Family policy of Russia. Without a healthy family there will be no strong state
The future of the Russian state and society, their further development and security depend primarily on the socio-demographic situation in the country. High fertility - a guarantee that the people maintain a tendency to growth and development, even without dependence on economic specifics. Low birth rate calls into question the very physical survival of the people and, accordingly, the tasks of economic, cultural, technological development in this case fade into the background. Who will use the "achievements of civilization" if the population is rapidly declining? Therefore, for Russia, the effectiveness of demographic policy, including family policy, is of paramount importance. In recent years, a lot has been said and written about the family policy of the Russian state, but the real situation in this area is extremely far from perfect. As before, the state’s concern for the family leaves much to be desired.
The first post-Soviet period. State is suspended
In the Soviet period, the domestic stories the state created more or less equal conditions for the provision of families. The practical absence of unemployment in the country guaranteed any Soviet family (we don’t take as an example the exceptions - asocial and marginal segments of the population), albeit a small but regular income, albeit of low quality and small area, but some kind of housing. Children were provided with free medical care, free education, accessible places in pre-school educational institutions. The situation began to change rapidly in the process of market reforms that followed the final collapse of the Soviet state. Since the beginning of 1990's. In a country that was experiencing political instability and economic difficulties, the birth rate dropped sharply, kindergartens were sold to commercial organizations, and converted into institutions of government and administration. Constant salary delays and its meager level contributed to the outflow of personnel from the education sector, and also minimized the influx of young specialists into secondary schools. As a result, already in the 1990-e years, the education and upbringing of the younger generations was in deep crisis. At the same time there were negative changes in the field of family policy of the state. There was a "marketization" of family policy, the government hastened to minimize the level of care for families and children, limited to only a small amount of help to the most disadvantaged categories of families. In fact, ensuring the quality of life of a family has become a concern exclusively for its adult members - there is money and social status, which means that it is possible to study in a good school, and travel on vacations at sea, and good food, and toys. There is no money - it means that only the very minimum in the form of training in the district school and free service in the district clinic is guaranteed. At the same time, in 1990-s. the state has minimized interference with the privacy of citizens. There was a specific exchange of state refusal of social patronization of citizens to provide the latter with the opportunity to “live as they want”, including to carry out informal work activities, to conduct business. Families and private life of citizens received much greater autonomy than in the Soviet period, when the functioning of the family institution was subordinated to the interests of the state. In 1990-s. there was an almost complete destruction of the state policy in the field of youth education, which contributed to the loss of guidelines for the younger generation of Russian citizens, the devaluation of the former social values and the formation of a value and ideological vacuum. Family and children have ceased to be a value for a significant part of Russian citizens, because in the period under review, Russian national history was given a behavior vector that was hardly compatible with family life.
First of all, this concerned women - the decomposition of the female part of the country's population in the 1990s. went in full swing, which was facilitated by a huge number of relevant television programs, newspaper and magazine publications, films, songs of popular performers. It was in the 1990s. the types of "bitches" and "socialites" - semi-prostitutes began to be asserted as the most desirable patterns of behavior. Of course, girls from the Russian provinces, families of middle and low income, could not be “secular lionesses”, but they replenished the market of sexual services in abundance. At the same time, they led the way of life, which correlated little with family values - hence the large number of illegitimate births, early divorces, and abortions. According to the sociologist A.V. Noskova, "the ideological and moral vacuum has consistently begun to conquer the ideals of individualism, sexual freedom, economic independence, material success - the original values of Western society, which were formed in an environment different from our mental, spiritual, geographical, religious, economic, political environment" (Noskova A.V. Family and demographic situation in Russia and the world: problems and contradictions // http://www.demographia.ru/articles_N/index.html?idR=20&idArt=1783).
The processes occurring in the life of the country in the 1990-s have also resulted in transformational changes in the family life of a significant number of Russians. According to VTsIOM studies, the following key features in demography and family relations have become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia: 1) the spread of premarital relations, including long-lasting and even replacing family relationships, against the background of a general decline in the number of marriages and an increase in the number of cohabitations; 2) increase in extramarital births; 3) raising the age of marriage and the age of childbirth; 4) decrease in the age of sexual intercourse, not accompanied by childbirth, a decrease in the birth rate at an early age; 5) an increase in the time elapsed between marriage and the birth of children, between the birth of the first and subsequent children; 6) separating sexual relations from the functions of reproduction due to the widespread use of contraception and the “sexual revolution” in post-Soviet Russia. These transformational changes in family and sexual relations among Russians, especially when combined with economic problems, also had a corresponding effect on the overall decline in the birth rate. At the same time, the state, especially in the first half of the 1990s, practically defiantly distanced itself from the real solution of socio-demographic problems. The course was taken on the privacy of family and sexual relations of Russians.
The second post-Soviet period. The need for change
At the same time, the state could not completely abandon the management of socio-demographic processes even in the “dashing nineties”; at least it was necessary to create the appearance of the existence of a developed family policy of the Russian state. In 1996, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin "On the main directions of state family policy." Its essence was reduced to the positioning of family policy as an integral part of the social policy of the Russian Federation, the introduction of international norms in relation to women and children to the Russian family policy. At the same time, the situation in the country at that time already required the adoption of emergency resuscitation measures. So, in 1992, mortality for the first time exceeded the birth rate. This was a direct consequence of the social and economic policy pursued by the Russian leadership in the first half of the 1990s. and which led to catastrophic consequences for all spheres of life of the Russian society. It is clear that without a change in the fundamentals of the country's economic and even political course, no major changes in the sphere of family and demographic policy were out of the question. But family policy was not among the priorities of either the state or political parties, since the programs of the family and demography occupied a very small place, and the proposed methods for solving existing problems were declarative and even frankly demagogic. The presidential decree itself emphasized that at the federal level, families are provided with minimal social guarantees and benefits, and support is provided only to needy families in order to take them out of crisis. However, the real measures of social support even for low-income families were never taken - the state did not seek to burden the budget with serious expenses for supporting Russian families, so the latter were forced to survive, relying in fact only on their own strength. Meanwhile, in conditions of constant inflation, mass unemployment, chronic non-payment of wages, the task of the survival of Russian families became increasingly difficult. It was in 1990-s. Children's homelessness and neglect, social orphanhood, drunkenness, drug addiction and substance abuse among children and adolescents, child and adolescent prostitution have reached their peak. Responsibility for these negative phenomena, which also caused significant damage to Russian society, lies wholly and completely with the then Russian leadership, who in fact refused to organize family policy and set the situation in the most important sphere of society’s activity to take its course. By the end of 1990-x - the beginning of 2000-x. The government gradually realized the need to develop special measures to support Russian families, as social problems in the country became more and more terrifying.
Hopes for changing priorities in the family policy of the state appeared at the beginning of the 2000's. and were associated with the coming to power in the country of the new President - V.V. Putin's With the name of Putin - the young and energetic head of state - the majority of Russians connected the pressing political and socio-economic transformations, saw him as a leader capable of “raising Russia”. Actually, in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy of the Russian state in the years of Putin's rule, changes really came, indicating the strengthening of both the vertical of power and the country's position abroad. Already in the first year of the presidency, in 2000, Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation outlined the strategic line of the state in the field of social policy: “we will conduct social policy on the principles of general accessibility and acceptable quality of basic social benefits. And help to provide first of all to those whose incomes are significantly below the subsistence minimum. Children of ministers can do without child allowance, and bankers' wives can do without unemployment benefits. ” This thesis was positively perceived by the Russian society, since, as it seemed, it established true justice in the field of state social support for Russian families. However, in practice, its implementation has rather led to negative consequences for the majority of Russian families. So, 30 of May 2001 was passed a law introducing the right to a monthly allowance for a child up to 18 years only for families whose per capita income does not exceed 100% of the subsistence minimum. Meanwhile, prior to the entry into force of this law, a monthly allowance for each child up to 18 years was paid to all Russian families with children. Now families with very low incomes are eligible for benefits, especially if one considers that very small amounts have always been considered as the subsistence minimum in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, a large number of Russians, to whom child benefits would not hurt, despite the fact that their incomes were slightly higher than the subsistence minimum, turned out to be without government support. It turns out that the liberal policy in the social sphere in the early 2000-ies. continued and the state began to spend even less money to support Russian families.
Modern period. There are real improvements, but much needs to be done.
The situation changed in 2006, when there were obvious positive changes in the country's economy, the possibilities of the state budget increased and, at the same time, the political course of the Russian state underwent a significant adjustment. Russia began to look for its national idea; for the first time in many years after the collapse of the USSR, the course was taken to strengthen identity, to gain serious positions in world politics. The solution of these tasks required the improvement of the social, demographic, family policy of the Russian state. The decline in the birth rate in the country and a decrease in the population by the 2000-s. reached such proportions that they became the subject of special attention of the Russian authorities. It became clear that with further preservation of the current situation, its security and just survival would be under the gravest threat. Especially since the beginning of 2000's. the Russian leadership had not only the desire, but also the financial capacity to adjust the state policy in the management of socio-demographic processes, including family policy. It became obvious that without taking measures to financially support Russian families there would be no serious demographic improvements in the country. After all, the real prevention of further catastrophic decline in the population of the country was possible only in case of a gradual refusal of Russian families from small families, which became characteristic of them in the 1990-s. Due to economic difficulties, Russian women were afraid to give birth to two or more children, so the only way to stimulate the increase in the birth rate was to reorganize government policies to support families, primarily families with children. The following positive measures were introduced: 1) increased child care benefits up to one and a half years; 2) introduced benefits for working women for pregnancy and childbirth, as well as child care in the amount of not less than 40% of previous earnings; 3) introduced compensation for the costs of preschool education of children; 4) increased the cost of birth certificates; 5) introduced maternity capital - the material payment is quite large by Russian standards, the amount of money at the birth of the second child (the payment is made by issuing a certificate that can be used to improve the living conditions of the family, get children education and form the funded part of the mother's pension.
Maternal capital has become one of the most effective forms of material support for Russian families, aimed specifically at the birth of a second child. After all, many Russian families have postponed the birth of a child because of the constraints in housing conditions, and the payment of maternity capital allows you to improve housing conditions by buying more housing or, if we are talking about rural areas, buying even whole housing for maternity capital. The significance of maternity capital in ensuring an increase in the birth rate in the Russian Federation after 2006 is obvious. Many Russian families decided on the birth of a second and third child, counting on this measure of state support, which did not know analogues in the national history of the last decades. It turned out that it is precisely economic measures that are the most effective incentives for the growth of the birth rate in modern Russian society. Moreover, with their introduction, the state has demonstrated the importance for him of having children in families, and at least two to three children. Economic support for fertility has become the main form of support for Russian families at the present stage of the existence of the Russian state. Indeed, with its help, colossal shifts in the demographic sphere of the Russian Federation were achieved.
However, despite the obvious effectiveness of state policy in the field of support of the birth rate, there are a number of issues that remain relevant for modern Russia, and on the solution of which further growth in the birth rate and improvement of the quality of life of Russian families depend. First of all, it is a question of using the funds of the maternity capital only after the child reaches the age of three years. Until the child’s three years old, maternity capital can be used only to pay off a mortgage and a housing loan or loan, more recently, and to make a down payment on a mortgage. It turns out that families who are able to purchase housing, bypassing the mortgage, but need the means of maternity capital, have to wait three years (during this time, in any Russian large city an amount approximately the same as the entire maternity capital will be spent on renting an apartment) take a mortgage, overpaying for it. That is, the measure with the payment of maternity capital after the age of three is aimed more at supporting the domestic system of mortgage lending and the primary housing market than at meeting the needs of families with children. Of course, some experts explain this measure by the need to cut off maternal capital from unscrupulous parents - representatives of marginal layers who can give birth to a child only for the purpose of using maternal capital, and then abandon it. Growing up a child under three years old is evidence of the good faith of parents. However, with proper control over the expenditure of funds of the parent capital, its unfair use can be prevented. And for families with children, three years of waiting become very difficult and long, especially since the first three years, until the child goes to kindergarten and the mother is on parental leave, are the most difficult materially and psychologically for the family . As a rule, one father is actually supporting the family during these three years, renting a home creates additional colossal expenses for the average Russian family, and further living on a narrow living space creates psychological discomfort and causes intra-family conflicts.
Another important issue is the lack of state support for mothers between one and a half and three years. As is known, in most cases, children in kindergartens accept children on reaching three years old, respectively, mothers of children under this age must look after children and cannot go to work. But childcare benefits are no longer paid after one and a half years. It turns out that the mother does not receive benefits for a year and a half, but is also deprived of the opportunity to go to work. The nursery system in the country was completely collapsed, and now their number even in large cities is minimal, and it is problematic to settle in them because of the presence of large queues. It is also puzzling the lack of adequate state support for mothers of many children. Mothers with three or more children practically focus on raising and maintaining offspring. Accordingly, they do not work for a long time, lose their professional skills, but at the same time do not receive proper benefits from the state. These benefits could include the payment of the actual wages of mothers with many children who have more than three (or four) children. After all, one father in families of middle and low incomes cannot provide a decent maintenance for a family of six or seven people. Therefore, the appropriate solution to this issue is the introduction of a special allowance for mothers with many children, increasing depending on the number of children and paid before the last child reaches the age of 18 (23). Of course, the guarantee of the payment of this allowance must be the “sociality” of the family, that is, in case of deprivation of parental rights, other problems, the range of which is not so difficult to determine, the payment of the allowance must be suspended. In addition, mothers with many children should take care of the general work experience, regardless of whether they were employed before the birth of their first child or between the birth of their children.
"Paternity crisis" - the main gap in family policy?
A very important aspect of modern family policy in the Russian Federation is its “feminocentrism”. The role of the father in the family and the upbringing of children in Russia has been downgraded since Soviet times, which is a sad testimony to the crisis of the traditional family. A significant part of modern families consist of only one parent and a child (children), while in the vast majority of cases this parent is the mother. There may also be one or more relatives on the mother's side, usually a grandmother, less often also a grandfather and less close relatives. Without going into discussions about the influence of such a family model on the upbringing of the younger generations and the transmission of certain values of sexual behavior, it should be noted that belittling the role of the father in family policy is a dangerous and unfair trend. In modern Russian family policy, even at the level of terminology, the word "father" is either used in a tertiary sense, or not used at all. A typical example is maternity capital, with the receipt of which the father may have certain problems. The same applies to childcare benefits, the concept of "father of many children" does not exist, although there are fathers who alone raise three or more children. The "imprisonment" of the country's family policy exclusively for the mother and ensuring her rights actually undermines the foundations of the family as a social institution, since it convinces the mother of the opportunity to live and raise children without a father. As a result, the slightest intra-family conflicts lead to divorces, families break up, and wrong models of raising children are formed. Therefore, in order to truly modernize family policy in the country, to bring it to a state that really meets the needs of strengthening demography and the security of the Russian state, it is necessary to make family policy aimed not only at supporting mothers and children, but at supporting the family as a social institution. The implementation of this task can be started even at the level of symbols - with the renaming of maternity capital into family capital, the introduction of the concept of "father of many children", the active popularization of the family and family relations in the media, cinema, fiction, music.
The state must seek for this both strength and means, for a strong family is one of the main bases for the well-being and survival of society. The priest of the Russian Orthodox Church, Father Dmitry Berezin, believes that “the most important cause of the family crisis is the crisis of paternity, because the existence of abortions and single-parent families is mostly the fault of the man. When a father leaves a particular family, it is the pain, above all, of his children. Internet is all the same. There brutal macho think about something else. We also thought about something else. The fact that in our information space there was a lack of positive vivid examples of men as fathers, heads of families responsible for the family. And then we decided that it was necessary to popularize the image of a strong family, find examples, share experiences, unite ”(Quoted from: Father Dmitry Berezin: The most important cause of a family crisis is a paternity crisis // Russian Line. Orthodox news agency. // http: / /rusk.ru/). In a certain sense, it is difficult to disagree with Father Dmitry Berezin, but he somewhat exaggerates the dependence of divorces and abortions in Russia on men. The specificity of family and sexual relations in modern Russia is such that a man no longer plays virtually any role in controlling the reproductive behavior of a woman. The consent of a man, even an official husband, is not required for either abortion or childbirth; in the case of divorces, children in the vast majority of cases remain with the mother, regardless of the level of the material welfare of the father, his social activity, education, and human qualities. Most divorces occur at the initiative of women, which is also a consequence of the one-sided orientation of state family and social policies.
The cult of a large family and the development of social infrastructure
The next important point in the further improvement of the family policy and its direction towards ensuring the growth of the country's population is the transition to the model of a three-child family. It is the three-child family that ensures the real reproduction of the population, should become a priority for the state, and the support of the three-child family should be more significant. At present, the maternity capital is paid only for the birth of the second child, and at the birth of the third child, the family either does not receive anything, or receives from the regional authorities local maternity capital in a much smaller amount (and most often, it is paid only to low-income families) or the plot land for building a house (again - most often cheap, without communications). Meanwhile, the fair family policy of the state should include additional incentives for three-child families, and these incentives should be even more significant than those for two-child families. As suggested above, we can talk about the payment of wages to mothers or fathers in three-child families, or the payment of maternity capital, only on a larger scale than at the birth of the second child. Russian citizens should understand that childbearing is honored and respected in society, and the state is focused on supporting child families, and having a detailed family, one can even materially receive certain preferences that childless citizens are deprived of. Support for children’s families, including material ones, is an important task of state policy, including in the area of national security, so the statements that parenting should only be the responsibility of parents are characterized by a complete lack of understanding of objective Russian reality. In modern society, mass large families are possible only with real economic and cultural support from the state.
In addition to material incentives for children’s families, the most important task of the state in ensuring demographic growth should be the development of the infrastructure of education and upbringing, health care, and the promotion of youth and children's organizations. First of all, it is necessary to create such a number of pre-school educational institutions (creches and kindergartens), which will cover the existing lack of places. This is also due to the peculiarities of the current socio-demographic situation. If in a traditional society, older relatives, grandparents, could be engaged in raising children, in modern society, parents of young families who are at the age of 45-60 are often still working themselves and do not have the opportunity to raise grandchildren. On the other hand, the economic situation is such that most middle-income and low-income families need both husband and wife to work, since it’s very difficult, if not impossible, for one person to have a family with two and, moreover, three children. Secondly, here too the family policy is in contact with the policy in the field of education, it is necessary to ensure the availability of high-quality and free secondary and higher education. Unfortunately, the processes occurring in this area do not allow us to talk about positive prospects in this direction. In the Russian Federation, the number of higher vocational educational institutions, including branches, is declining, most of which are located in small towns and are often the only higher educational institutions in these localities. Meanwhile, reducing the number of universities, especially when combined with the lack of real work to create new institutions of secondary vocational education - technical schools, colleges that could replace closed universities, contributes to the emergence in Russian families of concerns about the future of their children, including those planned. After all, no normal parent would not want his child to not get an education and lead a life of a marginal or unemployed. The work of teachers and teachers is very low, which makes the once honorable work of educators in low-prestigious work, which the most promising and talented specialists refuse. Of course, the low level of remuneration of teachers and teaching staff also affects the decline in the quality of education in the Russian higher and secondary schools, entails its further commercialization, accompanied by a decrease in the availability of education for the broad masses of the population.
According to Ekaterina Dobrenkova, the Vice-Rector of the International Academy of Business and Management, a decline in the birth rate in the event of a reduction in the number of universities and the increasing complexity of access to education will in one way or another occur, primarily in families of intellectuals, scientific and technical workers who are focused children quality vocational education. Accordingly, if the state is really focused on solving the social and demographic problems facing Russia, then it should reconsider and adjust its educational policy, while maintaining free and accessible higher and secondary vocational education. Accordingly, adequate attention should be paid to solving the problems of material, financial, organizational, personnel, information support of the national education system, preservation of national educational traditions with simultaneous improvement of the quality of education, its competitiveness and attractiveness for applicants. Otherwise, the most talented part of the Russian students, as well as the most competent and promising teachers, will continue to go abroad, where the conditions of study and work in higher educational institutions seem to be more worthy than in our country. Naturally, the process of “brain drain” will affect all aspects of society, including the future state of the sphere of education and upbringing.
Prospects have only a "giving birth" nation
Gradually, we move from the key components that form the basis of an effective Russian state policy in the family sphere to a paradigm that should determine the very direction of the ongoing transformations. Despite the extreme importance of the economic component in ensuring family policy, we should not forget about the socio-cultural side, first of all - about the features of the value-ideological sphere of Russian society that are inherent in the modern stage of its existence. One of the most important reasons for the destruction of family values in modern Russia is the rapid spread of individualistic and consumer values that were originally alien to the traditional values of the peoples of Russia, and almost all the peoples of the world as a whole.
Modern civilization, the economic basis of which is capitalism and the political expression is neoliberalism, asserts individualism as the main value, which implies a gradual growth of hostility and distrust of the forms of collective existence and collective responsibility, including the institution of the family. The values of personal success and consumerism are incompatible with the creation of a family, which requires a certain sacrifice, the abandonment of the usual comfort, the redistribution of funds, and self-restraint. In recent years, the Childe Fries movement, which is “free from children,” which promotes a childless lifestyle, has gained popularity. The absence of children is presented by representatives of this movement as an absolute dignity and even an advantage, and the movement does not hide the abandonment of children precisely for selfish reasons. On the other hand, one should not forget about the so-called. The “LGBT community”, which also makes a definite contribution to changing the perception of modern society about the family and relations between the sexes. The Western world is already reaping the fruits of the crisis and the collapse of family relations, in effect destroying itself. Cities of Europe are filled with migrants from Asia and Africa - more vital, tough, but prone to traditional forms of hostel. Individualists - Europeans are powerless in front of them - precisely because of the destruction of collectivist values, especially against the background of the relevant policies of European left-liberal governments, stimulating on the one hand the further destruction of the family, and on the other hand - migration from the third world countries.
Such a development model may well wait for Russia - if the government is not able to work out a worthy development paradigm for the Russian civilization that can adequately respond to the many challenges and risks our country faces in the modern world. In the elaboration of this paradigm, pseudo-patriotic rhetoric will not pass, which only distracts the attention of the population of the country, but in fact serves as a “screen” of its decomposition and destruction. The Russian challenge should be modern and, at the same time, “soil”, giving innovative content to traditional Russian values. In the area of socio-demographic policy, it is to prevent the spread of individualistic and consumer values alien to Russian society, to affirm positive values and models of family relations, economic and social support for the family, and to improve the quality of education and upbringing of the younger generations of Russians. Of course, this will require enormous resource costs on the part of the state, but in the event of refusal to implement this action program, Russian society will sooner or later be doomed not only to aggravate crisis tendencies, but also to physical extinction.
The first post-Soviet period. State is suspended
In the Soviet period, the domestic stories the state created more or less equal conditions for the provision of families. The practical absence of unemployment in the country guaranteed any Soviet family (we don’t take as an example the exceptions - asocial and marginal segments of the population), albeit a small but regular income, albeit of low quality and small area, but some kind of housing. Children were provided with free medical care, free education, accessible places in pre-school educational institutions. The situation began to change rapidly in the process of market reforms that followed the final collapse of the Soviet state. Since the beginning of 1990's. In a country that was experiencing political instability and economic difficulties, the birth rate dropped sharply, kindergartens were sold to commercial organizations, and converted into institutions of government and administration. Constant salary delays and its meager level contributed to the outflow of personnel from the education sector, and also minimized the influx of young specialists into secondary schools. As a result, already in the 1990-e years, the education and upbringing of the younger generations was in deep crisis. At the same time there were negative changes in the field of family policy of the state. There was a "marketization" of family policy, the government hastened to minimize the level of care for families and children, limited to only a small amount of help to the most disadvantaged categories of families. In fact, ensuring the quality of life of a family has become a concern exclusively for its adult members - there is money and social status, which means that it is possible to study in a good school, and travel on vacations at sea, and good food, and toys. There is no money - it means that only the very minimum in the form of training in the district school and free service in the district clinic is guaranteed. At the same time, in 1990-s. the state has minimized interference with the privacy of citizens. There was a specific exchange of state refusal of social patronization of citizens to provide the latter with the opportunity to “live as they want”, including to carry out informal work activities, to conduct business. Families and private life of citizens received much greater autonomy than in the Soviet period, when the functioning of the family institution was subordinated to the interests of the state. In 1990-s. there was an almost complete destruction of the state policy in the field of youth education, which contributed to the loss of guidelines for the younger generation of Russian citizens, the devaluation of the former social values and the formation of a value and ideological vacuum. Family and children have ceased to be a value for a significant part of Russian citizens, because in the period under review, Russian national history was given a behavior vector that was hardly compatible with family life.
First of all, this concerned women - the decomposition of the female part of the country's population in the 1990s. went in full swing, which was facilitated by a huge number of relevant television programs, newspaper and magazine publications, films, songs of popular performers. It was in the 1990s. the types of "bitches" and "socialites" - semi-prostitutes began to be asserted as the most desirable patterns of behavior. Of course, girls from the Russian provinces, families of middle and low income, could not be “secular lionesses”, but they replenished the market of sexual services in abundance. At the same time, they led the way of life, which correlated little with family values - hence the large number of illegitimate births, early divorces, and abortions. According to the sociologist A.V. Noskova, "the ideological and moral vacuum has consistently begun to conquer the ideals of individualism, sexual freedom, economic independence, material success - the original values of Western society, which were formed in an environment different from our mental, spiritual, geographical, religious, economic, political environment" (Noskova A.V. Family and demographic situation in Russia and the world: problems and contradictions // http://www.demographia.ru/articles_N/index.html?idR=20&idArt=1783).
The processes occurring in the life of the country in the 1990-s have also resulted in transformational changes in the family life of a significant number of Russians. According to VTsIOM studies, the following key features in demography and family relations have become characteristic of post-Soviet Russia: 1) the spread of premarital relations, including long-lasting and even replacing family relationships, against the background of a general decline in the number of marriages and an increase in the number of cohabitations; 2) increase in extramarital births; 3) raising the age of marriage and the age of childbirth; 4) decrease in the age of sexual intercourse, not accompanied by childbirth, a decrease in the birth rate at an early age; 5) an increase in the time elapsed between marriage and the birth of children, between the birth of the first and subsequent children; 6) separating sexual relations from the functions of reproduction due to the widespread use of contraception and the “sexual revolution” in post-Soviet Russia. These transformational changes in family and sexual relations among Russians, especially when combined with economic problems, also had a corresponding effect on the overall decline in the birth rate. At the same time, the state, especially in the first half of the 1990s, practically defiantly distanced itself from the real solution of socio-demographic problems. The course was taken on the privacy of family and sexual relations of Russians.
The second post-Soviet period. The need for change
At the same time, the state could not completely abandon the management of socio-demographic processes even in the “dashing nineties”; at least it was necessary to create the appearance of the existence of a developed family policy of the Russian state. In 1996, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin "On the main directions of state family policy." Its essence was reduced to the positioning of family policy as an integral part of the social policy of the Russian Federation, the introduction of international norms in relation to women and children to the Russian family policy. At the same time, the situation in the country at that time already required the adoption of emergency resuscitation measures. So, in 1992, mortality for the first time exceeded the birth rate. This was a direct consequence of the social and economic policy pursued by the Russian leadership in the first half of the 1990s. and which led to catastrophic consequences for all spheres of life of the Russian society. It is clear that without a change in the fundamentals of the country's economic and even political course, no major changes in the sphere of family and demographic policy were out of the question. But family policy was not among the priorities of either the state or political parties, since the programs of the family and demography occupied a very small place, and the proposed methods for solving existing problems were declarative and even frankly demagogic. The presidential decree itself emphasized that at the federal level, families are provided with minimal social guarantees and benefits, and support is provided only to needy families in order to take them out of crisis. However, the real measures of social support even for low-income families were never taken - the state did not seek to burden the budget with serious expenses for supporting Russian families, so the latter were forced to survive, relying in fact only on their own strength. Meanwhile, in conditions of constant inflation, mass unemployment, chronic non-payment of wages, the task of the survival of Russian families became increasingly difficult. It was in 1990-s. Children's homelessness and neglect, social orphanhood, drunkenness, drug addiction and substance abuse among children and adolescents, child and adolescent prostitution have reached their peak. Responsibility for these negative phenomena, which also caused significant damage to Russian society, lies wholly and completely with the then Russian leadership, who in fact refused to organize family policy and set the situation in the most important sphere of society’s activity to take its course. By the end of 1990-x - the beginning of 2000-x. The government gradually realized the need to develop special measures to support Russian families, as social problems in the country became more and more terrifying.
Hopes for changing priorities in the family policy of the state appeared at the beginning of the 2000's. and were associated with the coming to power in the country of the new President - V.V. Putin's With the name of Putin - the young and energetic head of state - the majority of Russians connected the pressing political and socio-economic transformations, saw him as a leader capable of “raising Russia”. Actually, in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy of the Russian state in the years of Putin's rule, changes really came, indicating the strengthening of both the vertical of power and the country's position abroad. Already in the first year of the presidency, in 2000, Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation outlined the strategic line of the state in the field of social policy: “we will conduct social policy on the principles of general accessibility and acceptable quality of basic social benefits. And help to provide first of all to those whose incomes are significantly below the subsistence minimum. Children of ministers can do without child allowance, and bankers' wives can do without unemployment benefits. ” This thesis was positively perceived by the Russian society, since, as it seemed, it established true justice in the field of state social support for Russian families. However, in practice, its implementation has rather led to negative consequences for the majority of Russian families. So, 30 of May 2001 was passed a law introducing the right to a monthly allowance for a child up to 18 years only for families whose per capita income does not exceed 100% of the subsistence minimum. Meanwhile, prior to the entry into force of this law, a monthly allowance for each child up to 18 years was paid to all Russian families with children. Now families with very low incomes are eligible for benefits, especially if one considers that very small amounts have always been considered as the subsistence minimum in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, a large number of Russians, to whom child benefits would not hurt, despite the fact that their incomes were slightly higher than the subsistence minimum, turned out to be without government support. It turns out that the liberal policy in the social sphere in the early 2000-ies. continued and the state began to spend even less money to support Russian families.
Modern period. There are real improvements, but much needs to be done.
The situation changed in 2006, when there were obvious positive changes in the country's economy, the possibilities of the state budget increased and, at the same time, the political course of the Russian state underwent a significant adjustment. Russia began to look for its national idea; for the first time in many years after the collapse of the USSR, the course was taken to strengthen identity, to gain serious positions in world politics. The solution of these tasks required the improvement of the social, demographic, family policy of the Russian state. The decline in the birth rate in the country and a decrease in the population by the 2000-s. reached such proportions that they became the subject of special attention of the Russian authorities. It became clear that with further preservation of the current situation, its security and just survival would be under the gravest threat. Especially since the beginning of 2000's. the Russian leadership had not only the desire, but also the financial capacity to adjust the state policy in the management of socio-demographic processes, including family policy. It became obvious that without taking measures to financially support Russian families there would be no serious demographic improvements in the country. After all, the real prevention of further catastrophic decline in the population of the country was possible only in case of a gradual refusal of Russian families from small families, which became characteristic of them in the 1990-s. Due to economic difficulties, Russian women were afraid to give birth to two or more children, so the only way to stimulate the increase in the birth rate was to reorganize government policies to support families, primarily families with children. The following positive measures were introduced: 1) increased child care benefits up to one and a half years; 2) introduced benefits for working women for pregnancy and childbirth, as well as child care in the amount of not less than 40% of previous earnings; 3) introduced compensation for the costs of preschool education of children; 4) increased the cost of birth certificates; 5) introduced maternity capital - the material payment is quite large by Russian standards, the amount of money at the birth of the second child (the payment is made by issuing a certificate that can be used to improve the living conditions of the family, get children education and form the funded part of the mother's pension.
Maternal capital has become one of the most effective forms of material support for Russian families, aimed specifically at the birth of a second child. After all, many Russian families have postponed the birth of a child because of the constraints in housing conditions, and the payment of maternity capital allows you to improve housing conditions by buying more housing or, if we are talking about rural areas, buying even whole housing for maternity capital. The significance of maternity capital in ensuring an increase in the birth rate in the Russian Federation after 2006 is obvious. Many Russian families decided on the birth of a second and third child, counting on this measure of state support, which did not know analogues in the national history of the last decades. It turned out that it is precisely economic measures that are the most effective incentives for the growth of the birth rate in modern Russian society. Moreover, with their introduction, the state has demonstrated the importance for him of having children in families, and at least two to three children. Economic support for fertility has become the main form of support for Russian families at the present stage of the existence of the Russian state. Indeed, with its help, colossal shifts in the demographic sphere of the Russian Federation were achieved.
However, despite the obvious effectiveness of state policy in the field of support of the birth rate, there are a number of issues that remain relevant for modern Russia, and on the solution of which further growth in the birth rate and improvement of the quality of life of Russian families depend. First of all, it is a question of using the funds of the maternity capital only after the child reaches the age of three years. Until the child’s three years old, maternity capital can be used only to pay off a mortgage and a housing loan or loan, more recently, and to make a down payment on a mortgage. It turns out that families who are able to purchase housing, bypassing the mortgage, but need the means of maternity capital, have to wait three years (during this time, in any Russian large city an amount approximately the same as the entire maternity capital will be spent on renting an apartment) take a mortgage, overpaying for it. That is, the measure with the payment of maternity capital after the age of three is aimed more at supporting the domestic system of mortgage lending and the primary housing market than at meeting the needs of families with children. Of course, some experts explain this measure by the need to cut off maternal capital from unscrupulous parents - representatives of marginal layers who can give birth to a child only for the purpose of using maternal capital, and then abandon it. Growing up a child under three years old is evidence of the good faith of parents. However, with proper control over the expenditure of funds of the parent capital, its unfair use can be prevented. And for families with children, three years of waiting become very difficult and long, especially since the first three years, until the child goes to kindergarten and the mother is on parental leave, are the most difficult materially and psychologically for the family . As a rule, one father is actually supporting the family during these three years, renting a home creates additional colossal expenses for the average Russian family, and further living on a narrow living space creates psychological discomfort and causes intra-family conflicts.
Another important issue is the lack of state support for mothers between one and a half and three years. As is known, in most cases, children in kindergartens accept children on reaching three years old, respectively, mothers of children under this age must look after children and cannot go to work. But childcare benefits are no longer paid after one and a half years. It turns out that the mother does not receive benefits for a year and a half, but is also deprived of the opportunity to go to work. The nursery system in the country was completely collapsed, and now their number even in large cities is minimal, and it is problematic to settle in them because of the presence of large queues. It is also puzzling the lack of adequate state support for mothers of many children. Mothers with three or more children practically focus on raising and maintaining offspring. Accordingly, they do not work for a long time, lose their professional skills, but at the same time do not receive proper benefits from the state. These benefits could include the payment of the actual wages of mothers with many children who have more than three (or four) children. After all, one father in families of middle and low incomes cannot provide a decent maintenance for a family of six or seven people. Therefore, the appropriate solution to this issue is the introduction of a special allowance for mothers with many children, increasing depending on the number of children and paid before the last child reaches the age of 18 (23). Of course, the guarantee of the payment of this allowance must be the “sociality” of the family, that is, in case of deprivation of parental rights, other problems, the range of which is not so difficult to determine, the payment of the allowance must be suspended. In addition, mothers with many children should take care of the general work experience, regardless of whether they were employed before the birth of their first child or between the birth of their children.
"Paternity crisis" - the main gap in family policy?
A very important aspect of modern family policy in the Russian Federation is its “feminocentrism”. The role of the father in the family and the upbringing of children in Russia has been downgraded since Soviet times, which is a sad testimony to the crisis of the traditional family. A significant part of modern families consist of only one parent and a child (children), while in the vast majority of cases this parent is the mother. There may also be one or more relatives on the mother's side, usually a grandmother, less often also a grandfather and less close relatives. Without going into discussions about the influence of such a family model on the upbringing of the younger generations and the transmission of certain values of sexual behavior, it should be noted that belittling the role of the father in family policy is a dangerous and unfair trend. In modern Russian family policy, even at the level of terminology, the word "father" is either used in a tertiary sense, or not used at all. A typical example is maternity capital, with the receipt of which the father may have certain problems. The same applies to childcare benefits, the concept of "father of many children" does not exist, although there are fathers who alone raise three or more children. The "imprisonment" of the country's family policy exclusively for the mother and ensuring her rights actually undermines the foundations of the family as a social institution, since it convinces the mother of the opportunity to live and raise children without a father. As a result, the slightest intra-family conflicts lead to divorces, families break up, and wrong models of raising children are formed. Therefore, in order to truly modernize family policy in the country, to bring it to a state that really meets the needs of strengthening demography and the security of the Russian state, it is necessary to make family policy aimed not only at supporting mothers and children, but at supporting the family as a social institution. The implementation of this task can be started even at the level of symbols - with the renaming of maternity capital into family capital, the introduction of the concept of "father of many children", the active popularization of the family and family relations in the media, cinema, fiction, music.
The state must seek for this both strength and means, for a strong family is one of the main bases for the well-being and survival of society. The priest of the Russian Orthodox Church, Father Dmitry Berezin, believes that “the most important cause of the family crisis is the crisis of paternity, because the existence of abortions and single-parent families is mostly the fault of the man. When a father leaves a particular family, it is the pain, above all, of his children. Internet is all the same. There brutal macho think about something else. We also thought about something else. The fact that in our information space there was a lack of positive vivid examples of men as fathers, heads of families responsible for the family. And then we decided that it was necessary to popularize the image of a strong family, find examples, share experiences, unite ”(Quoted from: Father Dmitry Berezin: The most important cause of a family crisis is a paternity crisis // Russian Line. Orthodox news agency. // http: / /rusk.ru/). In a certain sense, it is difficult to disagree with Father Dmitry Berezin, but he somewhat exaggerates the dependence of divorces and abortions in Russia on men. The specificity of family and sexual relations in modern Russia is such that a man no longer plays virtually any role in controlling the reproductive behavior of a woman. The consent of a man, even an official husband, is not required for either abortion or childbirth; in the case of divorces, children in the vast majority of cases remain with the mother, regardless of the level of the material welfare of the father, his social activity, education, and human qualities. Most divorces occur at the initiative of women, which is also a consequence of the one-sided orientation of state family and social policies.
The cult of a large family and the development of social infrastructure
The next important point in the further improvement of the family policy and its direction towards ensuring the growth of the country's population is the transition to the model of a three-child family. It is the three-child family that ensures the real reproduction of the population, should become a priority for the state, and the support of the three-child family should be more significant. At present, the maternity capital is paid only for the birth of the second child, and at the birth of the third child, the family either does not receive anything, or receives from the regional authorities local maternity capital in a much smaller amount (and most often, it is paid only to low-income families) or the plot land for building a house (again - most often cheap, without communications). Meanwhile, the fair family policy of the state should include additional incentives for three-child families, and these incentives should be even more significant than those for two-child families. As suggested above, we can talk about the payment of wages to mothers or fathers in three-child families, or the payment of maternity capital, only on a larger scale than at the birth of the second child. Russian citizens should understand that childbearing is honored and respected in society, and the state is focused on supporting child families, and having a detailed family, one can even materially receive certain preferences that childless citizens are deprived of. Support for children’s families, including material ones, is an important task of state policy, including in the area of national security, so the statements that parenting should only be the responsibility of parents are characterized by a complete lack of understanding of objective Russian reality. In modern society, mass large families are possible only with real economic and cultural support from the state.
In addition to material incentives for children’s families, the most important task of the state in ensuring demographic growth should be the development of the infrastructure of education and upbringing, health care, and the promotion of youth and children's organizations. First of all, it is necessary to create such a number of pre-school educational institutions (creches and kindergartens), which will cover the existing lack of places. This is also due to the peculiarities of the current socio-demographic situation. If in a traditional society, older relatives, grandparents, could be engaged in raising children, in modern society, parents of young families who are at the age of 45-60 are often still working themselves and do not have the opportunity to raise grandchildren. On the other hand, the economic situation is such that most middle-income and low-income families need both husband and wife to work, since it’s very difficult, if not impossible, for one person to have a family with two and, moreover, three children. Secondly, here too the family policy is in contact with the policy in the field of education, it is necessary to ensure the availability of high-quality and free secondary and higher education. Unfortunately, the processes occurring in this area do not allow us to talk about positive prospects in this direction. In the Russian Federation, the number of higher vocational educational institutions, including branches, is declining, most of which are located in small towns and are often the only higher educational institutions in these localities. Meanwhile, reducing the number of universities, especially when combined with the lack of real work to create new institutions of secondary vocational education - technical schools, colleges that could replace closed universities, contributes to the emergence in Russian families of concerns about the future of their children, including those planned. After all, no normal parent would not want his child to not get an education and lead a life of a marginal or unemployed. The work of teachers and teachers is very low, which makes the once honorable work of educators in low-prestigious work, which the most promising and talented specialists refuse. Of course, the low level of remuneration of teachers and teaching staff also affects the decline in the quality of education in the Russian higher and secondary schools, entails its further commercialization, accompanied by a decrease in the availability of education for the broad masses of the population.
According to Ekaterina Dobrenkova, the Vice-Rector of the International Academy of Business and Management, a decline in the birth rate in the event of a reduction in the number of universities and the increasing complexity of access to education will in one way or another occur, primarily in families of intellectuals, scientific and technical workers who are focused children quality vocational education. Accordingly, if the state is really focused on solving the social and demographic problems facing Russia, then it should reconsider and adjust its educational policy, while maintaining free and accessible higher and secondary vocational education. Accordingly, adequate attention should be paid to solving the problems of material, financial, organizational, personnel, information support of the national education system, preservation of national educational traditions with simultaneous improvement of the quality of education, its competitiveness and attractiveness for applicants. Otherwise, the most talented part of the Russian students, as well as the most competent and promising teachers, will continue to go abroad, where the conditions of study and work in higher educational institutions seem to be more worthy than in our country. Naturally, the process of “brain drain” will affect all aspects of society, including the future state of the sphere of education and upbringing.
Prospects have only a "giving birth" nation
Gradually, we move from the key components that form the basis of an effective Russian state policy in the family sphere to a paradigm that should determine the very direction of the ongoing transformations. Despite the extreme importance of the economic component in ensuring family policy, we should not forget about the socio-cultural side, first of all - about the features of the value-ideological sphere of Russian society that are inherent in the modern stage of its existence. One of the most important reasons for the destruction of family values in modern Russia is the rapid spread of individualistic and consumer values that were originally alien to the traditional values of the peoples of Russia, and almost all the peoples of the world as a whole.
Modern civilization, the economic basis of which is capitalism and the political expression is neoliberalism, asserts individualism as the main value, which implies a gradual growth of hostility and distrust of the forms of collective existence and collective responsibility, including the institution of the family. The values of personal success and consumerism are incompatible with the creation of a family, which requires a certain sacrifice, the abandonment of the usual comfort, the redistribution of funds, and self-restraint. In recent years, the Childe Fries movement, which is “free from children,” which promotes a childless lifestyle, has gained popularity. The absence of children is presented by representatives of this movement as an absolute dignity and even an advantage, and the movement does not hide the abandonment of children precisely for selfish reasons. On the other hand, one should not forget about the so-called. The “LGBT community”, which also makes a definite contribution to changing the perception of modern society about the family and relations between the sexes. The Western world is already reaping the fruits of the crisis and the collapse of family relations, in effect destroying itself. Cities of Europe are filled with migrants from Asia and Africa - more vital, tough, but prone to traditional forms of hostel. Individualists - Europeans are powerless in front of them - precisely because of the destruction of collectivist values, especially against the background of the relevant policies of European left-liberal governments, stimulating on the one hand the further destruction of the family, and on the other hand - migration from the third world countries.
Such a development model may well wait for Russia - if the government is not able to work out a worthy development paradigm for the Russian civilization that can adequately respond to the many challenges and risks our country faces in the modern world. In the elaboration of this paradigm, pseudo-patriotic rhetoric will not pass, which only distracts the attention of the population of the country, but in fact serves as a “screen” of its decomposition and destruction. The Russian challenge should be modern and, at the same time, “soil”, giving innovative content to traditional Russian values. In the area of socio-demographic policy, it is to prevent the spread of individualistic and consumer values alien to Russian society, to affirm positive values and models of family relations, economic and social support for the family, and to improve the quality of education and upbringing of the younger generations of Russians. Of course, this will require enormous resource costs on the part of the state, but in the event of refusal to implement this action program, Russian society will sooner or later be doomed not only to aggravate crisis tendencies, but also to physical extinction.
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