Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1920 – 30's
With the role that modern Russia plays in the lives of Arab and other countries with a predominantly Muslim population, the question of the prerequisites and fundamental episodes of mutual relations at their initial stage of our state with Egypt as one of the leading states of the Arab world inevitably arises. [1]
In addition, recent events in the Arab East in general and in Egypt in particular, have aroused heightened interest in Soviet-Arab relations in all their aspects: political-ideological, cultural-educational and economic.
The period indicated in the title is explained by the course of events in Russia and worldwide. stories: from the beginning of the struggle of the RSFSR for a way out of international isolation until the beginning of the Second World War, when Soviet-Egyptian relations virtually ceased to be maintained.
The Eastern policy of the Soviet state in 1920 – 30-s was carried out in several forms. Through them, the nature of relations with one or another Eastern country was expressed, as well as the position towards certain steps of the powers: establishing trade relations, establishing political contacts, declaring their position towards the policies of the powers in the East, counteracting the policies of the powers in the East towards a particular country .
In his speech at the 2-th All-Union Meeting of the Commissioners of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade 7 in January 1924, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin emphasized: “There is one extremely difficult question in our world politics. This is the difference between our relations with the West and our relations with the East. Our tasks, both political and economic, are set differently in the West and in the East. However, the West is watching what we do in the East. We cannot act in the East no matter how we act in the West ”[2].
The Arab East, being an integral part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in the Middle East, was interested in the Soviet government as a possible counterbalance to the colonial policy of Great Britain, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Arab countries were interested in the same situation as those who were directly dependent pressure of the leading world power of that time. [3]
In 1918 – 1919 not without the influence of the October Revolution in the big cities of Egypt among the workers began to emerge socialist cells, united in 1921 in the Socialist Party of Egypt (SPE). In 1922, SPE was renamed the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) and accepted into the Comintern. [4] “At the end of October 1922 to participate in the 4th Congress of the Communist International, members of the Alexandrian faction insisted on going to Moscow SPE member Husni al-Orabi. ... During his stay in Moscow, he was introduced to 1922, prepared in June, by an employee of the Eastern Division of the ECCI [5], a famous Soviet orientalist K.M. Troyanovsky Theses on the program and tactics of the Communist Party of Egypt. This document emphasized that in Egypt "a base is being created for communist work not only in Arabic, but also in the entire Middle East, ... along the entire southern and southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea." K.M. Troyanovsky believed that this circumstance is fundamental, since Egypt is extremely important "for ... British capitalism" because this country is located "at the crossroads of the main sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, in general, and the western part of the British Empire (metropolis) with east (India) ”. And further he wrote: “In order to separate the brain from the vertebra of the empire, it is necessary to cut this 'occipital nerve', which Egypt is for English imperialism”. It was about the Suez Canal, which acted as the “focus” of international politics, “the capture of the channel by the British meant militarily and politically subjugation and occupation of the whole country, and the return of the channel to its natural owners means political liberation and independence of Egypt.” But, moreover, a change in the status of this waterway (the author of the theses spoke of the need for the socialists to nominate the canal nationalization) would mean “breaking the British Empire into two parts, at the same time, the disintegration of the empire”. However, Soviet geopolitics, framed by KM. Troyanovsky class slogans, had a tendency to further development ”[6].
Egyptian socialists clearly overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union in the confrontation with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet side skillfully used this: “The Egyptian delegate was seduced by the promises of Sudan in order to gain full support for his foreign policy from his supporters in Egypt. In turn, for his recognition as the head of the Egyptian section of the Comintern, H. al-Orabi was ready to recognize the legitimacy of Moscow’s claims on his country and its surrounding geopolitical space ”[7].
What were the reasons for the desire of the Egyptian socialists to cooperate with Moscow? “The coming to an alliance with the Soviet state of those who, ultimately, became the Communists of Egypt, was a consequence of the radicalization of the nationalist views of these people, absolutely far from any concepts of internationalism, as well as of working life. ... The leadership of the ETUC (at least, H. al-Orabi), was aware of the price paid by him for joining the Comintern. The repetition in the program of a party of ideas of Soviet geopolitics is a sufficiently weighty confirmation [8].
In 1922, in Egypt, a translation of Lenin's The State and the Revolution was published. [9] It is noteworthy that the first students from the Arab countries of the Communist University of Eastern Workers (KUTV), formed in 1921, as one of the schools of the Comintern [10] , became in 1922 Egyptians. [11]
Graduates KUTV originally intended to be used to work on the Soviet foreign intelligence. "In Egypt, the work of the GPU [12] was carried out by local communists ... The work was supervised by the Berlin residency of the GPU, which monthly sent 1000 dollars to pay for agents in Egypt" [13].
In addition to ideological penetration into Egypt, the Soviet leadership sought to establish trade relations with the country, which is an important link in the British colonial system. In 1922, the first batch of flour was delivered to Egypt from Soviet Russia to 751 thousand pounds, and from Russia to Egypt - 16,1 thousand tons of kerosene, to 1923 - already 73 thousand tons. These deliveries were carried out through the mediation of foreign brokerage firms.
In June, 1920 in London, according to British law, was established by a Soviet cooperative delegation and was registered as a private limited liability company by the joint stock trading company ARCOS (“All Russian Cooperative Society Limited”, with 1922 - “Arcos Ltd”). [14] At the end 1922 Arkosa’s London office was able to establish links with several Egyptian cotton export companies. [15]
Chicherin, being the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference [16], wrote to his deputy M.M. on January 30, 1923 Litvinov: “I received from the delegation of the Egyptian National Party [17] a large collection of documents that I am taking with me to Moscow. Today I had a full delegation of the Egyptian national party. According to them, England has no legal rights to prevent Egypt from entering into relations with us ”[18]. In 1923, Egyptian authorities allowed the steamers of the General Directorate of Merchant fleet USSR (Sovtorgflot) call at the ports of Egypt: Alexandria, Port Said and others, from which cotton and jute were exported.
In December, the Russian Eastern Chamber of Commerce (RWTP, or Rosvosttorg) [1922] was established in Moscow in 19, paying much attention to the development of trade relations with Arab countries, and in particular with Egypt. [20] In 1924 – 1925. Rosvosttorg positively resolved the issue of importing Egyptian cotton through the Black Sea ports and petitioned the USSR government for the exemption of this cargo from customs duties, which created favorable conditions for importing approx. 1 million pounds of Egyptian cotton in exchange for Soviet goods (kerosene, sugar). [21]
At the end of 1923, a representative of the Alexandrian cotton trading company, Kazulli, arrived in Moscow. As a result of negotiations with the Soviet interested organizations, it was agreed that the company would send cotton to the All-Union Textile Syndicate through Liverpool. At the same time, the representative of Arcos LA Glaser obtained permission from the Egyptian authorities to enter the country. [22] Until 1926, Egyptian cotton continued to flow from Alexandria mainly to the ports of Leningrad and Murmansk through Bremen, Hamburg, Liverpool and London. [23]
In addition to Arcos and Rosvostorg, trade relations with Egypt were developed by a mixed Russian-Turkish export-import society (Russotürk), established in July 1924 to develop trade with Turkey and Arab countries. In 1926, in Alexandria, this society opened its branch, which was headed by a citizen of the United States of North America, IG Semenyuk. “The presence of an American passport was provided by I.G. Semenyuku relative freedom of commercial activity in the Egyptian market and even the right of legal protection of commercial transactions ”[24]. Russotürk exported to Egypt the majority of imports imported to the country: timber, flour, petroleum products, sugar, tobacco, coal, cement, etc. [25] After the abolition of the Rosotürk in 1928, the USSR Trade Mission in Turkey carried out trade operations. [26 ]
Political relations between the USSR and Egypt developed much more slowly than trade. As mentioned above, in January, 1923, Chicherin, met in Lausanne with a delegation from Egypt. After the departure of the People's Commissar of Lausanne, the plenipotentiary in Italy, V.V., made contact with the Egyptian side. Vorovskiy. 25 April 1923 Mr. Chicherin gave the secretary general of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne conference to Thieves special instruction: “In Lausanne, you will certainly meet with the Egyptians: please use this to ... convey to the Egyptian government an invitation to enter diplomatic relations [27]” [28] .
In January 1924, the plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet Union in Italy N.I. Jordan sent a letter to Egyptian Foreign Minister Vasif Gali-Bey, in which he proposed “to establish political and trade relations between the two countries, especially taking into account the strong economic ties that for many years united Russia and Egypt, as well as the deep sympathy shown by the peoples of the Soviet Union Union to the Egyptian people. ”[29] However, the initiative of the Soviet government did not meet at that time the support of the Egyptian side: the pressure on the UK was so significant that it did not even vetul on the USSR proposal. [30] In addition, the government of the founder and first chairman of the Wafd party, Saad Zaglyulya, which came to power in January 1924, spoke of a “Bolshevik danger”, especially since the social contradictions in Egypt at that time were exacerbated and power collapsed on the ECP. [31]
To preserve the popularity of Zaglyul demanded the withdrawal of the British officers from the Egyptian army. The British, in response, appointed her commander of Sudanese Governor-General Lee Stack, who was mortally wounded in Cairo. As a result, in November 1924, after the ultimatum presented by the British, the government of Zaglyulya was forced to resign, because it agreed to fulfill only a part of the demands, refusing to withdraw Egyptian troops from Sudan and allow the Sudanese government to increase the area of irrigated land in Gezira without limit. [32] The WAFD parliament has also been dissolved. [33]
After the announcement of the English ultimatum, in the Soviet Union, mainly in the Muslim republics, there was a movement in support of Egypt. In Baku, the “Hands off Egypt!” Committee was created, and its creation was approved at the highest political level: at a meeting of the Political Bureau of 4 in December of 1924 (Protocol No. 39 / 26), a decision was made “On Appeals for an Ultimatum to Egypt” [34], and at a meeting of the Political Bureau of 3 in January 1925 (Protocol No. 43), it was decided “not to oppose the formation of“ Hands off Egypt ”society in Azerbaijan by way of private initiative [35].
The new Egyptian government was formed from pro-British leaders. However, it could not accept the draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty. [36]
Formed in 1930, the Egyptian government adopted a new constitution. Nevertheless, an attempt to hold 1931 on its basis in May, the parliamentary elections failed as a result of the speeches of workers and students, as a result of which blood was shed. At the beginning of 1933, this government also resigned.
Fearing the influence in Egypt of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, whose governments attached key importance to this country in the region, the United Kingdom in November 1934 abolished the 1930 constitution of the year. However, the 1923 constitution was reinstated only in December, 1935, because the British tried to use the Italian invasion of Ethiopia as an excuse to delay the restoration of the old constitution, although the really changed military-political situation in the region did not affect the internal situation in Egypt.
As a result of the restoration of the 1923 constitution in May, 1936 came to power again by wafdists, and in August, 1936 in London signed the Anglo-Egyptian alliance treaty that weakened the military and political position of the UK. [37] Despite the fact that the treaty declared the termination of the military occupation of Egypt and canceled the post of military commissar of the country; Great Britain maintained control over Egypt. Therefore, the general population, both left and right, were unhappy with its limitations. [38]
The contacts of the Soviet Union with the Egyptian side were also carried out through the representations of both countries in Ankara, Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Tehran, moreover, as L.M. Karakhan [39], who oversaw relations with countries of the East, Plenipotentiary in France V.S. Dovgalevsky 1 September 1928, “Paris seems to us the most convenient point for negotiations with the Egyptians” [40]. As for the capital of Italy, according to the same Karakhan, addressed to the plenipotentiary in Italy, D.I. Kursk 19 February 1929 g., “Rome acquires for us the significance of a primary observation point along the line of ... Eastern policy” [41]. This is confirmed by the fact that in MM 1934, M.M. Axelrod [42], previously as a scout working in Yemen and Turkey, was appointed a resident of the Soviet political intelligence precisely to Rome.
On how active Axelrod’s activity in Egypt was indirectly is an episode that took place along his route to Yemen in 1928 in: “In Port Said, increased vigilance of the police on us was apparent in relation to us, especially in relation to tons. Axelrod. Our passports were taken ashore (obviously, for a photo) ... One of the police officers, with an exaggerated confidentiality, informed T. Axelrod that we are in Egypt blacklisted [43].
The issues discussed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Egypt were the most diverse. First of all, they dealt with trade affairs, including shipping, since Soviet merchant ships called at the port of Alexandria quite often. [44] They also discussed establishing diplomatic relations, assisting the Soviet Union in refusing the regime of capitulations of other countries, etc.
Over time, the range of trade expanded. Grain, including wheat, caviar, kerosene, starch products, timber, including sawn timber, machinery and equipment, medical and medicinal raw materials, flour, oil and petroleum products, vegetables, dishes, including glass, porcelain, were imported from Egypt to the USSR and earthenware, sugar, seeds, silicates, livestock, matches, tobacco, fabrics, coal (for bunker stations of Alexandria and Port Said), fertilizers, plywood, fruits, chemicals, including soda products, cement, etc., and jute was exported , coffee, tin, pepper, rice, salt, fertilizer, cotton, exotic resins, etc . [45]
In 1925 – 1926 The USSR exported goods to Egypt for 2923 thousand rubles, which amounted to approx. 0,5% (total - 589124 thousand rubles) from Soviet exports, and imported goods from Egypt to 26561 thousand rubles, which amounted to approx. 4% (total - 673677 thousand rubles) from Soviet imports. [46] It is noteworthy that negotiations and conclusion of cotton deals were held for some time in the UK, particularly in Liverpool [47], and in Germany.
In May, 1927, in Egyptian political and business circles, launched a company to establish direct trade relations between the USSR and Egypt, supported by the Egyptian press, including Al Siyas, which wrote 9 in an editorial in May: “We do not understand ... why trade relations between Egypt and Russia continue to be interrupted, while the interests of Egypt itself urgently demand the restoration of these relations ... We believe that the issue of restoring economic relations between Egypt and Russia should be considered with all care and thoroughness, and that the Egyptian government should take a clear position in relation to it in accordance with the interests of the country, requiring their restoration and streamlining ”[48].
At the same time, the Egyptian parliament held a debate on this issue, during which some deputies expressed concern that the Soviet side had difficulties in conducting trade operations with Egypt due to the opposition of the Egyptian government. After the rupture by the United Kingdom of relations with the USSR, the campaign only intensified, since Soviet-Egyptian trade until then was conducted mainly through the mediation of British commercial organizations. [49]
Egyptian journalist Enan, head of the foreign department of the al-Siyas newspaper, told 1927 in June to interim charge in charge affairs of the USSR in Turkey V.P. Potemkin "about the fierce campaign of the British in Egypt against trade with the Soviet Union," and immediately confirmed the determination of his newspaper in conducting a counter-company. [50]
The Egyptian government in September 1927 allowed the representative of the Soviet joint-stock company Textilimport to enter the country to buy cotton in Egypt. [51] At the same time in Alexandria, the Textilimport office was opened, which started buying up cotton from both Egyptian firms and Egyptian governments. [52]
The Soviet side also sought to conclude a trade agreement for fixing guarantees of stable trade in it. [53] The fact is that the Soviet side was interested in Egyptian cotton more than Egypt in Soviet goods. The impossibility of replacing Egyptian cotton due to its special spinning properties by other imported types and raw materials of its own production, as well as due to the significant share of the Soviet side’s needs (about 7% of the total Egyptian crop), which grows as industry develops, created in 1927 g The problem of supplying factories with raw materials. [54] The Soviet side played a global drop in cotton prices and the tendency of the UK to switch to lower cotton varieties. [55] At the end of November 1927, “as a result of almost two months regovorov agreement with the government (of Egypt. - P.G.) managed to conclude on favorable ... conditions ”[56]. The contract provided for the purchase of cotton from the Egyptian government stores by the Soviet side for an amount of approx. 10 million rubles. In connection with which the Soviet ships, who arrived for cotton, were allowed to approach the Alexandrian marinas. Until then, Soviet ships were to remain in the raid. [57] Thus, the treaty guaranteed, “although still temporary, the equal rights of the Soviet fleet in Egyptian waters” [58].
The result of the execution of direct Soviet-Egyptian trade relations was an increase in commodity circulation between our countries. According to RVTP, in 1926 / 1927, the turnover amounted to 26,7 million rubles, and in 1927 / 1928, it increased to 41,1 million rubles, that is, more than 1,5 times. The purchases of cotton especially increased, which, according to Textilimport, increased over the same period from 29,1 thousand bales [59] to 68,4 thousand bales, that is, more than doubled. This accounted for more than 7% of all Egyptian cotton exports. [60] Thus, according to the Egyptian customs service, in 1928, the USSR occupied the 6 place in Egypt’s foreign trade and 4 place for the export of cotton from that country. [61 ]
Despite the obvious success in the development of trade relations with Egypt, Soviet diplomats did not fall into euphoria. Karakhan in a letter to Dovgalevsky from 23 June 1928 assessed the prospects of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the following way: “I don’t think that we could [soon] raise the question of establishing political relations with Egypt. Our immediate task is to expand our de facto trade relations and consolidate them in some document ”[62].
In the Soviet-Egyptian relations of the period under review there were also cultural ties. Thus, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) achieved good results in the book exchange with Egypt: only in 1924 – 1931. 723 books were sent to Egypt by VOX and 1158 was received from there, and the total book circulation with Egypt turned out to be greater than with any other Arab country. [63]
Academician Ignaty Yulianovich Krachkovsky, who worked in the libraries of Alexandria and Cairo and maintained contacts with Egyptian scholars, became the “first sign” of scientific communication between the USSR and the Arab East. [64]
As a result of the global economic crisis, developing countries also suffered huge economic losses. For the industrially underdeveloped states, the effects of the crisis were most severe. Bringing the ruin to countries-suppliers of raw materials and food, the crisis has increased the burden of payments on old debts, has led many states to bankruptcy. The fall in the purchasing power of the population of underdeveloped countries made it extremely difficult to expand the sales of industrial goods exported by industrially developed countries. As the crisis spread to the entire capitalist world, it was impossible to maneuver some countries at the expense of others. [65]
Economic ties with the Soviet Union became even more important for Egypt in 1929 – 1931, when the problem of cotton export became more acute due to the crisis. So, in 1931, which became the most difficult for the Egyptian economy, the USSR bought approx. 27 tonnes, or 8,6% of all cotton exported by Egypt this year. [66]
However, under pressure from the British, the Egyptians began to impede the entry of Soviet goods into the country. So, on November 1 1930, the Egyptian government introduced double duties on certain types of Soviet goods. As a result of negotiations held between the Soviet and Egyptian sides in Paris, and the demands of interested representatives of the Egyptian trade community, increased duties on Soviet goods from January 1 1931 were lifted, but only temporarily. Since November 1931, they were re-introduced, ostensibly to counter the Soviet "dumping". In total, such duties were extended to 20 types of Soviet goods. It is noteworthy that shortly before this, the British delegation, headed by former Foreign Minister A. Balfour, visited Cairo. [67]
Later a representative of Textilexport I.P. was sent from Alexandria. Vorobiev, and in August 1932, the Egyptian authorities banned the activities of the Soviet society “Russtorg”, which united the offices of Gostorg RSFSR, Tekstilimport and a number of Egyptian firms and conducted trade operations in Alexandria in July 1931. As a result, in 1932 Egypt was purchased only 1033 tons of cotton [68], that is, about 26 times less compared to the previous year, and since 1933, purchases of Egyptian cotton by the Soviet Union have stopped altogether. [69]
The behavior of the Egyptian government was largely determined by the anti-Soviet stance of Great Britain, which declared a trade war against the Soviet Union in April 1932. [70] After the introduction of November 5 by the Egyptian side of the USSR prohibitive and increased duties, the USSR reduced the range of goods exported to Egypt, limiting itself to forestry, oil products and coal. The newspaper Al-Balag, which advocated the development of trade with the Soviet Union, wrote that "the customs policy in Egypt is aimed at providing an opportunity to trade in Egypt only the British Empire." [1931]
In 1938, the Egyptian side itself took the initiative to develop trade relations. The main reason for the appeal was that the Egyptian side understood the benefits being lost in unilateral trade with the Soviet Union. So, in 1927 / 1928, the USSR imports from Egypt amounted to 113,6 million rubles, and exports to Egypt - 33,1 million rubles, that is, there was a positive balance for the Egyptian side with a superiority of more than 3,4 times. In 1938, USSR imports from Egypt amounted to just 211 thousand rubles. (salt!), and exports to Egypt - 9 million rubles [72], that is, there was a negative balance for the Egyptian side with a concession of more than 42,7 times. At the September 3 meeting, the Politburo 1938 (Protocol No. 63) decided to “declare to the Egyptian government that we do not object to his proposal to conclude a trade agreement, provided that it is concluded on the most favored basis without certain obligations of certain purchases and without net balance [73]. And yet, before the Great Patriotic War, Soviet-Egyptian trade relations boiled down mainly to the export of goods from the USSR.
One of the indicators of the political situation in Egypt unfavorable for the USSR was the increase in the number of political emigrants visiting the Soviet Union. The first political emigrants from Egypt began to arrive in the USSR in 1925. [74] In 1933 and 1936. their number has increased dramatically. [75]
In October, the Comintern 1936 initiated the creation of international brigades, international formations that brought together anti-fascist volunteers from dozens of countries to help Republican Spain. In total, seven international brigades were formed. [76] According to the Comintern, Egyptians fought among the representatives of the Arab peoples in the international brigades. [77] their opponents in the region are too immature and divided so that the fundamental difference in the approach to the Middle East situation of Moscow, on the one hand, and London and Paris, on the other, will bring some substantial results for the USSR [78].
In 1938 – 1939 there was a fading of the international activity of the USSR in the Middle East, which led to the curtailment of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which ended the first stage of their evolution.
Notes
[1] About the relationship of the Soviet state with the countries of the Muslim world in this period, see: Spector I. The Soviet Union and the Muslim World. 1917 – 1958. Wash., 1958.
[2] Documents of the USSR foreign policy (hereinafter - DVP USSR). T. VII, p. 608.
[3] See: Milner A. England in Egypt. L., 1920; Chirol V. The Egyptian Problem. L., 1921; Report of Special mission to Egypt. L., 1921; Mowat Ch. Britain between the wars, 1918 – 1940. L., 1955; Darwin J. Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: 1918 – 1922. L., 1981.
[4] The newest history of the Arab countries of Africa. M., 1990, p. 9.
[5] Executive Committee of the Communist International.
[6] Kosach G.G. Red flag over the Middle East? M., 2001, p. 74, 78.
[7] Ibid., P. 79.
[8] Ibid., P. 89.
[9] Gorbatov OM, Cherkassky L.Ya. Cooperation of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East and Africa. M., 1980, p. 22.
[10] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 7, 18, 54, 93, 114, 115, 158, 182; Adibekov G.M., Shakhnazarova E.N., Shirinya K.K. The organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919 – 1943. M., 1997, p. 127 – 128, 171 – 172, 207. See: On the political tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East. - In book: Stalin I. Writings T. 7. M., 1954.
[11] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 2, l. 49. Cm.: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East in the USSR. 1920 – 1930-e years. M., 2009, Ch. I.
[12] The main political department, which included the Foreign Office, which was engaged in foreign intelligence. Cm.: Gusterin P. At the origins of Soviet intelligence in the East // Asia and Africa today. 2012, No. 3.
[13] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes chekista. Berlin, 1930, p. 237.
[14] Arkos acted as a representative of Soviet foreign trade organizations and carried out export-import operations with offices and offices in a number of countries.
[15] RGAE. F. 3270, op. 3, d. 13.
[16] See: Sevres peace treaty and acts signed in Lausanne. M., 1927; Rubinstein N.L. Near and Middle East after World War I. Lausanne Conference. M., 1952; Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922 – 1923. L., 1923.
[17] It's about the Vatan party. Cm.: Howell J. Egypt's Past, Present and Future. Dayton, 1929; Deeb M. Party Politics in Egypt, 1919 – 1939. L., 1979.
[18] DVP USSR. T. VI, p. 169. Cm.: Symons M. Britain and Egypt: the rise of Egyptian nationalism. L., 1925; Zayid M. Egypt's Struggle for Independence. Beirut, 1965; The Anglo-Egyptian experience, 1882 – 1982. L., 1983.
[19] In 1926 – 1931 - All-Union Eastern Chamber of Commerce.
[20] RGAE. F. 635, op. 3, d. 60.
[21] Gorbatov OM, Cherkassky L.Ya., with. 39.
[22] Makeev D.A. Foreign trade relations of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East in 1922 – 1939 M., 1983, p. 7 – 9.
[23] Ibid., P. 15.
[24] Ibid., P. 16 – 19.
[25] RGAE. F. 3514, op. 1, d. 62.
[26] Makeev D.A., with. 20.
[27] Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Egypt were established in 6 July - 26 August 1943 at the mission level, 15 February - 11 March 1954 the mission were transformed into embassies.
[28] International life. 1964, No. 6, p. 158.
[29] Ibid., P. 159.
[30] See: Podorolsky N.A. Egypt and England. Odessa, 1925; Volkov F.D. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924 – 1929 M., 1958; Young J. Egypt. L., 1927; Marshal J. The Egyptian Enigma. L., 1928; Fischer L. The Soviets in World Affairs: Vol. 1 – 2. L., 1930; Marlowe J. Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800 – 1953. L., 1954; Mansfield P. The British in Egypt. L., 1971.
[31] Laqueur W. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. L., 1959, p. 97 – 101.
[32] See: Abbas M. The Sudan Question. The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. 1884 – 1951. L., 1952; Fabunmi l. The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations. L., 1960; The British in the Sudan. 1898 – 1956. Oxf., 1984.
[33] See: Petrov K. Anglo-Egyptian Conflict 1924. - In the book: Arab countries. Story. M., 1963; Elgood P. Egypt and the Army. Oxf., 1924; Elgood P. The Transit of Egypt. L., 1928; Deeb M. Party Politics in Egypt, 1919 – 1939. L., 1979; Terry J. The Wafd, 1919 – 1952. L., 1982.
[34] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 162, d. 2, l. 46.
[35] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 163, d. 470, l. 14.
[36] See: Buryan M.S. Egypt in the foreign and colonial policy of Great Britain in the 20-ies. XX century. Lugansk, 1994.
[37] British and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 140, p. 179 – 204. Cm.: Buryan M.S. On the history of the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 1936. - In the book: Ideology and politics. CH 1. M., 1986; Teplov L.F. From the history of the struggle of the Egyptian people for independence: the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. - In the book: Africa. Problems of history. M., 1986.
[38] Recent History of the Arab Countries in Africa, p. 8 – 12; Laqueur W.p. 121 – 123. Cm.: Vatikiotis P. The History of Egypt. From Muhammad Ali to Sadat. L., 1976.
[39] The real name of Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan (1889 – 1937) is Levon Karakhanyan.
[40] DVP USSR. T. XI, p. 498.
[41] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 38.
[42] See: Smilyanskaya I.M. Moses Markovich Axelrod // Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1989, No. 5; Kilberg H.I. Memories of MM Axelrode. - In: Unknown Pages of Russian Oriental Studies. M., 1997.
[43] On the second trip to Yemen. Report G. Astakhov from 21.01.1929 // AVPRF. F. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 21.
[44] DVP USSR. T. VIII, p. 698 – 699.
[45] USSR Foreign Trade in 1918 – 1940 M., 1960, p. 1109 – 1117.
[46] DVP USSR. T. IX, p. 702 – 703.
[47] Ibid., P. 549.
[48] Cit. by: DVP USSR. T. X, p. 640.
[49] Ibid., P. 641.
[50] Ibid., P. 316.
[51] Ibid., P. 641.
[52] Ibid., P. 584.
[53] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 4.
[54] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 7.
[55] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 641.
[56] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 8.
[57] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 584.
[58] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 8.
[59] The Egyptian cotton bale was 320 – 360 kg.
[60] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 641.
[61] DVP USSR. T. XII, p. 218.
[62] DVP USSR. T. XI, p. 404 – 405.
[63] Sharafutdinova R.Sh. Cultural links of the library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with the countries of the Near and Middle East. - In: Scientific and Cultural Relations of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with foreign countries of the East. M. —L., 1957, p. 72; Ioffe A.E. International relations of Soviet science, technology and culture, 1917 – 1939. M., 1975, p. 387.
[64] Ioffe A.E. International relations of Soviet science, technology and culture ..., p. 382.
[65] See: Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s // Journal of Economic History. December 1985, No. 45 (4); Kindleberger Ch. The World in Depression, 1929 – 1939. University of California Press, 1986; Brendon P. The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s. New York, 2000.
[66] DVP USSR. T. XIII, p. 138.
[67] See: Foundation of British foreign policy. Camb., 1938; Carr E. The foreign policy of Britain. From 1918 to September 1939. L., 1939; Marlowe J. Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800 – 1953. L., 1954; Vatikiotis P. The Modern History of Egypt. L., 1969; Mansfield P. The British in Egypt. L., 1971; Richmond J. Egypt, 1798 – 1952. NY, 1977.
[68] Ioffe A.E. Soviet Union Foreign Policy, 1928 – 1932 M., 1968, p. 419, 421 – 422; Makeev D.A., with. 36 – 37, 41.
[69] Foreign trade of capitalist countries in 1929 – 1936 M. —L., 1937, p. 68 – 69.
[70] See: Volkov F.D. USSR - England. 1929 – 1945 Anglo-Soviet relations on the eve of and during the Second World War. M., 1964.
[71] Makeev D.A., with. 38 – 40. Cm.: Fox R. English colonial policy. Per. from English M. —L., 1934; Lutsky V.B. England and Egypt. M., 1947; Elliot W. The New British Empire. L., 1932; Knarlund P. The British Empire, 1815 – 1939. L., 1942; Cross C. The Fall of the British Empire, 1918 – 1968. L., 1969.
[72] USSR Foreign Trade in 1918 – 1940 M., 1960, p. 1116 – 1117.
[73] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 162, d. 23, l. 147.
[74] RGASPI. F. 539, op. 4, d. 136.
[75] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 85, d. 104; 115. Cm.: Kosach G.G., with. 143 (approx. 206).
[76] See: Longo L. International brigades in Spain. M., 1960.
[77] RGASPI. F. 545, op. 6, d. 436; 437; 626; 843.
[78] Vasiliev A. Russia in the Middle East: from Messianism to Pragmatism. M., 1993, p. 18.
In addition, recent events in the Arab East in general and in Egypt in particular, have aroused heightened interest in Soviet-Arab relations in all their aspects: political-ideological, cultural-educational and economic.
The period indicated in the title is explained by the course of events in Russia and worldwide. stories: from the beginning of the struggle of the RSFSR for a way out of international isolation until the beginning of the Second World War, when Soviet-Egyptian relations virtually ceased to be maintained.
The Eastern policy of the Soviet state in 1920 – 30-s was carried out in several forms. Through them, the nature of relations with one or another Eastern country was expressed, as well as the position towards certain steps of the powers: establishing trade relations, establishing political contacts, declaring their position towards the policies of the powers in the East, counteracting the policies of the powers in the East towards a particular country .
In his speech at the 2-th All-Union Meeting of the Commissioners of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade 7 in January 1924, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin emphasized: “There is one extremely difficult question in our world politics. This is the difference between our relations with the West and our relations with the East. Our tasks, both political and economic, are set differently in the West and in the East. However, the West is watching what we do in the East. We cannot act in the East no matter how we act in the West ”[2].
The Arab East, being an integral part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in the Middle East, was interested in the Soviet government as a possible counterbalance to the colonial policy of Great Britain, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the Arab countries were interested in the same situation as those who were directly dependent pressure of the leading world power of that time. [3]
In 1918 – 1919 not without the influence of the October Revolution in the big cities of Egypt among the workers began to emerge socialist cells, united in 1921 in the Socialist Party of Egypt (SPE). In 1922, SPE was renamed the Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) and accepted into the Comintern. [4] “At the end of October 1922 to participate in the 4th Congress of the Communist International, members of the Alexandrian faction insisted on going to Moscow SPE member Husni al-Orabi. ... During his stay in Moscow, he was introduced to 1922, prepared in June, by an employee of the Eastern Division of the ECCI [5], a famous Soviet orientalist K.M. Troyanovsky Theses on the program and tactics of the Communist Party of Egypt. This document emphasized that in Egypt "a base is being created for communist work not only in Arabic, but also in the entire Middle East, ... along the entire southern and southeastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea." K.M. Troyanovsky believed that this circumstance is fundamental, since Egypt is extremely important "for ... British capitalism" because this country is located "at the crossroads of the main sea routes connecting Europe with Africa and Asia, in general, and the western part of the British Empire (metropolis) with east (India) ”. And further he wrote: “In order to separate the brain from the vertebra of the empire, it is necessary to cut this 'occipital nerve', which Egypt is for English imperialism”. It was about the Suez Canal, which acted as the “focus” of international politics, “the capture of the channel by the British meant militarily and politically subjugation and occupation of the whole country, and the return of the channel to its natural owners means political liberation and independence of Egypt.” But, moreover, a change in the status of this waterway (the author of the theses spoke of the need for the socialists to nominate the canal nationalization) would mean “breaking the British Empire into two parts, at the same time, the disintegration of the empire”. However, Soviet geopolitics, framed by KM. Troyanovsky class slogans, had a tendency to further development ”[6].
Egyptian socialists clearly overestimated the capabilities of the Soviet Union in the confrontation with the United Kingdom, and the Soviet side skillfully used this: “The Egyptian delegate was seduced by the promises of Sudan in order to gain full support for his foreign policy from his supporters in Egypt. In turn, for his recognition as the head of the Egyptian section of the Comintern, H. al-Orabi was ready to recognize the legitimacy of Moscow’s claims on his country and its surrounding geopolitical space ”[7].
What were the reasons for the desire of the Egyptian socialists to cooperate with Moscow? “The coming to an alliance with the Soviet state of those who, ultimately, became the Communists of Egypt, was a consequence of the radicalization of the nationalist views of these people, absolutely far from any concepts of internationalism, as well as of working life. ... The leadership of the ETUC (at least, H. al-Orabi), was aware of the price paid by him for joining the Comintern. The repetition in the program of a party of ideas of Soviet geopolitics is a sufficiently weighty confirmation [8].
In 1922, in Egypt, a translation of Lenin's The State and the Revolution was published. [9] It is noteworthy that the first students from the Arab countries of the Communist University of Eastern Workers (KUTV), formed in 1921, as one of the schools of the Comintern [10] , became in 1922 Egyptians. [11]
Graduates KUTV originally intended to be used to work on the Soviet foreign intelligence. "In Egypt, the work of the GPU [12] was carried out by local communists ... The work was supervised by the Berlin residency of the GPU, which monthly sent 1000 dollars to pay for agents in Egypt" [13].
In addition to ideological penetration into Egypt, the Soviet leadership sought to establish trade relations with the country, which is an important link in the British colonial system. In 1922, the first batch of flour was delivered to Egypt from Soviet Russia to 751 thousand pounds, and from Russia to Egypt - 16,1 thousand tons of kerosene, to 1923 - already 73 thousand tons. These deliveries were carried out through the mediation of foreign brokerage firms.
In June, 1920 in London, according to British law, was established by a Soviet cooperative delegation and was registered as a private limited liability company by the joint stock trading company ARCOS (“All Russian Cooperative Society Limited”, with 1922 - “Arcos Ltd”). [14] At the end 1922 Arkosa’s London office was able to establish links with several Egyptian cotton export companies. [15]
Chicherin, being the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation at the Lausanne Conference [16], wrote to his deputy M.M. on January 30, 1923 Litvinov: “I received from the delegation of the Egyptian National Party [17] a large collection of documents that I am taking with me to Moscow. Today I had a full delegation of the Egyptian national party. According to them, England has no legal rights to prevent Egypt from entering into relations with us ”[18]. In 1923, Egyptian authorities allowed the steamers of the General Directorate of Merchant fleet USSR (Sovtorgflot) call at the ports of Egypt: Alexandria, Port Said and others, from which cotton and jute were exported.
In December, the Russian Eastern Chamber of Commerce (RWTP, or Rosvosttorg) [1922] was established in Moscow in 19, paying much attention to the development of trade relations with Arab countries, and in particular with Egypt. [20] In 1924 – 1925. Rosvosttorg positively resolved the issue of importing Egyptian cotton through the Black Sea ports and petitioned the USSR government for the exemption of this cargo from customs duties, which created favorable conditions for importing approx. 1 million pounds of Egyptian cotton in exchange for Soviet goods (kerosene, sugar). [21]
At the end of 1923, a representative of the Alexandrian cotton trading company, Kazulli, arrived in Moscow. As a result of negotiations with the Soviet interested organizations, it was agreed that the company would send cotton to the All-Union Textile Syndicate through Liverpool. At the same time, the representative of Arcos LA Glaser obtained permission from the Egyptian authorities to enter the country. [22] Until 1926, Egyptian cotton continued to flow from Alexandria mainly to the ports of Leningrad and Murmansk through Bremen, Hamburg, Liverpool and London. [23]
In addition to Arcos and Rosvostorg, trade relations with Egypt were developed by a mixed Russian-Turkish export-import society (Russotürk), established in July 1924 to develop trade with Turkey and Arab countries. In 1926, in Alexandria, this society opened its branch, which was headed by a citizen of the United States of North America, IG Semenyuk. “The presence of an American passport was provided by I.G. Semenyuku relative freedom of commercial activity in the Egyptian market and even the right of legal protection of commercial transactions ”[24]. Russotürk exported to Egypt the majority of imports imported to the country: timber, flour, petroleum products, sugar, tobacco, coal, cement, etc. [25] After the abolition of the Rosotürk in 1928, the USSR Trade Mission in Turkey carried out trade operations. [26 ]
Political relations between the USSR and Egypt developed much more slowly than trade. As mentioned above, in January, 1923, Chicherin, met in Lausanne with a delegation from Egypt. After the departure of the People's Commissar of Lausanne, the plenipotentiary in Italy, V.V., made contact with the Egyptian side. Vorovskiy. 25 April 1923 Mr. Chicherin gave the secretary general of the Soviet delegation at the Lausanne conference to Thieves special instruction: “In Lausanne, you will certainly meet with the Egyptians: please use this to ... convey to the Egyptian government an invitation to enter diplomatic relations [27]” [28] .
In January 1924, the plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet Union in Italy N.I. Jordan sent a letter to Egyptian Foreign Minister Vasif Gali-Bey, in which he proposed “to establish political and trade relations between the two countries, especially taking into account the strong economic ties that for many years united Russia and Egypt, as well as the deep sympathy shown by the peoples of the Soviet Union Union to the Egyptian people. ”[29] However, the initiative of the Soviet government did not meet at that time the support of the Egyptian side: the pressure on the UK was so significant that it did not even vetul on the USSR proposal. [30] In addition, the government of the founder and first chairman of the Wafd party, Saad Zaglyulya, which came to power in January 1924, spoke of a “Bolshevik danger”, especially since the social contradictions in Egypt at that time were exacerbated and power collapsed on the ECP. [31]
To preserve the popularity of Zaglyul demanded the withdrawal of the British officers from the Egyptian army. The British, in response, appointed her commander of Sudanese Governor-General Lee Stack, who was mortally wounded in Cairo. As a result, in November 1924, after the ultimatum presented by the British, the government of Zaglyulya was forced to resign, because it agreed to fulfill only a part of the demands, refusing to withdraw Egyptian troops from Sudan and allow the Sudanese government to increase the area of irrigated land in Gezira without limit. [32] The WAFD parliament has also been dissolved. [33]
After the announcement of the English ultimatum, in the Soviet Union, mainly in the Muslim republics, there was a movement in support of Egypt. In Baku, the “Hands off Egypt!” Committee was created, and its creation was approved at the highest political level: at a meeting of the Political Bureau of 4 in December of 1924 (Protocol No. 39 / 26), a decision was made “On Appeals for an Ultimatum to Egypt” [34], and at a meeting of the Political Bureau of 3 in January 1925 (Protocol No. 43), it was decided “not to oppose the formation of“ Hands off Egypt ”society in Azerbaijan by way of private initiative [35].
The new Egyptian government was formed from pro-British leaders. However, it could not accept the draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty. [36]
Formed in 1930, the Egyptian government adopted a new constitution. Nevertheless, an attempt to hold 1931 on its basis in May, the parliamentary elections failed as a result of the speeches of workers and students, as a result of which blood was shed. At the beginning of 1933, this government also resigned.
Fearing the influence in Egypt of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, whose governments attached key importance to this country in the region, the United Kingdom in November 1934 abolished the 1930 constitution of the year. However, the 1923 constitution was reinstated only in December, 1935, because the British tried to use the Italian invasion of Ethiopia as an excuse to delay the restoration of the old constitution, although the really changed military-political situation in the region did not affect the internal situation in Egypt.
As a result of the restoration of the 1923 constitution in May, 1936 came to power again by wafdists, and in August, 1936 in London signed the Anglo-Egyptian alliance treaty that weakened the military and political position of the UK. [37] Despite the fact that the treaty declared the termination of the military occupation of Egypt and canceled the post of military commissar of the country; Great Britain maintained control over Egypt. Therefore, the general population, both left and right, were unhappy with its limitations. [38]
The contacts of the Soviet Union with the Egyptian side were also carried out through the representations of both countries in Ankara, Berlin, London, Paris, Rome and Tehran, moreover, as L.M. Karakhan [39], who oversaw relations with countries of the East, Plenipotentiary in France V.S. Dovgalevsky 1 September 1928, “Paris seems to us the most convenient point for negotiations with the Egyptians” [40]. As for the capital of Italy, according to the same Karakhan, addressed to the plenipotentiary in Italy, D.I. Kursk 19 February 1929 g., “Rome acquires for us the significance of a primary observation point along the line of ... Eastern policy” [41]. This is confirmed by the fact that in MM 1934, M.M. Axelrod [42], previously as a scout working in Yemen and Turkey, was appointed a resident of the Soviet political intelligence precisely to Rome.
On how active Axelrod’s activity in Egypt was indirectly is an episode that took place along his route to Yemen in 1928 in: “In Port Said, increased vigilance of the police on us was apparent in relation to us, especially in relation to tons. Axelrod. Our passports were taken ashore (obviously, for a photo) ... One of the police officers, with an exaggerated confidentiality, informed T. Axelrod that we are in Egypt blacklisted [43].
The issues discussed by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Egypt were the most diverse. First of all, they dealt with trade affairs, including shipping, since Soviet merchant ships called at the port of Alexandria quite often. [44] They also discussed establishing diplomatic relations, assisting the Soviet Union in refusing the regime of capitulations of other countries, etc.
Over time, the range of trade expanded. Grain, including wheat, caviar, kerosene, starch products, timber, including sawn timber, machinery and equipment, medical and medicinal raw materials, flour, oil and petroleum products, vegetables, dishes, including glass, porcelain, were imported from Egypt to the USSR and earthenware, sugar, seeds, silicates, livestock, matches, tobacco, fabrics, coal (for bunker stations of Alexandria and Port Said), fertilizers, plywood, fruits, chemicals, including soda products, cement, etc., and jute was exported , coffee, tin, pepper, rice, salt, fertilizer, cotton, exotic resins, etc . [45]
In 1925 – 1926 The USSR exported goods to Egypt for 2923 thousand rubles, which amounted to approx. 0,5% (total - 589124 thousand rubles) from Soviet exports, and imported goods from Egypt to 26561 thousand rubles, which amounted to approx. 4% (total - 673677 thousand rubles) from Soviet imports. [46] It is noteworthy that negotiations and conclusion of cotton deals were held for some time in the UK, particularly in Liverpool [47], and in Germany.
In May, 1927, in Egyptian political and business circles, launched a company to establish direct trade relations between the USSR and Egypt, supported by the Egyptian press, including Al Siyas, which wrote 9 in an editorial in May: “We do not understand ... why trade relations between Egypt and Russia continue to be interrupted, while the interests of Egypt itself urgently demand the restoration of these relations ... We believe that the issue of restoring economic relations between Egypt and Russia should be considered with all care and thoroughness, and that the Egyptian government should take a clear position in relation to it in accordance with the interests of the country, requiring their restoration and streamlining ”[48].
At the same time, the Egyptian parliament held a debate on this issue, during which some deputies expressed concern that the Soviet side had difficulties in conducting trade operations with Egypt due to the opposition of the Egyptian government. After the rupture by the United Kingdom of relations with the USSR, the campaign only intensified, since Soviet-Egyptian trade until then was conducted mainly through the mediation of British commercial organizations. [49]
Egyptian journalist Enan, head of the foreign department of the al-Siyas newspaper, told 1927 in June to interim charge in charge affairs of the USSR in Turkey V.P. Potemkin "about the fierce campaign of the British in Egypt against trade with the Soviet Union," and immediately confirmed the determination of his newspaper in conducting a counter-company. [50]
The Egyptian government in September 1927 allowed the representative of the Soviet joint-stock company Textilimport to enter the country to buy cotton in Egypt. [51] At the same time in Alexandria, the Textilimport office was opened, which started buying up cotton from both Egyptian firms and Egyptian governments. [52]
The Soviet side also sought to conclude a trade agreement for fixing guarantees of stable trade in it. [53] The fact is that the Soviet side was interested in Egyptian cotton more than Egypt in Soviet goods. The impossibility of replacing Egyptian cotton due to its special spinning properties by other imported types and raw materials of its own production, as well as due to the significant share of the Soviet side’s needs (about 7% of the total Egyptian crop), which grows as industry develops, created in 1927 g The problem of supplying factories with raw materials. [54] The Soviet side played a global drop in cotton prices and the tendency of the UK to switch to lower cotton varieties. [55] At the end of November 1927, “as a result of almost two months regovorov agreement with the government (of Egypt. - P.G.) managed to conclude on favorable ... conditions ”[56]. The contract provided for the purchase of cotton from the Egyptian government stores by the Soviet side for an amount of approx. 10 million rubles. In connection with which the Soviet ships, who arrived for cotton, were allowed to approach the Alexandrian marinas. Until then, Soviet ships were to remain in the raid. [57] Thus, the treaty guaranteed, “although still temporary, the equal rights of the Soviet fleet in Egyptian waters” [58].
The result of the execution of direct Soviet-Egyptian trade relations was an increase in commodity circulation between our countries. According to RVTP, in 1926 / 1927, the turnover amounted to 26,7 million rubles, and in 1927 / 1928, it increased to 41,1 million rubles, that is, more than 1,5 times. The purchases of cotton especially increased, which, according to Textilimport, increased over the same period from 29,1 thousand bales [59] to 68,4 thousand bales, that is, more than doubled. This accounted for more than 7% of all Egyptian cotton exports. [60] Thus, according to the Egyptian customs service, in 1928, the USSR occupied the 6 place in Egypt’s foreign trade and 4 place for the export of cotton from that country. [61 ]
Despite the obvious success in the development of trade relations with Egypt, Soviet diplomats did not fall into euphoria. Karakhan in a letter to Dovgalevsky from 23 June 1928 assessed the prospects of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the following way: “I don’t think that we could [soon] raise the question of establishing political relations with Egypt. Our immediate task is to expand our de facto trade relations and consolidate them in some document ”[62].
In the Soviet-Egyptian relations of the period under review there were also cultural ties. Thus, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) achieved good results in the book exchange with Egypt: only in 1924 – 1931. 723 books were sent to Egypt by VOX and 1158 was received from there, and the total book circulation with Egypt turned out to be greater than with any other Arab country. [63]
Academician Ignaty Yulianovich Krachkovsky, who worked in the libraries of Alexandria and Cairo and maintained contacts with Egyptian scholars, became the “first sign” of scientific communication between the USSR and the Arab East. [64]
As a result of the global economic crisis, developing countries also suffered huge economic losses. For the industrially underdeveloped states, the effects of the crisis were most severe. Bringing the ruin to countries-suppliers of raw materials and food, the crisis has increased the burden of payments on old debts, has led many states to bankruptcy. The fall in the purchasing power of the population of underdeveloped countries made it extremely difficult to expand the sales of industrial goods exported by industrially developed countries. As the crisis spread to the entire capitalist world, it was impossible to maneuver some countries at the expense of others. [65]
Economic ties with the Soviet Union became even more important for Egypt in 1929 – 1931, when the problem of cotton export became more acute due to the crisis. So, in 1931, which became the most difficult for the Egyptian economy, the USSR bought approx. 27 tonnes, or 8,6% of all cotton exported by Egypt this year. [66]
However, under pressure from the British, the Egyptians began to impede the entry of Soviet goods into the country. So, on November 1 1930, the Egyptian government introduced double duties on certain types of Soviet goods. As a result of negotiations held between the Soviet and Egyptian sides in Paris, and the demands of interested representatives of the Egyptian trade community, increased duties on Soviet goods from January 1 1931 were lifted, but only temporarily. Since November 1931, they were re-introduced, ostensibly to counter the Soviet "dumping". In total, such duties were extended to 20 types of Soviet goods. It is noteworthy that shortly before this, the British delegation, headed by former Foreign Minister A. Balfour, visited Cairo. [67]
Later a representative of Textilexport I.P. was sent from Alexandria. Vorobiev, and in August 1932, the Egyptian authorities banned the activities of the Soviet society “Russtorg”, which united the offices of Gostorg RSFSR, Tekstilimport and a number of Egyptian firms and conducted trade operations in Alexandria in July 1931. As a result, in 1932 Egypt was purchased only 1033 tons of cotton [68], that is, about 26 times less compared to the previous year, and since 1933, purchases of Egyptian cotton by the Soviet Union have stopped altogether. [69]
The behavior of the Egyptian government was largely determined by the anti-Soviet stance of Great Britain, which declared a trade war against the Soviet Union in April 1932. [70] After the introduction of November 5 by the Egyptian side of the USSR prohibitive and increased duties, the USSR reduced the range of goods exported to Egypt, limiting itself to forestry, oil products and coal. The newspaper Al-Balag, which advocated the development of trade with the Soviet Union, wrote that "the customs policy in Egypt is aimed at providing an opportunity to trade in Egypt only the British Empire." [1931]
In 1938, the Egyptian side itself took the initiative to develop trade relations. The main reason for the appeal was that the Egyptian side understood the benefits being lost in unilateral trade with the Soviet Union. So, in 1927 / 1928, the USSR imports from Egypt amounted to 113,6 million rubles, and exports to Egypt - 33,1 million rubles, that is, there was a positive balance for the Egyptian side with a superiority of more than 3,4 times. In 1938, USSR imports from Egypt amounted to just 211 thousand rubles. (salt!), and exports to Egypt - 9 million rubles [72], that is, there was a negative balance for the Egyptian side with a concession of more than 42,7 times. At the September 3 meeting, the Politburo 1938 (Protocol No. 63) decided to “declare to the Egyptian government that we do not object to his proposal to conclude a trade agreement, provided that it is concluded on the most favored basis without certain obligations of certain purchases and without net balance [73]. And yet, before the Great Patriotic War, Soviet-Egyptian trade relations boiled down mainly to the export of goods from the USSR.
One of the indicators of the political situation in Egypt unfavorable for the USSR was the increase in the number of political emigrants visiting the Soviet Union. The first political emigrants from Egypt began to arrive in the USSR in 1925. [74] In 1933 and 1936. their number has increased dramatically. [75]
In October, the Comintern 1936 initiated the creation of international brigades, international formations that brought together anti-fascist volunteers from dozens of countries to help Republican Spain. In total, seven international brigades were formed. [76] According to the Comintern, Egyptians fought among the representatives of the Arab peoples in the international brigades. [77] their opponents in the region are too immature and divided so that the fundamental difference in the approach to the Middle East situation of Moscow, on the one hand, and London and Paris, on the other, will bring some substantial results for the USSR [78].
In 1938 – 1939 there was a fading of the international activity of the USSR in the Middle East, which led to the curtailment of Soviet-Egyptian relations, which ended the first stage of their evolution.
Notes
[1] About the relationship of the Soviet state with the countries of the Muslim world in this period, see: Spector I. The Soviet Union and the Muslim World. 1917 – 1958. Wash., 1958.
[2] Documents of the USSR foreign policy (hereinafter - DVP USSR). T. VII, p. 608.
[3] See: Milner A. England in Egypt. L., 1920; Chirol V. The Egyptian Problem. L., 1921; Report of Special mission to Egypt. L., 1921; Mowat Ch. Britain between the wars, 1918 – 1940. L., 1955; Darwin J. Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: 1918 – 1922. L., 1981.
[4] The newest history of the Arab countries of Africa. M., 1990, p. 9.
[5] Executive Committee of the Communist International.
[6] Kosach G.G. Red flag over the Middle East? M., 2001, p. 74, 78.
[7] Ibid., P. 79.
[8] Ibid., P. 89.
[9] Gorbatov OM, Cherkassky L.Ya. Cooperation of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East and Africa. M., 1980, p. 22.
[10] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 7, 18, 54, 93, 114, 115, 158, 182; Adibekov G.M., Shakhnazarova E.N., Shirinya K.K. The organizational structure of the Comintern. 1919 – 1943. M., 1997, p. 127 – 128, 171 – 172, 207. See: On the political tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East. - In book: Stalin I. Writings T. 7. M., 1954.
[11] RGASPI. F. 532, op. 1, d. 2, l. 49. Cm.: Kosach G.G. The Communists of the Middle East in the USSR. 1920 – 1930-e years. M., 2009, Ch. I.
[12] The main political department, which included the Foreign Office, which was engaged in foreign intelligence. Cm.: Gusterin P. At the origins of Soviet intelligence in the East // Asia and Africa today. 2012, No. 3.
[13] Agabekov G.S. GPU: Notes chekista. Berlin, 1930, p. 237.
[14] Arkos acted as a representative of Soviet foreign trade organizations and carried out export-import operations with offices and offices in a number of countries.
[15] RGAE. F. 3270, op. 3, d. 13.
[16] See: Sevres peace treaty and acts signed in Lausanne. M., 1927; Rubinstein N.L. Near and Middle East after World War I. Lausanne Conference. M., 1952; Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922 – 1923. L., 1923.
[17] It's about the Vatan party. Cm.: Howell J. Egypt's Past, Present and Future. Dayton, 1929; Deeb M. Party Politics in Egypt, 1919 – 1939. L., 1979.
[18] DVP USSR. T. VI, p. 169. Cm.: Symons M. Britain and Egypt: the rise of Egyptian nationalism. L., 1925; Zayid M. Egypt's Struggle for Independence. Beirut, 1965; The Anglo-Egyptian experience, 1882 – 1982. L., 1983.
[19] In 1926 – 1931 - All-Union Eastern Chamber of Commerce.
[20] RGAE. F. 635, op. 3, d. 60.
[21] Gorbatov OM, Cherkassky L.Ya., with. 39.
[22] Makeev D.A. Foreign trade relations of the USSR with the countries of the Arab East in 1922 – 1939 M., 1983, p. 7 – 9.
[23] Ibid., P. 15.
[24] Ibid., P. 16 – 19.
[25] RGAE. F. 3514, op. 1, d. 62.
[26] Makeev D.A., with. 20.
[27] Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Egypt were established in 6 July - 26 August 1943 at the mission level, 15 February - 11 March 1954 the mission were transformed into embassies.
[28] International life. 1964, No. 6, p. 158.
[29] Ibid., P. 159.
[30] See: Podorolsky N.A. Egypt and England. Odessa, 1925; Volkov F.D. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924 – 1929 M., 1958; Young J. Egypt. L., 1927; Marshal J. The Egyptian Enigma. L., 1928; Fischer L. The Soviets in World Affairs: Vol. 1 – 2. L., 1930; Marlowe J. Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800 – 1953. L., 1954; Mansfield P. The British in Egypt. L., 1971.
[31] Laqueur W. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. L., 1959, p. 97 – 101.
[32] See: Abbas M. The Sudan Question. The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. 1884 – 1951. L., 1952; Fabunmi l. The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations. L., 1960; The British in the Sudan. 1898 – 1956. Oxf., 1984.
[33] See: Petrov K. Anglo-Egyptian Conflict 1924. - In the book: Arab countries. Story. M., 1963; Elgood P. Egypt and the Army. Oxf., 1924; Elgood P. The Transit of Egypt. L., 1928; Deeb M. Party Politics in Egypt, 1919 – 1939. L., 1979; Terry J. The Wafd, 1919 – 1952. L., 1982.
[34] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 162, d. 2, l. 46.
[35] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 163, d. 470, l. 14.
[36] See: Buryan M.S. Egypt in the foreign and colonial policy of Great Britain in the 20-ies. XX century. Lugansk, 1994.
[37] British and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 140, p. 179 – 204. Cm.: Buryan M.S. On the history of the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 1936. - In the book: Ideology and politics. CH 1. M., 1986; Teplov L.F. From the history of the struggle of the Egyptian people for independence: the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. - In the book: Africa. Problems of history. M., 1986.
[38] Recent History of the Arab Countries in Africa, p. 8 – 12; Laqueur W.p. 121 – 123. Cm.: Vatikiotis P. The History of Egypt. From Muhammad Ali to Sadat. L., 1976.
[39] The real name of Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan (1889 – 1937) is Levon Karakhanyan.
[40] DVP USSR. T. XI, p. 498.
[41] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 38.
[42] See: Smilyanskaya I.M. Moses Markovich Axelrod // Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1989, No. 5; Kilberg H.I. Memories of MM Axelrode. - In: Unknown Pages of Russian Oriental Studies. M., 1997.
[43] On the second trip to Yemen. Report G. Astakhov from 21.01.1929 // AVPRF. F. 08, op. 12, p. 77, d. 99, l. 21.
[44] DVP USSR. T. VIII, p. 698 – 699.
[45] USSR Foreign Trade in 1918 – 1940 M., 1960, p. 1109 – 1117.
[46] DVP USSR. T. IX, p. 702 – 703.
[47] Ibid., P. 549.
[48] Cit. by: DVP USSR. T. X, p. 640.
[49] Ibid., P. 641.
[50] Ibid., P. 316.
[51] Ibid., P. 641.
[52] Ibid., P. 584.
[53] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 4.
[54] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 7.
[55] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 641.
[56] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 8.
[57] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 584.
[58] AVPRF. F. 08, op. 11, p. 50, d. 93, l. 8.
[59] The Egyptian cotton bale was 320 – 360 kg.
[60] DVP USSR. T. X, p. 641.
[61] DVP USSR. T. XII, p. 218.
[62] DVP USSR. T. XI, p. 404 – 405.
[63] Sharafutdinova R.Sh. Cultural links of the library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with the countries of the Near and Middle East. - In: Scientific and Cultural Relations of the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with foreign countries of the East. M. —L., 1957, p. 72; Ioffe A.E. International relations of Soviet science, technology and culture, 1917 – 1939. M., 1975, p. 387.
[64] Ioffe A.E. International relations of Soviet science, technology and culture ..., p. 382.
[65] See: Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s // Journal of Economic History. December 1985, No. 45 (4); Kindleberger Ch. The World in Depression, 1929 – 1939. University of California Press, 1986; Brendon P. The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s. New York, 2000.
[66] DVP USSR. T. XIII, p. 138.
[67] See: Foundation of British foreign policy. Camb., 1938; Carr E. The foreign policy of Britain. From 1918 to September 1939. L., 1939; Marlowe J. Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800 – 1953. L., 1954; Vatikiotis P. The Modern History of Egypt. L., 1969; Mansfield P. The British in Egypt. L., 1971; Richmond J. Egypt, 1798 – 1952. NY, 1977.
[68] Ioffe A.E. Soviet Union Foreign Policy, 1928 – 1932 M., 1968, p. 419, 421 – 422; Makeev D.A., with. 36 – 37, 41.
[69] Foreign trade of capitalist countries in 1929 – 1936 M. —L., 1937, p. 68 – 69.
[70] See: Volkov F.D. USSR - England. 1929 – 1945 Anglo-Soviet relations on the eve of and during the Second World War. M., 1964.
[71] Makeev D.A., with. 38 – 40. Cm.: Fox R. English colonial policy. Per. from English M. —L., 1934; Lutsky V.B. England and Egypt. M., 1947; Elliot W. The New British Empire. L., 1932; Knarlund P. The British Empire, 1815 – 1939. L., 1942; Cross C. The Fall of the British Empire, 1918 – 1968. L., 1969.
[72] USSR Foreign Trade in 1918 – 1940 M., 1960, p. 1116 – 1117.
[73] RGASPI. F. 17, op. 162, d. 23, l. 147.
[74] RGASPI. F. 539, op. 4, d. 136.
[75] RGASPI. F. 495, op. 85, d. 104; 115. Cm.: Kosach G.G., with. 143 (approx. 206).
[76] See: Longo L. International brigades in Spain. M., 1960.
[77] RGASPI. F. 545, op. 6, d. 436; 437; 626; 843.
[78] Vasiliev A. Russia in the Middle East: from Messianism to Pragmatism. M., 1993, p. 18.
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