new immediate attack on a narrow corridor of the Demyansk bridgehead. "History Of the Great Patriotic War "reports on the considerations of the Soviet command regarding this operation. In the third volume we read:" The wide-spread offensive of the Red Army in the south, in the central sector of the front and near Leningrad, constrained the forces of the enemy, exhausted his reserves. A favorable situation was created for the elimination of the Demyansky bridgehead, on which the main forces of the German 16 th army were concentrated — the entire 12 divisions. "
Fair and logical conclusion. The German 18 Army, a neighbor of the 16 Army on the left, was seriously absorbed by the events near Leningrad. The 59 Corps, south of Demyansk, near Vitebsk, fought hard at the junction of Army Groups “Center” and “North”. Rzhev's 9 Army for more than two months could barely cope with the defense. And further south, Field Marshal von Manstein needed every battalion to stop Popov’s tank group and Vatutin’s attack across the Donets on the Dnieper. Therefore, it was quite clear that the 16 Army could not count on the effective assistance of its neighbors if the situation around Demyansk was heated up again. And the 16 Army has no reserves at all.
The History of the Great Patriotic War indicates that the Soviet operations were carefully coordinated. Three days before this, 12 February, a new offensive began on the Leningrad front, south of Lake Ladoga. Thus, the German 18 Army was tied up, and Army Group North could not get any reserves from this source this time.
On the Rzhevsky ledge and on the breakthrough section of the Great Onions, the Russians also launched an offensive, so it was impossible to expect help from the neighboring army group. Thus, the divisions of the 16 Army in Valdai had to cope with this new mortal threat without any outside help.
With 07.00, Tymoshenko attacked the northern front of the Demyan Corridor with six rifle divisions and three tank regiments; his strike fell on the positions of three German divisions - 290, 58 and 254-th infantry divisions. On the southern front of the corridor, the Soviet 1 Shock Army attacked the regiments of the 126 Infantry Division with six rifle divisions and three rifle brigades.
There were dangerous wedges, especially in the southern sector of the 126 Infantry Division. But nowhere Tymoshenko failed to make a breakthrough. The German command was well aware that this was only a prelude. So far the Russians have engaged only two armies, but five more were standing around the Demyansky "mushroom". Five armies against 12 divisions! A full-scale offensive from all sides could begin at any moment. Taking into account the current situation and, above all, the critical situation on the southern front of the corridor, it was impossible to lose a single minute, the front had to be immediately reduced. General Lauks contacted the 16 Army and agreed to an immediate evacuation with Field Marshal Bush. 17 February 1943, the Germans began to withdraw from the demyansk bridgehead. A snowstorm began, in a few hours all roads and rail tracks were covered up. People and horses struggled to overcome the deep, loose snow. Machines along the axis fell into the white mass. There are traffic jams. There was a threat of disruption of the evacuation schedule, although so far everything worked like a clock. Intervened and the enemy.
By the morning of February 19, the Soviet command realized that the positions on the eastern edge of the combat zone were empty. The Russians began pursuing cavalry and skier formations. Fast ski battalions raced through the snowstorm, broke through the German cover and tried to seize the roads to block the withdrawal of German divisions. During the night, the third defensive line was removed from 19 to 20 in February exactly - the front line swept the town of Demyansk with a wide arch, so the highways and bridges over the Yavon and Paul rivers were preserved for the outgoing units. Under their cover, mechanized and cavalry units of heavy and light artillery, anti-aircraft and assault guns, as well as communications troops and field hospitals, went through the city. Moving marching columns of the Grenadier regiments were sent along the road bypassing Demyansk.
The Soviet Army vigorously pursued the retreating German units. 27 February, ten days after the start of departure, demyansky bridgehead and corridor were evacuated. Twelve divisions withdrew in ten days. The Germans left approximately 2000 square kilometers of territory. But not a single combat-ready weapon, not a single operating machine, not a single rifle ready for firing, fell into the hands of Tymoshenko. Several hundred tons of ammunition went off the air, 1500 machines were rendered unusable, as were 700 tons of food that could not be removed. "Deficiencies in the management of the troops," Marshal Tymoshenko does not relieve him of responsibility for the success of the German evacuation from the Demyansky bridgehead.
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